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ABSTRACT 
 
 The WTO dispute settlement system recognizes trade retaliation under Article 22 (2) of 
DSU to induce scofflaw party of WTO dispute to comply with the DSB Decision.  However, 
trade retaliation under the DSU rules lacks any duty to mitigate the economic or social 
consequences to private economic actors who conduct their economic activities under the WTO 
Agreements. Many of these actors will be innocent of any responsibility for the WTO violation 
that underlies the case. Banana case (EU v. US) and FSC/ETI case (US v. EU) were example of 
WTO cases from where these actors bear the cost of trade damage caused by the retaliation. 
Trade damage that is borne by these actors substantially infringed their rights to gain benefits 
under the WTO Agreement. They therefore seek the possibility to obtain compensation by 
recourse to national litigations. State liability principle may be viewed as a feasible principle to 
ensure these actors to obtain redress when their rights are infringed by the disobedience of their 
governments to WTO rules. Hence, the national judicial body is obliged to perform the function 
of state liability to rectify and to compensate the damage accruing to these actors. This research 
is pertinent to seek the answer to what extent is state liability accomplished when the private 
economic actors are badly affected by the WTO retaliation. However the lack of direct-effect to 
WTO Law and DSB Decision prevent these actors to obtain compensation for trade damage 
caused to them. To this end, this research also seek alternative solution to induce national 
litigation to determine a sole concern on infringement of individual right in order to imply state 
liability principle  
1 
 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Background 
World Trade Organization (hereinafter the WTO) dispute settlement system through 
Panel and Appellate Body, allows sanctions to be imposed when a member is unwilling to 
bring a WTO-inconsistent trade measure into conformity.  According to the Article 22 (2) of 
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (hereinafter 
DSU), if in a certain case WTO Panel finds a party has failed to make new rules in 
compliance with the WTO obligations, the injured party is entitled to obtain retaliation. 
However, WTO retaliation is causing several implications specific to private economic actors 
against whom retaliation is instituted.  Such economic actors are the main trade player under 
the WTO rules but have a vulnerable position in case of retaliation. 
This research investigates the implications of WTO retaliation to private economic 
actors and to what extent state liability is relevant and accomplished.  The question of state 
liability in this respect relates to the issue of compensation for damage caused to the private 
economic actors by the relation as a consequence of the decision not to comply with the 
dispute settlement ruling of the non-ability to comply with such ruling. 
2. The Main Thrust of the Research 
The principles and procedures are foreseen in the Article 22 (3) DSU underlines that 
the injured party who wins the dispute may suspend its concession in the same commercial 
sector, which is involved in the dispute.  However, if it turns out to be impossible or 
ineffective, the country wishing to retaliate may seek from the Dispute Settlement Body 
(hereinafter DSB) authorization to suspend its concession in other industrial sectors covered 
by the same agreement.  If this measure, still, is considered of little or no effect, the country 
will be able to request the suspension of its obligations covered by another agreement (cross 
retaliation).   
 According to Article 3 (7), 21 (6), and 22 (1) DSU, retaliation is only a temporary 
measure that falls short of resolving the dispute.  The DSU clearly stipulates in Article 19 that 
the preferred remedy is for the non-compliant party to bring its measure into conformity with 
the relevant covered agreement.  Hence, retaliation should be withdrawn once the non- 
compliant party brings its measure into conformity with WTO rules.  From this point of view, 
2 
 
the retaliation serves to induce compliance1 and should only be in place until such time.2  
Imposing retaliation can be immediately after DSB authorize the injured party to impose 
suspension concession or other obligation under covered agreement.  An important procedural 
dispute arose in the Banana Case between the European Union (since the research is 
conducted after Lisbon Treaty, the research uses terms European Union (EU)unless it is 
inherently to the title of case and literatures) and the United Statesof America (hereinafter the 
U.S.) over the relative primacy and sequencing of compliance.  The United States wished to 
retaliate immediately while the EU argued that this could only be done if its new trade 
measures for bananas were found not to comply with the WTO rules.3 
 Once injured party requests authorization from the DSB to suspend the application of 
concession or other obligations under covered agreement, or to impose retaliation, it must set 
out a specific level of suspension.  The level of suspension must equivalent to the nullification 
and impairment that caused by the WTO inconsistent measure.  In addition, the request must 
specify the sectors and the agreements under which concession or other obligations would be 
suspended.4  Although the DSU does not explicitly require that members must include a list of 
potential target products with their request to impose retaliation, but in EC-Hormones case, 
the Arbitrators stated that, “the U.S. as the party that seek to suspend concession has to 
identify the products subject to suspension in a way that allowed us to attribute annual tariff 
proposed, namely a 100% tariff.”  Arbitrators emphasized that once this is done, the U.S. is 
free to pick any products from the list (not outside the list) that equals a total trade value but it 
does not exceed the amount of trade impairment.5Nothing in the provisions in the DSU 
provides the requirement of a list of products subject to countermeasures or retaliation, 
therefore the injured party is free to set any products on the list and pick them freely.  Since 
                                                          
1European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas), 
Decision of the Arbitration,April 9, 1999, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/ARB, para. 6.3.  Arbitrators stated that “we 
agree with the United States that this temporary nature (of countermeasures) indicates that is the purpose of 
countermeasures to induce compliance” 
 
2The Article 22(8) DSU provides “the suspension of concession or other obligations shall be temporary and shall 
only be applied until “such time” as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been 
removed...” 
 
3European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas), 
Recourse by the United States to Article 22 (2), WT/DS27/43, 14 January 1999. 
 
4The Article 22(4)DSU.  See also European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones) – Original Complaint by the United States – Recourse to Arbitration by the European 
Communities under Article 22 (6) of the DSU, WT/DS26/ARB, 12 July 1999. 
 
5Ibid 
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the injured party uses lists for practical reason, the itemization of potential target products 
serves to notify elements of the private sector in the territory of non-compliant member. 
WTO retaliation in general is utilized to prevent continued losses for injured party in 
the future.  However, this can be costly to the non-compliant party, and unfortunately the 
economic impact of the WTO retaliation will depend on the size of the economies involved, 
the degree of bilateral trade between the two nations and the composition of this trade and its 
relative importance.  The impact will also depend on the ability of the industries targeted to 
adjust to the punitive tariffs, or to find alternative markets for the goods that subject to 
retaliation.  This situation might be workable for the world trade major player or developed 
country.  Conversely, the economic impact of WTO retaliation would probably different when 
a small economic country which is dependent on the defendant country as the only possible 
source of its exports.   
  WTO retaliation implies unfortunate condition to trade player within the disputant 
countries.  In Banana Case, DSB determined that the EU import regime for bananas violated 
WTO non-discrimination principle.6 In 1999, DSB authorized the U.S. to suspend tariff 
concessions up to US$ 191.4 million per year on imports of EUproducts in attributable to 
non-compliance of EU to Panel and Appellate rulings and recommendation.7 The U.S. levied 
100% ad valorem customs duties on imports of various EU – origin goods, such as batteries, 
bed linen, paper boxes, spectacles cases and bath products.8This prohibitive tariff is 
consequently damaging trade benefits of certain EU exporters.  These EU exporters – none of 
whom were involved in bananas – finally sued the Council of the EU (hereinafter the 
Council)andthe European Commission (hereinafter the Commission) in damages.9 
 The WTO retaliation seems unfair for industries that affected by this countermeasure.  
In Brazil Aircraft case, some domestic industries such as industries of iron products, 
agricultural products, textiles and low technology products are affected industries if Canada 
imposed a 100% punitive tariff.  Brazil should be able to clear these products through other 
international markets, in the light of the relatively limited quantities sold into Canada.  As a 
                                                          
6European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas Complaint by the 
United States, WT/DS27/AB/R, Panel report as modified by Appellate in WT/DS27/R/USA. 
 
7European Community – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas; Recourse by the United 
States to Article 22 (2) of DSU, WT/DS/27/43, 14 January 1999. 
 
8Ibid  
 
9Joined Cases C--120/06 P and 121/06 P, FabbricaItalianaAccumulatoriMotocarriMontecchioSpA (FIAMM) 
and Others v. Council and Commission and Giorgio Fedon&FigliSpA and Others v. Council and 
Commission [2008] ECR I--6513 (hereinafter: Joined case FIAMM and Fedon). 
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result, a punitive duty of 100% can be expected to shut off trade in the majority of products 
imported from Brazil.  
 The main purpose of Article 22 DSU is promoting compliance by the non-compliance 
party.  The purpose is also not to punish nor coerce the country at fault, but rather to enable 
the injured party to recover by re-levelling its trade.  However, under the DSU rules, the 
government is using a suspension of concession or other obligation (retaliation) lacks any 
duty to mitigate the economic or social consequences to private economic actors.  Many of 
these actors will be innocent of any responsibility for the WTO violation that underlies the 
case. In the case of EC – Bananas III10, Ecuador intent to impose cross retaliation under 
Trade-Related aspect on Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter TRIPs) that can generally be 
expected to have a significant impact on key industries and thereby provide a strong incentive 
to industrialized countries to comply with WTO rulings.   However, after negotiation with 
EU, Ecuador opted not to implement its authority to cross retaliation, since the EU has given 
attention on Ecuador’s demands in regard with quota of banana import. 
 One question may arise relating to the implementation of WTO retaliation is who are 
the most affected parties by the adoption of retaliation measure? Alemmano mentioned that 
private economic actors are the most affected party.  They are actors participating in the 
global market.  The actors can be natural persons, business corporations, partnerships or 
labour union.  They operate as producers, consumers, exporters or importers.  Alemmano 
distinguished between two categories of private economic actors.  Firstly, private companies 
in the winning countries whose exports continue not to receive the benefits that are normally 
entitled to, and secondly, companies in the losing countries that are affected by the retaliation 
or cross retaliation.11  Unfortunately, although these private economic actors are the most 
affected parties by WTO countermeasure, WTO rules do not provide rights directly to them 
nor a direct access to the dispute settlement mechanism. 
 WTO rules do not provide direct rights and obligations to the private economic actors.  
The rights and obligations of private economic actors are substantively given by the 
government of the WTO Members.  When a WTO Member is dealing with WTO rules for 
instance TRIPs, the government should give rights to individual who is holding exclusive 
                                                          
10European Community – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas; Recourse by the 
Ecuador to Article 22 (2) of DSU, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU. 
 
11Alemmano, Alberto, (2008), ‘Private Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement System, Who Bears the Costs of 
Non –Compliance and Why Private Parties Should Not Bear Them’, in Essays on the Future of the World 
Trade Organization; Vol. II The WTO Judicial System: Contributions and Challenges, ed. Chaisse, Julien, 
and Balmelli, Tiziano, Editions InteruniversitairesSuisses – Geneva/Switzerland,  pp. 37. 
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property rights such as copyrights, patents, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial 
designs and undisclosed information.12 General Agreement on Trade in Services (hereinafter 
GATS) applies the Most – Favoured-Nations (MFN) and National Treatment principles to 
economic actors, namely “services suppliers”.13  These principles also apply to products that 
exported and imported among WTO Members pursuant to General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariff (hereinafter GATT) rules.14  The substantive rights apply directly from national law of 
WTO Members to the private economic actors in the context of implementation of TRIPs, 
GATS and GATT.   When a dispute arises and a non- compliance party ignores the DSB 
recommendations and rulings, then the injured party intent to impose countermeasure, private 
economic actors may run risk of not being protected by a system that on the one hand make 
them bear all the costs of the countermeasures. It is clear that WTO retaliation likely to 
influence the private economic actors. Private economic actors are powerless to bear trade 
damage caused by the WTO retaliation in consequence of non-compliance of their 
governments to WTO rules.  State should therefore endorse a feasible system to ensure its 
citizen to obtain redress when their rights are infringed by the disobedience of its government 
to WTO rules.  State liability may be viewed as an important remedy for private economic 
actors whose seek compensation.  However countries seem implementing state liability 
principle differently. 
1) Non-contractual Liability in the European Union 
 The state liability principle in EU is divided into liability of State Member which is 
underpinning of Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy case15, and liability of EU Institutions under 
Article 340 (2) of Treaty Functioning of European Union (hereinafter TFEU). This principle 
lays down the basic argument that Member State or EU Institutions should be required to pay 
a private litigant for losses caused by the violation of EU Law.  For the explanation of Article 
340 (2) of TFEU, EU however, seeks to address the situation where an EU Institution has 
caused an individual to suffer loss through the exercise of its general legislative or 
                                                          
12Agreement on Trade – related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter GATS), Article 41, (1995) in 
The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Cambridge University Press – 
Cambridge/UK, pp.20 
13Zdouc, Werner, (February,1999), ‘WTO Settlement Practice Relating to the GATS’, Journal of International 
Economic Law, Vol. 2, pp. 295.   
 
14General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Articles I and III, The WTO Legal Text, (1995), The Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Cambridge University Press- Cambridge/UK. 
 
15Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Andrea Francovich and DanilaBonifaci and others v Italian Republic 
(hereinafter Francovich Case), (1991), ECR at I-5371 
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administrative function.  Nevertheless, due to adjudication proceeding, the court proceeded to 
outline three conditions for the availability of this right to damages for the implement a 
directive. 1) The results prescribed by the EU rules of laws entail the grant of rights to 
individual.  2) The breach is sufficiently serious; and 3) there is a causal link between the 
breach and the damage suffered by the claimants.16 
 In 2000, when several EU companies brought proceedings before EU Courts in order 
to claim compensation for damages allegedly caused by the increased retaliatory duties in 
their export that imposed by the U.S.17, the European Court of Justice (hereinafter ECJ) 
dismissed the compensation claims in its judgments.18  The ECJ judgment was denying direct 
effect19 to the WTO Agreement and to DSB ruling and recommendations; it was also rejecting 
the applicant’s main claim for compensation by refusing to identify an “unlawful act”.  
According to the judgment, the plaintiffs could not show that the loss and damage was 
identifying as unlawful act.   
2) Political Accountability in the United States of America 
 In contrary to EU, theUnited States generally possess state sovereign immunity from 
private damage claims for violation of federal law.  Nevertheless, this state sovereign 
immunity principle is subject to a number of qualifications.  Congress enjoys some authorities 
to waive the state sovereign immunity doctrine such in the course of passing generally 
applicable rules to regulate the commercial life of the nation.  It ordinarily may not overcome 
state immunity as to render states liable to private individuals. In addition the Constitution 
                                                          
16Ibid, Paragraph 40 
 
17The DSB adopted both Appellate Body report of 9 September (WT/DS27/AB/R) and the Panel Report, as 
modified by the AB of May 1997 (WT/DS27/R/USA).  The US obtained authorization from DSB to suspend 
tariff concessions and related GATT obligations with respect to imports from EU up to US$ 191,4 million 
per year (WT/DS/27/49, 9 April 1999, WT/DSB/M/59, 3 June 1999). 
 
18  Joined Cases FIAMM &Fedon, Supra Note 9.  The claim is brought pursuant to Articles 225, 235 EU confer 
jurisdiction on the GC, and according to Art. 288(2) EC (Article 340 TFEU), “the community (EU) shall, in 
accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, take good any damage 
caused by its institutions in the performance of its duties.  See also Partiécologiste ‘les verts’ v. European 
Parliament, case 294/83, 23 April 1986. Available at: (http://www.ena.lu/) last visited 16 September 2009.  
 
19Direct effect is a principle of EU law that is applied to those aspects of EU Law.  Direct effect is enforceable 
directly by EU citizens in their own Member state, regardless of whether the Member State has introduced 
specific national laws to implement the provisions.   It can apply in relation to EU regulations, directives, 
Treaty provisions and decisions. The term ‘direct effect’ was first used by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) when it attributed to specific Treaty articles the legal quality of ‘direct effect’ in the case of NV 
AlgemeneTransportenExpeditieOnderneming van Gend en Loos v. NederlandseAdministratie der 
Belastingen, Case 26/62 [1963].  Available at: 
(http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/directeffect.htm), last visited 
June 4, 2009 at 16:43 pm. 
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authorizes congress to approach rules of liability that run directly as state.20  In the case of 
implications of WTO retaliation to several U.S. private economic actors, since the Uruguay 
Round Agreement Act (hereinafter URAA) do not recognize direct effect of WTO Law in the 
U.S, thus the political repercussion could be more significant.  The U.S. Legislative Bodies 
apply its accountability by passing a package of subsidies in response to EU trade sanction 
that is initially imposed in 2004.  The subsidies package – the Jumpstart Our Business 
Strength (JOBS) Act - as legislative remedy been provided to overcome the loss of trade 
several U.S. private companies due to punitive tariff that is imposed by EU.  The JOBS Act 
momentum traces back to the retaliatory measures that is imposed by EU pursuant to DSB 
ruling and recommendation of the FSC – ETI Case.21 
 
3. The Inquiry ofthe Research 
 The characteristic of recommendation and rulings from the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body is the illegal measures conducted by a WTO member must be aligned on WTO rules.  In 
case this does not succeed, the injured member can even resort to retaliation.  It is possibly 
even involving industries that have little to do with those involved in the initial dispute.  
Moreover, the various consequences on the implementation of the WTO retaliation will 
associate with the trade damaging to private economic actors.  This issue above entails three 
parallel questions to investigate.  First, the research investigates how the implications of WTO 
retaliation for private economic actors within the country that is retaliated?  Second, to what 
extent state liability is accomplished in order to compensate trade damage caused by WTO 
retaliation? Third, the research seeks into the possibility of legal solution for the implication 
of WTO retaliation. 
4. The Objective of the Research 
Those three parallel questions will accomplish the objective of the research that 
divides into two. The first, the research focuses on whether there are implications of the WTO 
retaliation to private economic actors within the countries whom the retaliation is instituted.  
It mainly to attest that WTO retaliation is not only a procedure of rebalancing trade 
                                                          
20   See US Constitution Amendment 14 § 5 (providing for Congress to enforce the amendment through 
“appropriate legislation”). 
 
21The Dispute Settlement Body adopted the Appellate Body report on United States - Tax Treatment for 
"Foreign Sales Corporations": Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the EU 
(WT/DS108/AB/RW2) and the Panel report (WT/DS108/RW2), as upheld by the Appellate Body report. 
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concessions between Members to the dispute, but also a concept causally related to the 
incidence of morally significant harm, because it may directly affect to people from the 
country that loses case.  Since private economic actors are the main trade player of the WTO 
rules, so that the WTO trade sanction could directly affect them.  This research is an effort to 
develop different outlook regarding the evaluation of WTO retaliation.   
The second, the researchfocuses on the responsibility of countries to rebalance the 
trade damage of theirs private economic actors caused by WTO retaliation.  State liability 
principle may be viewed as an important remedy for private economic actors whose seek 
compensation.  Nevertheless, due to legal system lays down in national constitution, state 
liability principle seems unyielding to conduct.  
 
5. Methodology of the Research 
 The method used for the research relies on descriptive analytical approach. The first 
step is collecting primary resources involve International Law, U.S. Law and regulations, EU 
law and regulations, WTO Rules, International Agreements, Court Decisions and Customary 
International law relates to application of International Economic Law.  The secondary 
resources involve the books, notices, and explanations of the laws, communications, 
documents, Articles, case‐reports, news, historical records and court observation.  Second step 
is mainly analysing data to discover the consequence of the implementation of WTO 
retaliation and its impact on the private economic actors within the countries which is 
retaliated.  Case study is necessary in this step to reveal the consistency between the 
implementation of WTO retaliation to private economic actors and the effort of their 
governments to overcome the impact by implying state liability principle. 
 There are three variables correlateto each other in this research.First is the WTO trade 
retaliation, second is the private economic actor, and third is state liability principle.  The 
correlation between first and second variable is the premise that trade retaliation is harmful 
for private economic actors, thus, it is necessary to prove the premise by elaborating the 
implication of WTO retaliation to private economic actors. Because of the premise that the 
implication of WTO retaliation is harmful to private economic actors, thus, it is necessary to 
analyse third variable, whether state liability is accomplished in order to give compensation of 
trade damage caused by the trade retaliation.   
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6. Structure of the Research 
The structure of the research is divided into six chapters. 
Chapter I: Trade Retaliation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
 There are essentially six phases in the WTO dispute settlement process, namely: 
consultation, the panel process, the appellate process, the recommendation and rulings, 
arbitration and surveillance of implementation.  The surveillance of implementation basically 
is the final phase of the WTO dispute settlement process.  Unless the loss party fails to 
implement the recommendations and rulings of DSB within the reasonable period of time, the 
injury party may recourse under Article 22(2) of DSU.  In this chapter, the predominant issue 
is the implementation of Article 22(2) DSU which unquestionably have correlation with all 
aspects of the research.  Theoretical analysis is needed in this chapter to describe the trade 
retaliation.  
 
Chapter II: Private Economic Actors in the WTO 
 This chapter is dealing with explanation regarding the concept of private economic 
actors as the main player of international trade under the WTO rules. These players embark 
on across border trading since centuries ago under the auspices of their national trade policy.  
As legal entity, these players subject to rights and obligations derive from either national trade 
regulation or international trade law.  Indeed, the today WTO rules do not directly provide 
rights and obligations to them, however, the government of the WTO Members who 
accommodates these rights and obligations to their private economic actors.  They should be 
bridging the gap between WTO rules and the private economic actors. 
The main idea of this chapter is to digest the role of private economic actors in the 
array of the WTO Agreementsbased on analytical approach upon each agreement such as 
GATT, GATS, TRIPS, SCM Agreement, SPS Agreement, Agricultural Agreement 
and,Textile and Clothing Agreement, private economic actors thus exist implicitly in the array 
of WTO Agreements.  It shows that, first, WTO Agreements profoundly require the Members 
to consider the role of private economic actors as a trade player in the WTO, and second, 
some WTO agreements transmit obligation and rights indirectly to private economic actors 
and the government should ensure to take such measure to accommodate its private economic 
actors to comply with these obligations and to obtain their rights. In respect to the WTO 
dispute settlement, this chapter also describes the role of private economic actors in the 
dispute settlement system.  
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Chapter III: Theoretical Overview of State Liability in the European Union and the 
United States in terms of Seeking Compensation Caused by the WTO Retaliation to 
Private Economic Actors.  
 This chapter discusses theoretical background regarding perception of state liability 
principle in general.  There are two types of state liability, first is international state liability 
which is coherence with the definition of international state responsibility. Second is state 
liability in the domestic level.  State liability in the domestic level concerns the responsibility 
of government to protect individual right, where the main function of state liability principle 
is rectifying or compensating the damage caused by the infringement of individual right 
conducted by the government. This chapter also discusses the condition of state liability in EU 
and the U.S. The EU recognizes State Member Liability and EU Institution Liability based on 
non-contractual liability principle meanwhile the U.S. recognizes abrogation of state 
sovereign immunity which leads to state liability for unconstitutional act conducted by the 
government.  In relation with the WTO Law, this chapter also discusses the effect of WTO 
Law in the EU and the U.S. legal systems. 
 
Chapter IV: The Implication of WTO Retaliation to Private Economic Actors: To What 
Extent is State Liability Accomplished? Case Study 
 This chapter is discussing the brief enlighten of several cases that entails authorization 
of retaliation from the WTO.  These cases are Banana case (the U.S. v. EU) and Foreign Sales 
Corporation/Extraterritorial Tax Income exclusion (FSC/ETI) case (the U.S. v. EU). The trade 
impact of WTO retaliation to private economic actors based on these cases divide in three 
different impacts.  The first is the economic impact of 100% retaliatory tariff over several 
private economic actors both in EU and the U.S. The second is the legal implication of the 
WTO retaliation to private economic actors in the EU based on Banana case and the U.S. 
based on FSC Case. In Banana Case, DSB authorized the US to imply trade retaliation as a 
result of non-compliant of EU to the DSB Decision. The excess of EU non-compliant is a 
dispute between EU private economic actors and EU Institutions in 
FabbricaItalianaAccumulatoriMotocarriMontecchio Spa (hereinafter FIAMM) case where 
the EU non-contractual liability in this case is contested to be implied by the Court. The third 
is political implication of the WTO retaliation to private economic actors in the U.S based on 
FSC/ETI Case.  The political accountability is challenged to be implied by the U.S. legislative 
bodies in order to comply with DSB Decision on FSC/ETI Case and to restraint the trade 
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damaged caused to the U.S. private economic actors. A critical analysis will be applied in 
order to develop the answer to what extent state liability is accomplished by both EU and the 
U.S. authorities. 
Chapter V: The Friction between the WTO Law and State Liability 
 The preliminary hypothesisinstitute in chapter IV is that state liability is not 
accomplished because of a friction between state liability principle and the WTO Law.  The 
friction occurs as a result of the absence of direct effect of WTO law and DSB Decision, thus, 
private economic actors are barred to rely on WTO Law and DSB decision to challenge the 
illegality of national trade policy which is violating the WTO Law. Chapter V is discussing 
about the pro and contra arguments regarding direct effect of WTO Law and DSB decision 
which leads to the friction between the WTO law and state liability.  
Chapter VI: The Nexus between the WTO Law and State Liability Principle 
 In order to suppress the friction between WTO law and state liability principle, this 
chapter analyses the nexus between state liability principle and WTO law. It focuses on the 
conception of state liability that the government is obliged to protect constitutional right (such 
an economic right) by providing a system to compensate or to rectify the right that has been 
infringed, meanwhile, WTO law consist obligation of government to guarantee individual to 
pursue economic interest by providing the rule and mechanism to conduct economic activities 
across frontiers which the obligation to guarantee individual economic interest is pertinent to 
their obligation to protect and to preserve economic rights derive from their constitutions. 
 The analyses of the nexus between the WTO Law and state liability principle is to 
prove the final hypothesis that state liability can be accomplished in term of the implication of 
WTO retaliation to private economic actors.  
Chapter VII: Conclusion and Recommendation 
Chapter VII discusses the conclusion of this research and recommendation for future 
cases. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
TRADE RETALIATION IN THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
 
1. The General Overview of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process 
The main objective of DSU is a central element to provide security and predictability to 
the multilateral trading system.22  There are essentially six phases in the WTO dispute 
settlement process: consultation, the panel process, the appellate process, the recommendation 
and rulings, arbitration and surveillance of implementation.  The surveillance of 
implementation basically is the final phase of the WTO dispute settlement process.  Unless 
the loss party fails to implement the recommendations and rulings of DSB23 within the 
reasonable period of time, the injury party may recourse under Article 22(2) of DSU.  In this 
chapter, the predominant issue is the implementation of Article 22(2) DSU which 
unquestionably have correlation with all aspects of the research.  Prior to it, six phases of 
WTO dispute settlement process will be elaborated in a brief enlightenment. 
1.1. Consultation 
 Pursuant to Article 4 (1) DSU, a WTO Member has right to ask for consultation with 
another member, if it believes that the other member has violated a WTO Agreement or 
otherwise the member finds that other member nullified and impaired benefits accruing to it.  
Bearing in mind that the structure of consultation is undefined and there no rules for 
conducting them, members have to be entered into good faith.24 
                                                          
22Article 3 (2), General Provision, Annex 2 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes.  The Agreement on Establishing the World Trade Organization, available at:(www.wto.org/dispute 
settlement). See Lester, Simon, Mercurio, Bryan, Davies, Arwel and Leiner, Kara Leitner, (2008), World 
Trade Law, Text, Material and Commentary, Hart Publishing – USA, pp.153.  The DSU represents an 
important change from the dispute settlement system in the GATT, which is broader, efficient, predictable 
and reliable dispute resolution process.   
 
23Article 2 of DSU, Administration, ibid.SeeWaincymer, Jeff, (2002), WTO Litigation: Procedural Aspects of 
Formal Dispute Settlement, Cameron May – London/UK, pp.78.See alsoWouters, Jan Wouters and De 
Meester, Bart, (2007), The World Trade Organization: A Legal and Institutional Analysis, Intersentia – 
Antwerpen/Belgium, pp. 217. See also WTO Secretariat, (2004), A Handbook on the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System, A WTO Secretariat Publication: prepared for publication by the Legal Affairs Division 
and the Appellate Body, Cambridge University Press – Cambridge/UK. 
 
24Waincymer,Jeff, ibid, p. 211,  There are no specific controls over such informal consultations within the WTO 
system, because there are a number of potentially conflicting aims in the process, it is therefore difficult to 
identify an optimal procedures and obligations.See also Read, Robert, (2005), ‘Trade Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms: the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding in the Wake of the GATT’, in the WTO and the 
Regulation of International Trade : Recent Trade Disputes between the European Union and the United 
States, eds. Perdikis, Nicholas and Read, Rober, Edward Elgar Publishing – London/UK, pp.36. 
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 The consultation phase is prerequisite before the request of panel establishment.  It is 
the responsibility of the complainant and the respondent members to consult on the matter of 
dispute, and WTO Secretariat shall provide no support.25  The only requirement is that the 
consultation should be notified to DSB.  The defendant member should respond to the request 
of consultation within 10 days after the receipt of request, and consultation should be 
confidential.26  If no response is given after 10 days, or does not enter into consultation within 
30 days, the complainant member can directly request the DSB for the establishment of 
Panel.27 The DSB shall establish the Panel, unless it is rejected by consensus.28 Since 
consultation is a necessary step before the commencement of panel proceedings, the parties 
could request the establishment of panel only if the consultations fail to settle a dispute within 
60 days after the date of receipt of request for consultations.29 However, some members have 
purposed for shortening the period of time for consultation, so that they can proceed to 
another stage or to request establishment of Panel.30 
 There are various ways for parties to the dispute satisfied in consultations phase.  For 
example member who initiates the consultations is withdrawing and not replacing the issue, 
even though the measure may have had some negative impact on its trade while it was 
enforce.31 Another possible settlement may also be achieved, when the consultation lead to 
                                                          
25 See Zimmermann, Thomas Alexander, (2005), Negotiating the Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, Cameron May – London/UK, pp. 61. 
 
26Article 4 (6) of DSU, Consultation.  See also the Korea – Alcoholic Beverages Case, the Panel held that the 
information acquired during consultations could be subsequently be used by any party in the ensuing 
proceedings, WT/DS75/18. 17-01-2000. Available at (http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/GEN_searchResult.asp 
), last visited October, 14, 2009. 
 
27Article 4 (3) of DSU.  See also Matsushita, Mitsuo, Schoenbaum, Thomas J. and Mavroidis, Petros C. (2003), 
The World Trade Organization Law, Practice, and Policy, Oxford University Press- Oxford/UK, pp. 26. 
 
28 Article 6 of DSU, Supra Note 22. 
 
29Article 4 (7) of DSU, Supra Note 22. See also Yang, Guohua, (2005), WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: 
Detailed Interpretation, Kluwer Law International – The Hague/The Netherland, pp. 495. 
 
30 In the EC – Trade Descriptive of Scallops (WT/DS7/R).  In this case Canada requested for the establishment 
of Panel prior to the expiration of the 60 days consultation period.  Available at: 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/a1s1p1_e.htm ) last visited October, 13 
2009. See alsoTrebilcock, Michael J. and Howse, Robert, (2013), The Regulation of International Trade 
(Fourth Edition), Routledge – London/UK, pp. 121.  In case of Fructose Corn Syrup, Appellate Body 
recommended that although consultation had not occurred Panel could be properly established.  
 
31 Some cases considers ‘dropped’ or ‘to be withdrawn’, for instance: US – Tariff Increases (Hormones 
Retaliation) (WT/DS39); EC – Cheese (WT/DS104);Pakistan – Hides and Skin (WT/DS107); US – 
GroundnutQuotas (WT/DS111); Argentina – Pharmaceuticals (WT/DS168); EC – Rice Duties (DS134); 
Turkey – Pipe Fittings (WT/DS208), EC – Patent Protection (WT/DS153); Greece – Taxes (WT/DS129); 
ect. Available at: (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm ) last visited October, 15 
2009. 
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favourable change or clarification in the way that the measure at issue is to be applied.  
However, the initiate member can also withdraw the measure, but it is replaced with another 
measure, which may have WTO-inconsistency problems of its own.32  The most favourable 
result is when parties to the dispute are reaching amicable settlement. On the contrary with the 
respect of the dropped cases, there was not agreed settlement; the parties shall recourse to 
Panel.33 
 The consultation is a preliminary stage to identify with the legal basis of claim and 
facts. It serves a very valuable function and seems to work quiet well for cases that do not go 
on to Panel and Appellate process.34 It provides a mechanism that resolves most cases 
promptly than the other processes.  Nevertheless, some problematic issues arise in this process 
due to the application of Article 4 (11) of DSU which provides that any member who 
considers that it has a ‘substantial trade interest’, could join a consultation process without the 
consent of the other members who initiated the consultation process.35  Another problematic 
issues is notification to DSB, some disputes were settled without notification to DSB.36  
Despite the problematic issues regarding the consultation process, overall it has worked rather 
effectively.  Unlike the Panel and Appellate process, the consultation process is more flexible 
for member to settle the dispute. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
32Malaysia – Polyethylene (WT/DS1); Korea – Shelf Life(WT/DS5); EC – Grains(WT/DS13); Poland – Autos 
(WT/DS19); Korea – Bottled Water(WT/DS20); Venezuela – OCTG Imports(WT/DS23); Japan – 
Copyright(WT/DS28); US – Textile and Apparel I and II(WT/DS85) and (DS151); Australia – Coated 
Paper(WT/DS119). 
 
33Since the establishment of WTO in 1994 until 2009, 399 cases filed in the DSB.  Most of the disputes started 
with consultation request. There are 107 disputes that did not result panel adoption.  Available at: 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm). See Zimmermann, Thomas Alexander, 
Supra Note 25, pp. 59-61. 
 
34 Davey, William J., ‘Evaluating WTO dispute settlement: what results have been achieved through 
consultations and implementation of panel reports?’, (2007), in The WTO in the Twenty-first Century : 
Dispute Settlement, Negotiations, and Regionalism in Asia, eds. Yasuhei Taniguchi, Alan Yanovich and Jab 
Bohanes, Cambridge University Press – Cambridge/UK, pp. 107. See also Martin, Mervyn, (2013), WTO 
Dispute Settlement Understanding and Development, MartinusNijjhoff Publisher – Leiden/The Netherlands, 
pp. 95-99. See also Trebilcock, Michael J, and Howse, Robert, Supra Note 30, pp. 136.   
 
35Babu, R.Rajesh,  (2005),  ‘Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Progress and Prospect’, 
Asian- African Legal Consultative Organization Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 2-3, New Delhi/India, pp. 55.   
 
36 Korean – Inspection (WT/DS3 and WT/DS41), US – Auto (WT/DS6), Japan – Telecommunication Equipment 
(WT/DS15), Brazil – Autos (WT/DS51, WT/DS52, WT/DS65,WT/DS81),Mexico - Customs Valuation of 
Imports (WT/DS53),  ), US – Poultry Imports (DS100), Brazil – Payment Terms (WT/DS116), India – 
Customs Duties (WT/DS150), EC – Conifer Wood (WT/DS137). 
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1.2. The Panel Process 
    The complainant parties are entitled to request DSB to establish Panel if consultation 
process is fruitless.  The request for the establishment of Panel shall indicate whether 
consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary 
of the legal basis of the complaint.  If the parties request the special terms of reference, the 
proposed text of it must clearly set out in the request.37 In the EC – Banana Case III38, 
Appellate Body indicated profoundly major terms of Article 6 of DSU that a Panel request 
will usually be approved automatically at the DSB meeting unless the DSB decides by 
consensus not to establish a Panel.   
Once DSB agree to establish Panel, the Panel is bound by its terms of reference.39 On 
the Brazil – Desiccated Coconut40, Appellate Body explained the importance of the terms of 
reference for two reasons.  First, terms of reference fulfil an important due process objective – 
they give the parties and third parties sufficient information concerning the claims at issue in 
the dispute in order to allow them an opportunity to respond to the complainant’s case.  
Second, they establish the jurisdiction of the Panel by defining the precise claims at issue in 
the dispute.  In terms of defining the precise claims at issue, Panel shall address the relevant 
provision in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute, they also 
should not conduct de novo nor act ultra petita, in addressing issue of the claims.  As explain 
in Mexico – Corn Syrup Case41, Appellate Body defined that Panel shall come under the duty 
to address the issues as a matter of due process.  Hence, to conduct proper exercise of the 
judicial function, Panel is required to address issues that put before them by the parties.  Panel 
also has to address and dispose of certain issues of a fundamental nature of the case. 
  To begin with assessing the dispute stipulates in the terms of reference, Panel shall 
follow the Working Procedures underlies in Appendix 3.   Article 12 of DSU states the 
                                                          
37Article 6 (2) of DSU.  This article is addressing the task of Panel to examine request for establishment which 
must be sufficiently precise.  See also United States-Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant 
Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany, (WT/DS213/AB/R), 28-11-2002. 
 
38European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas - AB-1997-3 - Report 
of the Appellate Body, (WT/DS27/AB/R), 09-09-1997. 
 
39Article 7 of DSU also states within twenty days from the establishment of the Panel, a panel is given the 
following standard of reference unless the parties agree otherwise. 
 
40Brazil - Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut - AB-1996-4 - Report of the Appellate Body, 
(WT/DS22/AB/R), 21-02-1997. 
 
41Mexico – Anti – Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States – 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of DSU by the United Stated, (WT/DS132/AB/RW), 22-10-2001. 
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Working Procedures of the Panel unless Panel decides otherwise after consulting with the 
parties to the dispute.  Working procedures of the Panel elucidates obligations of Panel 
regarding the flexibility of time frame in assessing the dispute; however, Panel should not 
disregard observation of due process carefully.  In Australia – Salmon Case42, Appellate Body 
reported that Panel procedures should provide sufficient flexibility so as to ensure high-
quality Panel report, without unduly delaying the Panel process.  Meanwhile, Panel should 
also be careful to observe due process, which entails providing the parties adequate 
opportunity to respond to the evidence submitted in their submission.  The submission of the 
parties must be written in certain timetable.43 
The main important aim set out in Article 12 is basic rationale behind the any findings 
and recommendations of Panel.44Basic rationale constitutes the scope of duties imposed on 
panels under Article 12 (7) of DSU.  In defining basic rationale, Appellate Body considered 
that Article 12(7) establishes a minimum standard for the reasoning that Panels must provide 
in support of their findings and recommendations.  Panel must also set forth explanations and 
reasons sufficient to disclose the essential, or fundamental, justification for those findings and 
recommendations.45 
The Panel process elaborated above are converging on the aim of Article 11 of DSU, 
where Panel function is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibility under DSU and 
covered agreements.  Accordingly, Panel should make an objective assessment of the matter 
before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of 
and conformity with the relevant covered agreement.  Refer to it; Panel should apply an 
appropriate standard of review under the covered agreements.  In EC – Hormones Case46, the 
                                                          
42Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, (WT/DS18/AB/R), 20 -10-1998. 
 
43 Article 12 (5) of DSU, Supra Note 22. See Slotboom, Marco, (2006), A Comparison of WTO and EC Law: Do 
Different Objects and Purposes Matter for Treaty Interpretation?, Cameron May Publisher – London/UK, 
pp. 231.  Article 12 of the DSU gives WTO Panel discretion to depart from and to add the Working 
Procedures set out in Appendix 3 of the DSU, accordingly the WTO Panels should provide sufficient 
flexibility so as to ensure high quality panel report while not unduly delaying the Panel process. 
 
44Article 12 (7) of DSU elaborates that Panel shall set out the findings of fact, the applicability of relevant 
provisions and the basic rationale behind any finding and recommendations that it makes. 
 
45In Mexico – Corn Syrup Case, Supra Note 41, Appellate Body turned first to dictionary meaning of ‘basic’, 
which includes both ‘fundamental; essential’ and constituting a minimum acceptable level’.  ‘Rationale’ 
means both a ‘reasoned exposition of principles; an explanation or statement of reasons’ and ‘the 
fundamental or underlying reason for basis of a thing of justification’. The Panels must provide directly 
linked by the wording of Article 12(7) to the finding and recommendations made by them. 
 
46United States - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC - Hormones Dispute - AB-2008-5 - Report of 
the Appellate Body, (WT/DS320/AB/R),16-10-2008. 
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Appellate Body held that the applicable of standard of review under Article 11 of DSU is 
neither de novo review nor the total deference, but rather the objective of the assessment of 
the facts.  It refers to the case of EC - Poultry47 when Appellate Body warned that Panel is 
obliged to conduct the objective assessment of the matter before it, otherwise the allegation of 
it constitutes a very serious allegation.  Such an allegation goes to the very core of the 
integrity of the WTO dispute settlement process itself.  Another serious allegation that Panel 
might be doing is acting ultra petita.  In Chile – Price Band System Case48, Appellate Body 
considered that Panel has acted inconsistently with Article 11 of DSU since Panel had made a 
finding on a claim that was not made by Argentina. Furthermore, the Panel assessed a 
provision that was not a part of the matter before it.49  Accordingly, by acting ultra petita, 
Panel constituted depriving one party of a fair right of response.  Nevertheless, in making an 
objective assessment of the matter before it, Panel is also duty bound to ensure that due 
process of fair right of response is respected.50 
To be consistent with the duty in imposing assessment of the matter before it, Panel 
requires finding an objective assessment of the fact. Panel is necessary to consider the 
evidence presented by the parties and to make factual findings on the basis of that evidence.  
In EC – Hormones Case51, Appellate Body considered that the wilful distortion or 
misrepresentation of the evidence put before a panel is similarly inconsistent with an objective 
assessment of the facts.  In supporting an objective assessment of the facts, Panel has right to 
consult to experts52.  Refer to India – Quantitative Restrictions Case53, Appellate Body made 
                                                          
47European Communities- Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry Products, (WT/DS69/AB/R), 
13-7-1998. 
 
48Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Product, 
(WT/DS207/AB/R), 23- 9-2002. 
 
49In terms of reference of Panel, Article 7 of DSU limited the authority of Panel to assess the dispute only in the 
scope of claim written by the parties in the first sentence.  See also Argentina – Safeguard Measures on 
Imports of Footwear, (WT/DS121/AB/R), 14-12-1999. 
 
50Chile – Price Band System, Supra Note 48.  Due process is an obligation inherent in the WTO dispute 
settlement system.  A Panel will fail in the duty to respect due process if it makes a finding on a matter that is 
not before it, because it will thereby fail to accord to a party a fair right of response.  Panel considers acting 
beyond the requirement to asses objectively and in good faith. 
 
51 EC – Hormone Case, Supra Note 4. 
 
52 Article 13 of DSU mentions that Panel has right to seek information and technical advice from any individual 
or body includes the experts relating to the case. 
 
53India– Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, 
(WT/DS90/AB/R), 23-8-1999. 
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statement that although Panel has right to consult to expert such International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Panel did not delegate to the IMF its judicial function to make an objective assessment 
of the fact.  Panel should make carefully and critically assessment of any views made by the 
experts and also considered other data and opinion in reaching its conclusions.   In assessing 
the dispute, Panel is necessary to consider the municipal law of the parties, as evidence of 
facts.  However, the municipal law of WTO Members may be considered not only as evidence 
of facts, but also as evidence of compliance or non-compliant with international obligations.54  
Under DSU, Panel may examine the municipal law of a WTO Member for the purpose of 
determining whether that Member has complied with its obligations under the WTO 
Agreements. 
Once Panel concludes that a member’s measure is inconsistent with a covered 
agreement, it shall recommend the member concerned brings that measure into conformity 
with the agreement.55 Panel should submit its finding and conclusions in the form of written 
report to the DSB.  A Panel report must, at minimum, set out the findings of fact, the 
applicability of relevant provisions and the basic rationale behind any findings and 
recommendations that it makes.56 The report become legally binding when it is adopted by the 
DSB and thus have become the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, unless a party to 
the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by 
consensus not to adopt the report.  If a party has notified its decision to appeal, the report by 
the panel shall not be considered for adoption by the DSB until after completion of the 
appeal.57 
                                                          
54United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, (WT/DS176/AB/R), 2-1-2002.  See also 
Case concerning certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia (The Merits),(22 March 1926), 
Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice Series A – No.7 (Annex II); Collection of 
Judgments, A.W. Sijthoff’s Publishing Company – Leiden/Netherland.  In this merit, the court is certainly 
not interpreting the municipal law of the party, but there is nothing to prevent the court to give judgment on 
the question whether or not, in applying that law, party is acting inconformity with its obligations toward 
international law. 
 
55Article 19(1) of DSU.See also Bourgeois, J.H.J., (2005), Trade Law Experience: Pottering about in the GATT 
and WTO, Cameron May Publisher – London/UK, pp. 34. The discussion about whether WTO remedies are 
prospective only or also retrospective focuses on Article 19, accordingly Panel or Appellate Body urge the 
member to concerned bring the measure in to conformity. 
 
56Article 12(7) of DSU; see also Van den Bossche, Peter, (2005), The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization; Text, Cases and Materials, Cambridge University Press – Cambridge/UK. pp. 253 
 
57Article 16 (4) of DSU.  See Fabri, Helene Ruiz, (2013), ‘The Relationship between Negotiations and Third-
Party Dispute Settlement at the WTO, with an Emphasis on the EC-Banana Dispute’, in Diplomatic and 
Judicial Means of Dispute Settlement, eds. Chazournes, Laurence Boisson de, Kohen, Marcelo G., and 
Vinuales, Jorge E., MartinusNijhoff Publishers – The Hague/the Netherlands, pp. 93.  In Banana Case EU 
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1.3.  Appellate Body Process 
 The dispute settlement system in the WTO allows the parties to appeal against a panel 
report and take it to a quasi-judicial body at a second instance.  As enlighten in Article 17 of 
DSU, a standing Appellate Body shall be established by the DSB and hear appeals from Panel 
cases.  It is composed of seven persons and as general rule; the proceeding shall not exceed 60 
days from the date a party to the dispute formally notifies its decision to appeal to  the date the 
Appellate Body circulates its reports.  Unless the Appellate considers that it cannot provide 
report within 60 days, it can be exceeded until 90 days.58 
 The Appellate Body process is bound to Working Procedures set out in Article 17 (9) 
of DSU.  The Working Procedures of Appellate Review underlies in Section XXXII of DSU, 
and it shall be drawn up by the Appellate Body in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB 
and the Director-General, and also communicated to the members for their information.  Once 
Working Procedures are setting up by the Appellate Body, they are bound to review the case 
pursuant to Article 17 of DSU. 
 Article 17(6) of DSU provides that only issues of law and the legal interpretation 
developed by a panel can be reviewed by the Appellate Body.  The Appellate Body has to 
address all issues that are brought up by the complaining parties before it,59  and it shall not 
address new fact, issues or argument in its proceeding.60  Appellate Body merely is bound 
duty completing the analysis made by Panel.  As explained in United States – Gasoline 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
had failed to comply in DSB Recommendation, thus the DSB Agree to extension of the time period of 30 
days according to Article 16 (4) of the DSU. 
 
58In some cases Appellate Body extend of the deadline for its report, such as, United States – Imposition of 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the 
United Kingdom, (WT/DS138/AB/R), 10-5-2000, Thailand – Anti – Dumping Duties on Angles Shapes and 
Sections of Iron or Non- Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, (WT/DS122/AB/R), 12 -3-2001, and 
European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos – Containing Products, 
(WT/DS135/AB/R), 12-3-2001. 
 
59 See also Case Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, Supra Note 42. 
 
60In European Communities – Anti – Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil, 
(WT/DS219/AB/R), 22-6-2003, Appellate Body rejected the EU’s argument that was identifying during the 
Panel proceedings.  Also in Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, (WT/DS70/AB/R), 
2-8-1999, Appellate Body stated that an appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the Panel report 
and legal interpretations developed by the Panel.  Also in case of the United States – Continued Dumping and 
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000,(WT/DS217/AB/R and WT/DS234/AB/R), 16-1-2003, Appellate Body had no 
authority to consider new facts on appeal. 
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Case61, Appellate Body posited that they should reverse the Panel findings and complete the 
analysis of the case.  Similar to EC – Poultry Case62, Appellate Body elaborated Article 
17(13) of DSU that they may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of 
panel. 
1.4. Recommendations and Rulings 
 The predominant function of Panel and Appellate body is assessing whether a 
Member’s measure is inconformity with the covered agreement and whether it is nullifying 
and impairing63 benefits accruing to other member’s trade.  Once Panel or Appellate Body 
concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement64, it shall recommend that 
the member concerned should bring the measure into conformity with the agreement.  Panel 
and Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the member concerned could implement the 
recommendation.  Refer to the case of US - Underwear65 , Panel recommended the DSB to 
request the United States bring its measure into compliance with the Agreement on Textiles 
and Clothing by immediately removal of the measures that is further causing nullification and 
impairment of benefits accruing to Costa Rica.  The recommendation is also in the form of 
decline the request of the party, as Panel noted in Guatemala – Cement II case66 that Panel 
declined to suggest Guatemala to refund antidumping duties regarding the import of grey 
Portland cement from Mexico, however Panel only suggested Guatemala to revoke its anti-
dumping measure that inconsistent with WTO rules. 
                                                          
61The United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, (WT/DS2/9/AB/R), 20-5-1996. In 
this case Appellate Body reversed of Panel’s legal finding and made a finding on a legal issue which was not 
addressed by the Panel.  Appellate Body reversed the Panel conclusion on the first part of Article XX (g) of 
GATT 1994 and completed it.  In this case, Appellate Body also examined the measure’s consistency with 
the provision of Article XX based on the legal findings contained in the Panel report. 
 
62The European Communities – Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry Products,Supra Note 47. 
 
63The issue of nullification and impairment arose in European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale 
and Distribution of Bananas, Supra Note 38.  EU appealed the conclusion of Panel that ‘there is normally a 
presumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other members parties to that covered 
agreement’, Appellate observed that according  to Article 3(8) of DSU,  nullification and impairment issue is 
a basic standing the US to bring a claim before the Panel. 
 
64See India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, (WT/DS146/R and WT/DS175/R), 21-12-2001.  Panel 
noted that the case envisages a situation where the violation is in existence. 
 
65United States – Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear,(WT/DS24/AB/R),10-2-
1997. 
 
66Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico,(WT/DS156/R),24-
10-2000. 
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 Another issue relating to the recommendations and rulings of Panel and Appellate 
Body is both Panel and Appellate body should be vigilant in recommending the conclusion of 
the dispute.  Addressing to this issue, many members concerned that Appellate Body was 
exceeding its authority and created new rights and obligations through its ruling67.  It is 
remarkably notice set out in Article 19(2) of DSU that Panel and Appellate Body cannot add 
or diminish the rights and obligations in the covered agreement when they make findings and 
recommendations.  In US – Certain EC Product Case68, Appellate Body ruled that the 
purpose of dispute settlement is only to preserve the rights and obligations of members under 
the WTO Covered Agreements, and to clarify the existing provision of those agreements in 
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.  Nothing from 
Panel and Appellate findings can exceed beyond the interpretation of WTO Covered 
Agreement. 
 In Australia – Automotive Leather II Case69 , Panel addressed the issue of relationship 
between related covered agreements such Agreement of Surveillance and Countervailing 
Measures (hereinafter SCM) and Article 19(1) of DSU.  Panel thereby elucidated the 
interpretation of Article 4(7) of the SCM Agreement seems redundant, since Article 19(1) of 
DSU that emphasizes the member to “bring the measure into conformity” is indistinguishable 
from the interpretation of Article 4(7) of the SCM Agreement.70  Panel and Appellate Body 
are also bond duty of making interpretation on the provision relevant to the dispute in 
accordance with the general rule of interpretation.  The general rule of interpretation set out in 
Article 31(22) Vienna Convention of Treaty is directing the Appellate Body to apply in 
seeking clarification of the provision of the WTO Covered Agreement.  That direction reflects 
                                                          
67Babu, R.Rajesh, Supra Note 35, Special Review of DSU has been established since the Marrakesh Ministerial 
Meeting is held; many members submitted the proposal to review a number of issues includes the function of 
Appellate Body to recommend the conclusion of the dispute.   Addressing this issue, the US and Chile in a 
joint proposal has submitted six options aimed at providing parties to the WTO disputes more control over 
the content of Appellate Body reports, as well as the course of the dispute settlement proceedings. 
 
68United States – Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities, (WT/DS165/AB/R), 
11-12-2000. See also Sean D. Murphy, (2002), United States Practice in International Law, Volume 1: 1999-
2001, Cambridge University Press – Cambridge/UK, p.256. 
 
69Australia – Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather – Recourse to Article 21(5) 
of DSU by the United States,(WT/DS126/RW), 21-1-2000. 
 
70Article 4(7) of the SCM Agreement requires member to ‘withdraw the subsidies’ which is requiring some 
actions.  It is different from ‘bring the measure into conformity’ according to Article 19(1) of DSU. 
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a measure of recognition that covered agreement is not to be read in clinical isolation from 
public international law.71 
 After Panel or Appellate Body conclude the case and submit its recommendation to 
DSB, the time frame of adopting the rulings no later than 9 months since the DSB establish 
the Panel.  The time will be exceeded until 12 months if the report is appealed.   
 
I.5. Surveillance of Implementation Recommendation and Rulings 
 The implementation of recommendations and rulings of the DSB is the most crucial 
point for the entire WTO dispute settlement mechanism.  The very objective of attaining 
security and predictability of the WTO legal system principally depends on the compliance 
and enforcement of the recommendations and rulings.  Since the recommendations itself has 
no value unless the parties to the dispute implement it.  The method to implement the 
recommendation can be done by withdrawal or modification of a measure, or part of measure, 
the establishment of application of which by a member of the WTO constitutes the violation 
of a provision in a covered agreement.72 
Article 21(6) of DSU states the DSB shall keep under surveillance the implementation 
of adopted recommendations or rulings.  The issue of implementation of the recommendations 
or rulings may be raised at the DSB by any members at any time following their adoption.  
Accordingly, the members should implement the recommendation or rulings immediately, in 
a case that immediate compliance is impracticable, Article 21(3) of DSU provides a 
reasonable time for the member to bring itself into a state of conformity with its WTO 
obligation.73 The concept of reasonable period of time is elaborated in US – Hot-Rolled Steel 
(Article 21(3))74 by Arbitrator.  It implies a degree of flexible time to comply with the 
recommendations or rulings.  Arbitrator considered that the essence of reasonable period of 
time set out in covered agreement such Anti – Dumping Agreement should equally pertinent 
in the context of Article 21(3) ( c ) of DSU.  It also should be defined on a case by case basis, 
                                                          
71 See US – Gasoline Case, Supra Note 61,  
 
72 See Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather, Resort to 
Arbitration under article 21(3) of DSU , (WTO/DS155/10), 31-8-2001. 
 
73See Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Arbitration under Article 21(3) (C) of DSU, (WT/DS87/15 and 
WT/DS110/14), 23-5-2000. See also United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 
(WT/DS217/14 and WT/DS234/22), 13-6-2003. 
 
74The United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, 
(WT/DS184/AB/R), 24-6-2001 
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for example in EC – Hormones (Article 21(3)75 case, the Arbitrator considered that the 
ordinary meaning of the terms of ‘reasonable period time’ indicates to 15 months as a 
guideline for the arbitrator, and not a rule.76 
1.6. Arbitration 
 WTO dispute settlement mechanism recognizes Arbitration as a different and 
alternative procedure for parties to settle their dispute.  According to Article 25 of DSU, the 
parties may recourse Arbitration to facilitate the solution of certain disputes that concern 
issues that are clearly defined by them.  Arbitration process therefore requires mutual 
agreement of the parties, except as otherwise provided in DSU.  The parties to the arbitration 
proceeding shall also agree to abide by the Arbitration award. 
 The first case recourse to Arbitration since the inception of the WTO is US – Section 
110(5) Copyright Act Case77.  In this case, Arbitrator observed that Article 25 of DSU 
provides a different procedure that the parties have alternative whether notify the DSB to 
establish Panel or refers matters to Arbitration.  The parties to this dispute only had to notify 
the DSB of their recourse to Arbitration, and there is no decision required from the DSB for a 
matter referred to Arbitration.  Arbitrator is bound duty to apply all the rules and principle 
governing the WTO system. 
 Arbitration can imply its jurisdiction regarding its function as an international tribunal.  
In the US – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 Case78 the Arbitrators therefore considered that they 
are entitled to consider the issue of its own jurisdiction on its own initiative.  The jurisdiction 
in this case is not a unilateral extension of the WTO jurisdiction, since it is dependent on the 
agreement of the parties to a dispute to have recourse to Article 25 of DSU.79  The Arbitration 
                                                          
75  EC - Hormone Case, Supra Note 4.See also case Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides 
and the Import of Finished Leather, Resort to Arbitration under article 21(3) of DSU, Supra Note 72.  
Argentina had argued that it needed 46 months as the reasonable period of time for implementation in order 
to control and counter certain economic and financial consequences that would follow the enactment of 
legislation implementing the recommendations of the DSB. 
 
76 It applies to the case involving developing country, see alsoIndonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the 
Automobile Industry, Recourse to Arbitration Under Article 21(3) (C) of DSU, (WT/DS54/15, WT/DS55/14, 
WT/DS59/13, WT/DS64/12), 7-12-1998. 
 
77The United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, Recourse to Arbitration under Article 25 of DSU, 
Award of the Arbitrators, (WT/DS160/ARB25/1), 9-11-2001. 
 
78The United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916,(WT/DS136/AB/R and WT/DS162/AB/R), 28-8-2000. 
 
79 See the US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act, Supra Note 77, see also Palmeter, David, and Mavroidis, Petros 
C., (2004), Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization; Practice and Procedure, Second Edition, 
Cambridge University Press-Cambridge/UK, pp.45. 
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in WTO dispute settlement system principally has broad authority to assess the issue 
submitted by the parties to the dispute.  However, disputes submitted to Arbitration mainly 
regarding the determination of level of nullification or impairment or the interpretation of 
Article 22 of DSU and determination of reasonable period of time in implementing the 
recommendation of the DSB.  The member may also request Arbitration of a determination by 
the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures regarding a program qualified as a 
non-actionable subsidy pursuant to SCM Agreement.  
 Arbitration is considered an alternative to a panel procedure.  Refer to US – Section 
110(5) Copyright Act Case80, Arbitrator noted that pursuant to Article 25(1) of DSU, 
Arbitration is an alternative means of dispute settlement that generally used to complete 
process of dispute settlement under DSU.  It is not only be used to one aspect of the 
procedures such as the determination of the level of benefits nullified or impaired as a result 
of a violation, but also to other aspect such a mutually acceptable in negotiating 
compensation.  This would seem to be confirmed by the terms of Article 25(4) of DSU which 
provides that Article 21 and 22 of DSU shall apply mutatis mutandis to arbitration award.   
 Furthermore, recourse to Arbitration pursuant to Article 25 of DSU is fully consistent 
with the object and purpose of DSU.  It is likely to contribute to the prompt settlement of a 
dispute between members, as commanded by Article 3(3) of DSU.  In general, recourse to 
Arbitration indeed strengthens the dispute resolution system.  The Working Procedures of 
Arbitration set out in Article 22(6) of DSU, will follow the normal working procedures of 
DSU where relevant and as adapted to the circumstances of the present proceeding which 
Arbitrator attached it to their decision. 
 
2.  Nullification and Impairment as Basic Rationale Causes of Action 
 The WTO language of dispute settlement system focuses on Article 3(8) of DSU: 
“In case where there an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered 
agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or 
impairment.  This means that there is normally a presumption that a breach of the rules has 
an adverse impact on other Members parties to that covered agreement, and in such cases, it 
shall be up to the Member against whom the complaint has been brought to rebut the 
charge.” 
                                                          
80Ibid 
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 The core of Article 3(8) DSU is nullification or impairment which is coherent with 
Article XXIII of GATT 194781 as predecessor concept of basic claim in international trade 
remedy.  In this article, nullification or impairment is considered as the result of failure of a 
contracting party to carry out its obligations, the application of any measures of a contracting 
party whether or not it conflicts with GATT, and the existence of any other situation.   
 As time went on, the concept of basic claim formulated in Article XXIII GATT 
remains become predominant concept in assessing dispute claimed by the WTO Member.  
This concept will be elaborated as violation claim basis, non-violation and existence of any 
other situation that is resulting nullification or impairment trade benefits of other member. 
2.1. Violation Claim Basis 
 All WTO Members are bound to comply with Marrakesh Agreement in accordance 
with pactasuntservanda principle.82  However, in light of considerable circumstances may 
arise in domestic level, some members are  unable to specify in advance how they ought to 
behave under every conceivable contingency in applying obligations of WTO.  For those 
members, to deviate from their commitments is inevitably, thus leading members to breach 
the obligations or violation of WTO Agreements. 
 The violation of WTO Agreements is triggering the complaining member to seek 
redress or to demand responsibility from violating member.83  Refer to India – Quantitative 
Restriction case84, when the United States considers that a benefit accruing to it under the 
GATT 1994 was nullified or impaired as a result of India’s alleged failure to carry out its 
obligations regarding balance of payments.  In this case, the articulation of “nullification or 
                                                          
81 Jackson, John H.,(1998), ‘Designing and Implementing Effective Dispute Settlement Procedures: WTO 
Dispute Settlement, Appraisal and Prospects’, in The WTO as an International Organization, ed. Krueger, 
Anne O., The University of Chicago Press – Chicago USA/London/UK, pp. 166.  In 1962, Uruguay brought 
case before Panel of GATT 1947, where the Panel introduced a revolutionary concept regarding of ‘prima 
facie nullification or impairment’.  In this concept, the breach of GATT would be prima facie nullification or 
impairment, and the responding party carried the burden of proof there was no nullification or impairment of 
benefits accruing other member. 
 
82 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaty: “every treaty in force is binding upon the 
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” 
 
83See Article 43 Notice of Claim by an Injured State, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
wrongful Acts, adopted by International Law Commission, at its fifty-third session, 2001),(extract from the 
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-third session, Official Records of the 
General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chapter IV.E.1), state that ‘an injured 
State which invokes the responsibility of another State shall give notice of its claim to that state’.  
84India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, Supra Note 53. 
See alsoAmerisinghe, Chittharanjan F., (2009), Jurisdiction of Specific International Tribunals, 
MartinusNijhoff Publishers – Leiden/The Netherlands, pp. 357. 
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impairment as a result of India’s violation of its obligation” should be emphasized as a notion 
of claim by the U.S.   
 Van den Boosche explains that “in only a few cases to date has the respondent argued 
that the alleged violation of WTO law did not nullify or impair benefits accruing to the 
complainant.  In no case has the respondent been successful in rebutting the presumption of 
nullification or impairment.  It is doubtful whether this presumption really is rebuttable”.85 It 
indicates that a party enables to rebut the presumption of nullification or impairment if it is 
proved contingency impact of nullification or impairment benefits accruing to other party.  In 
Turkey – Textiles Case86 albeit Turkey argued that India had not suffered any nullification or 
impairment of its WTO benefits, Panel determined that Turkey has not provided sufficient 
information to set aside the presumption of its measure has nullified and impaired the benefits 
accruing to India under GATT/WTO.  Consequently, to rebut the presumption of nullification 
or impairment, Turkey shall be adequately proving it to the contrary. 
2.2. Non Violation Claim Basis 
 Non Violation claim basis in the WTO dispute settlement system sets out in Article 26 
of DSU.  According to this article, a member who considers that any benefits accruing to it 
directly or indirectly under this Agreement are being nullified or impaired or that attainment 
of any objectives of the Agreement are being impeded as the result of the application by 
another member of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this 
Agreement, may submit its complaint to DSB.  Complaining party is therefore bearing burden 
of proof to present a detailed justification in support of its complaint.87 The detailed of 
justification must be tangible and concrete to prove the substantiation of a causal relation 
between the invoked measures and nullified or impaired benefits, and to this end broaden 
description of measure at issue is indispensable. 
                                                          
85 Van den Bossche, Peter, Supra Note 56, p. 193.  See also Roessler, F. and Gappah, P. (2005),‘A Re-appraisal 
of Non-Violation Complaints under the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures’, in The World Trade 
Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, Vol. I, eds. Macrory, P.F.J., Appleton, AE and 
Plummer, MG, Springer – New York/USA, pp.1371.Roessler mention that the non-violation remedy is best 
understood in the context of the original GATT, which had only limited coverage with regard to trade rules.  
It has been argued that the expansion of WTO rules to many new areas has made the non-violation remedy 
less important. 
 
86Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, (WT/DS34/R), 31-5-1999. 
 
87See EC – Asbestos Case, Supra Note 58. See also Kim, Dae-Won, (2006), Non-Violation Complaints in WTO 
Law: Theory and Practice, Peter Lang – Bern/Switzerland, p. 77. In this case, Appellate Body therefore 
considered that the non-violation complaint as a remedy should be approached with caution and should 
remain as an exception.  See also in regard with the standard of nullification and impairment, the Panel 
interprets as competitive relationship between imports and domestic product.  This practical standard applied 
in GATT Article III (4) which makes distinction between violation and non-violation complain meaningless. 
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 In the Japan – Film Case88 Panel reviewed whether there was a measure that 
promulgated by responding party which was nullifying or impairing benefits of complaining 
party.  In this case, Panel considered benefits that might be nullified or impaired to consist of 
enhanced market access arising from the change of competitive relationship brought about by 
tariff concessions, but it found that the U.S. as complaining party bore burden as to its 
‘legitimate expectations’89 of benefits after successive tariff negotiation rounds.  In order to 
meet this burden, the U.S. was required to show that Japanese measure at issue was not 
reasonably anticipated at the time the concessions were granted.90  According to this case, the 
complaining party required to elucidate legitimate expectations of benefits that is nullified or 
impaired by responding party.  However, in such case of non-violation claim basis, most 
Panel or Appellate Body shall recommend that the parties concerned make a mutually 
satisfactory adjustment. 
2.3. The Existence of Any Other Situation 
 Similar to the non-violation claim basis, the claim base on the existence of any other 
situation shall present a detailed justification in support of its argument.  Any other situation 
claim basis was designed to be used in situation such as macro economy emergencies i.e. 
general depressions, high unemployment, commodity price collapses, balance of payment 
difficulties.91  Article 26 (1) (b) of DSU, point out the duty of Panel to prepare and circulate 
separate reports for violation and non-violation dispute with the other situation of dispute. 
 In principle, procedure burden of prove between non violation and the existence of 
any other situation claim basis is not different.  The complaining party requires to bear burden 
of prove of nullification or impairment benefits accruing to it.   
 
                                                          
88Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper,(WT/DS44/R), 22-4-1998. 
 
89  Refer to the doctrine of legitimate expectation which means an ‘extension of the rules and natural justice and 
procedural fairness’.  This doctrine has been recognized as an important principle guiding the interpretation 
of other obligations in international economic law; inter alia it can be referred from several WTO Panel 
decision. See also Dissenting Opinion in Arbitral Award, International Thunderbird Gaming Cooperation 
(claimant) and the United Mexican States (respondent), before the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under 
Chapter Eleven of the North American Free Trade Agreement, Washington DC, 26-1-2006. 
 
90Trachman, Joel P.,(1999), ‘The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution’, Harvard International Law Journal, 
Vol.40 No.333, pp.27. 
 
91   See Nanto, Dick K., (2000), ‘Dispute Settlement Under the WTO and Trade Problems with Japan’, in World 
Trade Organization: Issue and Bibliography, ed. Babkina, A.M., Nova Science Publishing – New 
York/USA, pp. 37, Article 23 of DSU allows for a complaint if a member feels that the attainment of any 
objective of a WTO agreement is being impeded as a result of the failure of another party to carry out its 
obligations under an agreement, the application by another contracting party, or the existence of any other 
situation, thus the DSU are not limited to complaint about specific violations of agreements. 
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2.4. The Concept of Trade Nullification and Impairment in the WTO 
Violation, non-violation and the existence of any other situation’s claim bases constitute 
cause of action for WTO members to complain before the WTO dispute settlement body.  
However basic rationale of these claim bases is converging at ‘nullification or impairment’ 
concept.  Article XXIII GATT provides that the nullification or impairment of benefits 
accruing to a member under the General Agreement of WTO is a legitimate basis for 
commencing a dispute settlement procedure.  Abbot explained that GATT jurisprudence has 
interpreted nullification or impairment as ‘any change in domestic economy policy that 
adversely affects imports could be considered to impair the benefits of prior tariff binding’.92  
In addition, Jackson explicitly mentioned that the phrase of nullification or impairment in 
Article XXIII GATT is ambiguous.  It was not merely construed impair the benefits of 
member that could not reasonably been anticipated by the other member at the time it 
negotiated for a concession, but also the nullification or impairment could deter benefits in 
respect of  reasonable expectation concept.93 For example, in Brazil – Financing Aircraft 
Case94, Canada as complainant implicitly brought issue of nullification or impairment in its 
claim before the Panel. Canada argued that nullification or impairment caused to its benefit in 
aircraft industry is calculating since 1994 after Brazil become member of WTO.  It mentioned 
that the export subsidy created by Brazilian Government since 1991, reducing benefits of 
Canada in Aircraft industry since the export subsidy allured more international purchaser to 
opt purchase Brazilian aircraft.  The ProgramadeFinanciamentoàsExportaçaões (PROEX) 
subsidy impeded the benefits that supposed to be gained by Canada prior 1998 and 
presumably will deter its benefits in the future if Brazil remains non conformity with SCM 
Agreement.  This claim show that the concept of nullification or impairment is not merely 
addressing reasonable expectation concept, but also deter benefit prior the claim submitted by 
Canada. 
 However, the DSU merely recognizes concept of nullification or impairment close to 
the concept of injury in the law of contract that entails consequential damage and expectancy 
                                                          
92  Abbot, Kenneth W.,(1996), ‘Defensive Unfairness : The Normative Structure of Section 301’,Fair Trade and 
Harmonization, Prerequisite for Free Trade?:Vol. 2 Legal Analysis, eds. Bhagwati, Jagdish N. &Hudec, 
Rubert E., Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press – Massachusetts/USA. pp. 38. 
 
93 Jackson, John H., (1997), The World Trading System, Law and Policy of International Economic System, 
Second edition, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press – Massachusetts/USA, pp.120.   
 
94Brazil – Export Financing Program for Aircraft, Report of the Panel,(WT/DS46/R) 14-4-1999. 
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damage.  The consequential damage does not flow directly from a breach of contract but from 
the consequences of the breach.  These damages are, in a sense, one step removed from the 
breach itself.  Consequential damage include those based on a loss of expected profits, often 
referred to as expectancy damages, and damages based on a longer term loss of benefits, often 
referred to as lost opportunity damages.95 From this point of view, the nullification or 
impairment is deemed of losing the benefits accruing to the member under the covered 
agreement which is referred as consequential and expectancy damages. This concept is 
notably as basic rationale of cause of action in seeking adjustment by virtue of GATT Article 
XXIII.   
 
3. Trade Remedy in the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
The objective of WTO dispute settlement system is rebalancing trade concession 
which is impeded by the violating member; hence the violating member is obliged to comply 
with the recommendations and rulings of DSB.  Article 21 of DSU therefore sets out the 
obligation of violating party to comply with recommendation and ruling of the DSB in such 
period of time. However, in such cases, some members find difficulty to comply due to 
further complicated by the fact that domestic regulatory system are heavily bureaucratized.  
There thus needs to be a procedural consensus among competing groups, based on the belief 
that lawmaking processes balance interest and alleviate unequal amounts of 
influence.96Furthermore, political and economic pressure that might affect a violating 
member’s decision to carry on the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, leading to 
thecomplainant member accepting much less than full compliance,97 or otherwise non-
compliant measure.98 
                                                          
95Fitsgerald, Jean, and Olivio, Laurence, (2005), Fundamental of Contract Law, Second Edition, Emond 
Montgomery Publications-Toronto/Canada, pp. 129. 
 
96Zurn, Michael, and Joerges, Christian, (2005), Understanding Compliance with International Law, Law and 
Governance in Postnational Europe: Compliance beyond the Nation-State, Cambridge University Press – 
Cambridge/UK, pp. 312. See also Babu, R. Rajesh, (2012), Remedies under the WTO Legal System, 
MartinusNijhoff Publisher – Leiden/the Netherland, pp. 40-42. 
 
97Van den Bossche, Peter, and Zdouc, Werner, (2013), The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 
(Third Edition), Cambdrige University Press – Cambridge/UK, pp.307.See alsoBrimeyer, (2001), ‘Bananas, 
Reef, and Compliance in the World Trade Organization: The Inability of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Process to Achieve Compliance from Superpower Nations’, Minnesota Journal of Global Trade, Vol. 10, 
No. 1, pp.133. Brimeyer argues that compliance is doubtful because of disagreement as to what full 
compliance entails.  In some cases, it appears that the settlement system must be given the benefit of the 
doubt. 
 
98See EC – Banana Case, Supra Note 38, In this case the idea of compliance is a political calculation – 
strengthening the political economy perspective- however EU preferred non-compliance as a result from a 
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In term of disagreement of compliance measure, Article 21 (5) of DSU notes that a 
party is possible to resort to the original panel to determine whether violating party taken 
measure to comply with the recommendations and rulings,99 or the complainant party may 
recourse directly to Article 22 of DSU, if the compliance is not achieved by the deadline.  
These two articles have sequencing problem, where Hudec mentioned that implementation of 
Article 22 of DSU cannot be separated from the working of Article 21(5) of DSU.100 
However, it is possible to recourse to both articles simultaneously, as long as the parties 
would request the arbitrator to suspend its work in proceedings Article 22 until the adoption 
of the compliance panel under the Article 21(5) of DSU.  Another possible way is direct 
recourse to Article 22 of DSU, without preceding the Article 21(5) of DSU.   
 
3.1. The Objective of Article 22 of DSU 
 The main objective of Article 22 of DSU profoundly remarks that any measures taken 
according to this article should be able to bring the violating party to full implementation of a 
recommendation and ruling of the DSB. In other word, the measure sets out in the Article 22 
predominantly to induce violating member to comply with WTO rules.   Hence, Article 22 (2) 
of DSU notes that: 
 “If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a 
covered agreement into compliance therewith or otherwise comply with the recommendations 
and rulings within the reasonable period of time determined pursuant to paragraph 3 of 
Article 21, such Member shall, if so requested, and no later than the expiry of the reasonable 
period of time, enter into negotiations with any party having invoked the dispute settlement 
procedures, with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation. If no satisfactory 
compensation has been agreed within 20 days after the date of expiry of the reasonable 
period of time, any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
rational choice, nevertheless the EU has had every chance to implement WTO decision.  In Banana Case, EU 
preferential treatment of former colonies and the major economic activity of country were at stake if EU 
reasonably prefers to comply with the decision. 
 
99Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of DSU, 
(WT/DS70/AB/RW), 21-7-2000. Appellate Body held that interpretation of Article 21(5) of DSU refers to 
measures which have been, or which should be, adopted by the member to bring about compliance of the 
recommendation and rulings of the DSB. 
 
100Hudec, Robert E., (2000), ‘Broadening the scope of Remedies in WTO dispute Settlement’, inImproving WTO 
Dispute Settlement Procedures, eds. Weiss, Friedl,  &Wiers, Jochem, Cameron May Publisher – 
London/UK., pp. 345.  See also Case Australia Automotive Leader, Supra Note 69.  The complainant would 
not initiate Article 22 proceedings until the circulation of the compliance panel’s report pursuant to Article 21 
(5) of DSU. 
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authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of 
concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements.” 
 
 The objective of Article 22 (2) of DSU is focusing on the remedial measure which is 
divided into three remedial measures taken by the parties to the dispute.  First measure is the 
removal of violations by violating party.  This measure is known in the domain of public 
international law as cessation and non-repetition which is generally considered a foremost 
remedy for an internationally wrongful act.101 
Second measure is compensation.  Compensation constitutes a refund remedy where 
usually denotes a pecuniary concept.  As it is known by public international law, 
compensation should be achieved in accordance to cover any financially assessable damage 
including loss of profit.102 In general, compensation is the most liberal form of remedies that 
aims to achieve a “mutually acceptable” settlement based on the principle of “full and fair 
address”, the assessable damage therefore should be determined by both parties to the 
dispute.103 However, compensation in some cases allows the continuation of the WTO 
inconsistent measure, and in doing so conflicts with the objective of Article 22 of DSU.104  
For instance, in US – Copyright Case where the U.S. and EU mutually agreed to resolved the 
dispute with the U.S. paying a set amount of fund.  The agreement did not require the U.S. to 
amend the act found to be a violation of the U.S. obligations under TRIPs Agreement.  To the 
                                                          
101 Article 30, Cessation and Non-Repetition The State responsibility for the internationally wrongful act is under 
an obligation: (a) To cease that act, if it is continuing; (b) To offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of 
non-repetition, if circumstances so require. Articles of Responsibility of States, Supra Note 83.  See also 
Resolution of the General Assembly of the UN, A/RES/56/83, Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, adopted on Dec.12, 2001. 
 
102Article of Responsibility of States, Supra Note 83. Article 36 (Compensation), (1) The State responsible for an 
internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as 
such damage is not made good by restitution. (2) The compensation shall cover any financially assessable 
damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established.  
 
103Cho, Sungjoon,(2004), ‘the Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law’,the University of Pittsburgh Law 
Review, Vol. 65 No. 763, pp. 5. 
 
104Mercurio, Bryan, (2009), ‘Why Compensation Cannot Replace Trade Retaliation in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding’, World Trade Review, Vol. 8 No. 2, United Kingdom, pp. 315-338. See also 
Bronckers, Marco, and Van den Broek, Naboth, (2006), “Financial Compensation in the WTO: Improving 
Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement”, in Reform and Development of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 
eds. Georgiev, Dencho, and Vand der Borght, Kim , Cameron May – London/UK, pp. 43. 
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contrary, the relevant U.S. legislation at issue remains unchanged, meaning the compensation 
somehow does not always meet the objective of Article 22 of DSU.105 
Third measure is suspension the application to the member concerned of concessions 
or other obligations under the covered agreements.  This last measure is able to take if the 
parties to the dispute fail to hold the compensation measure.  The suspension of concession or 
other obligations under the covered agreement constitutes a trade retaliation action or trade 
countermeasure since the injury party implies it unilaterally.  This last remedy has been long 
remarkably recognized under public international law as restitution or a retrospective form of 
reparation.106 Nevertheless, unlike restitution concept granted under public international law 
which takes into account past as well as expected future injury, Article 22 of DSU provides 
for the authorization of retaliation exclusively for the future.  This means that the only 
concessions that may be suspended are those are equivalent to the benefits to be expected by 
injury party in the future because of non-compliant by another member.107  Thus, assessing 
the equivalent of level nullification or impairment is a significant issue before the injury party 
holds retaliation against another party, because the nature of WTO trade retaliation is focusing 
on a restoration of the balance of reciprocity that WTO obligations represent.  This is one of 
the issues that will be elaborated below to attain the legal concept of WTO trade retaliation, 
which derives from the objective of Article 22 of DSU. 
 
3.2. The Legal Concept of Trade Retaliation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
 The word “retaliation” is a generic term for “suspension of concession or other 
obligations” provide in DSU Article 22 (2), and “countermeasures” under Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement).   
                                                          
105 Davies, Arwel, (2006), ‘Reviewing Dispute Settlement at the World Trade Organization: A Time to 
Reconsider the Role/s of Compensation?’ World Trade Review, No.5, pp.31-67. 
 
106Article 35 (Restitution): A state responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make 
restitution, that is, to reestablish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed. Article 
of Responsibility of State, Supra Note 83.See also Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Pol. V. 
Germany), 1928 P.C.I.J. (serv.A) No.17 (Sept.13), available at 
:(http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/cases/chorzow2law.htm),last visited Jan, 12 2010. In its merit, PCIJ 
noted that the essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act-a principle which seems to be 
established by international practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals is that reparation 
must, as far as possible, wipe-out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which 
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. 
107 Vazquez, Carlos M., & Jackson, John H., (2002), ‘Symposium Issue on WTO Settlement Compliance: Some 
Reflections on Compliance with WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions’, Law & Policy International 
BusinessNo.33, pp.555. 
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3.2.1. The Determination of ‘equivalence to the level of nullification or impairment’ 
 One of the most controversial issues regarding trade retaliation in the WTO is the 
determination of appropriate level of nullification or impairment.  Even though Article 22(4) 
of DSU provides the legal concept of “balance” between the amounts of trade retaliation and 
the level of nullification or impairment, parties to the dispute sometimes take unfair advantage 
of the violation.  The target country views things from an economic (mercantilist) perspective, 
which tells that extra – large retaliation involves an extra-large economic gain for the 
retaliating country.108 This perception is contrary to legal concept of balance itself,109 so 
Article 22(6) provides standard of equivalent assessment that is spelled out by Arbitration.  
For example, in the EC - Hormone case, the level of nullification or impairment was defined 
by the arbitrators as being equal to the value of U.S. and Canadian exports of hormone-treated 
beef that would have entered the European market since the EU had withdrawn the ban on 13 
May 1999 (when the reasonable period of time is expired).  The estimate of the impairment 
suffered is therefore based on a counterfactual hypothesis and is crucially expressed as the 
value of trade lost due to the persistence of the wrongful act after the expiry of date.110 Once 
the arbitration determines the equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment, the injury 
country allowed beginning imposing trade retaliation under Article 22 of DSU. 
3.2.2. The Suspension of Concession to Rebalance Trade Concession  
Mercurio notes that the question of whether the retaliatory phase of the process is 
designed to rebalance trade concession is simply not clearly addressed in the text of 
DSU.111However, opposite to Mercurio argument, Article 3(3) of DSU describes that prompt 
settlement (including trade retaliation under Article 22 (3) of DSU) intends to the effective 
functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance between the rights and 
obligations of members.  The articulation of “a proper balance between the rights and 
obligations of members” is also underlying in GATT objective that rights and obligations of 
member are to give “reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the 
                                                          
108Hudec, Robert, Supra Note 100.  See also Lawrence, Robert Z., (2003),  Crimes & Punishment ?: Retaliation 
under the WTO, Institute For International Economics Publisher – Washington/USA, pp. 35 
 
109 Article 51 (proportionally), Article of State Responsibility, Supra Note 83, proportionally requirement is 
taking into account the gravity of wrongful acts. 
 
110 EC – Hormone Case, Supra Note 4. 
 
111Mercurio, Bryan, Supra Note 104. p.317.  See also Pauwelyn, Joost, (2010), ‘The Calculation and design of 
trade retaliation in context: What is the goal of suspending WTO Obligations?’, in The Law, Economics and 
Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement, eds. Bown, Chad P.,  and Pauwelyn, Joost , Cambridge 
University Press – Cambridge/UK, pp. 44-46. 
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substantial reduction in tariffs and other barriers to trade and to eliminate of discriminatory 
treatment in international commerce’.112  It means if one member destructs reciprocal and 
mutually advantages derive from WTO arrangement; it abides to recompense the destruction 
on purpose of rebalance the trade under WTO rules.  
 In particular condition, imposing trade retaliation presumably is not an easy task.  
Even though the level of suspension of concession had equivalent with the level of 
nullification or impairment, the injury country sometimes considers that trade retaliation is 
impracticable or ineffective if it is imposed to the same sector.113  The impracticable condition 
is unaffordable to rebalance trade concession which has been impeded by the violating 
country.  Article 22(6) paragraph (b) and (c) of DSU therefore provide the possibility for 
injury party to seek from the DSB authorization to suspend its concession in other industrial 
sectors covered by the same agreement.  If this measure, still, is considered of little or no 
effect, the country will be able to request the suspension of its obligations covered by another 
agreement (cross retaliation).  In Banana Case III (EU v. Ecuador), WTO Panel confirmed 
that EU had not brought its important regime into compliance with WTO rules.114  Ecuador 
therefore requested the right to retaliate against EU by suspending its obligation under 
TRIPs.115 In March 2000, WTO Arbitrators elaborated on the specific requirements for cross 
retaliation.  In order to impose cross retaliation, the retaliating country must show that is 
impractical and ineffective to suspend obligations in the same sector or the same agreement.  
In the case at hand, Ecuador reasoned that suspending tariff concessions was not practicable 
since the overwhelming portion of EU imports are primary and investment goods so that 
higher tariffs on these goods increase the cost of domestic production.  Since the EU was 
unable to show that alternative sources of supply were readily available at similar prices and 
without significant transaction costs, the arbitrators concluded that the EU had not shown that 
                                                          
112GATT Preamble.  Available at:  (http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm), last visited 
January, 21, 2010.  
 
113Article 22 (3) para. (a) of DSU. See also Shadikhodjaev, Sherzod, (2009), Retaliation in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System, Kluwer Law International Publisher – the Hague/The Netherland, pp. 44-47. 
 
114EC – Banana Case, Supra Note 6.   
 
115Ibid, See also Subramanian, Arvind, (2003), “India as User and Creator of Intellectual Property: The 
Challenges Post-Doha”, in India and the WTO, eds. Stein, Robert M.,andMattoo, Aaditya, The World Bank 
and Oxford University Press – Washington USA/Oxford/UK, pp. 169 – 180.  The issue is whether such 
procedures could unduly circumscribe the use of TRIPS as retaliation when partner country infringements are 
goods.  This depends very much on the interpretation of what is deemed effective and practicable.   
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suspension of tariff concessions on primary and investment goods is practicable.116  Ecuador 
therefore argued that tariff increases on EU imports are also unlikely to have a significant 
effect since Ecuador only accounts for a small proportion of EU exports.  The Arbitrators 
acknowledged that the retaliating country should ensure that the impact of the suspension has 
the result of inducing compliance.  According to Article 22 (8) DSU, retaliation serves to 
pressure the non-compliant party to comply with DSB rulings.117However, for Ecuador, 
imposing cross retaliation was perceivable to rebalance its trade concession that had impeded 
by the banana regime of EU. 
3.2.3. Trade Retaliation is Temporary Measure to Induce Compliance  
 Unlike national law, nothing in the parlance of international trade law promulgates 
retaliation as punishment.  It simply indicates in Article 3 (7), 21 (6), and 22 (1) DSU, that 
trade retaliation is only a temporary measure that falls short of resolving the dispute.  The 
DSU clearly stipulates in Article 19 that the preferred remedy is for the non-compliant party 
to bring its measure into conformity with the relevant covered agreement.  Hence, retaliation 
should be withdrawn once the non-compliant party brings its measure into conformity with 
WTO rules.  From this point of view, the retaliation serves to induce compliance118 and 
should only be in place until such time.119  The imposition of retaliation can be immediately 
after DSB authorized the injured party to impose suspension concession or other obligation 
under covered agreement.  An important procedural dispute arose in the Banana Case 
between the EU and the United States over the relative primacy and sequencing of 
compliance.  The United Stateswished to retaliate immediately while the EU argued that this 
could only be done if its new trade measures for bananas were found not to comply with the 
WTO rules.120 
 Once an injury party decide to impose retaliation, it is necessary to consider the ‘good 
faith’ of non-compliant party to further comply with WTO rules.  It is understood that the 
                                                          
116Ibid ,  Banana Case, Supra Note 6,  at para. 88 – 96 
 
117Banana Case, Supra Note 38. 
 
118Banana case Supra Note 38, para. 6.3.  Arbitrators stated that “we agree with the United States that this 
temporary nature (of countermeasures) indicates that is the purpose of countermeasures to induce 
compliance” 
 
119The Article 22(8) DSU provides “the suspension of concession or other obligations shall be temporary and 
shall only be applied until “such time” as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has 
been removed...” 
 
120  Banana Case, Supra Note 38. 
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retaliation is merely aimed at putting economic and political pressure on non-compliant 
member to withdraw or amend the WTO- illegal measures.  Nothing in the text of DSU offers 
a range of ways and means to punish the member country due to illegal measures that 
conducted in the past. 
 There are 4 cases lead to request to authorize retaliation and 6 cases are granted to 
impose retaliation. 
Request to have authorization to retaliate: 
1. United States v. EC, Section 110 (5) of US Copyright Act, Recourse to Article 21 (3) 
(c) of the DSU by the EC (WT/DS160/12) 7 January 2002. 
2. United States v. Argentina, Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil 
Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, Recourse to Article 21 (5) of the DSU by 
Argentina, (WT/DS268/AB/RW) 21 June 2007. 
3. European Communities v. U.S., Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, (WT/DS291/R), 17 January 2008. 
4. United States v. Indonesia, Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove 
Cigarettes, (WT/DS406/AB/R) 23 August 2013. 
Granting Authorization to impose retaliation 
1. United States v. Australia, Brazil, Chile, EC, Indonesia, India, Japan, Continued 
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, (WT/DS217/14 and WT/DS234/22) 
retaliation granted in 26 November 2004. 
2. European Communities v. U.S and Ecuador – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, Recourse to Article 21 (5) of the DSU by the United State 
and Ecuador (WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA and ECU) 26 November 2008. 
3. Canada v. Brazil, Export Credit and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft, Recourse 
to Arbitration by Canada under Article 22 (6) of the DSU and 4 (11) of the SCM 
Agreement, (WT/DS222/ARB) 17 February 2003. 
4. United States v. Canada and Mexico, Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 
2000 (WT/DS234/CAN and MEX) 26 November and 17 December 2004. 
5. United States v. Brazil, Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Recourse to Arbitration under 
Article 22 of the DSU and 4 (11) SCM Agreement, (WT/DS267/ARB) 19 November 
2009. 
6. United States v. Antigua & Barbuda, Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, Recourse to Arbitration under Article 22 (6) of the 
DSU, (WT/DS285/ARB) 28 January 2013. 
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3.3. The General Implications of WTO Trade Retaliation  
 WTO agreements are mainly to govern international trade player in the level of state.  
States as member abide by WTO law to rule small scale of international trade players in their 
domestic level, such as exporter, importer, individual, or trade union.  The trade retaliation is 
seemingly focused on state as international trade player, but does not touch the low level of 
international trade player.  Accordingly, to achieve the purpose of this research, some general 
implications of WTO retaliation will be elaborated below 
 
3.3.1. Implication of WTO Trade Retaliation to State as the WTO Member 
 The coherence factor between WTO trade retaliation and state as international trade 
player is depending on economic equilibrium of country itself.  For some countries (known as 
‘big international trade player’ such as EU, the U.S., Canada and Japan), WTO trade 
retaliation takes effect to small part of their monetary value in Gross National Income (GNI), 
because the implication of WTO trade retaliation is depending on the size of the economies 
involved, the degree of bilateral trade between the two nations to the dispute and the 
composition of this trade and, its relative importance.121  For EU, the suspension of 
concession amounting to up USD 191.4 million per year levied by the U.S. would not 
detriment whole GNI per year.122 
On the contrary, the economic implication of WTO trade retaliation would probably 
different when a small economic country is dependent on the defendant country as the only 
possible source of its exports.  Horn and Mavroidis123 also mentioned if the suspension of 
concession is costly; it will be more costly to the country with higher trade barriers.  If  in one 
country, the suspension reduces imports from US$600 to US$ 500 million, while in another 
country imports fall from US$100 to nil, and then from an economic point of view the loss to 
be felt more severely in the latter country.  Consequently, to the extent that small economic 
countries (small GNI countries) have higher barriers to trade, there may be an argument to be 
                                                          
121 Horn, Hendrick, and Mavroidis, Petros C.,(1999), ‘Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement System and 
Developing Country Interest’, Research Paper, Institute for Economic Studies, Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, Stockholm University – Sweden, November 14, 1999, pp. 21. See also Shanin, Magda,  (2011), 
‘WTO Dispute Settlement for Middle-Income Developing Country: The Situation Egypt’, in Dispute 
Settlement at the WTO: the Developing Country Experience, eds. Schaffer, Gregory C., and Melendez-Ortiz, 
Ricardo, Cambridge University Press – Cambridge/UK, pp.282-284 
 
122EC – Banana case, Supra Note 38. 
 
123 Horn, Hendrick, and Mavroidis, Petros C. Supra Note 121. 
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made for why they should suffer more in welfare terms from a countermeasure or retaliation 
of a given size.  
 Coherence with argument above, Yusuggested, “An import tariff on a small country 
pushes up its domestic import price, which in turn leads to higher domestic production and 
less consumption on the importable.  Without a doubt, such a small country bears a dead 
weight loss due to both production and consumption distortions.”124 This term therefore will 
aggravate domestic users, who suffer a loss of choice and probably have to pay higher prices 
for substitute product. Nevertheless, if a small country is retaliated, the import tariff will boost 
the price of exported product, which means domestic users particularly in a large country will 
acquire substitute product from different exporter country but less price.  Furthermore, the 
competition among exporters from developing countries is fierce, since developing countries 
are typically exporting similar products.125 
  The case of Brazil –Aircraft between Brazil and Canada was illustrative for the 
effects of implementation of the WTO retaliation on a developing country.  The retaliation 
measure was imposed since Brazil had failed to withdraw the export subsidies for regional 
aircraft under the PROEXpolicy.  Hence, the Brazilian policy was deemed to be nullification 
and impairment of the benefits accruing to Canada’s aircraft trade under the SCM Agreement.  
In 2000, following the Panel and Appellate Body decisions, Canada was allowed to impose 
retaliation against Brazil with respect to the suspension of the application of tariff concessions 
under GATT 1994, the suspension of obligation under the Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing, and the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.  Subsequently, WTO 
Arbitration determined the level of suspension in maximum amount of C$ 344.2 million per 
year.126 
According to Canada Gazette May 13, 2000,127  Canada would suspend the obligations 
under GATT 1994 by imposing 100% surtax on selected items imported from Brazil; the 
                                                          
124 Yu, Miaojie, (2007), ‘Measuring the Impact of Trade Protection on Industrial Production Size’, Research 
Paper Presented at the 2007 AEA Annual Meeting, Chicago, December 31, 2007, pp.11. 
 
125Trade Barriers Faced by Developing Countries’ Exporters of Tropical and Diversification Products, 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and the Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), FAO Trade Policy Brief No. 16, March 2008, available 
at(www.fao.org/es/esc/en/378/428/index.html.), last visited : 20 May 2008. 
 
126Brazil – export Financing Program for Aircraft, WT/DS46/ARB, August, 28 2000.  In reference to report of 
the Appellate Body, WTO/DS46/AB/RW, July, 21 2000, and WT/DS46/AB/R, August, 2 1999.Report of the 
Panel, WT/DS46/R, April, 14 1999. 
 
127Canada Gazette, Department of Foreign Affair and International Trade (DFAIT), May 13 2000.  Available at 
www.dfait.go.ca., last visited may 16, 2008. 
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surtax would be in addition to any existing rate of duty on these imports.  The initial lists 
included most industrial and agricultural products.  Canada also permitted the imposing of 
restraints on imports of textile and clothing outside the provision of Agreement on Textiles 
and Clothing.  Additionally, Canada was allowed to suspend its obligations to Brazil under 
Agreement on Import Licensing.  The Brazil General Preferential Tariff Treatment (GPT) 
would be suspended up to 100% tariff imports ad valorem.128  According to Canada Custom 
and Revenue Agency 2001, in the Custom Tariff Schedule, Canada imposed Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) Tariff to textile products about 10% - 16% per item.129 
If Canada would impose 100% surtax on each textile items that imported from Brazil, 
which was practically increasing the price of every piece of clothing imported from Brazil in 
the Canada’s market, then it would gradually exclude Brazil’s textile and clothing products in 
the Canada’s market.  It was obvious that the retaliation had an adverse effect upon the 
Brazilian exporters.  Finally, the impact of suspension of obligations would be able to 
decrease trade welfare to both Brazilian exporter and producers. 
Another implication of WTO retaliation by increasing tariff levels is particularly 
troublesome for smaller developing country members who have lack of capacity in retaliating 
non-compliant member.  As India summed up this matter in a proposal to the DSU Review 
mentioned that the tremendous imbalance in the trade relations between developed and 
developing countries places severe constraints on the ability of developing countries to 
exercise their rights under Article 22 of DSU.  The economic cost of withdrawal of 
concessions in the goods sector would have a greater adverse impact on the complaining 
developing country Member than on the defaulting developedcountry Member and would 
only further deepen the imbalance in their trade relations already seriously injured by the 
nullification and impairment of benefits.130 Thus, in terms of WTO retaliation, the implication 
of it depends on the size of trade bilateral between the country members to the dispute.   
 Nevertheless, WTO retaliation implies unfortunate condition to developed country as 
well as developing country, in particular to private economic actors.  In Banana Case, DSB 
determined that the EU import regime for bananas violated WTO non-discrimination 
principle. In 1999, DSB authorized the U.S. to suspend tariff concessions up to US$ 191.4 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
  
128Canada Department Foreign and International Trade (DFAIT), Export – Import Control Bureau, 2001 – 2002. 
 
129Ibid 
 
130TN/DS/W/19, at 1, see also Steinberg, Richard, (2002), ‘in the Shadow of Law or Power?: Consensus-Based 
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO’, International Organization JournalNo. 56, pp. 339-374. 
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million per year in imports of EU products in attributable to non-compliant of EU to Panel 
and Appellate rulings and recommendation.131 The U.S. levied 100% ad valorem customs 
duties on imports of various EU – origin goods, such as batteries, bed linen, paper boxes, 
spectacles cases and bath products.132This prohibitive tariff is consequently damaging trade 
benefits of certain EU industries, which do not have been benefiting from the EU Banana 
regime. 
 
3.3.2. Implication of WTO Trade Retaliation to Private Economic Actors 
According to the explanation above, WTO retaliation is more inflicting private 
economic actors within the countries to the dispute, since the private economic actors are the 
predominant player of international trade.  WTO retaliatory measures do not benefit the injury 
member but instead damage the innocent such as private economic actors, because from the 
economic point of view, trade retaliation is inefficient for both the country imposing the 
retaliatory measures as well as for the target nation.133 
From the perspective of importing country – importers are facing troublesome in 
adjusting the level of tariff, due to the application of - for example- 100% tariff ad valorem.  
Importer is holding obligations to pay more for the importing goods.  Economically, higher 
tariff will be presumably affecting the price of goods in the market, thus in the end of trading 
circumstance, the consumer will pay higher price than normal leverage.  In addition, the high 
tariff will inflict the cost of production if the goods are raw material.  For example, imposing 
100 % tariff on the spare part of automotive will boost the cost of production of vehicles for 
producers.   
The fact that trade retaliation causes harm to businesses or consumers in the country 
imposing trade retaliation (importing country) becomes polemic.  For example, the major 
critics happened when the U.S. has proposed to impose a 100 percent tariff on all European 
motorcycles and scooters under 500cc engine displacement as part of retaliation for the EU’s 
ongoing import ban on U.S. beef from cattle that have been treated with growth hormones, 
because EU officially have not lifted the 20 years old ban despite a WTO order to end it. 
Arbitrator therefore decided to allow the U.S. to impose US$116.8 million on import duties to 
more than 100 European goods.  One of the hit lists are motorcycles imported from EU. 
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133  See Pawelyn, Joost, Supra Note 111. 
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American automotive industries therefore urge the U.S. Government to consider the negative 
effect of imposing high tariff in this industry, because the majority of motorcycles and 
scooters under 500cc are sold through local dealerships.  Collectively, these dealerships 
contribute to the employment of a substantial number of Americans working in sales, 
services, parts and general operations.  Imposing 100% tariff on importation of these 
motorcycles and scooters will eventually spread the negative effect from dealer to 
consumer,134 because higher tariffs are intendedto increase the cost of targeted items to 
consumers and, thus, lead to declining purchases. 
 If the WTO retaliation is a blunt instrument for importers in retaliating country then it 
is also blatant measure for exporter in non-compliant country.  It can be viewed after the U.S. 
won Banana Case with EU. The U.S retaliated EU by implying 100% tariff to several EU 
Companies which is causing loss of trade benefit for those companies from April 1999 to June 
2001. This situation also happened to the U.S. when EU won its challenge before the WTO 
regarding the US – FSC/ETI case.135 On March 2004, the DSB authorized EU to imply 
retaliatory tariffs against the U.S. exports.  EU proposed list of goods which are subject to a 
100% tariff.  The list tilts heavily towards a large number of products that seemingly could be 
made just about anywhere in the U.S., such as the precious stones and jewelry, machinery and 
mechanical appliances, wood and paper articles, leather and leather articles, and toys and 
sport equipment.136 The effect of raising exports duties could cause most producers of the 
targeted products withered away after a short period of time. Furthermore, market distortion 
and unemployment tends to be a dilemmatic result of WTO retaliation.   
 At every point in WTO retaliation, it fails to consider how imposing of high tariff will 
hurt innocent victims in both importing and exporting country, as Charnovitz mentioned that 
WTO has no requirement that the sanctioning government provide help to private economic 
actors who bears the damage of retaliation.  Indeed, the DSU itself completely ignores the 
burden of any duties collected from exporters and importers within countries to the dispute.137 
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135United States — Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations,” Recourse to Article 21.5 of DSU by the 
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In general, the WTO retaliation also contradicts with raison d’etre of WTO objective 
since the retaliation mostly implies as trade barrier.138  The WTO objective based on the 
principle that the expansion of trade through reduced barriers leads to economic growth, trade 
development, and poverty reduction, but the retaliation of the imposing of higher trade 
barriers in attempt to remedy another member transgression seems contradictory.  In this 
regard, retaliatory measure could have the effect of limiting or reducing economic growth and 
trade development in domestic equilibrium.  The most controversy argument is trade 
retaliation seemingly against poverty reduction, since higher tariff could be perceived as cause 
of losing job in several industries.139 
It is simply argued by the creator of DSU that the implications of WTO retaliation will 
urge the companies and workers hurts by declining sales, in turn, could be expected to lobby 
their governments to change policy to conform with WTO rules. But in fact, it is not an easy 
task to change domestic policy.  Some policies are hardly to remove or to amend because of 
political influence, as the EU remains implies banana policy for years after the condemnation 
by the WTO Adjudication Bodies.  
This research objectively inquiries the implications of WTO retaliation to private 
economic actors within non-compliant country member by using the U.S. and EU as subject 
of research. The preliminary hypothesis is the implication of WTO retaliation is harmful to 
private economic actors while they are subject to rules implied by their governments.  Thus, 
state should therefore endorse a feasible system to ensure its citizen to obtain redress when 
their rights are infringed by the disobedience of its government to WTO rules.  From this 
point of view, state liability principle may be viewed as an important remedy for private 
economic actors whose seek compensation.  To this regard, compensation may be viewed as 
recompense of private right according to the objective of WTO. 
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139 See Federal Government Proposes 100% Tariff on European Motorcycles Under 500cc, Supra Note 137.  The 
head of AMA calculated, if US impose 1OO% tariff in European motorcycles, it will spell the end of about 
400 US motorcycle and scooter dealerships, and put their employees out in the street.  Then it causes poverty 
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CHAPTER II 
PRIVATE ECONOMIC ACTORS IN THE WTO LAW 
 
1. Defining Private Economic Actor toward the WTO 
 The question about private economic actors in the WTO was absent from the 
Marrakesh Agreement, since the focus of WTO is not on the individual trader, but rather on 
the meshing of governmental trade policies in to beneficial of global trade.140  But then 
another question arises, what is the correlation between private economic actors and WTO? 
How to define private economic actor toward the WTO? For the purpose of analysis about 
private economic actors, the argument begins with the economic activity in one state, 141where 
economic activity in one state may be defined into two parts.  First, there are those areas 
which the state is directly acting as economic actors. Second, in the field of economic activity, 
state is merely influencing the economic process through policies which are directly or 
indirectly addressed to non-state economic actors or private economic actors.142 
1.1.  State is Acting as Economic Actor 
An economic actor is basically defined as individual who is acting as producers, sellers, 
consumers, workers, investors, exporters and importers (in economic theory they are known 
                                                          
140Charnovitz, Steve,(2001), ‘the WTO and the Rights of Individual’, Journal of Intereconomics, Vol. 
March/April, pp. 1.  See also Kong, Qinjiang, (2002), China and the World Trade Organization: a Legal 
Perspective, World Scientific Publishing – London/UK, pp. 100.  The WTO Agreement is similar to any 
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141Economic activity is the production and distribution of goods and services. Economic Activity is also 
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(2008), World Development Indicators, The World Bank Publications-Washington/USA. 
 
142Pierson, Christopher,(2004), The Modern State, Routledge – NY/USA, pp.80. 
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as economic agents).143 In a general legal framework, legal definition of economic actor has 
moved beyond a simple barter system to more global economic system.  The basic legal 
definition of economic actor is a person (legal entity)144, who is holding the object of 
economic activity (proprietorship)145, then become broader with the concept of partnership 
(joint ownership).146 But this general legal system is of course established by the ruling of 
government, which is itself an important economic actor.  Accordingly, state who is acting as 
economic actor will be addressed before explaining non state economic actors.  The 
explanation is divided into two different economic systems, the non-market economy 
country147 and market economy country systems148. 
1.1.1. Non Market Economy Country 
 In a non-market economy country, state is acting totally as economic actor where the 
government seeks to determine economic activity largely through a mechanism of central 
planning.  The production targets, prices, costs, investment allocations, raw materials, labor, 
international trade and most other economic aggregates are manipulated within a national 
economic plan drawn up by a central planning authority.  Hence the public sector makes the 
                                                          
143 Wilber, Charles K., (2003), ‘Ethics and Economic Actors’,Post-Autistic-Economic Review, Issues no.21, 
Article No.3, 13 September 2003. See alsoLove, Patrick, and Lattimore, Ralph, (2009), International Trade: 
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144See Marsh, S.B., and Soulsby, J., (2002), Business Law: Eight Edition, Nelson Thomas Ltd – Edinburgh/UK, 
pp. 54. Legal entity is anything recognized by law as having legal right and duties, it is simply a person in the 
ordinary sense but the person who has legal capacity. 
 
145See the ancient definition of proprietorship according to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania – In Equity, ‘in the case of Laura Keene vs. Wheatley & Clarke’. See The American 
Law Register Vol. IX, (1861), eds. Fish, Asa I., and Wharton, Henry, D.B. Canfield & Co. Goldsmiths Hall, 
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compounded of the proprietor beneficial rights, and his rights of excluding other persons from the use or 
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146Rosenberg R.R., and Ott, W. G.,(1977),College business law, Shaum’s Outline Series, McGraw-Hill, New 
York/USA, pp. 61 
147Nove, Alec, (1987), ‘Planned Economy’, the New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, vol. 3,Stockton Press 
– NY/USA. pp. 879-880.  Non market economy is also known as planned economy which is an economic 
system when the state manages the economy.  The central government makes all decisions on the production 
and consumption of goods and services.  States also employs “influence, subsidies, grants and taxes but does 
not compel”.  In the planned economy country may consist of state owned enterprises and private enterprises 
directed by the state. 
 
148Altvater, E.,(1993). The Future of the Market: An Essay on the Regulation of Money and Nature after the 
Collapse of "Actually Existing Socialism”, Verso Books – London/UK, pp. 237–238.  A market economy is 
economy based on the division of labor in which the prices of goods and services are determined in a free 
price system set by supply and demand.   
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major decisions affecting demand and supply within the national economy.149  However, since 
GATT was designed by market economy for market economy countries, there is not a 
standard criterion for the market versus non market economy distinction,150 except for non-
market economy country; WTO Members explicitly recognize that it needs to be treated 
differently than market economy countries in antidumping case.151 
 Perhaps most tangible factor for state as economic actors in the non-economy 
market system is when state itself is holding almost all object of economy activity.  State can 
be acting as owner and producers, sellers and policy maker.  In the state-socialist societies of 
East Central Europe and former Soviet Union, state ownership was the preponderant form of 
ownership within the formal economy. Disposing of these state assets in ways which are fair, 
efficient and lawful has been acutely problematic.152 Furthermore, in this economic system, 
government can control foreign trading and entrepreneurship based on the centrally planned, 
where the implementation of economic freedom concept is decreasing.153 It seems contrary to 
the basic principle of WTO which the WTO Agreements and its trade systems are milestones 
                                                          
149S. Wang, (1996), ‘the US Trade Laws concerning Nonmarket Economics Revisited for Fairness and 
Consistency’, Emory International Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 593 – 616. Wang argues that in a non-
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Agreement, Article VI of GATT 1994. 
 
152Frydman, A. RapacyznskiFrydman and Earle, J., (1993), The Privatization Process in Central Europe, London 
and Budapest, Central European University Press – Budapest/Hungary, pp. 276. 
 
153See Friedman, Milton, and Friendman, Rose,(1990), Free to Choose: A personal Statement – A Classic 
Inquiry into the Relationship between Freedom and Economics, A Harvest Book (Harcourt Inc.) – 
Orlando/USA, pp.2-30.  Friedman concept of economic freedom is simply a requisite for political freedom, 
by enabling people to cooperate with one another without coercion or central direction it reduces the area 
over which political power is exercised.  See alsoGwartney, James, and Lawson, Robert, (2004), Economic 
Freedom of the World, 2004 Annual Report, The Fraser Institute – Vancouver/Canada, pp. 5.  In this report, 
economic freedom requires governments to refrain from actions that interferes personal choice, voluntary 
exchange and the freedom to enter and compete labor and product markets.  Economic freedom is reduced 
when taxes, government expenditures and regulations are substituted for personal choice, voluntary 
exchange, and market coordination.  Restriction that limits entry into occupations and business activities also 
retard economic freedom. 
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on the long and winding road worldwide economic freedom, consumer welfare and 
democratic peace.154 Hence, the explanation of non-market economy country will be excluded 
in this research, since the WTO is more focus on state as economic actor in a market economy 
system.155 
1.1.2. Market Economy Country 
 Contrary to the non-market economy country, in a market economy country, state is 
acting as an economic actor in a limited area such a state as owner-producer in State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs).156 State is mostly acting as economic policy maker which is influenced 
by the impact of globalization.157  The impact of globalization is principally concerned to the 
private ownership that is always remained the predominant forms.  The state ownership thus 
tends to be strongly focused upon the public utilities, that is providing basic services which is  
essential to everyone,158 but in the context of globalization, state is possible to devolve its 
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155  Finger, J. Michael, and Winters, L. Alan,(2002), ‘Reciprocity in the WTO’, in Development, Trade and the 
WTO: A Handbook, eds. Hoekman, Bernard, Mattoo, Aaditya, and English, Philip, The World Bank – 
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the direct role of the state in the economy has not lost its relevance.  There is still a number of SOEs in many 
OECD countries and the sector is remarkable for its size, economy impact, and for strategic sectors in which 
it operates. 
 
157Delbrück, Jost, (1993), ‘Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-- Implications for Domestic Law--A 
European Perspective’, Indiana JournalGlobal Legal Studies Vol. 1, pp. 1-9.see alsoDicken, Peter, (1998), 
‘Global Shift: The Internalization of Economic Activity’, Indiana Journal Global Legal Studies Vol. 1, No. 4 
, pp. 1-40, these authors are analyzing the process of globalization resulting from the interactions between 
states and corporations. SeealsoAmman, Afred C., (2002), ‘Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for A 
New Administrative Law’, UCLA Law Review, August 2002, pp.4.  For the context of this research, 
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158 Pierson, Christopher, Supra Note 142, pp. 81.  A public utility is an organization that maintains the 
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activity into independent body.  The economy activity in market economy country tends to 
de-centralize the state, along with the existence of private ownership as a non-state economic 
actor which constitutes as major role in economic equilibrium.  In this part, state as economic 
policy maker is taking more predominant position rather than owner-producer.   
 
1.2. State as Economic Policy Maker 
 In the economic activity within a country, government is acting as economic 
regulator and policy maker.  Economic regulation is an important instrument for government 
policy in market economy.  Some forms of regulations are concerned with setting a 
framework of rules for people to follow in their dealing with each other.159 The regulation 
applies to all market participants160 and it would be defended as a mean of making the market 
process more efficient over the long term.161 This economic regulation derives from economic 
policy of each country where such policies are often influenced by international institution 
like the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.   
 In the globalization era, the economy activity of state is indispensable to the 
international economic relations.  Government increasingly finds difficulties to implement 
commendable policies regarding economic activity because such activity often crosses the 
borders in ways that escape the reach of much of national government control.162Responding 
to these difficulties, states have created a number of international organizations with 
competences in the field of economic relations.163 Hence states are embarking their economy 
policies in harmony with international economic agreements, such as UN Treaty family of 
international economic relations.164 Even if nearly all of these international economic 
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160 Market participants are buyers, sellers and government.  See The OECD Report on Regulatory Reform, 
Volume I: Sectorial Studies, 1997, OECD Publishing – Paris/French. 
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agreements lack a binding character, they influence national economic policies and thereby 
indirectly impinge upon private participants in international economic relations.165 
 From this point of view, there are two levels subject involve in international 
economic relations.  First, an interstate or organization-state level covering the relationships 
among the traditional subject of international law; and second, a level of nationals (individual 
and legal persons) belongs to different state.  The interstate level deals with co-ordination of 
economic policies, elaboration of guidelines and mechanism for international economic co-
operation.  Meanwhile, direct economic interactions on production and exchange of goods are 
executed at the level nationals by private economic actors.166 Accordingly state is directly 
applying international economic agreements which are concern to regulate all market 
participants including non-state economic actor or private economic actor. 
 This research is usingterm of ‘private economic actor’, to distinguish between state 
own enterprise and non-state own enterprise. State own enterprise is an economic actor which 
predominantly exists in non-market economy system, but non-state own enterprise (private 
economic actor) exists due to influence of economic system in market economy country.  
Although in the market economy system state sometimes is acting as economic actor, but the 
form and policy is dissimilar to the concept of it in non-market economy system.   State in 
market economy system is generally maintaining public utilities (it is known as public 
economic actor).   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
165Kunig, Philip, Lau, Niels, and Meng, Werner, ibid, pp. XIII. Although lack of binding character, the 
international economic agreements are upheld to be law when state is voluntarily adopting them into its 
national legislation. Hence it is quiet evidence that international economic relations as a whole cannot be 
regulated in isolation by either international economic law or municipal law. SeeVoitovich, Sergei A., 
(1995), International Economic Organizations in the International Legal Process, MartinusNijhoff 
Publishers – Leiden/Netherlands, pp.4. 
 
166Voitovich, Sergei A., ibid.SeealsoMacDonald, Kate, and Woolcock, Stephen, (2007), ‘Non-State Actors in 
Economic Diplomacy’, in The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision Making and Negotiation in International 
economic Relations (Second Edition), eds. Bayne, Nicholas, and Woolcock, Stephen ,Ashgate Publishing Co 
– Farnham/UK, pp. 78. To complete Voitovich argument, private economic actors also have a crucial 
position in playing the role of economic diplomacy. At national level these actors are engaging with state 
decision-making processes.  It is partly following the new development of domestic economic policy.  At 
international level, these private economic actors are still holding the traditional strategic in which lobbying 
state actors nationally in the hope that their preferred positions will be incorporated within the definition of 
‘national interest’ and taken forward into international fore.  But these days, private economic actors 
mobilize beyond national border to leverage direct pressure on decision makers at the international level.  
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1.3. Private Economic Actors167 
 As mention in previous sub section above, the predominant economic actors within 
a state are private economic actors.  In the context of international economic relations, private 
economic actors are also holding an important part.  As Ostrihansky posited “it is not 
government, but enterprises and individual who make most economic decisions.”168 From this 
argument, it is comprehensible if private economic actors are holding an important role in 
economic environment; moreover, these legal entities for some reasons are affecting 
government economic policy both at the level of national and international.  However, this 
chapter does not give enlighten the existence of private economic actors in political 
dimensions  where private economic actors are holding adequate position in lobbying state in 
promulgating economic policy169, although in the chapter IV, the political relation between 
the U.S. Congress and their economic constitution in regard with implication of WTO 
retaliation will be discussed briefly. This chapter is more about general legal framework on 
relation between state and its private economic actors.  This relation is leading to the 
sustained economic growth in every country where most private economic actors rely upon 
national law of credible commitments to them.  If private economy actors are conducting their 
activities they require assurances of their rights despite their obligations.170 Governments play 
a critical role in securing these collecting goods by providing them directly a stable coalition 
between law and its enforcement. 
 
 
                                                          
167 The term private economic actors are regulated differently in some countries.  In this research, term of private 
economic actors is defined as exporter, importer, producer, seller or buyer, investor, financing institutions 
(bank), service provider (telecommunications operator or other service), in the form of Business Corporation, 
trade enterprise (company or firms), small medium enterprise or multinational company, those who pursue 
their self-interest. These private economic actors are different with Government-Owned Corporation (State 
Owned Enterprises) or Non Profit Corporation who gains profit in a secondary goal or does not pursue any 
interest or profit. See Pride, William J., Hughes, Robert J., and Kapoor, Jack R., (2008), Business (tenth 
edition), South-Western Cengage Learning – Ohio/USA.,pp.11 
 
168Ostrihansky, R. (1991), ‘Settlement of Interstate Trade Disputes – The Role of Law and Legal Procedures’, in 
Netherland Year Book of International Law, Vol. 22, December 1991, T.M.C Asser Institute-The 
Hague/Netherland, pp. 174-175. 
 
169 See MacDonald, Kate, and Woolcock, Stephen, SupraNote 166. 
 
170These rights include rule of law or i.e. property rights and effectiveness of contract.For this argument, 
seeWilliamson, Oliver, (1985), the Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Free Press – NY/USA., p. 15-38. See 
Also North, Douglass, and Weingast, Barry, (1989), ‘Constitution and Commitment: the Evolution of 
Institution Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England’, Journal of Economic History, Vol.49, 
no.4, pp.803.  See also Keefer, Phillip,(2004), ‘A Review of the Political Economy of Governance: from 
Property Right to Voice’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.3315, pp. 2-43. 
 
50 
 
1.3.1.  Private Economic Actor at National Law Level 
At the level of national law, the form of regulations bases on the right and obligations 
of private economic actors in the array of national law which derives from its constitution.A 
pertinent argument in explicating the existence of private economic actors are deliberately 
relating to economic right in every constitution of state. Constitutions in most country are the 
law of making.   
In this sub section, this research involves two different countries to elaborate the 
private economic actor at national law level.  These countries are the U.S. and the EU. The 
argument emphasize certain salient explicates in this sub section which is pertaining merely to 
private economic actors and their rights within the constitution and national law subject to 
them, without putting aside the legal system adopted among these countries.171 Moreover, the 
intentions of giving argument regarding the right of private economic actor will consequently 
coherence with the next argument pertinent to state liability as the predominant inquiry of this 
research. 
1.3.1.1. The United States of America 
Even though the Constitution of America does not specifically mention private 
economic actors (Business Corporation)172, the nineteenth century lawyers argued that 
business corporation should be considered as citizen or person for applications of any rights 
derive from various constitutional provisions.173 Perhaps this argument can be traced back to 
the earliest case identified business corporation as person.  In the case of Santa Clara Country 
                                                          
171The American legal system is often referred to as being in the common law tradition.  The fact is that the 
Anglo American system is a combination of judge made law and legislature made law.  Both types of law 
making bodies are regarded as legitimate norms and creators and interpreters.  See Malone, Albert P., and 
Karnes, Allan, (2008), the American Legal System: Perspective, Politics, Processes and Policies (Second 
Edition), Rowman& Littlefield Publishers – Maryland/USA, pp. 5.  Dissimilar to the U.S. (as a country), the 
EU operates through a hybrid system of supranationalism and intergoverntalism.  The EU legal system (also 
known as Community legal system) is based on several sources of law.  The EU law is not universal; its 
competence is limited to the power attributed to the Union by the legal texts adopted by the Member States.  
General principles of law which are recognized and applied by the member states have been used by the ECJ 
to underpin the Community Legal System. SeeHorspool, Margot, &Humpreys, Mathew, (2006), European 
Union Law, Oxford University Press – Oxford/UK., pp. 69. 
 
172 Mayer, Carl J., (1990), ‘Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporation and the Bill of Rights’, Hastings Law 
Journal (March 1990), pp. 557 -667.  Mayer mentioned the term of “corporation” includes both public and 
private corporations.  It is concerned particularly with the large, publicly held corporation of the kind that 
dominates the American economy. 
 
173See Hurst, J. W., (1970), The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States in 1780-
1780, The University Press of Virginia – Virginia/USA, p. 14-40. The most corporations were chartered by 
the state legislatures for specific purposes, including banks, canal companies, and trading companies. 
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v. Southern Pacific Railroad174, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a business corporation is 
a person and entitled to the legal rights and protections of the U.S. Constitution that afford to 
any person.  Because the U.S. Constitution does not mention of corporations, it is a fairly 
clear case of the Court was taking it upon itself to rewrite the constitution.175 After long road 
of jurisprudence in America, some constitutional protections apply to business corporations, 
and enjoy many of the same rights and privileges as natural person do.176  The private 
economic actors enjoy protection from government’s intrusion.  These protections derive 
from bill of rights,177 and it involves the corporation rights to sue or be sued.178 
From this point of view, the law governing the rights of private economic actors in 
the U.S. began with somejurisprudence delineated by the U.S. Court.  Coherence with it, the 
rights and obligations of private economic actors set out in their domestic commercial law.  
For example, the commercial law regulates private economic actors in many areas of 
commercial activities, such as contract law; corporate law, consumer protection law.179 
 
 
                                                          
174Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S 394 (1886) filled May 10, 1886, available at: 
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/118/394.html,last visited March 25, 2010. 
 
175Hartmann, Thom, (2010), Unequal Protection:  How Corporations become people and How can you fight 
back?,Berret-Koehler Publishers, Inc.-CA/USA, pp. 29. 
 
176 Miller, Roger LeRoy, and Jentz, Gaylord A., (2010), Fundamentals of Business Law and Summarized Cases, 
8th Edition, South-Western Cengage Learning – Ohio/USA, pp. 12.  See also The US Supreme Court has 
examined whether corporations are citizens under the following provisions: article III diversity jurisdiction, 
see Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 91 (1809), in this case jurisdiction 
determined by the ‘real persons’ (shareholders) coming to the court under the corporate name. 
 
177See The Supreme Court first conferred Bill of Rights protections on corporations in Noble v. Union River 
Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165 (1893) (fifth amendment due process rights). Although the Court conferred 
fourth amendment protections on corporations in Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), the Court limited these 
rights in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950).Today, the business corporation have panoply 
of Bill of Rights protections: first amendment guarantees of political speech, commercial speech, and 
negative free speech rights: fourth amendment safeguards against unreasonable regulatory searches; Fifth 
Amendment double jeopardy and liberty rights; and sixth and seventh amendment entitlements to trial by 
jury. 
178In parlance of Fourteenth Amendment, the US Supreme Courts recognize ‘due process clause’ in the case of 
Minneapolis & S.L.R Co. V. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889), corporations are persons for purposes of the due 
process clause.See also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed 937 (1905), this case is 
emanating the rise of economic due process in the U.S. the essence of this case was when business were 
threatened with a stifling law, the courts used the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to declare that law is arbitrary and unreasonable. 
179Gano, Darwin Curtis, and Williams, Samuel Collin, (2008), Commercial Law, BiblioBazaarLLC – South 
Carolina/the U.S.A., pp. 10. Commercial law is a branch of the civil law, and includes the laws regulating the 
rights and relations of persons engaged in trade or commercial pursuits, as the law of contracts, of 
partnerships or of agency. 
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1.3.1.2. The European Union 
 Unlike the U.S., the Treaty instituting of the European Union explicitly mentioned 
private economic actors180 (business enterprises and individual) are granted beneficiaries from 
the four fundamental freedoms of free movement of goods, persons, services and capital.181 
The supranational system set by the EU treaty is also recognized private economic actors or 
individual as subject of EU Law.  It can be traced back to the origin of the Court decision in 
the case of Van Gend en Loos v. NederlandseAdministratie der Belastingen182in which the 
Court stated that the EC Treaty (today Treaty Functioning of European Union hereinafter 
TFEU) had created a new legal order.183The main feature of the supranational integration is to 
achieve political integration through economic integration184 which is in supporting economic 
integration process.  The subject of this new legal order is not only the Member States but 
also their nationals.185Vranes thus opined that “the Van Gen and Costa/Enel cases landmarks 
                                                          
180
 The term of ‘company’ is the expression commonly used in Article 54 TFEU Available at: 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu) last visited March, 15 2010, 20:07 pm. See alsoZaphiriou, G.A., (1970), European 
Business Law, London Sweet & Maxwell – London, pp. 18.  Zaphiriou mentioned that according to EEC 
Treaty (Rome Treaty 1957), EEC recognized enterprise as subject of community law. 
181See case 240/83 Procurer de la République v ABDHU (1985) ECR 520, 531, refer to this case, the Court 
stated ‘It should be borne in mind that the principles of free movement of goods and freedom of competition, 
together with freedom of trade as a fundamental right.  See alsoScout, Sionaidh Douglas, (2002), 
Constitutional Law of European Union, Pearson Education Limited – UK, pp.435. 
 
182See Case 26/62 Van Gend& Loos v. NederlandseAdministratie der Belastingen(1963) ECR 1.See also case 
6/64 Costa v. Enel (1964) ECR 585 at 593. See also Craig, Paul P., and de Burca, Gràinne, (2008), EU Law 
Text, Cases and Materials: Fourth Edition, Oxford University Press – Oxford/UK, pp. 273. Van Gend Loos 
was a ground-breaking judgment.  This is an emerging concept of direct effect of Treaty Provision which is 
understood as the immediate enforceability by individual applicants of those provisions in National Court.  
See alsoRaitio,Juha, (2003), The Principle of Legal Certainty in EC Law, Kluwer Academic Publishing – the 
Hague/Netherland, pp. 348, see also Chalmers, Damian, Hadjiemmanuil,Christos,Monti, Giorgio and 
Tomkins, Adam, (2007), European Union Law, Cambridge University Press- Cambridge/UK, pp. 47. 
 
183 See Engle, Eric, (2009), ‘Constitutive Cases: Marbury v. Madison Meets Van Gend Loos’, Hanse Law 
Review, Vol.5, pp. 33 – 46.  In this article Engle refer to case of Van Gend Loos that the court in Van Gend at 
once declared, a) that individuals have rights under the treaty, b) that those rights are enforceable against the 
Member States, c) that those rights may be express or implied, d) that Member States created a new 
international legal person, unique in international law, e) that the Member States had transferred their 
sovereignty in limited fields to the new international legal person, f) that the addresses of this new legal 
person are not merely the member states or even the individuals but also the people of the Member States. 
184See Daniel, Andrea, (2009), Is Economic Integration the Motor of all European Integration? The Debate 
Surrounding the Service Directive: Essay, GRIN Verlag-Munchen/Germany, pp. 3.  See also Directive 
2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006, on services inthe internal 
Market. 
 
185See Llorens, AlbertinaAlbors, (1996), Private Parties in European Community Law: Challenging Community 
Measures, Clarendon Press – Oxford/UK, pp. 1. 
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are commonly regarded as two of the essential starting points of the ‘transformation of 
Europe’, which has correctly been characterized as a dynamic quasi-automatic process.”186 
 Due to the judgment of Van Gen and Costa/Enelcase, individuals and private 
economic actors have been empowered to assert their rights, in any national court, vis a vis 
their state of origin and other EU member states, which are then bound not to apply domestic 
law in situations where this law is in conflict with EU primary and secondary law. Private 
economic actors thus are granted rights to seek assistance of the courts in order to oblige the 
member state to respect the Treaty obligations.187  These rights is subsequently interpreted by 
the ECJ which is granting individual and/or  private economic actors rights to invoke directly 
clear EU provisions before national courts and get a proper remedy if their rights have been 
violated.188  Furtherance, the EU Treaty also granted private economic actors and individual 
direct access to EU Courts (General Court and ECJ) to challenge the legality of decision made 
by the Commission and the Council of EU.  This possibility has been extended to decisions 
adopted by European Parliament and to decision of the European Central Bank.189 
 It seem to be clear that since EU Law can penetrate and directly affect the sphere of 
interest of EU nationals, the law itself should be providing an adequate means for private 
economic actors to plea a illegality and also the action for a failure to act of their governments 
and any EU institutions.190Furthermore, private economic actors may recourse to a very 
specific means in an action for damage caused by disobedience of EU Treaty.191 Besides any 
                                                          
186Vranes, Erich, (2003), ‘European Human Right Protection and the Contested Relationship  of the ECJ and 
National Courts: Convergent Solution under International European and National Law?’, in The Banana 
Dispute An Economic and Legal Analysis, eds. Breuss, Fritz, Griller, Stefan and Vranes, Erich, Springer 
Wien –NY/USA, p.198. 
 
187See case C-173/99 Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematographic and Theatre Union (BECTU) v. Secretary 
of State for Trade and Industry (2001), E.C.R. I-4881.  See also Carozza, Paolo, (2004), ‘The Member 
States’, in The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Politic, Law and Policy: Essay in European Law, eds. 
Peers, Steve, and Wards, Angela, Hart Publishing – Oxford/UK, pp. 54, Carozza concluded that this case 
represented the undivided attention of EU law in fundamental rights of EU citizens. 
 
188Article 230 EC Treaty, see also Szyszcak, Erika, and Cygan, Adam, (2008), Understanding EU Law: Second 
Edition, Thomson – Sweet & Maxwell- London/UK., pp.86.  See also case C-271/91 Marshall v. 
Southampton Health Authority No.2 (1993) E.C.R. I-4367. 
 
189See Parkinson, K.A., (1989), ‘Admissibility of Direct Action by Natural or Legal Person in the European 
Court of Justice: Judicial Distinctions between Decision and Regulations’, Texas International Law Journal 
No 24, pp. 433. 
 
190 See Lang, John Temple, (2000), ‘The Principle of Effective Protection of Community Law Rights’, in LIBER 
AMICORUM in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley: Judicial Review in European Union Vol. I, eds. O’Keeffe, 
David, and Bavasso, Antonio, Kluwer Law International – the Hague/Netherlands, pp. 250.  
 
191 See Bondi, Andrea, and Farley, Marten, (2009), the Right to Damages in European Law: Kluwer European 
Law Collection – 5, Kluwer Law International – the Hague/Netherlands, pp. I67.  These authors explained 
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rights inherent from EU Law which is provided for private economic actors, these legal 
entities are as well bound duty to apply national laws. For example, pursuant to Article 54 
TFEU, in order to be considered as a ‘company’, the private economic actors must satisfy two 
requirements. First, private economic actors must have been formed in accordance with the 
law of a Member State, and they have registered office, central administration of principal 
place of business within the EU.Second, a Member State may define the connecting factors 
required for a company to be incorporated under its law and for it to continue to retain that 
status.192 
 In conclusion, this research emphasized the existence of private economic actor’s 
right which derives from their national constitutions and law.  The important argument 
regarding of this is whether the state is not merely enhancing dichotomy of rights and 
obligations of private economic actors before ensuring the right of them in peculiar 
circumstance (i.e. locus standi of Business Corporation against government intrusion that 
against their constitutional right).    
 The rights of private economic actors in general are instituting to what extent the 
dependency of state to their economic actors vice versa.193  These private economic actors are 
stanchion of economic growth in each country, thus state as economic regulator should be 
more perceptible in protecting its private economic actors.  In this sense, it refers to all legal 
rules which mitigate the conduct of private economic actors within its territory or cross 
border.  This dependency can be measured by economic indicators (such as labor, export-
import, investment, internal market equilibrium, and income per-capita and GDP), but the 
rationalization of protection the right of economic private actors tends to support elimination 
of studious economic stalemate in every country, i.e. uncertainty of law enforcement, 
constraint of right until decreasing of GDP. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
regarding the right to seek compensation in damage caused to disobedience of EU Treaty.  These private 
economic actors (individual) had the possibility of a restitutionary claim against the national authorities; it 
must first exhaust that right under national law before seeking damage for non-contractual liability against 
the EU under Article 340 TFEU. See chapter III. 
 
192 See Moens, Gabriel and Trone, John, (2010), ‘Commercial Law of the European Union’, in IusGentium: 
Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice No. 4,eds. Sellers, Mortimer and Maxeiner, JamesSpringer 
Science + Business Media – New York/USA, pp. 88. 
 
193See Arnold, Roger A., (2008), Macroeconomics 8th Edition, Thomson South Western Cengage – Ohio/USA, 
pp. 375. Business can influence the total value of all final goods and service produced annually within the 
country (GDP).  In the business cycles, the activity of business also influence the GDP where all industries 
are seeking economic growth, full employment and price stability, which is presumably supported by 
government’s economic policy.  On the other hand, government policy is influencing the stability of business 
cycles by promulgating new law in economic activities.  
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A state is also providing broad possibility for its economic actors to conduct their 
activities in the large spectrum such as cross border supply and demand in the sphere of 
international trade in order to gain their benefits.194  Prior to it, state should be willing to gain 
economic relation in the virtue of international economic relation.  As mentioned before, 
interstate economic relation is dealing with coordination of economic policies and 
cooperation; hence states are building rule of law in international economic relation as the 
prevailing part of the object of international economic law. 
1.3.2. Private Economic Actors at the International Economic Law Level 
The argument regarding the international economic law mostly begins with the notion 
and good will of state to conduct further cross border relation in economic field, such as 
monetary and financial issues, investment, transport and communication, industrial and 
agricultural and more.195  However, the core of intensive international economic relation 
begins with individual economic interest, then state’s economic interest and the latest is 
economic interest in the range of sub- regional, regional and global.196  The global economic 
                                                          
194For a comprehensive account of the intellectual history of free trade theory, see: Irwin, Douglas, (1996), 
Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade,Princeton University Press-NJ/USA., pp. 28.  Irwin 
refers to Adam Smith Theory in Adam Smith, (1776), The Wealth of Nations, reprinted (1937), Modern 
Library Edition- NY/USA, pp. 424. 
195For the definition of International Economic Law, see Zamora, Stephen, (1996), ‘Introduction: International 
Economic Law, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 17, Issue 1, pp.63-
67.  Zamora argued that some scholar limit the definition of international economic law to encompass only 
economic relations between nations, a kind of public international law of economic relation.  Conversely, can 
intergovernmental economic relations be effectively analyzed without resort to the effect on private 
transaction? Accordingly Zamora created definition of international economic law comprises a broad 
collection of laws and customary practices that govern economic relations between actors in different 
nations, includes examination of both law and policy issues on multiple levels including private law, local 
law, national law and international law.  However, Louis Henkin argued although international economic law 
is blending between national law and international law, public and private law, it is still in a confinement of 
integral part of international law in general.  The contract of concession between state and Oil Company is 
not constituted a treaty under international law but merely international economic relation. SeeHenkin, Louis 
(1995), International Law: Politics and Values, MartinusNijhoff Publisher – Leiden/Netherland, pp. 146. See 
alsoVanTheemat, Pieter Verloren, (1981), The Changing Structure of International Economic Law, 
MartinusNijhoff Publisher-Leiden/Netherland, pp. 13.  Van Themaat argued that the actual extraterritorial 
effect of economic law as opposed to the juridical effects limited to the domestic area.  Opposite to Zamora 
and Henkin, Schwarzenberger argued that common drawbacks of ‘blending or mix’ approaches are 
methodology incorrect.  See Schwarzenberger, G., (1966), ‘The Principles and Standards of International 
economic Law’, in Recuil des Cours I, vol. 117, pp.7. See also Jackson, John H., (1995), ‘International 
Economic Law: Reflections on the "Boilerroom" of International Relations’, American University Journal of 
International Law &Policy, No. 10, p. 595 - 596. Jackson refers in speculation almost 90% public 
international law is international economic law by argued that international economic law can cover a very 
broad inventory of subject which is embracing the law of economic transactions, government regulation of 
economic matters, and related legal relations including litigation and international institutions for economic 
relations. 
196 See Petersmann, Ernest-Urlich, (2005), ‘Bridging Foundations – Human Rights and International Trade Law: 
Defining and Connecting the Two Fields’, in Human Right and International Trade, eds. Cottier, Thomas 
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relation derives from common economic interest of states which is influenced by individual 
economic interest within the country, hence, to meet this common economic interest, state 
construct extraterritorial economic agreements which is creating international legal 
rules.197These legal rules are inevitably creating a question, whether they are binding and 
benefiting only state or also binding a private actor subject to the jurisdiction of the state.  In 
this sense, Trachtman made an argument that governments increasingly recognize the issue 
that international economic law also governs and recognizes the interest of private person.  In 
supporting it, the government engages in efforts to unify or organize this interest by espousing 
“international private law” in order to facilitate business.  They often do so through public 
international law technique, including entry into treaty.  Accordingly, private economic actors 
may have obligations as well as rights.  Rights and obligations may arise either directly by the 
treaty or customary law, or indirectly by an act of transformation.  But, the spectrum of 
transformed perspective of international economic law does not reject domestic values, 
including economic interest.  Thus domestic values can be maximized through international 
action.198 From this argument, another question then arises, what is the correlation between 
private economic actors and international economic law? According toVanThemaat, 
“international economic law should meet the requirements of the infrastructure of national 
economic policies and national economic law”.199 This is clearly an argument that the national 
economic law which is representing the national economic interest could be the primary 
reason to commit international economic law in the sphere of development of cross border 
economic activity.  Hence, government as economic regulator tends to follow its constituent 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Pauwelyn, Joost, andBurgi, Elisabeth, Oxford University Press – Oxford/UK., pp.42.Petersmann mentioned 
that the agreement among states have evolved bottom up in response to the demand of private economic 
actors and continues to be regulated in national, regional and worldwide rules. 
 
197 See Voitovich, Sergei A., Supra Note 165, pp.5.  Contradictory to it, see alsoCooper, Richard, (1967), 
‘National Economic Policy in An Interdependent World Economy’, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 76, No. 7, pp. 
1273.  Cooper mentioned that the growing economic interdependence among countries makes the successful 
pursuit of national economic objective or interest much more difficult.  Nonetheless Van Themaat argued that 
interdependency of states in economic activity (in his word ‘economic intervention at international level’) is 
obvious to realize the objective of national economic interest, since historically at national level in the west, 
that is no longer possible to achieve a number of the objectives of national economic policy through national 
means only.  For example of these objectives including combating unemployment and inflation, a stable 
value of money, a well balance of payments etc.  It is necessary to have international intervention in addition 
to international rules for liberalization and non-discriminations simply for realization of the objective of 
national economic interest.  SeeVanTheemat, Pieter Verloren, supra Note 195, pp. 15-16. 
 
198Trachtman, Joel P., (1996), ‘the International Economic Law Revolution’, University of Philadelphia Journal 
of International Economic Law, Vol. 17, Issue 3, Fall 1996, pp.5. 
 
199 Van Themaat, Pieter Veloren, Supra Note 195, pp. 16.   
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in avoiding laissez faire of international economic relations.200 In addition, the motivation 
behind a global economic agreement is the intention of state to enhance its private economic 
actors to gain broader benefit201 without putting aside the common interest in international 
economic achievement.202 
Private economic actors silently exist in the array of international economic law, for 
example the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) of 1974 obliges state 
to accommodate right of its private economic actors or individual ( both citizen and foreigner) 
who is conducting business within its territory .203 The main issue of this charter is state ‘have 
the right’ or have ‘the duty or responsibility’, over its private economic actors within its 
territory.204Van Themaat mentioned although CERDS pays less attention to the rights of 
                                                          
200 See also Kohona, Palitha T.B., (1985),The Regulation International Economic Relations through Law, 
MartinusNijhoff Publisher-Leiden/Netherlands, pp. 5. Kohona argued that in the contemporary world, this 
would result in the development of a closer relationship between international norms and domestic norms.  
Since international economic relation tends to affect citizen. As the world becomes more economically 
interdependent, more and more private citizen will find their jobs, their business, and their quality of life 
affected. Thus they will be more affected by the economic policy pursued by their own country on their 
behalf.  The result of this, citizen of the country could be expected to assert them in more aggressive and 
require their government to respond their needs to a greater extent in development of international economic 
relations, and participating in formulating international economic policy. 
 
201See Love, Patrick, and Lattimore, Ralph, Supra Note 143.  These authors explore the advantage of conducting 
international trade both from state’s focal point and individual interests. See also Carbaugh, Robert J., (2009), 
International Economics 12th edition, South-Western Cengage Learning-Ohio/USA, pp.27 – 29.  
 
202See General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/S-6/3201, Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO), 1 May 1974.  See AlsoMakarczyk, Jerzy, (1988), Principles of a New International 
Economic Order: A Study of International Law in the Making, MartinusNijhoff Publisher-
Leiden/Netherlands, pp.177-181.  The Declaration of NIEO was supplemented by the principle of the 
economic common interest of all state.  However this declaration stress out the duty of state to take into 
account the economic interest of other state, in taking economic decisions.  Every states has the primary 
responsibility to promote the economic, social and cultural development of its people, but it is entitle to seek 
development assistance from the international community in order to overcome temporary or structural 
obstacles for implementation of this task. 
 
203Subedi, Surya P. (2007), International Economic Law, Section A: Evolution and Principles of International 
Economic Law, The University of London Press – London/UK, pp. 23. See also Chatterjee, S.K., (1991), 
‘The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: an evaluation after 15 years’, International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 40, Issue 3, pp.100 
 
204See GA Res. 3281(xxix), UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 (1974) 50,Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States, Article 2(1), “every state has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including 
possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activities”.  In this article, 
equating peoples (individual), states make sense inasmuch as people act through state and state sponsor 
agency.  People could also mean all persons within the state in which case the power of state to freely dispose 
natural wealth and resources would be subject to the consent of all people within the state.  See Kofele-
Kale,Ndiva, (2006), The International Law of Responsibility for Economic Crimes, Ashgate Publishing – 
Farnham/UK, pp. 109-110.  Coherent with it, see Article 5 of CERDS; “All States have the right to associate 
in organizations of primary commodity producers in order to develop their national economies, to achieve 
stable financing for their development and, in pursuance of their aims, to assist in the promotion of sustained 
growth of the world economy. In particular is accelerating the development of developing countries. 
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individuals, enterprises and peoples, the rights itself derives from obligations and 
responsibility of state.  States is obliged to attain of wider prosperity among all countries and 
of higher standard of living for all peoples.205  But of course to explicate the rights of people 
or/and private economic actors in a broad spectrum will not be able to detach from relevant 
human rights law postulate as “economic right”206 which sets out in the International Human 
Right Law such as Universal Declarations of Human Rights (hereinafter UDHR)207, 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter ICESCR)208, at 
the Regional level, EU members recognize economic rights in their treaty209.  Accordingly, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Correspondingly, all States have the duty to respect that right by refraining from applying economic and 
political measures that would limit it.”  From this article, silently describe to pursue national economic aims; 
state delivers its right to ‘people’ in conducting business within its territory. 
205Van Themaat, Pieter Veloren, Supra Note 195, pp. 268. 
 
206 Relation between economic rights and interest of private economic actors is, private economic actors are the 
institution representing the group of individuals in achieving their economic rights.  According to 
international human rights law, individual has right to attain its economic rights, such as right to work.  See 
article 23 (1) Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948; “everyone has the right to work, to free choice of 
employment, to just and favorable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment”.  The healthy 
firm, Business Corporation or other forms of private economic actors will support the achievement of worker 
to achieve their economic rights.  This right is presumably entail two obligations, obligation of owner (direct 
to individual) and government (as economic regulator).See alsoNaverson, Jan, (1992), ‘Democracy and 
Economic Rights’, in Economic Rights, eds. Paul, Ellen Frankel, Miller Jr., Fred D., and Paul, Jeffrey, 
Cambridge University Press & Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation – Cambridge/UK., pp. 41.  
Economic rights are also relating to the freedom to engage in economic activities.  It is similar to be free to 
produce and to be free to trade what we produce.  In the means of production, trade and distribution, this 
freedom is not restricted by the states preventing from buying, selling and operating means of production.  
And the relation of employment is, if the people are allowed to own means of production, then potential 
employees are allowed vastly greater array of potential employment. 
 
207See article 22 of UDHR.  The main idea of Article 22 of UDHR is enhancing the protection of economic, 
social and cultural rights of each individual around the world. See Ishay, Micheline R., (2007), the Human 
Rights Reader: Major Political Essays, Speeches, and Documents from Ancient Time to Present (second 
edition), Routledge Publisher – NY/USA, pp. 39, See alsoAndreassen, Bard-Anders, (1999), ‘Article 22’, in 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights : A Common Standard of Achievement, eds. Alfredsson, 
Gudmundur,  and EIde, Asbjorn, MartinusNijhoff Publisher – the Netherland. pp. 477.Andreassen mentioned 
that economic, social and cultural rights were considered “programmatic” or “aspirations”, and hence not a 
matter of a claim-rights and entitlements.  The fulfillment of these goals was to be obtained gradually when 
resources were created through economic growth.  These rights are apparently were a matter of public policy 
and therefore ill-suited to legal enforcement and judicial review.  Linked to these ideas, assumption that 
economic, social and cultural rights were economically expensive, demanding a strong interventionist states 
(positive rights). 
 
208See Article 1(2) of ICESCR: “all peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation based upon 
the principle of mutual benefit, and international law.” The very logic interpretation of this provision 
presupposes that the people might want to trade their natural resources.  See Bartels, Lorand, (2009), ‘Trade 
and Human Rights’, in the Oxford Handbook of International Trade Law, eds. Bethlehem, Daniel, McRae, 
Donald, Neufeld, Rodney, and Van Damme, Isabelle, Oxford University Press – Oxford/UK, pp. 572.  This 
article is also relating to Article 6 of ICESCR. 
  
209 Scout, Sionaidh Douglas, Supra Note 181.  
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economic rights as part of human rights are obligation of state, as Petersmann posited that 
human rights are not granted, but only recognized by government and citizens constitute 
governments with limited powers that must be exercised for the protection of human rights 
and public interest of their citizen.210 
 The economic rights of every individual within the country enforce the government to 
use its power to conduct international agreement in the field of international economic 
includes international trade.211  This argument bases on the individual ‘right to trade’ which is 
advocated by Petersmann.212 The right based approach to freedom of trade is focusing on the 
legal protection of individual rights to have, possess, produce, consume, buy or sell or 
otherwise acquire or dispose of scarce goods, services or capital which should be inevitably 
related to economic rights.  It should be evolvedbottom up in respond to demands of citizens 
                                                          
210Petersman, Ernst-Ulrich, (1991), Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of International 
Economic Law, Fribourg University Press – Fribourg, pp. 61-72. See also The 1993 Vienna Declaration and 
Program of Action, at the UN World Conference on Human Rights, GA. A/CONF. 157/23, 12 July 1993.  
According to this declaration, human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birth rights of all human 
beings; their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of governments. 
Available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En?OpenDocument, last 
visited December 2009. 
 
211For comparison to this argument, see Schneider, Andrea K., (1998), ‘Democracy and Dispute Resolution: 
Individual Rights in International Trade Organization’, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
Economic Law, Vol. 19, Issue 2, summer 1998, pp. 537-638.  Schneider mentioned about debate on the 
benefits of individual in international free trade.  The debate about fast track authority for the Clinton 
Administration reflects concerns about the benefits of free trade agreements to the U.S. economy and fears 
that increased free trade with less developed states will lead to an elimination of jobs in certain 
manufacturing sectors. This debate focuseson whether it is even in our citizens' interests for the United States 
to join international trade organizations. Meanwhile, across the Atlantic Ocean, the ongoing debate about the 
“democracy deficit” in the European Union (“EU”) demonstrates the concern with the decreased ability of 
citizens to have a say in what the laws are under the EU. This debate focuses on the ability of citizens to 
influence lawmakers in the substantive laws that directly affect their lives. In both of these debates, people 
have examined the legitimacy of internationaltradeorganizations and debated ways of structuring these 
organizations to be more democratic and more legitimate. 
 
212 See Petersman, Ernst-Urlich, (2006), ‘Human Rights, Markets and Economic Welfare: Constitutional 
Functions of the Emerging UN Human Rights Constitution’, in International Trade and Human Rights: 
Foundations and Conceptual Issues, eds. Abbott, F., Breining-Kaufmann, C. and Cottier, Thomas, University 
of Michigan Press – Michigan/USA., pp.29-51.  The opponent to this right to trade mentioned that right to 
trade is obscure.  No major human right convention currently includes any individual rights to trade.  Indeed 
as posited by Peers, that no such right to trade exists in any international legal instrument and such a right 
exists only in a much-attenuated from national constitutions.  And from normative point of view it would be 
anti-democratic to recognize such a right without proper processes of international treaty making their 
course.  Furthermore, any free standing right would be subject to uncertainty about how conflicts might be 
resolved between it and other rights.  See Peers, Steven, (2001), ‘Fundamental Right or Political Whim? 
WTO Law and the European Court of Justice’, in The EU and The WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues, 
eds. De Burca, G., and Scott, J , Hart Publishing-Oxford/UK, pp.111  
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and legally protected in national, regional and worldwide rules.213  However this right to trade 
will be eliminated if trade restriction is free to impose among states.214  The trade restriction 
was a peril occurrence in the twentieth century. It can be traced back to the history of 
establishing of GATT 1947.   
 The emergence of The Great Depression was leading to the World War II, and in the 
interwar period, particularly after the damaging of the 1930 US Tariff Act was signed, many 
other nations began enacting protectionist measures, including quota-type restrictions, which 
chocked off international trade.  The history was leading to the major initiatives of 
establishment of GATT 1947 and it followed 47 years later by the establishment of WTO in 
1994. It was presumably would gain to the world welfare.215  As Jackson explained “if such 
“liberal trade” goals contribute to world welfare, then it follows that rules which assist such 
goals should also contribute to world welfare.  The policies which tend to reduce some risks 
lower the ‘risk premium’ required by entrepreneurs to enter into international transaction.  
This should result in a general increase in the efficiency of various economic activities, 
contributing to greater welfare for everyone”. Assuming that the institutions are important, 
and the law plays a significant role of these institutions, so in turn, will lead parties to pay 
closer attention to the rules of the treaty system, in particular economic affairs driven by 
market-oriented principles of decentralized decision making, with participation by millions of 
entrepreneurs.216 
                                                          
213 See Petersman, Ernst-Urlich, Supra Note 212, p. 53.  Petersmann has been unequivocal in giving relevant 
argument whether freedom of trade is also basic liberties.  See also Sen, Amartya, (1999), Development as 
Freedom, Oxford University Press – Oxford/UK, pp. 146.  Sen posited that freedom of exchange and 
transaction (trade) is itself part and parcel of the basic liberties that people have reason to value... the 
contribution of the market mechanism to economic growth is, of course, important but this comes only after 
the direct significance of the freedom to interchange.   
 
214See Bartels, Lorand, Supra Note 208,pp. 575. Bartels mentioned international law has traditionally supported 
the right of states to adopt whatever protectionist trade policy they choose.  However, recent years have 
afforded numerous examples of the severe economic consequences of protectionist trade measures, especially 
on small developing countries.  For example, US cotton subsidies have so depressed the world price of cotton 
that cotton farmers in Chad, Mali, Benin and Burkina Faso, dependent on cotton exports, have a reduced 
ability to feed themselves, as well as suffering degradations of other economic and social rights.  See 
alsoAlston, JM.; Sumner, D. and Brunke, H., (2007), Impacts of Reductions in US Cotton Subsidies on West 
African Cotton Producers, Oxfam America Press – Boston/USA, p. 1-13. 
 
215 Jackson, John H., (1990), Restructuring the GATT System, Royal Institute of International Affairs – 
London/UK, pp.9-10. 
 
216 Jackson, John H., (2006), Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law, 
Cambridge University Press – Cambridge/UK.,pp.88. 
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 It is much comprehensible if the establishment of GATT – followed by the WTO- is 
merely concerned of state to secure its private economic actors in involving international trade 
without vexation of other state restriction or protection on trade.  In addition, the WTO as 
international trade rules is necessary to fulfill the need of private economic actors for a degree 
of security and predictability of international trade.  Private economic actors operating or 
intending to operate, in a country that is bound by such legal rule will be able to predict better 
how that country will act in the future on matters affecting their operations in that country.217 
 
2. The Role of Private Economic Actors in the WTO 
 The WTO Agreements is created by governments of the Members as public 
international law.218  Nothing in the WTO Agreements clearly mention directly about rights 
and obligations of private economic actors.  It seems that the relationship to private economic 
actors (or may be individual) does not exist within the Marrakesh Agreement, because as a 
general rule, private parties are not legal subjects of the international legal order.  They cannot 
be a party to an international treaty neither carry out direct right and duties derive from it.219   
However, this research will prevail upon this stigma, by looking closer at the essence of the 
WTO Agreement to discern of the role of private economic actors in the WTO.  In the end, 
assumption of the relation between private economic actors and the WTO is a benevolent to 
answer the role of private economic actors in the WTO rules. 
 The main objective of the Marrakesh Agreement sets out in the Preamble of 
Agreement of Establishing the World Trade Organization is that: 
 
 
                                                          
217 Van den Bossche, Supra Note 56, pp. 39. 
 
218 See Sanson, Michelle, (2002), Essential International Trade Law, Cavendish Publishing – Newport/Australia, 
pp.4.Sanson mentioned that although the WTO constitutes a public international trade law, but it is 
immediately translated into private issues such as tariffs, dumping and taxes, since in the development of 
international  law, the distinction between private and public international trade law has less meaning.  
 
219Jackson, John H., Supra Note 162, pp. 127. See alsoHauser, Heinz,(1988), ‘Foreign Trade Policy and the 
Function of Rules for Trade Policy Making’, in Foreign Trade in the Present and A new Economic Order, 
eds. Dicke, Detlev Chr., and Petersman, Ernst-Urlich, Fribourg University Press – Fribourg/Switzerland, pp. 
18-38. Hauser emphasized that properly enforced international rules to reduce the risk of government 
interventions into private transactions.  In addition, the ultimate test of international trade law is to be seen in 
the extent to which international commitments make government behavior more stable and easier to predict, 
both for private investor and trader and for other government. 
 
 
62 
 
 “Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should 
be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large 
and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the 
production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the 
world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both 
to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner 
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic 
development.” 
 157 Members of WTO, including industrial countries and developing countries, are 
bound duty to comply with these objectives.  By entering WTO and GATT 1994, these 
Members committed to reduce and bind most of their tariffs, to suppress many non-tariff 
impediments to international trade and to avoid discrimination against all economic agents of 
other state in accordance with non-discrimination and most – favored nation clause.  These 
commitments are conceivable to support their private economic actors in achieving better 
income and benefit, to promote positive result of enhancing welfare, full employment and 
large volume of real income for individual at the end.220  Thus, to achieve the objective of 
WTO, the country members should implement WTO rules within their national legislation.221
 As mention before, state is propounded to commit international trade agreement on the 
basis of individual interest to achieve better life.  It is also supported by commitment of 
government to preserve individual economic right underlines innational constitution. From the 
language of “raising standards of living”, it is clear that Members had made commitment to 
trade liberalization as a mean for attaining the goal of enhancing human welfare and 
                                                          
220 See Shell, G. Richard, (1995), ‘Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World 
Trade Organization, Duke Law Journal, No. 44, pp. 877-878.  Shells argued that WTO rules are a means for 
globally oriented business interest and their government allies to overcome domestic resistance to free trade, 
reduce the legal transaction costs that states impose on the movement of goods and services across national 
borders, and thereby enhance consumer welfare for citizen of all nations.  For the literature review, See 
Hoekman, Bernard, (2002), ‘The WTO: Function and Basic Principles’, inDevelopment Trade, and the WTO: 
A Handbook, eds. Hoekman, Bernard M., Matoo, Aaditya, and English, Philip, the World Bank – 
Washington DC/USA., pp. 41-49. 
 
221Implementation of WTO agreements is unable to discharge the interpretation of them, where the interpretation 
of WTO agreements at the national level is to be found in the way these agreements are translated into 
national language, re-formulated in domestic legislation, interpreted in national’s tribunals and courts, and 
actually administered by agents of state.  See Qureshi, Asif H., (2006), Interpreting WTO Agreements: 
Problems and Perspective, Cambridge University Press – Cambridge/UK, pp. 70.  For example from the 
vantage point of the legal effect of WTO agreements, the US law promulgated the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, P.L. 103-465, 19 U.S.C.§§ 3501. 
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development by facilitating social and economic rights, by restricting monopolies, trade 
barriers and discrimination.222  In addition, the term of “full employment” also refers to 
UDHR Article 23(1)223 and ICESCR Article 6. There is a broader argument regarding of 
relation between individual right in the WTO Rules. According to Petersmann, the worldwide 
liberalization and regulation of welfare-reducing trade barriers continues to be based on the 
GATT and WTO Law.  The WTO Members emphasize that the WTO rules and policies must 
remain ‘member driven’ and outside the UN system.  WTO Members have no responded to 
the UN proposals for human right approach to international trade.  They continue to leave the 
clarification of the interrelationships between UN Law, WTO law and human rights to the 
WTO dispute settlement system.  The member driven character of the WTO entails the WTO 
rules and policies tend to be ‘producer driven’ for the benefit of powerful ‘rent seeking 
interest group’ (such as textiles, agricultural and steel lobbies, and periodically elected trade 
politicians) to the detriment of general consumer welfare and citizen rights.224  For this 
reason, Petersmann developed an idea of world trade constitution, which explicated the 
constitutional functions of WTO law.  This constitutional function is paralleling constitutions 
at the national level.  The main idea of world trade constitution is penetrating and extending 
the WTO guarantees of private (individual) rights.225 However, the key of the objective of 
                                                          
222See Article 22 UDHR, Supra Note 207.  See also Amani, Bita, (2009), State Agency and the Patenting of Life 
in International Law: Merchants and Missionaries in a Global Society, Ashgate Publishing – Farnham/UK, 
pp.247-248 However, reference to trade for the purpose of raising standard of living does more by filling the 
interstices of trade liberalization with a strong commitment to its social dimension. 
 
223 This right to work is obligation of state in a furtherance definition that state is oblige to fulfill full 
employment of its citizen, in supporting this state refers to Convention of International Labor Organization. 
 
224Petersmann, Ernst-Urlich, (2008), ‘State Sovereignty, Popular Sovereignty and Individual Sovereignty: From 
Constitutional Nationalism to Multilevel Constitutionalism in International Economic Law?’, in Redefining 
Sovereignty in International economic Law, eds. Shan, Wenhua,Simons, Penelope  and Singh, Dalvender 
Singh, Hart Publishing – Oxford/UK, pp. 32. 
 
225Petersmann, Ernst-Urlich, (2000), ‘Judicial Protection of Economic Freedom in National and International 
Law: Time for Bringing Rights Home’, inJudicial Review in International Perspective (Liber Amicorum, in 
Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley), eds. Andenas, Mads, and Fairgrieve, Duncan, Kluwer Law International – 
the Hague/Netherland, pp. 475-476.  Petersmann argued that the world constitutional function of WTO law, 
For instance, the WTO law guarantees freedom of trade, non-discrimination and rule of law go far beyond 
the unilateral guarantees in the domestic laws off WTO members. The Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU) provides for compulsory dispute settlement procedures leading to legally binding rulings based on 
Panel reports, appellate review and arbitration awards.  The WTO Agreements also establishes clear legal 
hierarchies for the treaty in multilateral trading system.  The WTO institutions can adopt legally binding 
decisions by majority-votes, including authoritative interpretations of WTO law.  Overall policy coherence is 
promoted by numerous references in WTO law to other worldwide agreement.  However, the idea of the 
world constitution has been challenged by Howse and Nicolaidis, these authors mentioned that one of the key 
dangers of the use of the language of constitutionalization is that it encourages the idea that the WTO will 
ultimately de directly effective within states.  See Howse, Robert, and Nicolaidis, K. (2001), ‘Legitimacy and 
Global Governance: Why Constitutionalizing the WTO is a Step Too Far’, in Efficiency, Equity and 
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WTO is the progressive removal of barriers that prevent or make more difficult beneficial 
exchange between producers and consumers located in different countries.  The removal of 
barriers intend to enhance broad empirical support for the proposition that WTO promotes 
growth, economic stability, in turn supports investment in the creation and protection 
economic rights for individual.226  Accordingly, it is comprehensible if the argument returns 
to the previous sub section in this research that private economic actors are holding important 
part in trade relation among countries,227since private economic actors are economic 
institution representing the group of individuals in order to achieve their economic rights.  
Without legal support and protection from their governments, including national and 
international legal support, these legal entities find a paucity of economic benefits. The legal 
support and protection principally derives from the national constitution where the 
constitution consists of individual rights and obligations of government to protect these rights.  
The argument about economic rights which are pertinent to the objective of WTO Agreement 
will be discussed in Chapter VI.This research will not argue to the Petersmann’s idea nor 
agree to his idea, but principally WTO directly provides wide opportunity for private 
economic actors to achieve their trade benefits, through their governments commitment based 
on national constitution.  
 In relation between WTO Agreement and private economic actors, Charnovitz argued 
that similar to every international organization, the WTO connects in some ways to the 
individual, which inhabit the country.  The main impact of the WTO on the individual springs 
up from the substantive disciplines of the trading system. For example, eliminating quotas can 
change the structure of production and employment within a country.  In addition, the WTO 
also has an important connection to individuals through its procedural discipline which is 
implied by the government. For example,GATT Article X contains a sunshine provision 
calling for the prompt publication of trade laws, regulations, andadministrative rulings in 
order to enable both governments and “traders” to become acquainted 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, eds. Porter, RB., Sauvé,Piere,  Subramanian, 
Arvind, and Zampetti, AmericoBeviglia, Brooking Institution Press – Washington DC./USA, pp. 228. 
 
226See Anderson, Robert D., and Wager, Hannu, (2006), ‘Human Rights, Development, and the WTO: the Case 
of Intellectual Property and Competition Policy’, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 9, Issue 3, 
September, 2006, pp. 707-747. 
 
227See Strange, Susan, (1992), ‘States, Firms, and Diplomacy’, International Affairs Vol. 68, no.1, pp. 1-15. In 
an increasingly interdependent global economy, companies and individuals, not states, are the primary 
vehicles for conducting international trade. 
 
65 
 
withthem.228Charnovitzdoes not distinguish the purpose of substantive and procedural 
disciplines whether these are applicable for private economic actors solely or also individual. 
But prior to investigate these substantive and procedural disciplines in the WTO, it would be 
clearer if this sub section elaborate the role of private economic actors in the WTO 
Agreements.   
2.1. Private Economic Actors in the GATT 
 GATT is not silently emphasizing the private economic actors to gain –non- 
discriminatory principle benefits from their governments.  It can be seen in the Understanding 
on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.   
In the preamble, “GATT Article XVII provides for obligations on Members in respect of the 
activities of the state trading enterprises referred to in paragraph 1 of Article XVII, which 
arerequired to be consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment 
prescribed in GATT 1994 for governmental measures affecting imports or export by 
privatetraders.”229 
 Although this article raises confusing statement between preamble and paragraph 1, 
(state obliges to impose non-discriminatory principle to private trades , but in Paragraph 1 this 
Article also mention ‘non -governmental’ (means private enterprise) which has been granted 
exclusive or special rights or privileges)230, but according to Mattoo, the essence of the 
interpretation of Article XVII  creates no obligations to change the pattern of ownership 
(public to private) or to distinguish between governmental or non- governmental enterprises, 
because  such enterprises (government or private enterprise) subject to government control, 
and perhaps enjoy exclusive or special rights or privilege in conducting exports and imports in 
goods.  Article XVII therefore only contains substantive disciples on trading enterprise 
(government or private enterprise), which is relevant only for notification purposes, narrows 
                                                          
228Charnovitz, Steve, (2001),‘Economic and Social Actors in the World Trade Organization’, ILSA Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, spring, 2001, p. 259-274.  See also Charnovitz, Steve, Supra Note 140.  
GATT Article X: 3(b) states that each contracting party requires maintaining judicial, arbitral or 
administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose of the prompt review and correction of administrative 
action relating to customs matters. 
229Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 
available at   http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/08-17.pdf, last visited 11 April 2010. 
230Ibid, Paragraph 1 “ Governmental and non-governmental enterprises, including marketing boards, which have 
been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, including statutory or constitutional powers, in the 
exercise of which they influence through their purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or exports.” 
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the scope to all kind of enterprise (government or private economic actors) that have been 
granted exclusive rights or privileges.231 
2.2. Private Economic Actors in Agreement on Agricultural 
One of the types of private economic actors is producer, both producers in the raw 
level (e.g. farmers) and the second level of economic production (e.g. Textile Company).  
They constitute private economic actors in supporting the trade (domestic or international 
trade). The Agreement on Agricultural recognizes agricultural producer of the basic 
agricultural product and non-product.232  These producers are usually subject to ‘domestic 
support’, ‘subsidies’ and ‘restriction of market access through market price policy’.  
Accordingly, the objective of Agreement on Agricultural is to reform the principle and 
discipline on agricultural policy as well as to reduce the distortion in agricultural trade caused 
by agricultural protectionism and domestic support.  The market price policy sometimes 
closes the competition opportunity for producers in international trade.  The deployment of 
market prices support policies is resulting the differentiation of price between the domestic 
market price and world market prices of farm commodities which forces domestic consumers 
to pay higher price for food commodity than they would in a more liberal marketing 
environment.  Domestic support policy includes a variety of measures aimed at raising the 
income of producers and sustaining the profitability of domestic farming (such as government 
direct payment and export subsidies).233 
Apart from the explanation of the objective of Agreement on Agricultural, the main 
idea of this argument is, besides the obligation of Member not to protect its agricultural 
producers, this agreement also concerns in broadening the right of other members agricultural 
producer (or consumer at the end) to enjoy the fruit of market access principles. 
                                                          
231Mattoo, Aaditya, (1998), ‘Dealing with Monopolies and State Enterprise: WTO Rules for Goods and 
Services’, in State Trading in the Twenty First Century (Studies in International Economics – The World 
Trade Forum Vol. I), eds. Cottier, Thomas, Mavroidis, Petros C., and Schefer, Krista N., The University 
Michigan Press – Michigan/USA, pp.37-69 
 
232Agreement on Agricultural, Part I, Article 1 Definition of Terms, “Aggregate Measures of Support” and AMS 
mean the annual level of support, expressed in Monetary terms, provided for an Agricultural product in favor 
of the producers of the basic agricultural product or non – product specific support provided in favor of 
agricultural producers in general, other than support provided under programs that qualify a s exempt from 
reduction under Annex 2 to this Agreement.” Available at:(http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-
ag.pdf ) last visited 12 April 2010. 
233See Haley, Stephen, Pearce, Richard, and Stockbridge, Michael, (1998), the Implications of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture for Developing Countries: A Training Manual, FAO UN Publications– 
NY/USA, pp. 15-18. 
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2.3. Private Economic Actors in GATS 
General Agreement on Trade in Services may be seen as crucial place for private 
economic in the scope of WTO Agreements.  In the virtue of most-favored-nation and 
national treatment principle, private economic actors who operate their business in services 
have discretion to conduct their business in across border under the cross border supply and 
commercial presence.234  GATS recognize private economic actor as “service supplier”, 
according to Article XXVIII: Definitions, paragraph (g).  In paragraph (i) GATS also 
recognizes “juridical person” which means any legal entity duly constituted or otherwise 
organized under applicable law, whether for profit or otherwise, and whether privately-owned 
or governmentally-owned, including any corporation, trust, partnership, joint venture, sole 
proprietorship or association.  GATS also regulate service in the field of aircraft, maritime, 
financial and telecommunications.235 
In the term of cross border supply, the service takes place when the consumer remains 
in his or her own country, while the service crosses national borders, the supplier being 
located in a different country.  The delivery of the service can be obtained for example by 
telecommunications features, internet, mail or courier.236  In the cyber era, cross border supply 
is prominent in delivering service (i.e. online bank, international telecommunication etc.), 
thus GATS constitutes an international legal protection for those who operating business in 
cross border supply service. 
In term of commercial presence, GATS regulation bases on the need of private 
economic actors who is necessary to establish a commercial presence abroad in order to 
ensure a close contact with the consumers in their territories at the various stages of 
                                                          
234The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): Objective, Coverage and Disciplines, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm, last visited at 15 April 2010. GATS basically have 
four modes of supplying services, 1) cross-border supply is defined to cover services flows from the territory 
of one Member into the territory of another Member, e.g. banking, telecommunications or broadcasting. 2) 
Consumption abroad refers to situations where a service consumer (e.g. tourist, students or patient), moves 
into another Member’s territory to obtain a service. 3) Commercial Presence implies that a service supplier of 
one Member establishes a territorial presence, including through ownership or lease of premises, in another 
Member’s territory to provide service (e.g. insurance, hotel chain, and banking). 4) Presence of natural 
persons consists of persons of one Member entering the territory of another Member to supply a service (e.g. 
accountants, doctors or teachers) 
 
235GATS annex on Air Transport Service, Annex on Financial Services and Annex on Telecommunications and 
Basic Telecommunications, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats.pdf, last visited 
15 April 2010. 
 
236Publication of United Nations, (2002), Manual on Statistic of International Trade in Services, UN 
Publications – NY/USA. pp. 11 
 
68 
 
production and delivery, as well as after delivery.  Commercial presence in the global market 
covers not only juridical persons in the strict legal sense, but also legal entities that share 
some characteristic, such as representative offices and branches.  Under GATS, “supply of a 
service” includes production, distribution, marketing, sale and delivery.237 
2.4. Private Economic Actors in the Agreement on the Application Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) 
The SPS Agreement also mention about private economic actors, which is indirectly 
having obligations under it. Article 2, Basic Rights and Obligations, paragraph 3 is explicitly 
expressing non restriction to trade for private economic actors. 
“Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures do not 
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar 
conditions prevail, including between their own territory and that of other Members. Sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a 
disguised restriction on international trade.” 
Furthermore, Article 13 also promulgates the role of private economic actors under 
this agreement. According to Article 13, “Member shall take such reasonable measures as 
may be available to them to ensure that non-governmental entities within their territories, as 
well as regional body in which relevant entities within their territories are members, comply 
with the relevant provisions of this Agreement.  In addition, Members shall not take measures 
which have the effect of, directly or indirectly, requiring or encouraging such regional or 
non-government entities, or local government bodies, to act in a manner inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement.  Members shall ensure that they rely on the services of non-
governmental entities for implementing sanitary and phytosanitary measures only if these 
entities comply with the provisions of this Agreement.”238 
 Such an issue derives from application of Article 13 SPS Agreement is which entities 
are covered by its rules.  This issue has gained prominence due to the fact that the adoption 
and implementation of SPS requirements is increasingly in the hands of body other than 
central government.  Some of these bodies involve governmental action at sub-national level, 
                                                          
237Ibid 
 
238 SPS Agreement available at: (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm) last visit 15 April 
2010. 
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such as local government regulators (states or provinces) or at supra-national level, such as 
regulatory bodies under regional agreements.  In addition, increasingly SPS requirements are 
imposed by private economic actors, such as supermarket and retail consortia.   
The role of SPS Agreement of the WTO is merely to discipline government, not 
private in imposing SPS Standard.  Since private sector standard have the potential to 
stimulate improvements in production practices and provide a competition advantage to 
producers that comply with these standards, they can also be extremely burdensome for 
suppliers and in particular for small-scale producers.   This is due to the fact that compliance 
with particular private sector standard is required by large supermarket chains.  The SPS 
Agreement therefore requires that SPS measures adopted by WTO members that may affect 
international trade, should comply with certain disciplines.  For example SPS measure should 
aim at health protection, should be based on a risk assessments and it applied in a non- 
discriminatory manner.239 
2.5. Private Economic Actors in Agreement of Textiles and Clothing 
In the globalization era, most of textile and clothing companies are private economic 
actors.  In addition, in some developing and least developed countries, the production of 
textiles and clothing is categorizing as small enterprise or small supplier.  For example, most 
of Indonesian and Brazilian (and other developing countries such Thailand, Ghana, Vietnam, 
Bangladesh and India) textile producers and suppliers are middle low enterprises, (some 
Indonesian textile industries are homemade industries).  They are categorizing vulnerable 
economic groups.  Vulnerable economic groups are sensitive private economic actors in a 
developing and least developed countries.  They are sensitive because of the number of 
workers they employ, their small impact on the domestic economy, and the lack of power to 
lobby their politicians, their vulnerability to international competition and their symbolic 
status.  Hence, to support the sustainability, the growth and right to compete in the sphere of 
international trade, the Agreement on Textile and Clothing mandate to WTO members a 
subtle attention concerning small supplier of textiles and clothing, particularly those who are 
live in developing or least developed countries.240  
                                                          
239See Prevost, Denise, (2008), ‘Private Sector Food-Safety Standards and the SPS Agreement: Challenges and 
Possibilities’, South African Yearbook of International Law, Vol.33, pp. 4-9. 
 
240See Agreement on Textiles and Clothing Article 1 (2),Members agree to use the provisions of paragraph 18 
Article 2 and paragraph 6(b) of Article 6 in such a way to permit meaningful increases in access possibilities 
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2.6.  Private Actors in Agreement on Anti-Dumping 
 Another particular agreement in WTO Law which is giving attention to private 
economic actors is Agreement on Anti-dumping, Article 4 concerning domestic industry.241  
From the parlance of Article 4, domestic industry means the domestic producers as a whole of 
the like products or to those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a 
major proportion of the total domestic production of those products.  According to the 
Agreement on Anti-dumping, an antidumping duty is imposed when there is a dumping that 
causes a material injury to a domestic industry and the causation between the dumping and 
injury.  However, if a domestic producers is related to or affiliated with exporters or importers 
of the product in question or the domestic producer is an importer of the product, national 
antidumping authorities may decide that such a domestic producer should be excluded from 
the category of domestic industry.  This is because a domestic producer that is related to 
exporters or importers of the dumped product or is itself an importer of that product and 
thereby presumably benefits from such relationship does not need protection by an 
antidumping measure.242 
 From the brief explanation regarding the role of private economic actors in the WTO 
Agreement, it comes to a conclusion that private economic actors exist vividly in the array of 
WTO Agreements.  Some agreements have made a clear statement regarding the private 
economic actors.  It shows that, first, WTO Agreements profoundly require the Members to 
consider the right of private economic actors as a trade player in WTO, and second, some 
WTO agreements transmit obligation indirectly to private economic actors and the 
government should ensure to take such measure to accommodate its private economic actors 
to comply with these obligations. 
 Perhaps the most tangible view in the relation between private economic actors and 
the WTO is when the government applies both substantive and procedural rights in its 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
for small suppliers and the development of commercially significant trading opportunities for new entrants in 
the field of textiles and clothing  trade. 
241See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Article 
4 Definition of Domestic Industry.  Available at:(http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp.pdf), 
last visited 12 April 2010. 
242Matsushita, Mitsuo, Schoenbaum, Thomas J., and Mavroidis, Petros C., (2002), the World Trade 
Organization: Law, Practice and Policy, Oxford University Press – Oxford/UK, pp. 327. 
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domestic regulations.  As Charnovitz mentioned that “It is similar to the GATT, the WTO 
does not accord rights directly to individuals, but rather mandates that Member governments 
do so”.243  This argument will lead to the next question; do private economic actors have 
rights derive from the WTO Agreement?  A pertinent answer will be elaborated below in 
coherence with the arguments before. 
 
3. Do Private Economic Actors Have Rights Derive from the WTO Agreement? 
 The question about right will entail the answer about obligation.244   The substantive 
right derives from WTO rules is recognized as economic right which is on the other side as 
obligation of state.245  Another precedent is procedural right which relates to the right of 
private economic actors to gain trade benefit through implementation of WTO Agreements by 
their governments. 
3.1. Substantive Rights 
 Nothing in the parlance of WTO law mentions directly the substantive right for private 
economic actors, however the substantive right itself exist and apply indirectly through 
national law and regulations.  Such a remarkable work has made by the WTO creators when 
Intellectual Property Right(hereinafter IPR) has been created to accommodate individual 
property right.  The Agreement on Trade –Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) requires Members to create and grant IPR to its national and nationals of other WTO 
Members.  This right is peculiar since it is applied to individual.  The person who is granted 
IPR is permitted to collect rents and to prevent others from infringing on their privilege for 
specified period.246  Article 7 of the TRIPS refers to the objectives of IPR protection which 
puts emphasis on the public rationale.  This article emphasizes the need for balance of ‘the 
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge’ and ‘balance of rights 
                                                          
243Charnovitz, Supra Note 228.   
 
244See Kratochwill, Friedrich V., (1999), Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal 
Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, Cambridge university Press – Cambridge/UK, 
pp. 155.  All arguments about rights stake out claims backed by reason why these demands should be socially 
protected.  Rights are, therefore, not only insistent claims, but are also imposing obligations on others. 
 
245Petersmann, Supra Note 212. 
 
246WTO Annex 1C, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, available 
at:(http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf ), last visited 12 April 2010.  See also Stoll, 
Peter-Tobias, and Schofkopf, Franck, (2006), WTO, World economic Order, World Trade Law, 
MartinusNijhoff Publisher – Leiden/Netherlands, pp.207-220. 
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and obligations between the inventor and users’.  TRIPS is a set of IPR agreement that is 
created an obligation for government to protect IPR of its individual, through domestic 
law.247The most important protection in IPR is that TRIPS requires government to establish a 
process enabling the IPR holder to ask custom authorities to detain counterfeit trademark or 
“pirated” copyright goods.  TRIPS also requires government to provide civil judicial 
procedures in order to protect right of IPR holder. Furthermore, TRIPS commits government 
to cooperate with a view to eliminate international trade in goods infringing intellectual 
property rights.248  These rights are economic substantive right indirectly from WTO Law.249   
However, as a notion of IPR is right for individual, substantive right also indirectly exists for 
individual through the implementation of the objective of WTO.250Pettersmann also argued 
that the international WTO guarantees of freedom of trade251, non-discrimination, and rule-of-
law serve “constitutional functions” for protecting, enlarging, regulating, and mutually 
balancing equal freedoms and other individual rights across frontiers.252  In this sense, without 
a doubt, economic substantive right is deployed by WTO to pursue the interest of individual 
through the obligations of governments. 
                                                          
247See also Anderson, Robert D., and Wager, Hannu, Supra Note 226, Anderson and Wager mentioned that 
TRIPS created a minimum protection of IPR rights of individual that leaves a fair amount of leeway to 
Member countries to implement its provisions within their own legal system and practice and fine-tune the 
balance in the light of domestic public policy considerations. 
 
248 Alvarez, José E., and Charnovitz, Steve, (January 2002), ‘Triangulating the World Trade Organization’In 
Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 96, Issue 1, pp. 28-
55.  See TRIPS Agreement Part III: Enforcement of Intellectual Property Right.  
249See Charnovitz, Supra Note 137.  Charnovitz argued that IP right derives from TRIPS is economic substantive 
right.  Nevertheless, according to Chapman, although several human rights instruments recognize a human 
right to one's own intellectual products, such a UDHR Article 27, the conceptual of IP as substantive rights 
differs in fundamental ways from its treatment as an economic interest under TRIPS.  From human right 
perspective, intellectual property protection is understood more as a social product with a social function and 
not primarily as economic relationship.  See Chapman, Audrey R., (2002), ‘The Human Rights Implications 
of Intellectual Property Protection’, in Mini-Symposium: Health and the WTO, Journal of International 
Economic Law, Vol. 5, Issue 4, pp. 861-882. 
250WTO Objectives recognize the obligation of Member states to improve standard of living and full 
employment which in conformity with UDHR and ICESCR.  
 
251 See Petersmann, Supra Note 225,  WTO rules generally protect freedom of trade (e.g. Articles II,XI GATT, 
XVI GATS), most favored nation treatment (e.g. Articles I GATT, II GATT, II GATS, 4 TRIPS Agreement), 
national treatment (e.g. Article III GATT, XVII GATS), private property rights ( the TRIPS Agreement), rule 
of law and broadly defined public goods (GATT Article XVII-XXI, GATS  Articles XIV, XIVbis., Articles 
6-8, 30-31, 40 of the TRIPS agreement) for the benefit of private traders, investors, producers and 
consumers. 
 
252Petersmann, Ernst-Urlich, (2008),‘Constitutionalism and WTO Law: From a State Centered Approach 
Towards a Human Rights Approach in International Economic Law’, in The Political Economy of 
International Trade Law (Essays in Honor of Robert E. Hudec), eds. Kennedy, Daniel L. M., and Southwick, 
James D., Cambridge University Press – Cambridge/UK, pp. 33.   
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The GATS also entails substantive right indirectly to both individual and private 
economic actors.  The substantive right for individual under GATS is free movement for 
natural person in supplying service.253   In addition, the substantive rights for private 
economic actors derive from service mode of cross border supply and commercial presence.  
State is obliged to impose substantive right directly to service supplier or individual.  In the 
context of substantive right for individual and substantive obligation for government254, state 
must apply most favored-nation and national treatment principles, but does with a twist.  As it 
in other WTO Agreement, the MFN principle prohibits discrimination, whether it is 
intentional or unintentional, and applies MFN principle regardless of the nationality of service 
suppliers.255 In the GATS, state members should provide the service supplier transparency 
regarding the schedule of commitment in order to achieve market access in services.   
3.2. Procedural Rights   
To assist private economic actors to gain the benefits of WTO agreement, WTO 
creator established a number of procedural and administrative requirements to be met by the 
Members.  These requirements provide indirect procedural right to private economic actors.  
Procedural right is right to due process regarding the implementation of WTO Agreements. 
3.2.1. Procedural Right According to GATT  
 Article X 3(a) of GATT requires each party to administer in a uniform, impartial and 
reasonable mannerall its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings of the kind described in 
paragraph 1 of this Article.  This article constitutes procedural obligation of state to manage 
all its law, regulations, decisions and rulings in order to give such information for trading 
partner both governments and their enterprises.256  Along with Article X 3(a), paragraph (b) 
                                                          
253GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying services Under the Agreement, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats.pdf, to compare this argument freedom of movement 
of natural person is also recognized by EC Treaty.  See Carozza,Paola, Supra Note 189. 
254See Fidler, David P., Drager, Nick, Correa, Carlos, and Aginam, Obijiofor, (2006), ‘Making Commitments in 
Health Services under the GATS: Legal Dimensions’, in International Trade in Health Services and The 
GATS: Current Issues and Debates, eds. Blouin, Chantal, Drager, Nick, and Smith, Richard, the World Bank 
– Washington DC/USA,pp.150-155 General obligations and disciplines derives from GATS is known as 
substantive duties and procedural duties.  State is obliged to perform these obligations in order to achieve 
substantive rights of individual and private economic actors under GATS. 
 
255Ibid, GATS Part II General Obligations and Disciplines, Article II Most-Favored-Nation Treatment: With 
respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each Member shall accord immediately and 
unconditionally to services and services suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favorable that that it 
accords to like services and services suppliers of any other country.  
256See European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of BananasSupra Note 38, 
Appellate Body clarified that the uniformity requirement is not a general non-discrimination obligation, such 
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requires each party ‘to maintain, or institute as soon as practicable, judicial, arbitral or 
administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review and 
correction of administrative action relating to customs matters.  Such tribunals or procedures 
shall be independent of the agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement and their 
decisions shall be implemented by, and shall govern the practice of, such agency appeal to be 
lodged by importers; provided that the central administration of such agency may take steps 
to obtain a review of the matter in another proceeding if there is good cause to believe that 
the decision is inconsistent with established principles of law or the actual facts.’   
 Article X of GATT enshrines the reference of transparency and due process which has 
been quoted by WTO Panel and Appellate body. In the case of the United States – Fiber 
Underwear257, particular significance concerning Article X has been made by the Appellate 
Body that Article X merely enhances transparency and due process protections extend to 
administrative action taken by Members in relation to their own citizen (i.e. internal 
government and trader as well as foreign trader).  Another point made by Appellate Body is 
that Article X, unlike other GATT provisions, is explicitly concerned with the rights and 
expectations of trader.  Finally, the Appellate Body clarified that Article X allows challenge 
to the administrative measures that are otherwise WTO consistent.258  The ‘due process’ and 
transparency constitute a procedural right that implies to private economic actors, in gaining 
its benefit from GATT Agreement. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
an MFN requirement.  In other words, it does not deal with the substance of measure at issue, but only their 
administration.  See also Davey, William J., (2004),‘Dispute Settlement Practice Relatingto GATT 1994’, in 
The WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995-203 (Studies in Transnational Economic Law Vol. 18), eds. 
Ortino, Federic,  and Petersmann, Ernst-Urlich, Kluwer Law International – the Hague/Netherlands, pp.210. 
 
257The United States – Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man Fiber Underwear, WT/DS24/R, 8 November 
1996. Appellate clarified that Article X may be seen to embody a principle of fundamental importance that of 
promoting full disclosure of governmental acts affecting Members and private persons and enterprises, 
whether of domestic or foreign nationality.  The relevant policy principle is widely known as the principle or 
transparency and has obviously due process dimensions.  The essential implication is that Members and other 
persons affected or likely to be affected, by the governmental measures, imposing restraints, requirements, 
and other burdens, should have a reasonable opportunity to acquire authentic information about such a 
measure and accordingly to protect and adjust their activities or alternatively to seek modification of such 
measure. 
 
258Ala’i, Padideh, (2010), ‘From the Periphery to the Centre? The Evolving WTO Jurisprudence on 
Transparency and Good Governance’, in Redesigning the World Trade Organization for the Twenty-First 
Century, ed. Steger, Debra P., the Centre for the International Governance Innovation (CIGI) and Wilfrid 
Laurier University Press – Ontario/Canada, pp. 170-173.  
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3.2.2.  Procedural Right According to TRIPS 
 The procedural right or due process right set out in TRIPS is the important stage in 
dealing with the enforcement of IPRs.  TRIPS lays down minimum standard that must be 
reflected in the domestic laws of WTO Members.  However, the TRIPS standard on 
enforcement of IPR does not attempt to harmonize member’s law and practices.  The general 
provisions under Section I Part III of TRIPS establish the obligation that member of WTO 
shall ensure the availability of enforcement procedures under their law.259  The availability of 
the enforcement procedures under domestic law must be fair and equitable and must permit 
effective action against any act of infringement of IPR covered by TRIPS.  However the 
application of the enforcement procedures shall be in a manner as to avoid the creation of 
barriers to legitimate trade and provide for safeguards against their abuse.  Article 41 (5) of 
TRIPS confirm that the obligation for the availability of enforcement procedures does not 
create any obligations to put in place a judicial system and for allocation of resources for 
enforcement of IPR as a distinct from enforcement of law in general.  TRIPS is specific on 
obligations of WTO member to make available effective mechanisms for enforcement without 
putting standard on measuring the operational and functional aspect of the mechanism in each 
country.260  Furthermore, WTO Members have to put in place the required measures to ensure 
effective enforcement of IPR.  The private domestic enforcement actions, brought by right 
holders under domestic law, will augment the top down role of the TRIPS Council and reduce 
the need for the dispute settlement action.  Civil litigation brought by businesses operating in 
local market has the potential to assist in ensuring effective enforcement of intellectual 
property protection.261Accordingly, the enforcement of intellectual property rights involves 
                                                          
259TRIPS Agreement, Part III Article 41. 
 
260Biadgleng, ErmiasTekeste, (2008), ‘The Development Balance of the TRIPS Agreement and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights’, in Interpreting and Implementing the TRIPS Agreement Is It Fair?, eds. 
Malbon, Justin, and Lawson, Charles Lawson, Edward Elgar Publishing-Glos/UK, pp. 120.  Biadgleng 
explained according to Article 41 (5), TRIPS requires countries to make available to right holders civil 
judicial procedures concerning the enforcement of any IP right covered by TRIPS, and criminal procedures 
and penalties at least in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy ion a commercial scale.  
Countries should adopt procedures to enable right holder to lodge an application with competent authorities, 
for the suspension of the release into free circulation of goods validly suspected to involve trademark 
counterfeiting or copyright piracy.   The Judicial authorities should have the authority to order disclosure of 
evidence, injunctions, damages, prompt and effective provisional measures and disposition of infringing 
goods and materials and implements the predominant use of which has been in the creation of the infringing 
goods.   
261 Mathews, Duncan, (2002), Globalizing Intellectual Property Rights: The TRIPS Agreement, Routledge – 
London/UK, pp. 92. 
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procedural formalities in a number of hierarchical forums.  Such formalities and procedures 
are designed to assist and help the owner of the rights not only to obtain them from the 
competent office but also to enforce them by preventing their infringement by others, usually 
competitor.262 
 The enforcement of intellectual property rights relies on a country’s judicial system.  
Right holders fight infringement of their exclusive rights in front of the courts.  To 
immediately stop infringing activities, they can request seizures or preliminary injunctions, if 
the claim of infringement is verified by trial, thus courts can demand the payment of punitive 
charges to the infringer of IPR holder.263  From the explanation above, TRIPS also enforce 
‘due process’ right through domestic law of right holder.  An assumption derives from this 
argument, that nothing in TRIPS Agreement not to compel Member countries in protecting 
the substantive right of their IPR holders, both individual (i.e. copyright) and private 
economic actors (i.e. trademark). 
3.2.3. Procedural Right According to Anti-Dumping Agreement (AD-Agreement) 
 The procedural right on Anti-Dumping Agreement lays down in Article 5, regarding 
the AD investigation.264  Although nothing in AD Agreement requires Member to create 
domestic institution and legal basis for imposing measures in terms of AD Agreement, but as 
practical manner, Member generally create an institutional framework, with the investigating 
authorities designed and empowered to conduct Anti-Dumping investigations.  The AD 
agreement does not contain any requirements or guideline in respect to AD investigation 
institution.  The government generally establishes investigation institution as independent 
body from government.  The function of investigating body in the context of AD Agreement 
is providing procedural support for domestic industry. 
 An investigation normally initiated as a result of a complaint in the form of a written 
application by the domestic industry alleging that it is suffering injury and a threat thereof 
because of dumped imports.  The initial step is the consideration whether the application 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
262Alikhan, Shahid, (2000), Socio-Economic Benefits of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing 
Countries, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Publication- Geneva/Switzerland, pp. 153 
 
263  Braga, Carlos A Primo, Fink, Carsten , and Sepulveda, Claudia Paz, (2000), Intellectual Property Rights and 
Economic Development, The World Bank – Washington/USA, pp.6 
 
264Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Article 5, 
available at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp.pdf, last visited 12 April 2010. 
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meets the documentation requirement, if it is not; it has to be supplemented or re-submitted.  
Once the application is accepted as properly documented, the government of the exporting 
country has to be notified.  The authority’s body must examine the accuracy and adequacy of 
the evidence provided and takes a decision whether there is sufficient evidence.  Before the 
investigation, the authority body must ensure that the application has the required degree of 
support of the domestic industry.  An on the initiation of the investigations, the public notice 
therefore must be given.265 
 The due process clause in AD Agreement sets out in Article 6 (2) which is throughout 
the anti-dumping investigation all interest parties shall have a full opportunity for the defense 
of their interests.  To this end, the authorities shall, on request, provide opportunities for all 
interested parties to meet those parties with adverse interests, so that opposing views may be 
presented and rebuttal arguments offered.  Provision of such opportunities must take account 
of the need to preserve confidentiality and of the convenience to the parties.  There shall be no 
obligation on any party to attend a meeting; a failure to do so shall not be prejudicial to that 
party’s case.  Interested parties shall also have the right, on justification, to present other 
information orally.  The due process clause inherently derives from AD Agreement as if it 
depends on member’s legal system.266  The incorporation of AD Agreement itself depends on 
the constitutional law of WTO Members.  The AD Agreement may be incorporated directly 
into domestic legal system as is, or may be incorporated indirectly in to domestic law, by 
means of implementing or enabling legislation.  Members commonly supplement the 
incorporation of the AD Agreement into domestic law by adopting a supplemental, or 
secondary, set provision in the form of regulations or subsidiary legal instrument.267 
3.2.4. Procedural Right According to GATS 
 According to GATS Article VI (2), each Member shall maintain or institute as soon 
as practicable judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures which provide, at 
                                                          
265Czako, Judith, Human, Johan, and Miranda, Jorge, (2003), A Handbook on Anti-Dumping Investigations, 
Cambridge University Press – Cambridge/UK, pp.5-6. 
 
266See for example the Anti-Dumping Law in Argentina, the 1998 Decree, together with the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement as incorporated into Argentina domestic legal system, forms the core of Argentina’s current 
domestic regulation concerning anti-dumping measures.  This law contains general principle of 
administrative procedures in anti-dumping such as principles of right to due process including right to be 
heard and right to offer and produce evidence, and the right to a reasonable decision.  Nakagawa,Junji, 
(2007), Anti-Dumping Laws and Practices of the New User, Cameron May – London/UK, pp.337. 
 
267Czako, Judith, Human, Johan and Miranda, Jorge, Supra Note 265. 
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the request of an affected service supplier, for the prompt review of, and where justified, 
appropriate remedies for, administrative decisions affecting trade in service.  Where such 
procedures are not independent of the agency entrusted with the administrative decision 
concerned, the Member shall ensure that the procedures in fact provide for an objective and 
impartial review.  This Article basically provides a basic framework for minimizing the 
distortions of trade created by domestic regulation.  The regulations that affect service bound 
by national commitments are to be administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial 
manner.  To paraphrase Article VI member countries must provide procedures for the review 
of the regulation at the request of service suppliers and must be based on objective and 
transparent criteria.  The review itself must not be more burdensome than necessary to ensure 
the quality of the services.  And in the case of licensing procedures must not in themselves 
restrict the supply of the service.268 
 Article VI of GATS explicitly recognizes the right of service supplier to information 
on regulatory and administrative decisions and to judicial and administrative review and 
appeals process, and contains no provisions on notifications to the WTO or on bilateral 
consultations with other WTO members.269 
3.2.5.  Procedural Rights According to Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Agreement (SCM Agreement) 
 Article 11 of SCM Agreement indicates that an investigation to determine the 
existence, degree and effect of any alleged subsidy shall be initiated upon a written 
application by or on behalf of the domestic industry.270  The SCM Agreement notably 
provides for detailed procedural requirement regarding the initiation and conduct of a 
countervailing investigation by the competent authority of the Member imposing the 
countervailing duties on subsidized imports.  The main objectives of these requirements are to 
ensure that, the investigations are conducted in a transparent manner, all interest parties have 
the opportunity to defend their interests, and the investigating authorities adequately explain 
                                                          
268See GATS, Article VI available at:(http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats.pdf ), last visited 12 
April 2010. See also Beaulieu, Eugene, (2007), ‘Trade in Service’, in Handbook on International Trade 
Policy, eds. Kerr, William A., and Gaisford, James D., Edward Elgar – London/UK, pp.157. 
 
269OECD, (2001), Trade in Services: Negotiating Issues and Approaches, OECD Publications Services-
Paris/French, p.99. 
 
270Article 11 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
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the basis for their determinations.271SCM Agreement pointed out in obligation of state for its 
private economic actors when one of the actors is an actor with aninterest in a new 
countervailing duty investigation has a right to receive notice, to present writtenevidence, to 
review the public docket, to be informed of the essential facts in time to defend its interest, to 
make a representation against the countervailing duty, to receive notice of preliminary and 
final determinations, and to seek judicial review. 
The WTO provision for procedural rights extends both to adjudication and to 
rulemaking.  However, in the context of SCM Agreement, government has firm authorities to 
rewrite its countervailing duty law or the accompanying regulations, and the SCM Agreement 
does not accord any procedural rights to the private economic actors.  In other words, the 
SCM Agreement does not prior notice to the opportunity for public statement.  The relevant 
possibility of the SCM Agreement gets to the rulemaking is that it gives a private economic 
actor an opportunity to comment on a governmental review of whether a countervailing duty 
should be discontinued.272 
 Substantive and procedural rights enshrine in WTO Agreements, could in particular be 
understood as duty and obligation of government to confer these rights in domestic regulation.  
However, when government disobliges these rights, nothing from the WTO rules provide an 
adequate discretion for private economic actors to challenge it before the WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings.  In spite of regulating the right of private economic actors to 
challenge their government regarding their rights of trade before WTO dispute settlement 
proceeding, WTO otherwise requires the Members to provide legal and judicial remedies 
inside WTO Members in relations between private economic actors, governments and certain 
non-governmental organization (e.g. Articles X GATT, VI GATS, TRIPS and Article 13 
Anti-Dumping Agreement, and Article 23 of SCM Agreements).  These articles suggest that 
WTO rules must protect ‘security and predictability’ also for producers, investors, traders and 
consumers engaged in international trade.  Some WTO rules indeed explicitly require 
domestic courts (e.g. Article XX Agreement on Government Procurement) or commercial 
arbitration inside the WTO (e.g. Article 4 Pre-shipment Inspection Agreement) to settle 
                                                          
271Van den Bosche, supra Note 56. 
 
272 See Charnovitz, Supra Note 143. 
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disputes in conformity with the relevant WTO Obligations or to protect individual trading 
rights and – in particular individual rights of intellectual property rights.273 
 The WTO agreement basically is involving the private economic actors in particular 
appropriate trade scheme.  States intend to design trade treaties to encourage private economic 
actors to import and export from other private economic actors.  In order to encourage the 
trade, WTO provide substantive and procedural rights for private economic actors that would 
basically require state not to take actions that would adversely affect these private economic 
actors.  Accordingly, most of trade treaties – including WTO – basically provide a set of 
rights for private economic actors against the government who implement unfair trade 
regulation.  However, WTO is currently structured as to provide Members these rights on 
behalf of their citizen rather than granting these rights directly to the citizens.  But because 
WTO most affects private economic actors, it only makes sense that these rights have 
appropriate remedies.274  Unfortunately, WTO does not provide direct remedies for private 
economic actors to against foreign government or their government who is implementing 
unfair trade regulation that restrains them to achieve trade benefits under the WTO.   
 Some authors argued that it is required for WTO to provide more apparent role for 
private actors to involve in dispute settlement system.  For example, in a manner of 
democracy deficit coined bySchneider who discusses the link between domesticpolitics and 
international trade, where the involvement of private actors in the dispute resolution 
mechanisms of tradeorganizations has the ability to reduce the linkage between trade and 
domestic politicalinterests. While theoretically this link allows governments to be more 
responsive to theircitizens, in reality, the link between trade and politics keeps governments 
tetheredtospecial and well-organized interest groups. Once a state has determined that it is in 
itsnational interest to join a trade organization and once rules are adopted under 
thatorganization, the link to domestic political interests can be reduced by giving private 
actorsstanding to enforce the agreement. The governments therefore will be more responsible 
forfollowing the rules across the board rather than selectively.275  In addition, more apparent 
argument in democracy absence argued by Young that “as power is centralized in an 
                                                          
273Petersmann, Ernst-Urlich, (2008), ‘Judging Judges: From ‘Principal-Agent Theory’ To Constitutional Justice’ 
In Multilevel ‘ Judicial Governance’ of Economic Cooperation Among Citizens’, Journal of International 
Economic Law, Vol. 11, Issue 4, December, 2008, pp. 827- 884  
 
274Schneider,Supra Note 211, pp. 627 -638. 
 
275Ibid, p. 587-594 
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organization or government and as increasing numbers of laws are passed, individuals have 
less ability to influence the actions of the organization or government, where at the WTO, the 
lack of access for other parties to dispute resolution mechanisms may be more appropriately 
termed, ‘democracy absence’”.276  Concurrently, Young posited that if private partiesare 
denied sufficient access to the dispute resolution system, then the WTO will lose itslegitimacy 
as the final arbiter of international trade and its decisions will be renderedpowerless.277 
 Those arguments above basically denied the supremacy of rule of law underlies in the 
WTO as International Public Law, which theoretically absorb the sovereignty of state member 
to involve in the international organization.  Thus, the portion of private economic actors as 
merely amicus curiae is ample to support their interest, since basically WTO rules are giving 
directly obligations among Members.  Accordingly, this argument will continue to reveal the 
private economic actors in the WTO dispute settlement system without prejudicing the 
positive function of Members in enhancing their duties protecting the interest of private 
economic actors. 
4.  Private Economic Actors in WTO  Dispute Settlement System 
The WTO dispute settlement system is the most unique measure among the WTO 
Agreements.  A controversial issue regarding the involvement of non-government entities in 
the dispute settlement system becomes debate amongst experts.  This section therefore 
elaborates the place of non-government entities including private economic actors as amicus 
curiae278 in the WTO dispute settlement system. 
                                                          
276See Laihhold, Michael, (1999), ‘Private Party Access to the WTO: Do Recent Developments in International 
Trade Dispute Resolution Really Give Private Organizations A Voice in the WTO?’ Journal of 
Transnational Law, Vol. 12, autumn 1999, pp.449. 
277  Young, Michael K., (1995), ‘Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over Diplomats’, 
Journal of International Law, No. 29, pp. 389 – 402. 
278Amicus curia is defined as: "A person who is not a party to a lawsuit but who petitions the court to file a brief 
in the action because that person has a strong interest in the subject matter." See Cawley, Jared B., (2004), 
‘Friend of the Court: How the WTO Justifies the Acceptance of the Amicus Curiae Brief from Non-
Governmental Organizations’, Penn State International Law Review, Vol. 23 No. 1, summer 2004, pp. 47-
78.Cawley elaborate the history of amicus curiae began with the permission from US Supreme Court to 
accept amicus curiae on behalf of non-party in the dispute as “dramatic and unusual” (case of Green v. 
Biddle, 21 US 1 (1823).  Over years later, the filling of amicus curiae brief has also less controversial, and 
more frequent.  The purpose and reasons for such submissions vary, but not largely so. Often, non-parties 
(whether they are governmental, private-interest groups, or private individuals) file briefs on behalf of 
constitutional, environmental, and civil rights issues.  Amicus Curiae become more popular when 
international tribunal also use the brief submitted by non-governmental entities in the proceeding of court, 
see also Shelton, Dinah, (1994), ‘the Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations in International 
Judicial Proceeding’, American Journal of International Law No. 88, October 1994, pp. 611. Shelton 
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4.1. Private Economic Actors in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, Legal or 
Political issues? 
 WTO dispute settlement system is merely providing standing to governments on 
behalf of their trade interests.  Private parties or non-governmental entities are not entitled to 
appear as party in the WTO dispute settlement process.  However, according to Article 13 of 
DSU state that “each arbitration panel’s has right to seek information and technical advice 
from any individual or body which is deemed appropriate.  However before a panel seek such 
information or advice from any individual or body within the jurisdiction of amember it shall 
inform the authorities of that member.  A member should respond promptly and fully to any 
request by a panel for such information as the panel considers necessary and appropriate.  
Confidential information which is provided shall not be revealed without formal authorization 
from the individual, body, or authorities of the member providing the information.  Panels 
may also seek information from any relevant source and may consult experts to obtain their 
opinion on certain aspects of the matter.  With respect to a factual issue concerning a 
scientific or other technical matter raised by a party to a dispute, a panel may request an 
advisory report in writing from an expert review group.” 
 Article 13 of the DSU authorizes WTO Panel and appellate body to seek and accept 
the ‘solicited’ amicus curiae brief from non-government entities.  However in some cases, 
unsolicited amicus curiae brief become controversy such as in the US – Shrimp case,279when 
some NGOs submitted unsolicited amicus curiae briefs to both Panel and Appellate Body.  
The Panel rejected all of the unsolicited NGO submission, stating that “accepting non-
requested information from non-governmental sources would be, in our opinion, incompatible 
with the provisions of the DSU as currently applied.”  The Panel interpreted the word “seek” 
in Article 13 to mean only those submissions that were explicitly solicited or requested.  
However, the U.S. argued on appeal that the Panel in this case had erred in finding the 
interpretation of Article 13 of DSU by concluding that it only applies to solicited or requested 
submissions.  The Appellate Body therefore agreed with the U.S. and reversed the Panel’s 
decision on this issue.  The Appellate Body stated that “under the DSU, only Members who 
are parties to the dispute, or who have notified their interests become third parties in such a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
summarizes the amicus curiae involvement in some international tribunals such as PCIJ, ICJ, EU Courts and 
WTO. 
 
279United States--Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Panel, WT/DS58/R 
(May 15, 1998). 
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dispute to the DSB, have a legal right to make submissions to, and have a legal right to have 
those submissions considered by a Panel.  Correlatively, a Panel is obliged in law to accept 
and give due consideration only to submissions made by the parties and the third parties in a 
panel proceeding.”  In other words, Appellate body suggested that under Article 13 of DSU, a 
Panel has the discretion to look at or ignore any information, including submissions by NGOs, 
irrespective of whether such information was requested.280 
 Another case referring to the dilemmatic of unsolicited amicus curiae is EC – Asbestos 
Case281.  In this case the Panel received five written submissions from asbestos victim group 
and industries. Two of these were appended to the EU submission and considered by the 
Panel as a part of defending party’s arguments.  The Panel then rejected the remaining three.  
Canada notified the DSB to appeal.  In appeal proceedings, Appellate Body had received 
thirteen unsolicited amicus curiae briefs regarding the appeal.  The Appellate Body then 
issued Additional Procedure which is only applicable to this particular case, mentioned that 
“to file an amicus brief stating that the decision to publish the criteria was made in the interest 
of fairness and orderly procedure in the conduct of the said appeal”.  After issued the 
Additional Procedures, Appellate Body then rejected and returned all unsolicited briefs, along 
with the adoption of new additional procedures. The Additional Procedures provided mostly 
all those who intended to submit amicus curiae briefs would first be required to submit 
application for leave to file such a submission with the Appellate Body. Only one of these 
NGOs, the Korea Asbestos Association subsequently submitted a request for leave in 
accordance with the Additional Procedures.282 
                                                          
280Ala’I, Padideh, (2000), ‘Judicial Lobbying at the WTO: the Debate over the Use of Amicus Curiae Briefs and 
the U.S. Experience’, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 24, Issue 1, pp.62-94.  See also Keller, 
Joseph, (2005), ‘the Future of Amicus Participation at the WTO: Implications of the Sardines Decision and 
Suggestions for Further Developments’, International Journal of Legal Information,Vol. 33. Issue 3, pp. 449-
470.  Keller stated that the Appellate Body in the case of US Lead and Bismuth II, (WT/DS138/AB/R, 
adopted 7 June 2000) determined that acceptance of amicus curiae briefs filed by the members is a matter of 
discretion, to be determined on a case by case basis.  It seems appropriate for the Appellate Body to consider 
the underlying purposes of WTO lawanddispute settlement in making decisions of this manner.  If the 
Appellate Body finds any amicus brief objectionable or simply not useful in deciding the dispute, it can 
choose not to consider that brief.  This discretion will create a balance of interest by allowing access for 
amicus submissions while at the same time appropriately limiting the influence of such submissions. 
 
281European Communities--Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, Report of the Panel, 
WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000). 
 
282European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products, Communication 
from the Appellate Body, WT/DS135/9, November 8, 2000.  This additional procedure has been adopted by 
the Division hearing this appeal for the purposes of this appeal only pursuant to Rule 16(1) of the Working 
Procedures for Appellate Review, and is not a new working procedure drawn by the Appellate Body pursuant 
to paragraph 9 of Article 17 of the DSU. 
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 The WTO Members then accused the Appellate Body of taking actions that were 
beyond its mandate under DSU.  At the Special Session, many  of WTO Members argued that 
the issuance of the Additional Procedures to allow acceptance of an unsolicited amicus curiae 
was only disturbing developments, such as acceptance of amicus curiae briefs in the United 
States – British Steel Case283 and US-Shrimp case.  WTO Members in the Special Session 
consented to declare that the issue of amicus curiae briefs was not procedural, but a 
substantive one that only Members could decide.284  Of course this consensus was with 
contention from the U.S.  According to the U.S Representative to the WTO, the Appellate 
Body did the only thing it could do by given the number of persons that either had already 
filed or expressed their intent to file friend of the court briefs.285  The U.S. considered that 
acceptance of amicus curiae from non WTO Members  especially from NGO was unavoidable 
since the submission of amicus curiae brief by outside groups were considered important.  In 
several cases, the number of amicus curiae briefs being filed before the dispute resolution 
system of the WTO.  In an effort to facilitate this procedure, the U.S. believe that the 
submission of amicus curiae briefs from NGO should be more formalized to allow for a more 
uniform and judicial means of submission.286 
 The discussion regarding the NGO in WTO become more intractable issues since 
some authors mention that involvement of NGO will enhance the WTO decision-making 
process, because NGOs will provide information, arguments and other perspective than the 
government itself.  NGO is also acting as intellectual competitors to government.287 Van den 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
283United States--Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel 
Products Originating in the United Kingdom, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS138/AB/R (May 10, 
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284Mavroidis, Petros C., (2002), ‘Amicus Curiae Briefs Before The WTO:  Much Ado About Nothing’, in 
European Integration and International Co-ordination: Studies in Transnational Economic Law in Honor of 
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285Ala’i, Supra Note 280. 
 
286Cawley, Jared B., Supra Note 278. See alsoPruzin, Daniel, (2000), ‘WTO Appellate Body under Fire for 
Move to Accept Amicus Curiae Briefs from NGOs’, International Trade Reporter, November 30, 2000, pp. 
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287Esty, Daniel, (1998), ‘Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, 
Competition, or Exclusion’, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 1, pp. 123 -147. 
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Bossche mentioned that NGO participation will also increase the legitimacy of the WTO.288  
The legitimacy of WTO and public confidence in the WTO will increase when NGOs have 
the opportunity to be heard and to observe the decision making process, since the WTO itself 
as intergovernmental organization has been described as undemocratic and lacking in the 
transparency.  Moreover, by allowing NGO to involve in WTO discussion, the WTO would 
hear about important issues which may not be adequately represented by any national 
government.  However, this argument still in contrast with some developing countries 
member arguments.  Most of developing countries remain object to greater involvement of 
NGOs in the WTO, because the opposite point of view remarked by NGO mostly inimical 
their interests, for example on environmental and labor issues.  Moreover, developing 
countries perceive NGOs involvement will dilute their WTO membership rights, since many 
developing countries lack of resources necessary to fully participate at the WTO then believe 
that NGOs – especially which is well-funded by European and American export- will impinge 
upon developing countries rights as WTO members.289 
 The pros and contrast arguments regarding the involvement of NGO in WTO – in 
particular WTO dispute settlement system- are far from settled.  Those arguments are 
conceivable since the definition of NGO is still ambiguous and inconsistent used by any 
international institutions.   Lindblom mentioned that definition and criterion of NGO basically 
derived from UN Review Consultative Arrangements with Non-Governmental Organizations 
that established the definition of NGO as “any international organization which is not created 
by intergovernmental agreement shall be considered as a nongovernmental organization for 
the purpose of these arrangements.”290 Furtherance, Secretary-General of the UN proposed a 
definition of NGO as “a non-profit entity whose members are citizens or association of 
citizens of one or more countries and whose activities are determined by the collective will of 
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its members in response to the needs of the members or of one or more communities with 
which the NGO cooperates”.291 
 From the definition above, a question arises whether private economic actors are NGO 
in the context of WTO.  It seems logical if private economic actors are not NGO according to 
the UN definition, because private economic actors are profitable legal entities.292  However 
for some reasons, private economic actors are able to be considered as NGO when they 
interests are represented by business association, for example in the British steel case, The 
Specialty Steel Industry of North America (SSINA) which represents all the producers of 
specialty steel in North America,293 filed an unsolicited amicus curiae to Panel and Appellate 
Body on behalf of steel industries in North America. It emerges the fear of some developing 
countries regarding the involvement of private economic actors indirectly through their 
associations to dispute settlement system.  Some authors argued that private economic actors 
are lurking the dispute by lobbying their governments to file against another WTO members 
regarding their inconformity with WTO rules.294 Thus, if this NGO – which is representing 
the interest of private economic actors – has right indirectly or directly to involve in the WTO 
dispute settlement system, the balance of fairness will be diminishing.  Moreover, if WTO 
allowed amicus curiae which came from industry groups rather than the more traditional 
NGOs, such as environmental groups, it will put them in disadvantage as the civil society 
                                                          
291General Review of Arrangements for Consultations with Non-governmental Organizations: Report of the 
Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Agenda Item 3, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/AC.70/1994/5 (1994). See also 
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292 See Van den Bossche, Supra Note 288. Bossche explained that in the first Session of the Ministerial 
Conference in Singapore in December 1996, the WTO Secretariat accredited all non-profit NGOs that could 
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stainless steel. Activities include: a proactive marketing program focused toward architects, designers, 
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(http://www.ssina.com/about/index.html ), last visited 20 June 2010. 
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organization.  In addition, developing countries are much fearer about this issue because they 
much weaker compare to developed countries.295 
 Apart from those arguments regarding the involvement of nongovernmental legal 
entities in the WTO dispute settlement system; this research will reveal the question whether 
the involvement of private economic actors in the WTO dispute settlement system is merely 
political or legal issue. 
4.2. Legal Issue 
The legal issue regarding the involvement of non-government entities or NGOs 
(including business association representing private economic actors) in the WTO dispute 
settlement system, will be divided into three arguments, first is legal issue regarding the 
acceptance of amicus curiae briefs, second is the involvement in WTO dispute settlement 
hearing and, third is the permissible of individual to represent the party to the dispute. 
4.2.1. Amicus Curiae Brief 
 As mentioned above, Article 13 DSU provides a possibility for non WTO member to 
involve in the WTO dispute settlement system by submitting amicus curiae if it is requested 
by Panel or Appellate Body. the WTO dispute settlement process could find a way to manage 
a system wherein amicus curiae briefs were accepted.  Panels and Appellate Body have 
authority but not obligation, to accept unsolicited (or solicited) briefs under Article 13 DSU. 
In fact, some unsolicited amicus curiae are accepted by the Appellate body since the 
interpretation of Article 13 (2) of DSU means that “panels may consult experts to obtain their 
opinion”.  In the Shrimp/Turtle case, Appellate Body determined that Panels could accept 
amicus curiae briefs under this language, because the briefs, although unsolicited, were part of 
the government submission, which are admissible.296 It is similar to the British Steel case 
                                                          
295See Schneider, Andrea Kupfer, (2001), ‘Unfriendly Actions: The Amicus Curiae Brief Battle in the WTO’, in 
Institutional Concerns of an Expanded Trade Regime: Where Should Global Social and Regulatory Policy Be 
Made?,Widener Law Symposium Journal, No. 87, Spring 2001, pp. 101-107.Schneider mentioned that the 
concerns about involvement of NGO in particular business group from some developing countries come in 
four types: (1) new policy is being made concerning amicus briefs by WTO Panels and the members should 
be deciding that rather than the panels; (2) NGOs will have more rights to participate than Member States; (3) 
the identity of these non-members is troublesome; and (4) any move away from the state-to-state interaction 
in the WTO is a bad one. 
296United States--Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Panel, WT/DS58/R 
(May 15, 1998).  See also Trachtman, Joel P., (2003), ‘Private Parties in EC-US Dispute Settlement at the 
WTO: Toward Intermediated Domestic Effect’, inTransatlantic Economic Disputes: the EU, The US, and the 
WTOeds. Petersmann, Ernst-Urlich, and Pollack, Mark A., Oxford University Press – Oxford/UK, pp. 530. 
Trachtman argued that under a regime of reasonably unrestricted access for amicus curiae, it would be highly 
impracticable for the dispute settlement system to undertake to recount and to respond each amicus brief in 
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when Appellate Body observed that “individual and organizations, which are not Members of 
the WTO, have no legal right to make submissions to or be heard by the Appellate Body.  The 
Appellate Body has no legal duty to accept or consider unsolicited amicus curiae briefs 
submitted by individuals or organizations, not Members of the WTO.  The Appellate Body 
has a legal duty to accept and consider only submissions from WTO members which are 
parties or third parties in a particular dispute.  We are of the opinion that we have the legal 
authority under the DSU to accept and consider amicus curiae briefs in an appeal in which we 
find it pertinent and useful to do so”.297  This recommendation stressed out the acceptance of 
amicus curiae from non WTO member if: 
1.  The amicus curiae brief is requested by Panel or Appellate Body 
2. The amicus curiae brief is deemed as part of each party’s submission298 
3. The Panel and Appellate Body find that amicus curiae brief are pertinent and useful in 
deciding particular case.299 
 It is clear that the Appellate Body search the interpretation regarding the amicus curiae 
from Article 13 of the DSU, since the Article 13 of the DSU the only reference for WTO 
adjudication body to conclude the legal authority under the DSU to accept amicus curiae.300 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the way that it does for member states brief.  It appears that neither panels nor the Appellate Body are 
obligated to do so. Nevertheless, most member states of the WTO today seem to reject the possibility of 
amicus curiae. 
 
297Appellate Body report on United States - Imposition Of Countervailing Duties On Certain Hot-Rolled Lead 
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4.2.2. The Involvement Private Economic Actors in WTO Dispute Settlement 
Proceedings 
 In some cases, private economic actors also get involve directly as delegation in WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings as long as their governments appointed them and they are 
constituted as delegation of the government of WTO members.  For example in the Banana 
Case, Appellate Body has been ruling that parties and third parties are free to determine for 
themselves the composition of their delegation at hearings of Panels and Appellate Body.  It 
should be understood that WTO adjudication body allow the presence of non-party in the 
dispute settlement proceeding as long as in the context of delegation of WTO member to the 
dispute.  In the case Korea – Certain Paper, Panel rejected the objections of Korea against the 
presence of representative of the Indonesian paper industry as part of the delegation of 
Indonesia at the Panel meetings. 
 In the Korea – Certain Paper Case301 at first substantive meeting with the Panel, 
Korea citing Article 18 (2) of the DSU stated that “there were representatives of the 
Indonesian paper industry in the Indonesian delegation and requested that they leave the 
hearing room because access to confidential information submitted by Korea would give them 
an unfair competitive advantage over their Korean counterparts”.  However, Panel argued that 
as provided in paragraph 15 of Panel Working Procedures, Indonesia was entitled to 
determine the composition of its delegation in these proceedings.  Panel also stated that, in 
accordance with Article 18 (2) of the DSU and paragraph 15 of Panel Working Procedures, 
Indonesia assumed responsibility for its delegation, including respect for the confidentiality of 
the submissions made by the Korea in the proceedings. 
 The reason of some WTO members to include private economic actors as part of their 
delegation merely because some governments, especially from developing countries, are 
lacking of the resources to fully investigate and develop cases of unfair trade regulation from 
other WTO members.  Meanwhile, private economic actors sometimes have access to 
information and expertise that governments lack. 302 
                                                          
301WTO Panel Report, Korea -- Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Certain Paper from Korea (Korea -- Certain 
Paper), WT/DS312/R, Adopted on 28 November 2005 
 
302See Zhengling, Supra Note 300.Zhengling refers to the Kodak case when to develop Japan’s arguments 
regarding the anti-competitive conduct in Japan's photographic film and paper markets, Kodak employed a 
substantial team of lawyers, economists and translators in Washington as well as "a small army of experts in 
Japan, including several legal scholars, three Japanese market research films and nearly a dozen independent 
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4.2.3. The Permissible of Individual to Represent the Party to the Dispute. 
The issue of private counsel representation before the WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings appeared when the Panel report in the Banana Case denied Saint Lucia’s request 
for representation by two private legal advisers who were not full-time employees of the 
government of Saint Lucia.303  It also happened in the case of Indonesian-Certain Measures 
Affecting the Automobile Industry when the government of Indonesia declared that its 
delegation included two private lawyers who were not permanently employed by Indonesian 
Government.  The United States then argued that Indonesia private counsel should be barred 
from Panel’s meeting.304 
In the Banana Case, Appellate Body granted Saint Lucia’s request to be represented 
by private counsel.  The Appellate Body stated that there was nothing in the WTO agreement, 
the DSU, the Working Procedures, nor in customary international law or the prevailing 
practice of international tribunals which prevents a WTO member from composing its own 
delegation to an Appellate Body Proceeding, and to specify who can represent a government 
in making its representations before the Appellate Body.  The Appellate Body also noted that 
in the interest of member government’s representation by qualified counsel in Appellate Body 
proceedings, the representation by counsel of government’s own choice may well be in a 
matter of particular significance – especially for developing country Members – to enable 
them to participate fully in dispute settlement proceedings. 
 In Indonesia – Autos case, Panel inclined to accept the private counsel before the 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings.  Panel emphasized that all members of parties 
delegations – whether or not they are government employees – are present as representatives 
of their governments, and as such are subject to the provision of the DSU and of the standard 
working procedures, including Articles 18 (1) and (2) of the DSU and paragraphs 2 and 3 of 
those procedures.305 It is similar to the Appellate Body ruling in the EU-Bananas case that 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
translators. See also Chandler, C., (1995), Dream Team” Helps Kodak Make Its Case; Trade Lawyers 
Uncover Crucial IndustryNewsletters, Washington Post, 26 June 1995, A12 
 
303See European Communities--Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas-Recourse to 
Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WTO doc. WT/DS27/ARB (Apr. 9, 
1999), Saint Lucia is an ACP state and a third party participant to the case. 
304Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry ("Indonesia – Autos "), 
WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R. 
 
305Ibid. 
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permits governmental representation by private counsel in oral hearings before the Appellate 
Body.  
4.3. Political Issue 
 Apart from legal issue regarding the involvement of private economic actors in the 
WTO dispute settlement system, each WTO member is dealing with political issue regarding 
to the public-private relation in WTO dispute settlement system.  According to Shaffer, the 
vital role of public-private networks play in litigation before the WTO, although only WTO 
Member States can bring litigation before the WTO, private actors such as Business 
Corporation and activities play role in states’ decisions about which case to bring.306 Shaffer 
therefore mentioned although trade relations are enforced through a formal international 
agreement in which only states have standing, private economic actors can still be very 
influential.  In the litigation process, private economic actors depend on authority of their 
government for access to the WTO legal proceedings, such as the submission of amicus curiae 
brief will constitute as part of party’s submission, or the government itself is able to include 
any private economic actors as a part of their delegations before WTO meeting.  In addition, 
government or public authority can politically rely on these private economic actors for 
financial and informational support.  These networked partners evaluate the costs and benefits 
bringing a claim and litigating or settling the dispute.307  In some circumstances, private 
economic actors can also initiate the dispute, for example in the United States, private 
economic actors used formal and informal channels to influence trade dispute settlement.  
These private economic actors can directly petition representatives of the U.S government to 
combat perceived trade barriers and discriminatory policies enacted by foreign governments. 
 In domestic political sphere, private economic actors can initiate dispute by using their 
domestic influence to get their government to raise the claim.  In addition, some governments, 
such as the United States and the European Union, have instituted formal procedures by 
which citizens can petition the government to respond to another nation’s trade 
violation.308For example, the private economic actors in the U.S may petition the U.S. Trade 
Representative (herein after USTR) to take action against a foreign nation’s trade practices 
                                                          
306 See Shaffer, Gregory C., (2003), Defending Interest Public-Private Partnerships in WTO Litigation, The 
Brooking Institution – Washington DC/USA, pp. 10-18. 
 
307Ibid 
 
308  See Schleyer, Glen T., (1997), ‘Power to the People: Allowing Private Parties to Raise Claims Before the 
WTO Dispute Resolution System’, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 65, Issue 5, p. 2275 – 2311. 
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under Section 301.  The private economic actors are able to report the unfair trade from other 
nations to USTR, and after an investigation, the USTR will decide whether the trade practice 
in question is violating any trade agreement and, if so, USTR will find what measure should 
be taken.309  Similar to the U.S., the European Union adopted Regulation 2641/84 in 1984 
which gives the right to petition the EU Commission to investigate harmful foreign trade 
practices.  According to Regulation 2641/84, the Commission will initiate an investigation of 
the offending trade practice if it deems necessary in the interest of the EU.310 
 The private economic actors have broad discretion to approach their government in 
political dimension to support them to gain broader benefits under WTO rules.  As mentioned 
in previous section of this chapter, private economic actors are able to lobby their government 
to involve in international trade311 or when the dispute arise these private economic actors can 
use political approach to involve indirectly to the dispute, by either providing financial and 
informational support.  Nevertheless, the political issue seems very delicate matter to confront 
in the domain of WTO rules, since the WTO itself will ignore this issue and leave it to each 
WTO member.  Indeed, the main objective of WTO rules is enhancing trade benefits of WTO 
members which in the end the constraint of that international trade puts on states thus directly 
benefit, or concern, private economic actors.312 
 In all arguments regarding the involvement of private economic actors in the WTO 
Dispute Settlement system both from legal or political point of view, enhance the notion that 
private economic actors will not have any sufficient parts to involve in the WTO dispute 
settlement system unless their governments are willing to bring them in to it.  Although some 
authors tend to support the direct involvement of private economic actors to standing before 
the WTO adjudication body, but as intergovernmental organization, WTO Member has 
                                                          
309  Puckett, A. Lyne, and Reynolds, William L. Reynolds, (1996), ‘Sanctions and Enforcement Under Section 
301: At Odds with the WTO?’,American Journal of International Law, No. 90, pp. 675.  The authors 
mentioned that the Section 301 is an inadequate method for private parties to protect their rights is that there 
is no guarantee that USTR will take action. 
 
310Leirer, Wolfgang W., (1994), ‘Retaliatory Action in the United States and European Union Trade Law: A 
Comparison of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Council Regulation 2641/84’, North Carolina 
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation, No. 20, pp. 41-96. The adoption of Regulation 
2641/84 was largely a response to the United States use of section 301, however this regulation will less use 
since the decrease of Section 301 actions and the sparring of WTO dispute settlement system. 
 
311 See MacDonald and Woolcock, Supra Note 166, pp. 77-92. 
 
312 See Ohlhof, Stefan, and Schloemann, Hannes, (2001), ‘Transcending the Nation-States? Private Parties and 
the Enforcement of International Trade Law’, in Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations law, Vol. 5, eds. 
Frowein, J.A., and Wolfrum, R., Kluwer Law International – the Hague/Netherlands, pp. 675 – 734. 
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exclusive right beyond interference of individual or citizen from any WTO Member.   
 WTO is international organization which has characteristic as an intergovernmental 
organization, or as public international organization, when it is established by an interstate 
agreement.  The WTO Members decide to create WTO for handling trade relation at the 
intergovernmental level, although at the end the governments of WTO Members have to make 
the laws regulating the behavior of the individual citizens,313 thus the enforcement of WTO 
rules is solely in the hand of WTO Members.   
5. Private Economic Actors in Case of the Implementation of Article 22 (2) of the DSU. 
 Chapter I elaborated the implementation of trade retaliation according to Article 22 of 
the DSU which the implication of trade retaliation is resulting trade effect directly to the 
private economic actors within the country that is retaliated.  Although the authority to impose 
trade retaliation comes from WTO adjudication body and it is clearly recognized by the WTO 
Agreement, but the enforcement itself, such as raising tariff or suspending concessions, is 
carried out by the aggrieved state or by others on behalf of their trade interests.314 
 The implementation of Article 22 of the DSU is deemed to be complicated measures 
since the effect is likely bitter for private economic actors.  However, nothing in the DSU 
provide the possibility for any private economic actors to complaint against WTO Members 
regarding this implementation, nor possibility of them to file against other state regarding the 
implications of WTO trade retaliation.  The only possibility is when their own governments 
provide legal mechanism for these private economic actors to claim compensation concerning 
the loss of trade benefits caused by the action of their government’s non-conformity with 
WTO rules.  This research further elaborates the possibility for private economic actors to 
recourse to litigation or political approachin the domestic level.  The possibility of these 
private economic actors to rebalance their trade benefit is using the principle of state liability 
and it will be elaborated in the next chapter. 
 
                                                          
313For basic theory of international organization see Schermers, Henry G., (1991), ‘International Organizations’, 
inInternational Law: Achievements and Prospect (Part 1), ed. Bedjaoui, Mohammed,Unesco – Paris/French 
&MartinusNjhoff Publisher- Leiden/the Netherland, pp. 67-96. 
 
314 See D’Anieri, Paul, (2010), International Politics Power and Purpose in Global Affairs, Wadsworth Cengage 
Learning – Ohio/US, pp. 370 -372.  D’Anieri mentioned that WTO dispute settlement mechanism might be 
described as an instance blended enforcement, when the retaliation is recommended by DSB, the 
enforcement is carried by the aggrieved member.  This is totally different with the UN Sanction, when the 
UN itself carried out the sanction thorough the resolution of Security Council.  
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CHAPTER III 
 THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF STATE LIABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
AND THE UNITED STATES  IN TERMS OF SEEKING COMPENSATION CAUSED 
BY THE WTO RETALIATION TO PRIVATE ECONOMIC ACTORS 
 
 
1. Background 
The important aspect of this research is elaborating the possibility for private 
economic actors to seek compensation for damage caused by WTO retaliation. Government 
should endorse a system to ensure its private economic actors to obtain redress when their 
trade benefits are infringed by the disobedience of its government to WTO rules. A basis 
remedy for compensation damage is applying state liability principle, where each WTO 
Member has different system in applying state liability principle. Accordingly, this chapter 
discuss about state liability principle in two different countries.  First is European Union 
where the EU recognizes Member State liability and liability of EU Institutions.In the 
relationship with the WTO law, the focus is mischievous measures conducted by the EU 
Institutions. It thus leads to the implementation of the liability of EU Institution or EU 
liability according to Article 340 (2) TFEU.  Second is the U.S. who recognizes state 
sovereign immunity which can be waived in term of unconstitutional act conducted by 
government.  
This chapter also discuss about the effect of WTO Law to both EU and the U.S. legal 
system, in order to answer whether theoretically plausible for private economic actors to 
obtain compensation caused by the WTO retaliation by referring to the principle of state 
liability that is recognized by the EU and the U.S., 
 
2. The Perception of State Liability Principle 
 Unlike international state responsibility principle315, state liability principle in this 
research is more to domestic obligations between state (government) and its citizen, or in 
                                                          
315Articles on Responsibility of States Supra Note 83.  This document is a very important source in applying state 
responsibility for international wrongful acts and it is invoked in the jurisprudence of international courts.  
For instance in the case of Barcelona Traction (Belgium v. Spain) (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970), pp. 3; 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) 
(Merits, I.C.J. Reports 1986), pp. 14; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United States 
of America) (Order, I.C.J. Reports 1998), p. 246; Gabcikovo- Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) 
(Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997), p. 7; Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special 
Rapporteuer of the Commission on Human Rights (Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1999), p. 62; La Grand 
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other word is governmental liability.316 Prior to it, this sub section briefly discuss the 
distinction between state responsibility, state liability based on international law (international 
liability), and state liability in domestic level. 
 
2.1. International State Responsibility and International Liability  
Article Responsibility of the States for International Wrongful Acts recognizes the 
distinction between term of international state responsibility and international liability. 
International state responsibility is concerned with the violation of a subjective international 
right even when it does not involve material damage. On the other hand, international liability 
is premised upon the occurrence of significant harm or damage and not on any violation of an 
international obligation or subjective international right of a state.  Wrongful acts are focus of 
state responsibility, whereas compensation for damage became the focus of international 
liability.317International Law Commission (hereinafter ILC) emphasize that state 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(Germany v. United States of America) (Merits, I.C.J. Reports 2001), p. 466. See also Crawford, James, 
(2002), The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and 
Commentaries, Cambridge University Press, - Cambridge/UK, p. 54. Article 1, every internationally 
wrongful act of a state entails the responsibility of that state.  The terms of “international responsibility” 
covers the new legal relations that arises under international law by reason of the internationally wrongful act 
of a state.  State responsibility principle derives from the concept of the law of nations.  Once the existence of 
the law of nations was recognized, the issue of liability was presented of necessity, though no doubts at first 
obscurely. This principle also focuses on attribution of conduct to the state or government to individual or 
other state.  In some cases, state responsibility principle is sometimes seen as special topic within public 
international law.  It provides the foundation of the law of treaties and constitutes the most basic part of 
general international law.  See Brownlie, Ian, (2004), ‘State Responsibility and the International Court of 
Justice’, in Issues of State Responsibility before International Judicial Institutions, eds. Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice, Malgosia, and Sarooshi, Danesh, Hart Publishing-Oregon/USA, pp. 11-18 
 
316State liability is generally understood as the liability of the state and other public bodies for damages that are 
sustained in the course of performing official duties. In the broadest definition, state liability means that the 
state should make compensation for whatever loss and or injury or it is deemed to have caused directly or 
indirectly materially or mentally to its citizens. SeeFuke, Toshiro , (1999), ‘Historical Phases of State 
Liability as Law of Remedies – Some Introductory Remarks’, in Comparative Studies on Governmental 
Liability in East and Southeast Asia, in Public Law in East and Southeast Asia, ed. Zhang, Yong,  Kluwer 
Law International - the Hague/Netherlands, pp.1-6.  For comparison to another country, seeLuber, M, (2008), 
‘Liability of the State’, in Key Aspect of German Business Law – A Practical Manual, eds. Wendler, M, 
Springer-Verlag-Berlin Heidelberg/Germany, pp. 263, as a constitutional state, Germany recognize 
governmental liability where state is governed by law and order, state liability principle supplements the 
principle of the lawfulness of the administration. 
 
317United Nations, (2000), Yearbook of International Law Commission 2000, Vol. II, Part One, United Nation 
Publication – NY/USA, pp. 121. See also Zemanek, K., (2000), ‘Responsibility of States: General 
Principles’, in: Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Volume four, North Holland Publishing – 
Amsterdam/Netherlands, pp. 220, According to Zemanek the term state responsibility is classical one, which 
is used in the doctrine of international law. And the term state liability is used in international law for the 
purpose of stressing the application of state liability for lawful acts in case it is referred to only one form of 
liability to recover the damages. 
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responsibility principle creates a legal relationship for illegal acts of the state with other states, 
whether other states are suffering the damage or not in accordance to international law. This 
legal relationship can also affect other subject of international law. When the damage occurs, 
thus international liability principle can be implied by applying restitution or compensation, 
allowed by international law.318 
In the domestic level, there is no general principle of liability for imputable breaches 
of international law exist that requires a state to provide compensation at national level.  It is 
true that a state, by non-compliance with an international obligation, commits an international 
wrongful act and on that basis is obliged to provide reparation.319The government may imply 
a measure such as withdrawing or annulling a law that contravenes the international 
obligation, or by adopting a law to ensure that the result required by international obligation is 
achieved. However, significantly international law leaves states much freedom to choose the 
remedies required.320 Some questions then arise, when a state breach international law which 
is causing damage to its citizen, to what extent is state liable to rectify the damage? What is 
the condition for rectifying the damage? In order to answer the question, it is necessary to 
discuss about the general perception of state liability principle in relation with individual or 
citizen.  
 
2.2. State Liability Principle in Domestic Level 
 There are two principles of liability in general, strict or fault liability. Strict liability 
principle is a limited liability application.  It is based on notions of equality and solidarity.  
This principle requires special, abnormal or exceptional damage as a result of measures taken 
in the public interest which may recover compensation without the need to prove 
fault.321Another principle is principle of liability based on fault.  In terms of this principle, it 
requires damage results from a wrongful act or omission and negligence, which is at least, it 
must be proved.  The fault may be a wrongful act of administration or omission.  In some 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
318Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally wrongful Acts, Supra Note 83. 
 
319Ibid, Article 31 
 
320Nollkaemper, André, (2012), ‘The  Role of National Courts in Inducing Compliance with International and 
European Law – A Comparison, in Compliance and the Enforcement of EU Law, Vol. 20, Book 2, Ed. 
Cremona,  Marise, Oxford University Press – Oxford/UK, pp.186 
 
321Uksagis, Erdem Buy and Van Boom, Willem H, (2013), ‘Strict Liability in Contemporary European 
Codification: Torn Between Objects, Activities, and Their Risks’, Georgetown Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 44, pp. 610.  
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cases, the wrongful act or omission will give rise to a rebuttable presumption of fault.322 The 
latest concept of liability principle is more often used by the court in order to imply state 
liability that required compensation of damage. 
 State liability principle or governmental liability descends from long historical 
evolution since centuries ago.323A government is obliged to secure for citizens their individual 
rights to a life worthy of human being.  Thus when the damage (loss, injury, or property 
damage) caused to act of government in the course of any activities of welfare state suffered 
by the citizen, it is legitimate for government to compensate the damage.324 This obligation 
derives from national constitution, where constitution consist obligation of government to 
protect rights of individuals.325Since this research is discussing economic activity, thus, the 
focus is economic right belongs to individual that derives from national constitution.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
322 Steiner, Josephine, (1993), ‘From Direct Effects to Francovich: Shifting Means of Enforcement of 
Community Law’, European Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 3-22. 
 
323For example in England, the maxim “The King can do no wrong” becomes a major principle from the 
medieval early period until the late eighteen century which is dominated by the question of monarchy 
liability. It derived from the common sense of the immunity of the Crown for torts against its subject.  In 
legal principle, however, this was not strictly correct.  The Crown was in fact considered to be subject to the 
law, as consonant with the principle of justice. For the breach of contract made with a government 
department on behalf of the Crown a petition of right will in general lie, which though in form a petition and 
requiring the sanction of the attorney General. Thus, many Government departments can be sued as such. See 
Dicey, Albert Venn, (1915), Introduction to the Study of the law of Constitution, in Michener, Roger 
E.,(ed.),(1982), Liberty Fund – Indianapolis, pp. 417.  
 
324Fuke, Toshiro, Supra Note 316, p. 3.   See also, Fairgrieve, Duncan, (2003), State Liability in Tort: A 
Comparative Law study, Oxford University Press – Oxford/UK, pp 189-190. Governmental liability is in the 
array of administration law where in the structure of and scope of legal remedies against administrative 
action, basically in the similar terms, to any legal system – civil law or common law- which attempts to 
balance the necessary freedom of governmental decision making with the protection of basic individual 
rights. Fairgrieve posited that exemplary or punitive damages are more relevant to state liability (case Rookes 
vs. Barnard 1964 AC. 1129). On the other hand, however Fuke stated that three different dimensions of state 
liability, 1) every loss/injury incurred by citizen in the course of state activities might only be compensated 
by rare change if specific civil servant was found tortuously and personal liable for the outcome, 2) the new 
idea of state liability is not limited the personal liability of civil servant, 3) state liability has to be extended to 
non-fault (strict) liability. See also Friedmann, Wolfgang Gaston, (1972), Law in a Changing Society, Steven 
& Sons Ltd. – London/UK, pp. 361. 
 
325For definition of national constitution see Conant, Michael, (2009), The Constitution and Economic 
Regulation: Objective Theory and Critical Commentary, Transaction Publisher – New Jersey/USA, pp. 1. 
Basically the concept of constitution is the same in every country where constitution consist obligation of 
government to protect rights of individual. 
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2.2.1. State Liability Principle is about Protecting (Economic) Rights pursuant to 
Constitution 
 The first duty of government is protection the status of individual either the status of a 
freeman and a citizen, or the status that individual has substantive rights.  Protection means 
that the laws recognize and secure an individual’s rights to life, liberty and property.  The 
most meaning of protection referred to the enforcement of rights when government gives 
specific ways in which government prevent violations of substantive rights, or redress and 
punish such violations.326The protection is including to protect substantive economic rights 
belong to every citizen327. Substantive economic right is recognized as natural rights belong to 
every citizen that is granted in constitution of a state.328 Meanwhile the concept of protection 
genuinely derives from constitutional commitment from government to their citizens.329  It 
                                                          
326Heyman, Steven J., (1991), ‘the First Duty of Government Protection Liberty and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 41, pp. 508-570. 
 
327Macklem, Patrick, (1997), ‘Aboriginal Rights and State Obligations’, Alberta Law Review, No. 35, pp. 100. 
Macklem refer to the concept that economic right is recognized for many years as transformation of positive 
rights belong to every individual. From international perspective, it becomes the basic notion of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights to protect a wide range of social and economic rights. Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights proclaimed that everyone has a right to work, to free choice of employment favorable 
conditions to just and employment, right to equal pay for equal work, right to form and to join trade unions 
for protection and more broadly the Declaration gives everyone a right to a standard of living adequate for 
the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and 
necessary social services and the rights to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, 
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. See article 22 and article 
23 (1) Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948 (UDHR).  See also Young, Katharine G., (2012), 
Constituting Economic and Social Rights, Oxford University Press – Oxford/UK, pp.2-19. See also Chapter 
II. 
 
328 For example the first concept of natural right is promulgated in Pennsylvania Constitution in 1776, “That all 
men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter 
into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity, namely: the enjoyment 
of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining 
happiness and safety.  Source from; ‘Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, Article VIII’, 
reprinted in William F. Swindler (ed.), (1973-1979), Sources and Documents of the United States 
Constitutions, 10 Volumes, Dobbs Ferry, Oceana Publications – NY/USA, pp. 278.  In Addition to natural 
rights, Representative William Lawrence in the Thirty-Ninth Congress over the Fourteenth Amendment and 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, explained that “the necessary incidents of absolute rights included such rights 
as the right to make and enforce contract, to purchase, hold and enjoy property, and to share the benefit of 
laws for the security of person and property.” See Maltz, Earl M., (1985), ‘The Concept of Equal Protection 
of the Laws – A Historical Inquiry’, San Diego Law Review, No.22, pp. 499. The U.S. adopted the concept of 
protection of economic rights as natural right into Amendment Fifth and Bill of rights. The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union recognizes economic right in Article 15 (Freedom to choose an 
occupation and right to engage in work), Article 16 (Freedom to conduct a business) and Article 17 (Right to 
property). See also Petersmann, Ernst-Urlich, (1998), ‘From the Hobbesian International Law of Coexistence 
to Modern Integration Law: the WTO Dispute Settlement System’, Journal International Economic Law Vol. 
1, pp.175-198. 
 
329Keynes, Edward, (1996), Liberty, Property and Privacy : Toward  a Jurisprudence of Substantive Due 
Process, The Pennsylvania State University Press – Penn/USA, pp. 86 
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refers to general idea of the obligation of a state to protect its citizen, posited by John Locke.  
Locke emphasized that the consent of free individuals to enter into society and establish 
government is for the preservation of their natural rights, thus, because government is 
established for this purposed, it is an obligation to secure every individual’s life, liberty, and 
property.330 
 The economic rights concept is adopted by almost all modern constitution today,331this 
also endorses government to provide rule of law regarding right to pursue economic interest, 
such as right to property, right to make contract, to sell, to hold and convey real to inherit, to 
purchase and to full and equal benefit of all laws.332 The economic rights basically have a dual 
function, first, this right serves as basis for entitlement of an adequate standard of living, and 
second, it is a basis of independence and freedom.333Eide mentioned that the original concept 
of economic right derives from the idea of John Locke about property right.  “John Locke 
gave initial concern about property right was directed against feudal and order where control 
over land and other resources were based on hierarchical system constituting profound 
inequality and dependencies. It is understandable that the right to property become crucial 
                                                          
330 Locke, John, (3d 1698), Two Treatises of Government: Critical Edition with an Introduction and apparatus 
criticus, ed. Laslett, Peter, (1988), Cambridge University Press – Cambridge/UK, pp. 131. John Locke theory 
was increasingly recognized in national laws following the English, American and French revolutions and the 
English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. 
331Sunstein, Cass R., (2005), ‘Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic 
Guarantees?’,Syracuse Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 1-17.  Sunstein gave example of some Constitutions 
which followed economic rights according to UDHR. Many modern constitutions follow the UDHR in 
creating social and economic rights they guarantee citizens a wide range of economic and social entitlements.  
For example, the Romanian Constitution includes the right to leisure, the right to work, the right to equal pay 
for equal work and measures for the protection and safety of workers. The Syrian Constitution proclaims that 
the state undertakes to provide work for all citizens.  The Constitution of Norway imposes on the state 
responsibility to create conditions enabling every person capable of work to earn a living by his work.  The 
Bulgarian Constitution offers the right to a holiday, the right to work, the right to labor safety, the right to 
social security and the right to free medical care.  The Hungarian Constitution proclaims that everyone who 
works has the right to emolument that corresponds to the amount and quality of the work performed.  The 
Constitution of Peru announces that the worker is entitled to a fair and adequate remuneration enabling him 
to provide for himself and his family material and spiritual well-being. 
332For example Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1988)). The 
second bill of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Section 1 declared that “ all persons born in the United States 
were citizens of the United States and provided “ shall have the same right in every state and territory in the 
U.S. to make and enforce contract, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold 
and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of person and property.”  See also Stephen Jr., Otis H., and Scheb II, John M., (2008), American 
Constitutional Law (Vol. II) : Civil Rights and Liberties, Thomson Wadsworth Publisher – Ohio/USA,  pp. 
22-26. 
 
333Eide, Asbjorn, (2001), ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Right as Human Right’, in Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: A Text Book (Second Edition), eds. Eide, Asbjorn, Krausse, Catarina, and Rosas, Allan, 
MartinusNijhoff– Leiden/Netherland, pp. 21-22. 
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element in the early quest for freedom and quality, because it has to be supplemented by at 
least two other rights, the right to work which can provide income and at the end it will be 
ensuring an adequate standard of living.”334Accordingly, from the idea of John Locke in 
regard with the rights of citizen, and refer to the concept of first duty of government to protect 
the right of citizen, state creates the concept of civil protection.335 In one sense, civil 
protection might be viewed as merely procedural, consisting of the right to bring lawsuit, but 
according to Blackstone, the civil protection is also deemed as right to remedy.336 
Blackstone’s Commentaries underlined that the right to civil protection was substantive, not 
merely procedural or formal to ensure that individual were actually able to obtain remedies 
for the invasion of their rights by others.337In regard with the invasion or violation of 
substantive right, (such an economic right), the right to remedy should also be implied for the 
violation of economic right which is conducted by government.338 
 John Locke also qualified the term of protection of rights is to render to court for any 
violation of right conducted by government,339 where the idea of state liability principle 
derives from justification of the obligation of government to protect rights of citizen. In this 
regard, state liability is an important measure to avoid injustice and unlawful conduct which is 
done by government, and also to rehabilitate the damage because of the violation. The right of 
remedy thus is one of vital dimension on establishing the state liability, once the government 
                                                          
334Ibid,  see also Simmons, A. John, ( 1992), The Lockean Theory of Rights, Princeton University Press – 
NJ/USA, pp. 62-102 
 
335Heyman, Supra Note 236, pp. 508-570.  Common law tradition recognized three different concepts of 
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Marbury V. Madison: Establishing Supreme Court Power, InfoBase Publishing – NY/USA, pp. 110. Chief 
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336Blackstone, William, (1803), Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books, Vol. 1., ed. Lewis, 
William Draper, Reprinted in 2007, The Lawbook Exchange Ltd. – NJ/USA, pp. 233. 
 
337Ibid, a central purpose of Blackstone's Commentaries was to show that the common law accorded with the law 
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338Locke, Supra Note 330 
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violates the economic rights of citizen, the government is obliged to rehabilitate the damage 
through the implementation of state liability principle.340 
 Refer to argument of Fuke that “in the broadest concept of state liability means that 
state should make compensation for whatever loss or/and injury which it has to be deemed 
caused directly or indirectly and mentally or materially to its citizen.”341It thus relates to the 
concept that the prominent functionof state liability is to rectify or to compensate the damage 
suffered by citizen. 
 
2.2.2. State Liability Principle is about Compensation 
 When right is violated, it gives rise a justiciable claim that violated rights demand for 
rectification or compensation.  A morally adequate from rectification is either restoring 
precisely what was lost that is equivalent in values or restoring the position of victim of 
violation. The rectification and compensation in the framework of economic rights serve to 
restore to individuals to the extent possible their capacity to achieve the ends for their 
economic values.342  There are thus two theories of compensation.  First is the theory of state 
with substitute liability.  This theory holds when the government employee is wrongfully 
conducting their duties on behalf of state, individual is possible to file sue against them, 
however, the compensation can be paid by government due to financial disability of the 
employee.  The second is theory of a state with its own liability.  This theory is implied when 
a state engage in providing public service to fulfill public duties, but the risk of infringing the 
right and benefit of the people is unavoidable.  Hence, the government bears responsibility to 
compensate the damage.343 The theory of compensation derive from the central elements of 
negligence law in general, regarded not as indirectly furthering some independently 
                                                          
340Refer to The maxim of UbiiusIbiRemedium is known as general fundamental notion of liability doctrine in any 
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Commune, eds. Woulters, J., and Stuyck, J., Intersentia Publishing – Antwerp/Belgium, pp. 77-78. 
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identifiable combination of goals, but as categories that mark an immediate normative 
connection between what the defendant has done and the plaintiff has suffered.344  
 State liability should also be understood in the context judicial remedies in the civil 
society from which the state has long been alienated, and of public law remedies in the days 
of the administrative and welfare state.345In this sense, court generally has the power to 
declare the rights, status and other legal relations whether or not the rights have been violated.  
In conclusion, the characteristic of state liability principle is protecting individual right from 
unconstitutional act conducted by government which is causing damage, and the function of 
state liability is to rectify and to compensate the damage cause to individual.  
 The following section in this research continue to discuss the practice of state liability 
in two different countries, the EU and the U.S., in order to answer to what extent is state liable 
to rectify the damage that is causing the infringement of individual’s right, and what is the 
condition for implementation state liability in the EU and the U.S. 
 
3. Theoretical Overview of State Liability Principle in the European Union  and the 
United States of America 
3.1. State Liability Principle in the European Union 
 The European Union recognizes Member State liability and liability of EU Institutions 
(EU Liability).  The Member State liability is implying for damages arising against Member 
States for breaches of EU Law, meanwhile EU Liability claims is arising against the EU 
Institutions.346Liability principle in EU may be contractual or non-contractual. Contractual 
liability arises from the breach of contract for any reason whatsoever.347 On the other hand, 
non-contractual liability arises out of damage caused to another. In the case of non-contractual 
                                                          
344Weinrib, Ernest J., (1987), ‘Causation and Wrongdoing’, in Symposium on Causation in the Law of Torts, 
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347EU recognizes action for contractual liability, namely liability arising out of contracts concluded between the 
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liability, the applicant will not be seeking the annulment of measures but only for 
compensation from the damage.348Article 340 TFEU concern to liability based on fault,349 
which theoretically encompass systematically list of substantive condition for the liability of 
Member States and the EU Institutions. Prior to discuss about liability of EU Institutions, a 
brief explanation about Member State liability will be discussed below in order to elaborate 
the distinction between Member State liability and EU Institution liability. 
 
3.1.1.  Member State Liability in the EU 
 Member State liability for wrongful act or culpability may comprise conducted by 
primary legislation, enacted by parliament, or secondary legislation in the forms of executive 
acts.350This is relevant with the obligations of all branches of a state whether it is legislative, 
judicative or executive. They have an important role to play in the application and execution 
of EU Law within a Member State. Accordingly, a Member State is liable for damage caused 
to individuals by a manifest infringement of EU law attributable to a supreme court of that 
Member State.351There are four types of sources of EU law that could be breached by a 
Member State, namely: Treaties, Regulations, Decisions and Directive.  
 First are treaties. They are the highest source of European law which creates some 
rights and obligations.  Treaty provisions which are merely statements of intent or policy, 
                                                          
348Chalmers, Damian, Davis, Gareth and Monti, Giorgio, (2010), European Union Law: Second Edition, 
Cambridge University Press- Cambridge/UK, pp. 431.  See also Von Bar, Christian, (2009), Principle of 
European Law: Study Group on a European Civil Code, Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage 
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350Rebhahn, Robert,  (2008),  ‘Non Contractual Liability in Damages of Member States for Breach of 
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rather than establishing clear rights or duties, require detailed legislation to be made before 
they can be enforced in the Member States. Second are Regulations which are the most 
important form of EU acts.  They ensure uniformity of solutions on a specific point of law 
throughout the EU.  Regulations apply ergaomnes (in relation to everyone) and 
simultaneously in all Member States.352 Third are Decisions.  Unlike regulations, Decisions 
have no general scope of application unless addressed to a particular Member State or to any 
legal or natural person or they may have no addressees.353 Fourth is Directive.  In contrary to 
treaty provisions, regulations and decisions, a Member states can breach EU law in legal 
implementation issues by failing to transpose an EU Directive timely or correctly into national 
law.354 Although a Directive is used to harmonize national legislation, regulation and 
administrative provisions, but it depends on the national authorities to choose the form and 
method to imply it. It concerns the autonomy of national institutional and procedural systems 
while imposing upon a Member States the obligation to achieve a necessary result.  It thus 
establishes the same legal regime in all Member States with regard to the relevant matter.355 
 The following sub section discusses the condition for Member State Liability which is 
clarified by the decision of ECJ. 
1) Illegality or violation/breach of rule of EU law.   
 The principle of liability is implied when a member state infringed the EU Law 
whether a member state does not implement the rules or negligence of them.  Francovich case 
is dealing with the damages caused to an individual by the non-implementation of a directive 
that basically lack of direct effect.  In this case, Italy failed to implement the directive 80/987 
relating to the protection granted to employees in the event of the insolvency of their 
employment.  Italy considered negligence since it did not implement the directive during the 
required period of time.  Although the provisions of the directive were sufficiently precise and 
unconditional, the Directive did not define the persons obliged to pay the guaranteed sums, 
thus the employees could not rely on the direct effect of the directive against the defaulting 
                                                          
352 Article 288 TFEU defines regulations in following terms: “A regulation shall have general application. It 
shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.” 
 
353 Article 288 TFEU defines the effect of Decision, which states that “A decision shall be binding in its entirety.  
A decision which specifies those to whom it is addressed shall be binding only on them.” 
354Roosebeke, Bert Van, (2007), State Liability for Breaches of European Law: An Economic Analysis, Gabler 
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Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and 
methods.” 
 
105 
 
state.  In this case, there was not vertical direct effect due to insufficiently precise provision of 
the directive.  The Court in Francovich case more generally established the principle of 
liability of the state for negligence or non-implementation of EU Law, although the court 
regardless the conditions under which the state could be held liable other than in the specific 
case of the non-implementation of a directive.356 
2) The relevant rule of EU law breached is one which is intended to confer rights on 
individuals.   
 A certain measure leads to liability principle is when a state is infringing the 
individual rights that lays down in the EU rules.  In Francovich case, the judgment of it 
acknowledged that the full effectiveness of EU rules would be impaired and weakened the 
protection of individuals’ right if the redress for protecting rights is unavailable by the 
member states.  The court has interpreted the principle of state being liable for loss and 
damage caused to individuals that was in fact, “the principle whereby a State must be liable 
for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of EU law for which the 
State can be held responsible is inherent in the system of the Treaty”.357In this context, the 
European Judge shall prescribe for the national judge the implementation in its domestic law 
of a general principle of liability of the Member States for all kinds of breaches of EU law.   
 The principle of state liability is applied whichever organ of the state by its act or 
omission was responsible for the breach, as a consequence from the fundamental requirement 
of uniformity that EU law is applied.  All state authorities, including the legislature and 
judicature were bound to comply with the EU law which directly governed the legal position 
of individuals.358In some other cases such as FacciniDorivsRecreb359 and El Corte 
InglésvsBlàzquezRivero360, court stated, “EU law requires the Member States to make good 
damage caused to individuals through failure to transpose a directive, provided that three 
                                                          
356Francovich Case Supra Note 15. See also Weatherill, Stephen, (2012), Cases and Materials on EU Law, 
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conditions are fulfilled.  First, the purpose of the directive must be to grant rights to 
individuals.  Second, it must be possible to identify the content of those rights on the basis of 
the provisions of the directive. Finally, there must be a causal link between the breach of the 
State’s obligation and the damage suffered.”  Thus, the purpose of the directive is also well-
examined to conclude whether it is granting rights to individuals, and whether it is possible to 
identify the contents of those rights on the basis of the provisions of the directive.361 In terms 
of relationship between a directive and individual rights, directive may produce direct effect 
in vertical effect against state.362  In other way, the horizontal direct effect which a directive 
might also define rights, in the case when individuals were able to assert against other 
individuals.363 
 Another case identify as breach individual’s right is paramount in the Brasserie du 
Pêcheurcase, when the plaintiff was obliged at the end of 1981, to stop its exports of beer to 
Germany, as the German authorities had considered that the exported beer did not comply 
with the German legal requirements on beer purity (due to additives) and that it could not be 
marketed under the same name of “bier”.364According to ECJ’s judgment, the German law 
composed measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports as it is 
required in Article 30 TEC.365  Furtherance, the Brasserie du PêcheurCompany continued to 
bring an action in the Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court of Justice), to seek 
compensation over the damage suffered between 1981 until 1987 because of the prohibition 
of importation.366Nevertheless, the German Government claimed that a right to damages 
could only be created by legislation.  The ECJ responded that the Court has classification of 
the extent of the member state liability to judicial interpretation, rather than a brand new 
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364Case 148/84, Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank v. SA Brasserie du Pêcheur, (1985), ECR 1981at 897. 
365Case 178/84, RE Purity Requirements for Beer: EC Commission v. Germany, (1987) E.C.R. 1227, 1 C.M.L.R. 
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creation of rights.  And state liability supposed to be developed widely by the national 
court.367 
3) The breach is sufficiently serious 
 The ECJ has commented regarding the criterion of sufficiently serious breach in the 
Brasserie du PêcheurandFactortame case368  when the national court must take account of all 
the factors that is characterizing the situation placed before it.  As in the Brasserie du 
Pêcheur/Factortamejudgment, the Court mentioned that “the clarity and precision of the rule 
breached, the measure of discretion left by that rule to the national or EU authorities, whether 
the infringement and the damage caused was intentional or involuntary, whether any error of 
law was excusable or inexcusable, the fact that the position taken by a EU institution may 
have contributed towards the omission and the adoption and retention of national measures or 
practices contrary to EU Law.”  In sum, ECJ conclude that if the breach took place in an area 
where the Member State enjoys considerable freedom of action, the liability then will only 
arise when the circumstances under the national authorities acted.  The implication of their 
conduct was intentional and inexcusable due to the degree of clarity and precision of the 
provision infringed. 
4) Causal link between the breach and the damage suffered by individuals 
 The last condition of EU member state liability is causal link between the breach and 
the damage suffered by individuals.  The lack of implementation or fault or even negligence 
of the EU rules of law is not definitive criteria for establishing causality in Member State 
liability.  In Brasserie du Pêcheur and FactortamaCase, the court remarked that “it is up to 
national court to determine whether there is a direct causal connection between the breach of 
EU law and the damage”.369  National courts usually deny the causal link between the damage 
and the breach of its public authority to EU Law, such as when a connection is not direct, 
immediate and exclusive, with the concurrence of any circumstances, it is thus resulting the 
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state is not liable.370In Rechberger case, the Court held that there was a direct causal link 
between the breach conducted by Austria and the damage.  The breach was incorrect 
implementation of the Directive 90/314 on package travels, concerning the protection of 
consumers in the event of insolvency of the travel company.  The consumer was suffering 
from the insolvency of the travel company, thus, the Court held that the protection of 
consumer is a direct causal link between the breach and the damage suffered by individual, 
and if a direct causal link has been established, a member state’s liability cannot be 
precluded.371 However, it should be noted that direct causal link must be examined by 
national courts according to national legal norms by taking in reference to the principle of 
effectiveness and equivalence. The principle of equivalence requires that under national 
procedural rules, claims based on EU law must not be treated less favorably than similar 
domestic claims, and the principle of effectiveness requires that the applicant of domestic 
rules and procedures must not render the protection of individuals’ EU rights practically 
impossible or excessively difficult.372 
 
3.1.2.  EU Institutions Liability 
 In the case of violation conducted by the EU Institutions, the situation is a little bit 
more complicated, since the institutions themselves create the EU law.  In terms to determine 
the violation, the ECJ requires a condition for liability that the EU Institution has violated a 
superior rule of law for the protection of the individual rights.  In example, many provision in 
the Treaty direct relate to individual interest (e.g. Article 63 TFEU regarding of movement of 
capital); a hierarchically superior regulation (a regulation may relate to a prior network of 
regulations on the same topic); and general principles of EU law, such as principle of 
proportionality, legal certainty or legitimate expectations and principle non-discrimination.373 
The essence of superior rule of law mostly derives from the principles that are common to the 
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372Kaczorowska, Kalina, Supra Note 351 
 
373Rebhahn, Robert, Supra Note 350, pp. 189.  In this context, the ECJ does not mention the background of law 
constitutes as superior rules of law.  Superior sometimes seems to be equated with ‘important, and sometimes 
with a more formalistic conception of one rule being higher than another.  According to Rebhahn, this 
uncertainty certainly reflects a lacuna in the systematic order of Community law. See Case 24/82Martin 
Peters Bauunternehmung GmbH v Zuid Nederlandse Aannemers Vereniging  (1983) ECR 0987. 
 
109 
 
laws of the Member States, issues of liability and causation may not be common, but the ECJ 
has drawn on principles of tortuous liability within the Member States to formulate its own 
principles governing liability in EU law.  
 
3.1.3. Condition for EU Non-contractual Liability  
 Non-contractual liability exists inherently relate to three basic elements.  First, the 
illegality or a wrongful act or omission conducted by institution, second, the claimant has 
suffered damage, and third, there is a causative link between the act of omission and the 
damage suffered.  These three basic elements are supposed to link to each other in order to 
achieve the formalism of compensation due to the damage according to Article 340 (2) Treaty 
of Function of European Union (ex-Article 288 (2)of TEC), states that: 
 “In the case of non-contractual liability, the Union shall, in accordance with the 
general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any damage caused 
by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties.” 
 The liability of EU Institutions can be determined in two different measures in 
question, namely administrative and legislative acts.  Administrative acts may be defined as 
those acts by which the administration applies general rules in individual cases, or otherwise 
exercises its executive powers in individual manner.  Liability can also be incurred as a result 
of failures of administration or the negligence of employees of the EU Institutions in terms of 
performance their duties.374 Legislative measures are mostly dealing with broad policy areas, 
such economic policy. It requires the institutions to make choices as to the way in which issue 
should be resolved. The majority of legislative measures involve choices of economic policy, 
since the institutions enjoy wide discretionary powers in all areas of activity.  It is also 
possible for them to construe many measures in the context of TFEU.375 
 Both administrative and legislative acts are distinct by the court when court attempts 
to identify those situations where compensating individual applicants for the loss they have to 
suffered outweighs on general aims of the measure in question.  The court however 
recognizes in certain conditions, even when dealing with the measures of general and 
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legislative application, an individual may have the right to compensation.  In order to be 
entitled to such compensation, the applicant still needs to prove to the court the higher fault 
threshold and that the EU institutions have committed either illegality or a wrongful act or 
even lawful act but resulting a ‘sufficiently serious breach’ of their duties. However after the 
Bergaderm case occurred, the court made two important changes based on Bergaderm 
formula.   First, the court abandoned the distinction between administrative and legislative 
acts, because the formula would apply to all EU Institutions regardless their nature.  Second, 
the court dismissed the idea that a superior rule had to be infringed because according to the 
formula it was only necessary to show that the EU Institutions had breached a rule intended to 
confer individual rights.376 
 
3.1.3.1. The  Illegality or a Wrongful Act or Omission Conducted by the EU Institution 
The concept of illegality or a wrongful act or omission conducted by institution is 
profoundly remarked in several EU Court decisions.  The major judgment is in the case of 
Schöppenstedt. This case becomes a concept to test whether a sufficiently flagrant or serious 
violation of a superior rule of law for the protection of the individual right has occurred.377 
The Schöppenstedtcase established formula in regard to the requirement of unlawful act.  
These requirements related to legislative measures where is generally relating to regulations, 
and practically any legislative measure that could be construed as economic in the context of 
the TFEU. The other requirement concerns of the general principle of EU law as superior rule 
of law.  Hence, the Schöppenstedt test also required proof of breach of superior of law which 
is protecting individual rights, and the breach must be sufficiently serious, besides, there must 
be causation and damage.378 
There are two important elements in the Schöppenstedttest, first the rule breached by 
EU Institutions must be superior rule, and second, the rule of law constitute as protection of 
the individual rights.  
 
                                                          
376Case C-352/98P, Bergaderm et.al. v. Commission, (2000) ECR I-5291. See also  Schutze, Robert, (2012), 
European Constitutional Law, Cambridge University Press – UK, pp. 280-281 
 
377Case 5/71 ZuckerfabrikSchöppenstedt v. Council (1971), ECR 975. See also Kapteyn, P.J.G., (2008), 
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1) Superior rule of law 
 In terms of construction the superior rules of law, at the top of the hierarchy are the 
Treaties and the Acts of Accession which constitutes the basic constitutional charter of the 
European Union.  Beyond the Treaties, there is a series of quasi constitutional decision, such 
as the Decision on Own Resources or the Decision on the Direct Election of the European 
Parliament.  Further, and on the same hierarchical footing as the Treaties and quasi-
constitutional decisions, are the general principles of law, including fundamental rights, which 
constitute unwritten constitutional norms.  The second level of the hierarchy contains rules of 
international law which permeate the legal order of the EU, including agreements and 
customary international law.  The third level is acts of the EU institutions based directly on 
Treaty provisions.  Finally, there are acts of EU institutions which seek to implement previous 
acts of the institutions.379 
The EU liability principle emphasizes that both the Member State and EU Institutions are 
liable to compensate any damage for breach of a superior rule of law for the protection of 
individual right.  Although in practice, there is no specific definition of what makes a rule of 
law ‘superior’ for this purpose, but it is implicit in the court case law that such rules tend to be 
a general principle such as fundamental rights or fundamental freedom.380For example, 
pursuant to The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter EU 
Charter), EU recognizes economic right in Article 15 (Freedom to choose an occupation and 
right to engage in work), Article 16 (Freedom to conduct a business) and Article 17 (Right to 
property).381  It is therefore interesting to note that breach any of these articles may entail 
liability for economic loss. Generally, since the EU law is primarily concern with economic 
matters, breaches of any EU law will typically result in economic losses, and compensability 
of these losses when caused by EU Institutions has been clearly set forth in Article 340 (2) 
TFEU.382 
                                                          
379Case 294/83 PartiEcologiste ‘Les Verts’ vs. European Parliament (1986), ECR 1339, para.23.  See also Craig, 
Paul, and Burca, Grainné de, (2011), EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials (Fifth Edition), Oxford University 
Press- Oxford/UK, pp.103 - 118 
 
380  Scott, Supra Note 181, pp. 83. The compensation derives from principle of state liability for violating 
superior EU law is not about increase wealth of individual but more to help superior European law succeed 
and to eliminate unlawful nation laws. 
 
381 The Charter came into force with the Lisbon Treaty, which reformed the European Union.  However, the 
Charter will not apply in full in the UK, Poland, or the Czech Republic. 
 
382 Case C-104/89 and C-37/90, Mulder vs. Council of the European Communities (1992), ECR 1-3061. See also 
Van Dam, Cees, (2013), European Tort Law (second edition), Oxford University Press – Oxford/UK, pp. 42-
44 
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The relation between superior rule of law and protection of individual rights is vividly 
found in the context that the superior rule of law exists coherently with individual rights, 
when most of the law is created to protect rights. It lies down in the case of Schöppenstedt.383 
The court declared that “where legislative action involving measures of economic concern, 
the EU does not incur non-contractual liability for damage suffered by individuals as 
consequence of that action, by virtue of the provisions contains in Article 215 Treaty of 
European Community(hereinafter TEC) second paragraph (today is Art. 340 (2) of TFEU),  
unless a sufficiently flagrant violation of a superior rule of law for the protection of individual 
has occurred”.384 In the case of Kampffmeyer385 when the court decided that is sufficient to 
show under general law of German Law (based on the German Schutznormtheorie386), the 
protection of individual right is more to wide interpretation.  According to the Court, in order 
for an individual to be able to claim damages, the legal norm in question must be intended to 
protect not only individuals in general, but also the group of individuals to which the injury 
party belongs.387 Thus, interpretation of Article 340 (2) TFEU, requires that liability of 
damage for the alleged breach of legislative acts by the EU is only available where the 
measure in question breaches a legal norms that protects the individual in general or group of 
individuals (corporation).   
Regarding the type of EU legislation which is liable to give rise to a claim for damages is 
concerned with economy policy and involves the exercise by the political institutions of 
discretionary powers.388The Economy policy is including the regulations and decisions 
promulgated by the institutions which are considered breach the right of individual. For 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
383Case 5/71 ZuckerfabrikSchöppenstedt v. Council (1971) ECR 975. 
 
384Ibid,  
 
385Joined Case 5,7, 13-24/66 Kampffmeyer and others v. Commission (1967) ECR 317. 
 
386 According to this theory, the state is liable only when, in addition to causing an injury, breaches a 
schutznorm, which is a legal norm protecting a subjective public right of injury party and which is intended 
not to protect individuals in general, but also to protect a specific circle of individuals which the party 
belongs to.  The requirement of protection of specific individuals has often liberally interpreted.  Scott, 
Sionaidh Douglas, Supra Note181,  pp. 395 
 
387Ibid. 
 
388Schermers, Henry G. and Vaelbroek, Denis F., (2001), Judicial Protection in the European Union (Sixth 
Edition), Kluwer Law International – Alphen/Netherlands, pp. 1052. The article 288 (340 TFEU) requires 
that the action should always be brought against the relevant EU Institution or Institutions against the matter 
giving rise to liability is alleged. However, in practice, the Court has accepted actions brought not against the 
Union itself, but against the relevant Institutions.  
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example in Schneider v. Commission Case, Schneider and Legrand were two companies 
specializing in electrical distribution and low voltage who merged into a single company.  The 
Commission declared the merger is incompatible with the common market and ordered a 
break up for the company.  In 2002, the General Court (hereinafter GC, prior to the coming 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, it was known as the Court First 
Instance)found the Commission decision to be illegal on two grounds. First, there were errors 
in its economic analysis of all the national markets other than the French market. Second, the 
Commission had failed to tell Schneider in sufficiently clear terms what measures it needed to 
take avoid the merger being declared illegal. The Court went on to find that there was liability 
according to Article 340 of TFEU. It was because the Commission had violated rights of these 
companies by not telling it what corrective action needed to take.389 
 In order to establish the non-contractual liability of the EU for damage caused by its 
institutions, the applicants must show that the economic loss they claims to have suffered is 
attributable to an act adopted by the defendant in its capacity as a EU institution.390Another 
example is the HNL case.  In this settle case, the court was concern with an action for 
compensation concerning a Council regulation which provide for the compulsory purchase of 
skimmed milk held by the intervention agencies for use in feeding stuffs. The Court declared 
that, “to accept within reasonable limits certain harmful effects on their economic interest as a 
result of a legislative measure without being able to obtain compensation from public fund 
even if that measure has been declared null and void. In a legislative field such as the one in 
questions, in which one of the chief features is the exercise of a wide discretion essential for 
the implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy, the EU does not, therefore, incur 
liability unless the institution concerned has manifestly and gravely disregard the limit on the 
exercise of its power.”391 
There is authority for the proposition that the most general principles of law, and in 
particular all fundamental human rights should be considered as superior rules of law 
                                                          
389Case T-310/01, Schneider Electric SA v. Commission, (2002) ECR II-4071. The right confer to this case is the 
right is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU legal order in administrative procedures, is of 
particular importance for the control of concentrations between undertakings. See also Chalmers, Damian, 
Davies, Gareth, and Monti, Giorgio, Supra Note 348, pp. 434 – 436. 
 
390Biavati, Paolo, (2011), European Civil Procedure, Kluwer Law International – the Hague/Netherland, pp. 53.  
The ground for the non-contractual liability of the EU based on legislative measures in that a sufficiently 
serious and manifest breach of a superior rule of law for the protection of individuals may be found. When 
EU institutions have no discretionary power, the mere transgression of the rule of law may be sufficient to 
found the liability. 
 
391 Join Case 83 & 94 /76, 4 and 15 & 40/77, HNL  vs. Council and Commission (1978), ECR 1209, para 6. 
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protecting individuals.  For example in Case Nold v. Commission, in this particular case, a 
new Commission decision required that the German national coal producer, Ruhrkohle, would 
sell only to large wholesalers on two year contracts. Nold, (a small wholesaler, who under the 
previous system purchased directly from Ruhrkohle) considered this to be violation of his 
right to property and his freedom to pursue economic activities.  However, the Court 
reaffirmed its position that ‘fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles 
of law’, the observance of which it ensures that it found no violation of such right in this 
particular case. It justified this by holding that rights of ownership do not protect mere 
commercial opportunities. In this case, the ECJ broadened the sources of inspiration when it 
came to ascertaining specific fundamental rights as forming general principles of law.392 
General principles of law are more to the production of a rule of law and a rule not to be 
found expressly in the Treaty.  Once the EU Courts have determined what the common 
heritage is, a general principle of EU Law may emerge. General principles must be detected, 
understood and recognized. They are not to be found in the statutory provisions.  They are 
rather created and pronounced by the judge. In general, the Court will search for identify 
principles inspired by national law or international treaties ratified by all members states – 
with particular significance given to the European Convention on Human Rights. In an almost 
generic way, general principle of law constitutes principle of proportionality, legal 
expectations, equal treatment and good administration.393 
Furtherance, it needs to explain, what is the superior of law for the protection of 
individual rights according to EU law? In this context, some cases are leading to reveal the 
concept of it. 
 
2) The protection of individual rights  
The ECJ recruited the meaning of ‘rights’ as protection of individual if the EU 
Institution has failed to observe certain standards inherent in the EU legal system, as it comes 
from superior rule of law.394 In addition, the protection of individual rights was laid down in 
                                                          
392Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission (1974) ECR 491.  See also Reinisch, August, (2012), Essentials of EU Law 
(Second Edition), Cambridge University Press – UK, pp. 101-102. 
 
393Groussot, Xavier, and Lidgard, Hans Henrik, (2008), ‘Are There General Principles of Community Law 
Affecting Private Law?’, in General Principles of EC Law in a Process of Development, eds. Bernitz, Ulf, 
Nergelius, Joacin, and Cardner, Cecilia, Kluwer Law International – The Hague/ Netherlands, pp. 60 -61. 
 
394Biondi, Andrea, and Farley, Martin, (2009), the Right to Damages in European Law, Kluwer Law 
International – the Hague/Netherlands, pp. 392. 
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several general principles of the Law of European Union.395The following are among grand 
principles that have been fall with the category protection of individuals’ rights.  Although the 
ECJ in some cases also recognized some other principles in the context of actions for 
damages, including the principle of the protection of acquired rights396, the principle of non- 
retroactivity397, the principle of care and of sound administration398, and the principle of equal 
treatment in the award of public contracts399, but the major principles are focusing on the 
principle of non-discrimination and the principle of equality, the principle of proportional, and 
the principle of legitimate expectation. 
 
2.1) the principle of non-discrimination and principle of equality 
 Application to this principle was remarked by the ECJ in the case of Sermide v. 
CassaConguaglioZuccheroand others, when the Court noted that under the principle of non- 
discrimination between EU producers or consumers, the Article 40 TEC (now Article 46 
TFEU) includes the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality according to the 
Treaty.400 In other cases, such W. Ferrario and Others v. Commission of EC, the Court stated 
the general principle of equality is one of the fundamental principles of the law of the EU civil 
service.  The principle requires that comparable situation shall not be treated differently 
                                                          
395  The European Union was established by the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), Maastricht, Feb. 
7, 1992, 12 U.K.T.S. Cm. 2485 (1994).  It comprises three “pillars”.  The first pillar consists of the three 
European Communities: The Coal and Steel Community (ECSC Treaty) Paris,Apr.18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 
140; the Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM Treaty) Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 and the 
European Economic Community (EEC Treaty), Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S 11. The Treaty of 
Lisbon, Dec, 13, 2007, amends the EU’s two core treaties, the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community.  The latter is renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). See, Mathijsen, P.S.R.F., (2004), A Guide to European Union Law (Eight Edition), Sweet & 
Maxwell – London/UK, pp.12-23. 
396Joined Cases 95 to 98/74, 15 and 100/75 Union NationaledesCoopérativesAgricoles de Céréales and Others v. 
Commission and Council [1975] ECR 1615. 
397Case 71/74 Nederlandse Vereniging voor de Fruit- en Groentenimporthandel v Commission [1975] ECR 
1095. 
 
398Case T-231/97 New Europe Consulting and Brown v Commission [1999] ECR II-2401; Case T13/99 Pfizer 
Animal Health v Council [2002] ECR II-3305; Case T-285/03 Agraz[2005] ECR II-1063. 
399Case T-145/98 ADT Projekt[2000] ECR II-387; Case T-160/03 AF Con Management Consultants and Others 
v Commission [2005] ECR II-981. 
400Case 106/83, Sermide v. CassaConguaglioZucchero and Others, 1984 E.C.R. 4209. See also Case 139/77, 
DenkavitFuttermittel GmbH v. FinanzamtWarendorf, 1978E.C.R.para. 1317 1333; Case 106/81, Julius Kind 
v. European Economic Community, (1982) E.C.R. 2885, 291.  In Sermide Case, the court also mentioned that 
comparable situation must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same 
way unless such treatment is objectively justified. 
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unless such differentiation is objectively justified.401 Thus, the linkage between the violation 
of individual rights and the liability of EU can be seen in the way the Court produced the 
ultimate statement in order to compensate the damage caused by the transgression of general 
principle of EU law.  As it can be traced back to some cases, such as Bayerische NHL402 and 
QuellmehlCases that were recognized as case when the Court implied the requirement of 
infringement superior rule of law for protecting individual rights. The Court found that the 
Council had infringed the general principle of equality stated in Article 40 (3) TEC (Art. 46 
TFEU).403 
 
2.2) Principle of proportionality 
 It can be traced back to the previous cases based on old Article 215 of TEC (Article 
340 TFEU), when ECJ held decision arise from the elaboration of this article in which 
relating to the requirement of Schutznormtheorie. In the first judgment of Kampffmeyer case, 
the Court elaborates upon the Schutznormrequirement in connection with Article 215 TEC.  
The Court found that the regulation of prices and aids in relation to durum wheat for the 
1974/75 cereal marketing year constitute an infringement of the objective of stabilizing 
markets provided for in Article 39 (1) of the TEC which is assuring the availability of 
supplies (Art. 39 (1) (d) and ensuring that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices (Art. 
39 (1) (e)).  On the other word, the principle that was violated was EU fair trade principle and 
the principle of proportionality.404 
 The principle of proportionality is not only for a limitation on exercise of EU 
competence, but it also considers being a valuable tool to protect interest of individual or 
Member States against excessive EU acts.  According to this principle, the EU is not only 
entitled to exercise a competence but also to limit its scope and intensity irrespective of the 
                                                          
401Joined Cases 152, 158, 162, 166, 170, 173, 175, 177 to 179, 182 & 186/81, W. Ferrario and Others v. 
Commission of the European Communities, (1983) E.C.R. at  2367 
402Joined cases 83 and 94/76, 4, 15 and 40/77,Bayerische HNL and others v Council and Commission of the 
European Communities, (1978), ECR 1209 
 
403Case 262/78, Diamalt AG v. European Economic Community, (Quellmehl-Liability), (1982), ECR 3293.In the 
Quellmehl case, the ECJ held that the Council of the EU had infringed the general principle of equality by 
abolishing production refunds on maize used to make quellmehl and gritz while continuing to pay refunds on 
maize used in the manufacture of starch. 
 
404Kampfmeyer Case, Supra Note 385. The superior of rule of law that was infringed is non-discrimination and 
proportional principles. 
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nature of the competence itself.405 Principle of proportionality can be invoked not only as an 
interpretative tool, but also as a ground of judicial review.406For example in the case of 
Artegodan GmbH407, the ECJ decided that the review of principle of proportionally and in 
accordance with the principle of sound administration must be balanced against the legally 
protected interests of the holders of marketing authorizations by taking account of all the 
circumstances of the case. 
 
2.3) the principle of legitimate expectation 
 EU recognizes general principle of legal certainty which is a principle underpinning 
any legal system. This principle can be related to the demand that the application of the law to 
a specific situation must be predictable.408Legal certainty principle is intertwined with 
principle non retroactive and principle of legitimate expectation.409Principle non retroactive is 
a principle that prevents EU secondary legislation from taking effect before publication.410 It 
thus governs the presumption that legislation should not be retroactive.  However, retroactive 
is prohibited unless the measure may not otherwise be achieved. It provides a relation with 
principle of legitimate expectation.411Legitimate expectation is the principle that its root lays 
in the concept of good faith, and the administration should not fail to keep promise that is 
caused to individual suffers loss. It emphasizes that when administrative decision is cancelled 
                                                          
405 Hartley, Trevor C., (2010), the Foundation of European Union Law (Seventh Edition), Oxford University 
Press-Oxford/UK, pp. 123. See also Tridimas, Takis, (2006), The General Principle of EU Law, Oxford 
University Press – Oxford/UK, pp. 175-176.   
 
406 See Case C-170/08, Nijemeisland, (2009), ECR I-5127, para. 40.  See also Hofmann, Herwig C.H., Rowe, 
Gerard C. and Turk, Alexander H., (2011), Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union, Oxford 
University Press – Oxford/UK,  pp. 129-132. 
 
407See case T-429/05, Artegodan GmbH v. Commission of the EU, (2010), ECR II-494.  
 
408 Ratio, Juha, (2008), ‘The Principle of Legal Certainty as a General Principle of EU Law’, in General 
Principles of EC Law in A Process of Development, eds. Bernitz, Ulf, Nergelius, Joakim, and Cardner, 
Cecilia, Kluwer Law International – Alphen/Netherland, pp. 53-55. 
 
409 Ratio, Juha, (2003), the Principle of Legal Certainty in EC Law, Kluwer Academic Publisher – 
Dordrecht/Netherland, pp. 256.  
 
410 See Case 88/76, Société pour l’Exportation des Sucres v. Commission, (1977), ECR 709.  Commission had 
passed a regulation on 30 June 1976 removing the right of exporters to cancel their export licences.  The 
regulation was dated 1 July, the expected date of publication of the Official Journal.  The journal did not 
appear until 2 July.  The application applied for cancelation on 1 July but it was refused on the basis of the 
regulation.  The ECJ ruled that the regulation did not come into force until 2 July as the date of actual 
publication. 
 
411 See Kent, Penelope, (2008), Law of the European Union (Fourth Edition), Pearson Education Limited – 
Essex/UK, pp. 80-81 
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or revoked, the EU Institutions must concern regarding they act which influence individual 
rights or benefits in economic activity. They also must be able to respond to changes 
underlying economic situation, when the economic actors do not have a vested right on the 
maintenance forever of the existing common organization of the market.412 
 General nature of legitimate expectations has been declared by the court.  The courts 
have been prepared to hold that a clear representation by EU institutions is how they will act 
in the future or consistent practice in the past. It then shows whether they are capable in 
generating a duty to act in a particular way in relation to the recipient of the representation or 
the beneficiary of the practice.  Legitimate expectation principle may arise when EU 
Institutions have discretionary power and it represents that it will exercise the power in a 
particular way. The Institutions may express this principle in the form of an explicit promise 
or statement, or they may be implicit in the form of a consistent practice from the past.  This 
principle could also give rise to an enforceable legal right on the part of the individual who 
held such an expectation that EU Institutions will be required to give effect to it unless 
circumstances is entitled them to  draw it back.413 
 Under the principle of legitimate expectation, EU measures must not violate the 
protection of legitimate confidence of those concerned, especially in the absence of overriding 
public interest. This principle is a foundation of a rule of interpretation as well as a ground for 
annulment of EU measure, but basically it is used more often for an action damages for non-
contractual liability.414 In the previous CNTA vs. Commission case415, the court based on old 
Article 215 of TEC (Article 340 TFEU), decided that Commission had found guilty of 
wrongful act resulting ability to compensate damage.  The Court as well decided that 
Commission has been proved to infringe the principle of legitimate expectation. This case 
becomes a milestone for any cases regarding to the infringement of principle of legitimate 
expectation which is resulting the non-contractual liability for EU institutions.416 
                                                          
412 See Larragan, Javier De Cendra de, (2011), Distributional Choices in EU Climate Change Law and Policy: 
Towards a Principle Approach?, Kluwer Law International – Alphen/Netherlands, pp. 153. 
 
413 Auburn, Jonathan, Moffet, Jonathan and Sharland, Andrew, (2013), Judicial Review: Principles and 
Procedures, Oxford University Press – Oxford/UK, pp. 20-24. 
 
414 Hartley, Trevor C.,(2007), The Foundation of European Community Law (sixth edition), Oxford University 
Press – Oxford/UK., pp. 149 
 
415Case 74/74, Comptoir National Technique Agricole (CNTA) SA vs. Commission of EU, (1976), ECR 0797. 
 
416Ibid.This case arose out of the system of monetary compensatory amounts (MCAs), which were intended to 
compensate for fluctuations of exchange rates.  These payments had originally been granted on exports of 
colza seed from France, but on 26 January 1972, the Commission passed a regulation which abolished the 
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 There are two categories of legitimate expectation, namely substantive and procedural 
legitimate expectation.417 First is substantive legitimate expectation. Issues of substantive 
legitimate expectations typically arise when EU Institutions have led an individual to expect 
certain consequences either through the formulation of a particular policy or through 
sustained practice, but furtherance they change its policy or practice which is subsequently 
prevent individuals to obtain those expectations.418  In Mulder case419, Mulder a farmer 
undertook to cease producing milk for five years in return to premium. When he subsequently 
sought to resume production on the expiry of the 5 years period, he was refused a quota on the 
grounds that he had to have produced milk the preceding year in order to be eligible for a 
quota for the forthcoming year. This provision had, however, been introduced during the 5 
years period and Mulder argued that it frustrated his expectation of re-entering the milk 
market. The ECJ proceeded to balance the general policy objective the EU was pursuing 
against Mulder’s stated interest.  While nothing that Mulder could not expect to re-enter the 
market under exactly the same previous conditions. The Court wrote that “the producer who 
has voluntarily ceased production for a certain period cannot legitimately expect to be able to 
resume production under the same conditions as those which previously applied and not be 
subject to any rules of market or structural policy adopted in the meantime.  The fact remains 
that where such a producer, as in the present case, has been encouraged by the EU measure to 
suspend marketing for a limited period in the general interest and against payment of a 
premium he may legitimately expect not to be subject, upon the expiry of his undertaking, to 
restrictions which specifically affect him precisely because he availed himself of the 
possibilities offered by the EU provisions.”420 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
system as 1 February.  The applicant was a French firm which had entered into a number of contracts before 
the regulation was passed, and these were to be performed after the ending of the scheme.  It claimed that it 
had entered into the contracts on the assumption that MCAs would be payable and had calculated it price on 
that basis. It argued that it had suffered loss by reason of the sudden ending of the scheme without warning 
and without any provision being made for transactions which were in the process of completion when it came 
into force.   
417Craig, P.P. (1999), ‘Substantive Legitimate Expectations in Domestic and Community Law’, Cambridge Law 
of Journal No. 55, pp. 306. Craig argued that since legitimate expectation principle is well established in EU 
Law, thus this principle does not to be classified as either procedural or substantive. 
 
418 Anthony, Gordon, (2002), UK Public Law & European Law: The Dynamics of Legal Integration, Hart 
Publishing – Oregon/USA, pp. 118 
 
419See Case 120/86 Mulder v. Minister van Landbouw en Visserij (1988) ECR 2321 
 
420Ibid, para 22-23 
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 Second is procedural legitimate expectation. A procedural legitimate expectation 
relates to the procedure that will be followed by EU Institutions before they take a decision or 
acts.  A legitimate expectation may give a procedural benefit when a decision will be taken 
and there is an opportunity to comment, a hearing before a decision is taken or consultation 
will be made before a decision is actually taken.421In the France and France Télécom Case422, 
the GC found that, “it is settled law that, even in the absence of legislation, the right to rely on 
the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations extends to any individual where by 
giving him precise assurances, an institution has led him to entertain reasonable expectations. 
In whatever form they are given, precise, unconditional and consistent information from 
authorized and reliable source constitute such assurances.  However, a person may not plead 
breach of the principle unless the administration has given him precise assurances. It follows 
from that principle which is especially applicable in relation to the review of State aid 
pursuant to Art 14 of Regulation No 659/1999 that the protection of the legitimate 
expectations of the recipient of the aid can be relied upon provided that the recipient has 
sufficiently precise assurance arising from positive action taken by the commission which 
leads him to believe that a measure does not constitute state aid for the purpose of article 87 
TEC. If the Commission does not give an express opinion on a measure which has been 
notified to it, on the other hand, its silence cannot on the basis of the principle of the 
protection of the legitimate expectations of the recipient undertaking, preclude recovery of 
that aid.”423In conclusion, the core of legitimate expectation is that the law should not be 
different from what could be expected.  The EU Institutions are bound by a promise to act in a 
special way as a part of EU Law.424 
  
3) The existence of sufficiently serious of breach   
In order to define what constitute sufficiently serious of breach, the Court normally 
required evidence from the applicants of whether there having been a manifest and grave 
disregard by the institution for the limits on the exercise of its power.To some extent the court 
implies criteria regarding to the concept sufficiently serious of breach.  The criteria are the 
clarity and the precision of the EU rule breached, whether the infringement was intentional or 
                                                          
421Auburn, Jonathan, Moffet, Jonathan and Sharland, Andrew, Supra Note 413 
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accidental, whether any error was excusable, the degree of discretion enjoyed by EU 
institution concerned, the complexity of the situations to be regulated, and the difficulties in 
the application or interpretation of the relevant text.425In the P Holcim (Deutschland) case426, 
the ECJ stated that, “the system of rules which the court has worked out in relation to the non-
contractual liability of EU takes into account, inter alia, the complexity of the situations to be 
regulated, difficulties in the application or interpretation of the legislation and, more 
particularly, the margin of discretion available to the author of the act in question. The CFI 
(GC) took into account not only the defendant discretion but also the complexity of the facts 
and the difficulties on applying EU law in order to establish whether there had been a 
sufficiently serious breach of EU law. The criteria to which it had recourse to establish the 
existence of such a breach of EU law are therefore not vitiated by an error of the law.”427 
In summarizing the factors that contribute to the Court’s finding of a sufficiently 
serious breach, it could be identified three clear elements, whether the institution exercised its 
power in the way it did because of a higher public interest which justified the harm caused to 
individual interest, whether the harm caused by the exercise of discretionary power concerned 
a clearly defined group of individuals, and whether the individuals who have been harmed are 
expected to support the harm they suffered within reasonable limits.428 
 
4) Actual link between the damage and the conduct of the EU institutions 
The concept of actual link between the damage and the conduct of the EU Institutions 
seem to be important requirement.  It must be shown sufficiently that the act of Institution 
caused the damage when the damage must be ascertainable.429  The damage caused by the EU 
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427 Ibid, para 50-51 
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concept of non-contractual liability is that the action of the EU Institutions is not based upon contractual 
obligation, but upon its democratic legitimacy.  The democratic state is thought of as a representative of all, 
and acting for all. But almost all legislation or acts by the state in general will inevitably harm at least some 
individual’s interests. 
 
122 
 
institutions will be covering, inter alia, loss of interest430, pure economic loss431, lost profit on 
foreseeable contracts432, penalties paid for repudiation of contracts433, and non- financial loss 
such as physical incapacity434.The damage suffered by the applicant must be actual and 
certain, regardless whether it is present or future.  The court ruled that uncertainty regarding 
the exact quantification of damage would not preclude a finding that the damage alleged by 
the applicant was sufficiently certain.  Thus, in a situation where the damage alleged is real 
and actual there is uncertainty as to the extent of damage, the condition relating to certainty of 
damage is satisfied.435According to the interpretation of Article 340 (2) TFEU, the damage 
must be a sufficiently direct consequence of the wrongful act of the institution, and the 
causality of the damage may often be ‘direct, immediate and exclusive’.  However, the losses 
suffered are normally of an economic nature and such losses are recoverable, so according to 
the court in the Dumortier Frères vs. Council case436, that the losses should be certain and 
specific but not speculative.  In Ireks-Arkady case, Advocate General Capotorti stated that 
damage should cover both a material loss, a reduction in a person’s assets, and also the loss of 
an increase in those assets which would have occurred if the harmful act had not taken place.  
These three conditions governing the EU institution liability must be satisfied, but if one of 
conditions is not fulfilled, the applications is dismissed in it is entirety without the necessity 
for the court to examine the remaining conditions for such liability.437 
 
3.1.3.2. Liability for the absence of unlawfulness act 
Liability for the absence of unlawfulness act is a new plea in EU law which must be 
raised in the application.  Unlike the application for unlawful act, the EU Institution is liable 
                                                          
430 See case 238/78, Ireks-Arkady v. Council and Commission (1979) ECR 2955. 
 
431See C-37/90, Mulder II (1992) ECR I-3061. 
 
432 See Joined Cases 5/66, 7/66, Kampfmeyer v. Commission (1967) ECR 245; Case 74/74 CNTA v Commission 
(1975) ECR 533. 
 
433Kampfmeyer v Commission, ibid 
 
434Case 308/87, Grifoni v Commission (1990) ECR 1203. 
 
435 Case C-243/05 P, Agraz, SA and others vs. Commission of European Community, see Kaczorowska, Alina, 
(2011), European Union Law (Second Edition), Routledge – NY/USA, pp. 479 
 
436Joined Cases 64 and 113/76, 167 and 239/78, 27, 28 and 45/79 P.,Dumortier Frères SA and Others v. Council 
of EC (Maize gritz – Exchange rate applicable to damages). 
 
437See case  Ireks-Arkady v. Council and Commission, Supra Note 430 
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for damages caused by a lawful act. It does not require the applicant to show fault on the part 
of the EU, and it does not necessary for the Court in its ruling to investigate whether the 
institution has breached its duty.  The applicant requires demonstrating the special or unusual 
damages due to the act of institution.  With regard to the substantive elements of a claim 
based on lawful acts, the Advocate General Mayras in the case of 
Compagnied’Approvisionement v. Commission438addressed the special damage that must be 
particular to one or more persons, and it must be so serious as to exceed the duties imposed on 
each citizen by the requirements of life in the EU.439 The foundation of claim of EU 
Institution liability for the absence of unlawfulness, refer to the principle of public burdens 
(principle d’egalitédevant les charges publiques), and thereby amounts to the imposition of 
the concept of strict liability.440 
There are some requirements for the liability of the absence of unlawfulness act such 
an actual damage which must also be special and unusual.  The special damage normally is 
disproportionate impact on a particular circle of economic operators and the unusual damage 
is usually going beyond the limits of the normal (entrepreneurial) economic risks inherent in 
operating in the sector concerned.441Similar to liability for unlawful act, the EU Institution is 
liable if all the conditions, such as breach superior of law for protection individual rights, the 
existence of serious of breach and actual link between damage and the conduct of EU 
Institution are fulfilled.  Thus, as the cumulative nature of those conditions means that if one 
of them is not satisfied, the EU cannot incur non-contractual liability in respect of a lawful act 
of its institutions.   
 In the context of condition for non-contractual liability, the EU courts establish the 
same conditions both for EU Institutions and the Member State. However, there are two 
distinctions between liability of member states and liability of EU Institutions. First is liability 
for wrongful or negligent that is implemented by national authorities. In the case of 
                                                          
438Joined Cases 9 and 11/71, Compagnied’Approvisionment v. Commission (1972) ECR 391. 
 
439Ibid, this case arose out of the devaluation of the French franc in 1969, which caused the Council to decree 
that the France should grant subsidies for imports of cereal products from the Member states and third 
countries.  The devaluation of the French franc meant that the subsidy did not precisely compensate for the 
resulting price increase, therefore, the French traders and producers of cereals, brought an action for damages 
due to the treatment less favorably than importers from other member states.  They claimed that the 
Community should incur the liability, even though the amount of the subsidies had been legally fixed, but 
they had suffered unusual losses due to lack of compensation of devaluation of price. 
 
440 See the case 59/83 Biovilac v. EEC [1984] ECR 4057. 
 
441See case Case C-237/98 P Dorsch Consult v Council and Commission[2000] ECR I-4549; [2002] 1 CMLR 41 
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Granaria,442 the ECJ held that the question of compensation for loss incurred by individuals 
caused by a national body or by agents of the Member States that is resulting from either the 
infringement of EU measures or an act and omission contrary to national law while applying 
EU law, is not covered by Article 340 (2) TFEU.  It has to be assessed by national courts 
according to the national administrative law.  However the requirements of the principle of 
non-contractual liability must be respected. Second is liability of national authorities in the 
case of correct application or implementation of EU measures, but damage occurs. In this 
case, the EU Institution who issues the measure is liable for damage, exceptionally in respect 
of actions concerning monetary compensation, for example in Haegeman v. Commission443, 
the ECJ held that for the applicant the proper forum was in a national court, as the payment 
were collected by national authorities and thus the applicant was in a direct relationship with 
them, not with the council. If a measure is declared void by the ECJ, a national court will 
award compensation for the total damage suffered by individuals. The sum awarded will be 
paid from national funds but national authority can obtain reimbursement from EU funds. 
 EU Liability focuses on the infringement of individual’s right when the court 
significantly refers to the violation of superior of law accorded to protection of individual 
rights. The European Courts in their decision mostly emphasize the infringement of provision 
that is meant to protect rights, position or interest of the individual, such as fundamental rights 
and general principles.444 
 From the explanation above, it can be concluded that the protection of individual right 
become a prominent condition in order for EU Courts to hold a decision in regard with 
application of non-contractual liability in EU. Significantly for liability of EU institution, 
economic right is enshrined in EU liability principle where the EU Institutions are liable to 
rehabilitate and to rebalance the right that is violated by their acts.  The liability in this context 
refer to the duty of government in order to protect the right of individual derives from 
superior of law.  Henceforth, the EU Institutions have obligations to protect, to rehabilitate 
and to rebalance again the right that is violated by their legislative acts. 
 
                                                          
442Case 101/78 Granaria [1979] ECR 623. 
 
443Case 96/71 Haegeman v. Commission (1972) ECR 1005. 
444Thies, Anne, (2013), International Trade Dispute and EU Liability, Cambridge University Press-
Cambridge/UK, (Kindle Cloud Reader), Location 2159-2160.  See also Case T-193/04, Hans Martin Tillack 
v. Commission, para. 121. The GC in this case referred to the protection of family life, the freedom of the 
press, the principle of the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial as fundamental rights 
conferring enforceable rights. 
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3.2. The United States of America 
 Unlike European Union, the U.S. law system recognizes state sovereign immunity 
shielding them from damage liability to private individual for violation of federal law. The 
state sovereign immunity principle in the American constitutional are designed in two folds.  
First, the sovereign immunity of the Federal Government and the second is sovereign 
immunity of the states. Although in the development of cases and theory, state sovereign 
immunity principle in the U.S. is able to be waived based on some critical situations either 
derive from constitution or jurisprudence.  
 
3.2.1. Doctrine Sovereign Immunity of Federal Government 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is historically adopted in the U.S. legal system, 
such in the case of the United State v. Lee, the Supreme Court remarked about this doctrine 
that it has been treated as established doctrine.445 Nevertheless, in recent development of 
federal sovereign immunity doctrine, it can be waived by several reasons. It is because a 
sovereign creates the law does not mean that he should be immune to that law. 
 The U.S. law recognizes several legal products that are leading to abrogation of 
sovereign immunity doctrine, such as Law Tucker, Taking and Contracts Clause.  In example 
the Taking Clause of the Constitution underlies in the Fifth Amendments of Bill of Rights 
mentions that “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”446 In most 
cases, Takings Clause violations are brought under the Tucker Act447 or other statutory 
provisions explicitly granting a waiver of sovereign immunity that set forth a mechanism for 
                                                          
445See United States v. Lee case, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), the Court posited that “the doctrine is derived from the 
laws and practices of our English ancestors, and it is beyond question that from the time of Edward the First 
until now the King of England was not suable in the courts of that country.  And while the exemption of the 
United States and of the several States from being subjected as defendants to ordinary actions in the courts 
has since that time been repeatedly asserted here.  The principle never been discussed or the reasons for it 
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446 The U.S. Fifth Amendments of Bill of Rights states: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in  the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 
 
447U.S. Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §1491. 
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monetary relief.448The Congress has power to waive sovereign immunity in certain Takings 
Clause cases and set up the compensation mechanism available to claimants, although the 
Fifth Amendment alone does not create a monetary compensation regime through its own 
language. The plain language of the Taking Clause that ‘nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation’ is perfectly straightforward.  Compensation is 
necessary only when property is taken or the government must compensate the property 
owner is when physically seized property.  The text does not require compensation when 
regulations diminish the value of property.  Indeed, the clause does not even mention 
regulations.  Moreover, based on the Legal Tender Cases, the Supreme Court even posited 
that the taking clause has always been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation.  
It has never been supposed to have any bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work 
harm and loss to individuals.  A new tariff, an embargo, a draft, or a war may inevitably bring 
upon individuals great losses; may, indeed, render valuable property almost valueless.  They 
may destroy the worth of contracts.  In other words, the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause 
did not prevent regulations and statutes from restricting how property could be used nor did it 
prevent them from diminishing the value of property.  The Clause applied only to “a direct 
appropriation.”449 
 
3.2.2. Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity Doctrine 
The doctrine lays down in the Eleventh Amendment reads as follows: “The judicial 
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by 
citizens or subjects of any foreign state.”450It is inherently deriving from the nature of 
                                                          
448See Case ofSchillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894); Jacobs v. United States case, 290 U.S. 13 
(1933) (suit brought under Tucker Act for taking by flooding of property). 
 
449See Case Legal Tender, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871). It is the case regarding the early interpretation of the 
Fifth Amendments. In continuing case such Hepburn v. Griswold, the Supreme Court had found the legal 
tender laws inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution, which prohibited the states from passing “any law 
that is impairing the obligations of contracts.  The court held that an act compelling holders of contract to pay 
in gold or silver to accept legal tender was unconstitutional because deprived “such persons of property 
without due process of law under fifth Amendment, the congress thus constituted act unconstitutional.   But 
in 1871 based on Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis case, the court reverse itself in the legal tender case by 
declaring that the Legal Tender Acts constitutional the Fifth Amendment does not apply to injuries which 
flow from the Congress lawful act, but only to direct appropriate of property. Available 
at:(http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/79/457/case.html) last visited 12 January 2013. 
 
450The U.S. Constitution of Eleventh Amendment.  The eleventh amendment is the result of political dissent 
against the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Chisholm v. Georgia (Chisholm v. Ga., 2 U.S. 419, 1793.).  
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sovereignty not to be amenable to suit without consent. However it does not mean that the 
U.S. does not recognize state liability in the precise manner, since the principle of sovereign 
immunity is not applicable to political subdivisions of the state, such as cities, counties, and 
towns, which can be sued in a federal court.451 
In some cases, the doctrine of sovereign state immunity can also be waived.  The 
College Saving Bank case452is example of implying waiver doctrine when a state may 
impliedly abandon its sovereign immunity by engaging in conduct that comes within the 
ambit of an established federal regulatory program.453In Parden vs. Terminal Railway case, 
the Court posited that a state could make a “constructively waives” its immunity by engaging 
in activity that Congress regulates through its Article I of the U.S. Constitution.  The waiver 
itself must be voluntarily and equivocally by the Congress.  In the case of Fitzpatrick v. 
Bitzer, the U.S. Supreme Court discovered that Congress can abrogate state sovereign 
immunity doctrine by passing a statute that expressly provides for private damage suits 
against states.454 The Court said that Congress’s power, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is eligible to enforce the provision of the amendment by ‘appropriate’ legislation, 
permits Congress to override the states’ sovereign immunity.  Another case which is 
approving the abrogation of state sovereign immunity is Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. when 
the Court held that Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity and provide for private 
against states when exercising its power under the Constitution’s Commerce Clause.455  This 
decision appeared to promise a broad avenue of enforcement of federal law against states.  
There is two ideology back ground of waiver state sovereign immunity in the U.S.  
The first is pre 1945 ideological background of waiver doctrine, when a state voluntarily and 
knowingly agrees to be sued, thus it has consented to suit, and when a state’s actions 
otherwise eliminate its immunity; the state has waived its immunity from suit without 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Chisholm filed suit against state when it had heavy indebted in the aftermath of revolution.  It was triggering 
constitutional reform.  In Hans v. Louisiana case (Hans v. La., 134U.S. 1, 13 (1890)), proceedings brought 
by a citizen against its own state are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 
451See Fons, José A. Gutierrez, (Fall 2009), ‘Comparing Supremacy: Sovereign Immunity of States in the United 
States and Non-Contractual State Liability in the European Union’, Penn State International Law Review, 
Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 199. 
452See Case College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expenses Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999). 
 
453See Case Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 
454The Court held in Fitzpatrick that a state’s employees may sue the state under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. 
455The U.S. Constitution, Article 8, Section 1. 
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consent.456The second is after 1945 or starting in 1945 and continuing until today.  The Court 
is mostly reflecting a sharp hardening and ideologization of state sovereign immunity 
principles.  State sovereign immunity was transformed from an important but rather easily be 
waived defense into a sacred principle that state sovereign immunity could be avoided only by 
the clearest and most unequivocal consent to suit.457 In other meaning that today the waiver of 
state sovereign immunity needs to consider the prerogative of state to be sued in federal 
forum. 
Sovereign immunity doctrine has been limited or abolished, either by legislation or by 
judicial decision, both at the federal level and in virtually all states.  Governments or their 
officials may be liable under separate legal doctrine for any actions that are unconstitutional, 
whether those acts are legislative or administrative.  This liability is based primarily upon a 
specific federal law.  For example state liability principle in relation to the unlawful conduct 
of state official, such in case of ex parteYoung.458  The requirement for this state liability or 
governmental liability principle is that the government conducts unconstitutional action, such 
as improperly taking individual property. In conclusion, although the federal government is 
not itself responsible for damages resulting from unconstitutional laws or administrative acts, 
but the federal officials who are carrying out a clearly unconstitutional law would be liable to 
an injured individual.  The same as the official’s state government who are carrying out would 
be liable for the damages resulting from unconstitutional law.459 Local government such a 
state agencies are directly responsible for any unconstitutional laws (or other policy decision) 
                                                          
456See Case Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906). 
 
457Siegel, Jonathan R., (2003), ‘Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity and the Ideology of the Eleventh 
Amendment’, Duke Law Journal Vol. 52, pp. 1187 – 1205. 
 
458Ex Parte Young Case, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court case that private party allows suits in Federal 
Courts against officials acting on behalf of states of the Union to proceed despite the State’s Sovereign 
Immunity, when the State acted unconstitutionally.  
 
459Morrison, Fred L., (1998), ‘The Liability of Governments for Legislative Acts in the United States of 
America, Supplement to American Law at the End of the 20th Century: U.S. National Reports to the XVth 
International Congress of Comparative Law, Section IV, Topic IV.D.1’, American Journal of Comparative 
Law Vol. 46, pp. 351 -549.  Morrison concluded that “In the case of unconstitutional actions by state 
governments or by the federal government, there is no assurance that the plaintiff will be able to recover, 
unless the plaintiff can overcome the qualified immunity of the administering officer by showing violation of 
a clearly established constitutional standard.  In the case of a legislative act, an early challenge to the 
legislation by way of injunctive or declaratory relief may serve to put the enforcing officer on notice of its 
unconstitutionality.  If the plaintiff is successful in such an action to prevent application of the legislation, a 
remedy would be unnecessary.  In the unlikely event that the officer then ignored the injunction or 
declaration, a damages remedy might be available.” 
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they conducted.  It is also implied to their officials who are personally liable for any actions 
that violate a constitutional standard.460 
It is almost similar to EU Institutions liability that U.S. state official is liable for 
breach of constitutional and federal rights which is laid down in the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
and the U.S. Supreme Court case-law.  Under a body of laws that differs from the ordinary 
rules for tort liability, governmental institutions on the U.S. may be responsible for damages 
or injury caused by unconstitutional legislative act.  The institution is expected to know that 
his conduct was breach of statutory or constitutional rights, thus, the injured party or 
individual can bring an action for damages against them. There are two basic premises of the 
constitutional system of the U.S. provide a foundation for this liability.  The first premise was 
the unconstitutional act and second is compensation.  In the earliest decision of the U.S. 
Supreme Court that is no legislative body has the competence to enact an unconstitutional 
law. If any legislative body, whether the U.S. Congress, or a state legislature, or a city 
council, attempts to enact a law that violates the constitutional rights of the citizen, thus, 
individuals hold constitutional rights such as fundamental human rights or an economic right, 
may sue against legislative body to seek compensation on their damages.461 
Significantly, both EU and the U.S. practice to imply state liability principle is 
coherence with the violation of rights, whether it is fundamental rights derive from superior of 
law, or rights that is protected by the constitution. The EU supranational system of law 
recognizes state liability and EU liability for breach of superior rule of conferring to protect 
individual’s right. This condition is deemed to be the prominent requirement in order for 
individual to obtain compensation.  Meanwhile, the U.S sovereign immunity doctrine can be 
abrogated if the act of government’s official constitutes unconstitutional act which is violating 
constitutional rights of individual.  According to Meltzer, “there are commonalities between 
EU and the U.S. that both systems have cushioned the impact of damages liability for 
governmental action, whether imposed directly on governments themselves (as in the EU), or 
on government officials (as in the U.S.). such a constitutional remedies can be seen as serving 
two basic goals that first is providing compensation to those whose rights have been infringed, 
and second is creating a system of sanction designed to ensure an adequate level of adherence 
                                                          
460Case  Owen v. City of Independence,445 U.S. 622 (1980) 
 
461Meltzer, Daniel J., (2006), ‘Member State Liability in Europe and the United States’, International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, Vol. 4, Issue 3,pp. 39-83. 
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to constitutional right both the EU and the U.S.”462 In conclusion, the perception of state 
liability principle is that government is obliged to protect constitutional right (such an 
economic right) by providing a system to compensate or to rectify the right that has been 
infringed.   
 
 
4. The Effect of WTO Law in the EU and the U.S. 
 In order to analyse the possibility of private economic actors to obtain compensation 
due to damage caused by the disobedience of their governments to WTO Law, it is necessary 
to discuss the effect of WTO Law in the EU and the U.S. legal system. 
 
4.1. The Effect of WTO Law in the EU Legal System 
 The EU is supra national union established by EU Treaty which should accommodate 
interest of 28 countries members. The EU Commission submitted the proposal for the 
conclusion of the results of the Uruguay Round in the familiar format of a decision of sui 
generis that the Council was asked to approve the WTO Agreements, its annexes, the 
ministerial decisions and declarations and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial 
Services (Final Act of the Uruguay Round), Plurilateral Trade Agreements (Annex 4), and a 
minor side agreement on bovine meat concluded with the Uruguay Round.  The Council 
would have to give its approval on the basis of Article 207 TFEU (ex. Article 133 of the TEC 
or ex Article 113 EEC).463The Commission also explicitly made all matters within the ambit 
of the WTO would be under EU discipline.  It was asserted by the Member States to become 
Members of the WTO, and they should participate in the WTO and its organs, that is to say 
that the Member States would sit on the organs of the WTO grouped together as individually 
identifiable members of EU delegation.464 
                                                          
462Ibid. 
 
463The Court of Justice has been given the interpretation of Article 133 of the TEC ex 113 EEC (Article 207 
TFEU)  that the Council has exclusive power in the field of commercial policy in the EU, see Opinion 1/75, 
(1975), ECR 1355. 
 
464See Kuijper, Pieter J., (1995), ‘the Conclusion and the Implementation of the Uruguay Results by the 
European Community’, European Journal of International Law Vol. 6, pp. 225.  This proposal concluded the 
long debate regarding the Commission view that logically would lead to the EU alone becoming a Member 
of the WTO.  Almost all of the Member States and the Council did not agree and believed that the WTO 
covered important subject which had remained within the Member States’ power, and this should be 
concluded as a mixed agreement. 
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With regard to the effect of WTO law in EU law465, the history began when the 
Commission submitted remarkable proposal that it should not be possible to apply direct 
effect, since the U.S. and many other WTO members would explicitly exclude such direct 
effect as well.  Accordingly, the Commission explained if direct effect were not explicitly 
excludes in the EU, it would raise an important imbalance of trade relation under WTO 
Agreements between the EU and its partner’s countries, in addition, in the absence of 
reciprocity principle would place EU trader in the disadvantage position compared with their 
foreign competitors. 466 It is furtherance stated clearly in the Preamble to the Council Decision 
of 22 December 1994 on the conclusion of the WTO Agreement, that “ by its nature, the 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, including annexes thereto, is not 
susceptible to being directly invoked in Community (EU) or Member State courts.”467 
The absence of reciprocity principle is then lengthening to the case of non-conformity 
EU Measure with WTO Agreements.  The Portuguese v. Council case showed the reflection 
of non-direct effect by the Court, based on the principle of the absence of reciprocity.  In this 
case, Portugal challenged the decision of the Council to conclude Memoranda of 
Understanding with India and Pakistan on market access for textile products.468  According to 
Portugal, the memoranda are being inconsistent with the GATT 1994, the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing, and the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.  The ECJ held 
that Portugal could not rely on the provision of the WTO Agreement, because they were 
among the rules that could be used to challenge the legality of EU measures. The Agreement 
therefore was held not to have direct effect within the EU legal order and the WTO 
                                                          
465In terms of effect of international law in general on the EU legal system, Article 216 (2) TFEU declares that 
international agreements concluded by the EU is binding not only on the EU Member States but also on the 
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enter into force. For example see Case 181/73 Haegeman v. Belgian State (1974) ECR 449, para 4ff. Thies, 
Supra Note 444  location 2238 
466Kuijper , Pieter J., Supra Note  464. Although Switzerland took initiative to try to ensure that either domestic 
law or EU law should assure direct effect or self-executing of WTO law, the major of the members and the 
Commission could not accept it, since the major fear is, for instance, subsidiaries the US Companies would 
be able to enforce their rights directly through EU courts, including Members states Courts, striking down of 
laws of regulatory contrary to the WTO Law, while subsidiaries EU Company would have to go through the 
Commission, a member state, and subsequently await the result of dispute settlement procedures. 
 
467 Council Decision 94/800/EC of 22 December 1994 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the EC (EU), as 
regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral 
negotiations, OJ 1994, L446, pp. 1. 
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the EC (EU) and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and between the European Community (EU)and the 
Republic of India on arrangements in the area of market access for textile products, O.J. L 153, 27/6/1996, 
pp. 47. Notably, Portugal had voted against the conclusion of the Memoranda in the Council. 
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Agreement cannot be used to challenge the legality of EU Measures.469 To that extent, the 
Court relied on three examinations on this case.  First, the ECJ remarked that the WTO 
system is based on the negotiation between the parties, thus if it is to be considered as non-
compliance of WTO rules, the parties to dispute are able to negotiate with a view of DSU.470 
The second issue is absence of reciprocity principle; in this regard, the ECJ essentially held 
that since the major trading partners of the EU do not grant direct effect of WTO law, in the 
interest of the principle of reciprocity, the ECJ was precluded from doing so.  The Court 
affirmed that this principle constitutes as valid justification for the denial direct effect in 
relations between equals and balance to invoke international agreement such as WTO 
Agreements.471The third issue is the freedom of political institutions.  The grant of direct 
effect would compromise the freedom of the EU political institutions within the WTO system.  
The Court relied on two aspects of it, first is the external aspect, where the grant of direct 
effect is destined to weaken the negotiating strength of the institutions within the WTO in 
relation to the most important trading partners.  Second is the internal aspect where the grant 
of direct effect would have the consequence that any EU legislative measures could be 
challenged before the ECJ when the product of legislation is incompatible with the WTO 
Agreements.472 
The effect of WTO on the EU also concern to the effect of WTO adjudication decision 
on the EU measures. The enforcement of WTO decisions in the EU legal system against EU 
measure may arise at different stages: absent, pending, or after WTO dispute settlement 
proceeding on such an EU measure.  In the absence of dispute settlement proceeding, the EU 
could maintain on the non-enforceability of WTO rules.  In this stage EU has a number of 
open possibilities, such as; it can seek a negotiation solution with the opponent member 
                                                          
469Case C-149/96 Portugal v. Council [1999] ECR I-8395, in this case, the Court held that: “having regard to 
their nature and structure, the WTO agreements are nit un principle among the rules in the light of which the 
Court is to review the legality of measures adopted by the Community (EU) institutions.” 
 
470Ibid, decision of the Court. This examination held by the ECJ as contentious opinion with AG Saggio opinion 
who posited that the obligation to apply WTO law does not extend to the violation of primary EU law.  If 
WTO law is found to be in conflict with primary EU legislation, the latter should be upheld despite the risk 
of the EU suffering international responsibility. See AG Saggio Opinion in Case C-149/96 Portugal v. 
Council [1999] ECR I-8395 at para. 22. 
 
471 Antoniadis, Antonis, (2007), ‘the European Union and WTO law: a nexus of reactive, coactive, and proactive 
approaches’, World Trade ReviewVol. 6:1, pp. 50. 
 
472Ibid, see also Rudolf, Beate , (2000), ‘European Community – WTO Agreements – Effect of International 
Agreements in European Community law – Ability of Individuals and Member States of European 
Community to rely on WTO Agreements’, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Oct., 
2000), pp. 740-745. 
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(disputant party), -if the dispute under the GATT- it can request a waiver, it can unbind the 
duties and others political measures instead of judicial manner.473In the pending stage, J.H. 
Bourgeois commented when a dispute settlement proceeding is initiated, as the respondent 
party; the EU still has many possibilities to avert the subsequent adoption by the DSB.  In this 
term, EU still can take account to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of the WTO 
dispute.  Once a Panel or Appellate Body report finding that an EU measure breach of WTO 
rule and it is adopted by DSB, there are still two options whether EU by the declaration of 
ECJ that an EU measure, constitutes breach WTO rules, is operated as a rule ex tunc, or 
whether EU brings the measure into conformity to WTO rules.474Eeckhout also posited that a 
connection the judicial operators between WTO adjudication bodies and EU has several 
distinction: first, after the Panel and Appellate Body reports adopted by DSB in general, and 
the report regarding the breach of WTO rules by the EU.  Second, when there is pending on 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings on alleged breaches by the EU of WTO rules, and 
subsequent, when EU adopts Panel and appellate Body reports.475 
In the relation with the infringement of WTO Law by the EU, there are three phases that 
individual can challenge the EU act.476  First, individual can file suit against EU in EU Courts 
when a breach of primary WTO law before the dispute is brought before the DSB.477 Second, 
a breach of WTO law that has already been identified by the DSB, but the period granted for 
compliance has not yet expired478, and, third, a breach of WTO law is upheld despite the 
                                                          
473 H.J. Bourgeois, Jacques, ‘The European Court of Justice and the WTO: Problem and Challenges’, (2000), in 
The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade?,ed. Weiler, J.H.H., 
Oxford University Press – Oxford/UK, pp. 120.  Bourgeois concluded in this stage, a good argument could 
be made that it would be premature for the ECJ to recognize enforceability of the WTO rule in the EU legal 
system with the normal consequence that it would declare the EU measure unlawful. 
 
474Ibid, Bourgeois mentioned that even assuming that the ‘pay’ option is not a measure of last resort, once a 
breach of WTO rule is established by the DSB that option can no longer justify denying enforceability of the 
WTO rule in the EU legal system. If that were the case, hardly any international agreements would be 
enforceable in the EU legal system, in could probably do so by ruling pursuant to Article 174 (1) (new Art. 
231). 
 
475Eeckhout, Pieter, (1997), ‘The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal 
Systems’, Common Market Law Review No. 34, pp. 48. 
 
476Thies, Supra Note 444  , (kindle) Location 3192 
477See Case T-30/99, Bocchi Food Trade International GmbH v. Commission of the European 
Communities (2001) ECR 947. Joined Cases C-364/95 and C-365/95, T.Port v. Hauptzollamt 
Hamburg – Jonas, (1998) ECR I – 01023. 
478 See case T-69/00, FabbricaItalianaAccumulatoriMotocarriMontecchio Spa (FIAMM) vs. Council of the 
European Union (2005) E.C.R. II-5393, (hereinafter FIAMM Case) 
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determination of the DSB and the expiry of the period of time to comply is granted by the 
DSB.479 When the EU decides not to bring the measure into conformity to WTO rules, some 
implications would rise, whether the implication is the trade damage due to the infringement 
WTO Law by the EU480, or the implication due to the disobedience of EU to the DSB 
Decision, such as imposition of suspension concession or retaliation from other WTO 
Member.481 This research merely concern on the implication of retaliation from other WTO 
member. It will be discussed in the following chapter. 
 
4.2. The Effect of WTO Law in the United States of  Legal System 
There are three different perspectives when the U.S. government adopted the WTO 
Agreements into domestic law, first is an isolationist perspective which is arguing that the 
U.S. Law precludes considering whether or not domestic statute or its interpretation is 
consistent with WTO norms. Second is an internationalist perspective and argues that the U.S 
Law requires U.S statutes to be interpreted and to be consistent with WTO Laws unless 
Congress clearly intends otherwise. Third is an intermediate position is that agreements and 
decisions may be considered, but their significance is limited and WTO decisions by 
themselves are not sufficient to warrant overturning and agency’s statutory interpretation.482 
Traced back to the background on the relationship of the WTO Agreements to the U.S. 
Law, when Congress approved and implemented the WTO Agreements and the other 
agreements negotiated in the Uruguay Round Agreement Act(hereinafter URAA)483 as non-
self-executing measures.  Non-self-executing means the legal effect of WTO Law in the U.S. 
is based on their implementation to U.S. legislation.  Thus, the legislation regarding the 
implementation of WTO Law is given effect as law in the United States rather than the 
agreements themselves.  So it clearly states there is no provision of the WTO Agreements that 
                                                          
479 See Case C-93/02 P, Biret International SA v Council of the European Union (2003), ECR I-10535 
(hereinafter Biret Case) 
 
480Ibid, see also Case C-377/02, Léon Van Parys NVv. BelgischInterventie- en Restitutiebureau (BIRB), (2005) 
ECR I-01465 
481Case T-383/00 Beamglow Ltd v European Parliament and Others (Spain, intervening) (2005) ECR II-05459 
 
482 Reed, Patrick C., (2006), ‘Relationship of WTO Obligations to U.S. International Trade Law: Internationalist 
Vision Meets Domestic Reality’, Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol. 38, Issue 1, pp. 209-211. 
See also Williams, Michael F., (2001), ‘Charming Betsy, Chevron, and the World Trade Organization: 
Thoughts on the Interpretive Effect of International Trade Law’, Law and Policy International Business 
Journal, Vol. 32, Issue 4, pp.677, 693-97. 
 
483Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 102(a), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a). 
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is inconsistent with the U.S. law is given effect. Section 102 (a)(1) of the URAA states that  
“no provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of any such 
provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States 
shall have effect.”484This part of URAA based on the term of constitutional restrain on self-
executing character of international law.  An international agreement cannot take effect as 
domestic law without implementation by Congress if the agreement would achieve underlie 
within the exclusive law-making power of Congress under the Constitution.485The URAA 
further provides that nothing in the statute “shall be construed to amend or modify any law of 
the United States or to limit any authority conferred under any law of the United States unless 
specifically provide for in this act.”486 
The WTO leaves the members to adopt those agreements according to their legal 
systems.  As the U.S. system did not apply self-executing to WTO Agreement, somehow the 
position of the direct effect of WTO Agreements in the United States is clear that both direct 
applicability and direct invocation is denied by the URAA. The U.S. Government has 
profound reason regarding the WTO implementation into their legal system.  There were 
sovereignty objections when the U.S. ratified WTO Agreements.  The objections became 
debate toward the institution of WTO.  Some opponents to the WTO argued that the WTO 
posed risks to U.S. sovereignty because decisions could be made in the WTO that would 
override U.S. law.  This objection engages a number of particular clauses of the WTO, as well 
as the legal effect of potential WTO decisions in the U.S. domestic law.  Hence, this is leading 
to conclusion that WTO decisions did not have self-executing or direct legal effect in the U.S. 
law, since it will erode U.S. sovereignty.487 
                                                          
484Ibid, Section 102 (a)(1). 
 
485Restatement of the Law — Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States, 1987-2011, the American Law Institute. Other reason of non-self-
executing agreement if An international agreement therefore providing for the payment of money by the 
United States requires an appropriation of funds by Congress in order to effect payment required by the 
agreement 
 
486 URAA at § 102(a)(2), 19.U.S.C. § 3512(a)(2) 
487Jackson, John H., (1997), ‘the Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United Stated Acceptance and Implementation 
of the Uruguay Round Results, Chapter 2: Constitutional Question’, Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law, Vol. 36, No. 7, pp.157-173. See also Sprance, Willliam R., (1998), ‘The World Trade Organization and 
United States Sovereignty: The Political and Procedural Realities of the System’, American University 
International Law Review, Vol.13, No. 5, pp.1225-1265. Sprance concluded that “the U.S. has not 
surrendered its sovereignty by joining the WTO.  In fact, American sovereignty is protected in several ways. 
First, Congress passed implementing legislation that ensures U.S law takes precedence in the event of a 
conflict with one of the WTO Agreement.  The implementing bill also provides that WTO decisions do not 
have the power to change U.S. law. Second, the institutional structure of the WTO protects its member’s 
sovereignty.” 
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 The URAA limits the status and effect of the WTO Agreements in the U.S. Law, by 
promulgating section 102.  This section also refer to the non-effect on DSB decision, includes 
the prohibition of private right of action based on the WTO Agreements.  Nevertheless, 
URAA is the U.S legislative product which is regulating the intention“[to] bring the U.S. Law 
fully into compliance with the U.S. obligations under the WTO Agreements. It is 
accomplished objective with respect to federal legislation by amending existing federal 
statutes that would do otherwise be inconsistent with the agreements and, in certain instances, 
by creating entirely new provisions of law”. To fulfill this commitment, the U.S Government 
furtherance to amend all existing Federal statutes or provision of new authorities as known to 
be necessary or appropriate to enable full implementation of, and compliance with the U.S 
obligations under the WTO Agreements.488 To this end, the Congress approved Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act Statement of Administrative Action (hereinafter SAA) to be regarded 
as an authoritative expression by the United States concerning the interpretation and 
application of the Uruguay Round Agreement and to this Act in any judicial proceeding in 
which a question arises concerning such interpretation or application.489 
URAA sections 123 and 129 govern the effect of decisions under the DSU that the 
result of any WTO dispute settlement proceedings will not be incorporated into United States 
law without following a specific domestic implementation process.  Coherence with the non-
direct effect of the WTO Agreements into the U.S. domestic law, that the WTO dispute 
settlement decision would not apply directly in the U.S. domestic law, except by legislation 
approved by the Congress.490 The DSB decision also does not have any effect into private 
remedy, since URAA prohibits private remedy due to inconsistent of the U.S. law with the 
WTO Agreements.  It states in Article 102 (c) (1) that “No person other than the United 
States shall have a cause of action or defense under any of the Uruguay Round Agreements or 
by virtue of congressional approval of such an agreement, or may challenge, in any action 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
488H.R. REP. NO.103-826, pt.1, at 25 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773.  SAA gives interpretation 
of section 102 (a) states “ if there is a conflict between U.S. law and any of the Uruguay Round agreements, 
the implementing bill makes clear that U.S. law will take precedence.” 
489Ibid, 103(d), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(d). 
490Ibid, see Leebron, David W., (1997), ‘Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results in the United States’, 
inImplementing the Uruguay Round, eds. Jackson, John H.& Sykes Jr., Alan O., Clarendon Press – 
London/UK, pp. 212.  See also Smith, Aubry D., (1996), ‘Executive – Branch Rulemaking and Dispute 
Settlement in the World Trade Organization: A Proposal to Increase Public Participation’, Michigan Law 
Review, Vol. 94, No. 6, March – 1996, pp.1276. Smith analyzed that in the statute implementing the WTO, 
the URAA, and Congress established a scheme designed to assert political control over the United States' 
interaction with the WTO.   
 
137 
 
brought under any provision of law, any action or inaction by any department, agency, or 
other instrumentality of the United States, any State, or any political subdivision of a state on 
the ground that such action or inaction inconsistent with such agreement.”491  The 
interpretation of Article 102 (1) (c) profoundly remarks that private party cannot bring an 
action to require, preclude or modify government exercise of discretionary or general public 
interest authorities under the other provisions of law.   Contextual interpretation is that the 
URAA precludes any action by private party against a state “under or in connection” with any 
Uruguay Round Agreements.  According to House Ways and Means Committee report, the 
prohibitions on private rights of action “are based on the premise that it is the responsibility of 
the Federal Government, and not private citizens, to ensure that Federal or State laws are 
consistent with U.S. obligations under international agreements such as the Uruguay 
Round.”492  From this interpretation, it could be underlined two different points of views in 
regard with non-direct effect of WTO Decision into U.S Law.  First, private party cannot 
challenge the U.S. Government regarding non implementation of the WTO Agreements, non-
conformity of WTO Agreements and/or any actions or inactions that conducted by any 
departments, agency, or other instrumentality of the United States, any state, or any political 
subdivision of a state.493 Second, the premise that Federal Government responsible to ensure 
that Federal or State laws are consistent with U.S. obligation under WTO Agreements, to the 
extent of Federal Government responsibility, most courts recognize that, at least under certain 
conditions, a WTO dispute settlement decision may be taken into account by a court in ruling 
on the correctness of a federal agency’s determination, such in the case ofSNRRoulements v. 
U.S., the Court stated that WTO decisions may shed light on whether an agency’s practices 
and policies are in accordance with the international obligations of the U.S.494 
                                                          
491 URAA Section 102 (c) (1) 
 
492Uruguay Round Agreements Act Statement of Administrative Action (H.R. REP. NO. 103-826, pt.1, at 25 
(1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773). 
 
493 See the interpretation of section 102 (c) of the SAA InH.R. DOC. NO.103-316, at 676 (1994). 
494 See SNR Roulements v. U.S., 118 F.Supp.2d 1333 (2000),The Court in SNR Roulements v. U.S. posited that 
the relevance of a WTO dispute settlement decision in this context lies solely in its persuasive force as a 
means of properly interpreting a controlling statute.  It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.  This persuasive force, however, must be carefully balanced with the 
reasoned rulemaking process underlying Chevron step-two deference.  The Court is wary of overstepping the 
bounds of its judicial authority under the guise of the Charming Betsy doctrine stating that unless the conflict 
between an international obligation and Commerce’s interpretation of a statute is abundantly clear, a court 
should take special care before it upsets Commerce’s regulatory authority under the Charming Betsy 
Doctrine.  The Court also is mindful of the prerogative of the Executive Branch, most importantly, the office 
of the U.S. Trade Representative in dealing with the WTO in its diplomatic and policymaking roles. See also 
Murray v. Charming Betsy, The, 6 U.S. 64, 2 L. Ed. 208, 1804 WL 1103 (1804),  
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Nevertheless, the WTO adjudications decisions may not be binding on the United 
States in requiring that the U.S. regulatory need to conform its law to adverse WTO decisions, 
the legal consequences will flow as a result of those decisions, such as adverse decisions 
require offending states to conform or compensate.495At any situation where State law is at 
issue in a WTO dispute, the URAA provides for federal-state cooperation in the proceeding 
and limits any domestic legal challenges to such law to the United States.  Such in the case of 
United States – Equalizing Excise Tax Imposed by Florida on Processed Orange and 
Grapefruit Product,496 when Brazil submitted a dispute regarding the impact of the Florida 
equalizing excise tax that had been to provide protection and support to domestic processed 
citrus products and to restrain the importation of processed citrus product into Florida. This 
case was resolved in 2004 without panelist having been appointed after Florida amended its 
statutes, and both parties submitted Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution.497 
In light of the WTO obligations, URAA vehement the U.S. either federal and state 
law to conform its regulatory law with the WTO Agreements, although the URAA itself 
regulate that due to the supremacy of federal law, state law may not interfere with the U.S. 
obligations derives from the WTO agreements as international agreement.  The URAA also 
deals with the issue that federal government has complete monopoly to bring an action against 
or to raise any defense against the applicability of any state law claimed to be inconsistent 
with a WTO provision by any person.  Although the WTO Agreements would prevail over 
inconsistent of State law, this outcome can only be established if the federal government itself 
chooses to seek a judicial order to that effect.  A political decision must be taken at the federal 
level before a State law inconsistent with any of the WTO agreements.498  It could be a strong 
behest within the U.S. legal system that private parties are completely barred from seeking to 
give direct effect to WTO provision in court proceedings, whether the challenge is to federal 
                                                          
495CaseCanadian Lumber Trade Alliance v. U.S., 425 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 28 International Trade Representative 
2006. 
 
496United States — Equalizing Excise Tax Imposed by Florida on Processed Orange andGrapefruit Products, 
WT/DS250/3 (June 2, 2004). 
497Ibid. 
 
498Barcelo III, John J., (2006), ‘The Status of WTO Law in U.S. Law’, Cornell Law Faculty Publications,No. 36, 
pp.1-34 
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or state law.  The UURA even nullifies the few cases in the pre-WTO era that had allowed 
private enforcement of GATT law against the States.499 
Furtherance, in terms of the effect of WTO decision in U.S. law, URAA Section 123 
(g)(1) provides “in any case which a dispute settlement panel or the Appellate Body finds is 
inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, that regulation or practice may not 
be amended, rescinded, or otherwise modifies in the implementation of such report unless and 
until ..(there follows a list of requirements including, among others, consultation with 
Congressional committees, non-federal government officials and private sector 
representatives respecting whether and, if so, in what manner to implement decision).” This 
Article is clearly stating that URAA rejecting any adjudicatory force within the U.S. legal 
system for WTO Panel and Appellate Body rulings.  John J. Barcello III explained that the 
political process plays a significant role in a way to implement of the DSB Decision based on 
consultations with relevant Congressional committees and private sector interest groups.  
Since the implementation in any particular case is requiring new legislation or simply a 
change in agency interpretation of existing law, any change in agency interpretation would 
have to be prospective, unless the President specifically determines that an earlier 
implementation date is in the national interest.500 
Based on brief explanation regarding the effect of WTO Agreements and DSB 
decisions in U.S. law above, it comes to the conclusion that the U.S. legal system adhere to 
the principle of sovereignty, which John H. Jackson argued that a large and powerful state 
would more likely be hesitant to accept obligations to an international decision-making 
procedure that would most probably result in decisions contrary to the national goals of such a 
powerful state.501Due to this concept it can be seen that the intermediate position is 
significantly used in terms of elaborating the relationship of WTO in the U.S. Law, when the 
WTO Agreements and DSB decisions may be implemented through executive agreements 
subject to the explicit approval from houses of Congress under the so-called “fast-track” 
procedures.502  In term of implementation of WTO Law, the procedure requires legislative 
approval and Congress action to adjust domestic law to conform with WTO Law, in the same 
                                                          
499Ibid, see also Brand, Ronald A., (1997), ‘Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the UnitedStates and 
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way of the authority of executive branch when it represent the United States in dispute 
settlement of the WTO. The URAA establishes information and consultation requirements 
designed to keep Congress, various quasi representative bodies, and the public informed about 
the Executive Branch’s participation in the WTO activities.503 
The most significant clause in the URAA is that private parties do not have rights to 
challenge the U.S. Government “under or in any connection” with WTO Law, since the U.S. 
Federal Government has prominent responsibility to ensure that the U.S. Laws are consistent 
with U.S. obligations under WTO Agreements.  The interpretation of the URAA section 102 
therefore is  lengthen to the “impossibility” of private parties to seek compensation caused by 
the WTO retaliation, since The URAA section 102 is affirmative clause not to include private 
party.  SAA hereby interpret the Section 102 (C) as “Section 102(c) of the implementing bill 
precludes any private right of action or remedy against a federal, state or local agency.  A 
private party thus could not sue (or defend suit against) the United States, a state or a private 
party on grounds of consistency with those agreements.”504However, having in mind that the 
implementation of the WTO in the U.S. Law is merely ‘highly political process’ when the 
WTO rules function as rules within the U.S. legal system only to the extent Congress 
faithfully captures them in implementing legislation or executive agencies conform their 
interpretation of ambiguous statutes to comply with WTO requirements.  Congress has 
blocked all direct effect for WTO law and arguably even all indirect effect at least in judicial 
proceedings.505 
 
5. Conclusion 
 Both EU and the U.S. is member of the WTO, and they are bound by WTO Law as 
international law pursuant to principle of factasuntservanda. They are obliged to perform 
obligation derives from WTO Agreements in good faith.506 If they violate WTO Laws, or they 
                                                          
503 See Smith,Supra Note490. The URAA established set of provisions to give the general public access to 
information about adjudication proceedings by requiring that they be as transparent as possible within the 
constraints of WTO rules.  Another set of URAA provisions established procedures designed to subject the 
Executive Branch’s interaction with the WTO during adjudication to oversight by congressional committees 
and quasi-representative bodies.  A third set of provisions applies similar oversight provisions to the 
regulatory implementation of WTO rulings. 
 
504See Section 102(c) of the URAA, as interpreted in the Statement of Administrative Action, letter f, in H.R. 
DOC. NO. 103-316, (1994), p. 676, 
 
505 See Leebron, Supra Note490, pp. 181. 
 
506 See Article II (Scope of WTO) Agreement of Establishing of the World Trade Organization, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf.  This article base on Article 26 Vienna Convention 
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nullify and impair other WTO Member trade benefits, they can be held responsible by other 
WTO Member.507 However, nothing in the WTO Law mention about responsibility to other 
citizen of other WTO Member, nor to their own citizen due to the violation of WTO Law.  
Thus, when the violation of WTO law is causing trade damage to individual within their 
jurisdiction, it will depend on their legal system to apply state liability principle in order to 
give compensation for damage caused to individual.   
 From the explanation above, the major obstacle to imply state liability principle is that 
both countries theoretically do not recognize concept of direct-effect of WTO Law to their 
legal systems, where direct effect means that the individual can rely on the WTO Law in order 
to file suit against their government for the violation of WTO Law.  But, if the notion of state 
liability principle is protecting individual rights from infringement conducted by government, 
the compensation will be given base on infringement of individual rights. However, it needs 
to find more detail argument to support this hypothesis, to this end the research continue to 
discuss the implication of WTO retaliation to private economic actors by discussing the cases 
in order to answer the question ‘to what extent is state liability accomplished’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
on Treaties states that “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them 
in good faith”. Available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/viennaconvention.pdf, last visited 11 January 
2013. 
 
507 See Article 3 (8) of the DSU. 
142 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
THE IMPLICATION OF WTO RETALIATION TO PRIVATE ECONOMIC 
ACTORS: TO WHAT EXTENT STATE LIABILITY IS ACCOMPLISHED? 
CASE STUDY  
 
1. Background 
 Chapter II discussed about the role and the right (substantive and procedural) of 
private economic actors in the WTO trading system. All WTO Members are obliged to imply 
these rights in term of implementation of WTO Agreement in the context of international 
trade among them.  However, even if private economic actors are accorded rights derive from 
the implementation of WTO Agreements; they do not have procedural right to stand before 
WTO adjudication body. The absence of procedural access to the dispute settlement system 
for individual because of the characteristic of the WTO is intergovernmental organization 
where the Member State is the only eligible party to stand before the WTO adjudication 
bodies.508 
 Nevertheless, the prominent problem is when state reluctant to induce private 
economic actors to rely on the WTO law and to obtain judicial protection of their rights if 
their governments are violating WTO law that have affected their business.  For example in 
Banana case, EU private economic actors have suffered heavy losses in facing retaliatory 
measures resorted by the United States under the authorization of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body.  The retaliation created some implications to EU private economic actors.  
These implications thus are the main subject of this chapter, in a way to reveal to what extent 
state liability principle is applied by EU.  Besides Banana case, this chapter  also discuss 
another case, such a Foreign Sales Corporation/Extra Territorial Income case (FSC/ETI), in 
order to obtain comprehensive analysis to what extent the U.S. government is accountable for 
damage that might have affected their private economic actors caused by retaliatory measures 
resorted by the EU.  The U.S. is more using political approach in dealing with the economic 
impact of WTO retaliation, because the U.S. law does not recognize direct effect of WTO 
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decision. The choice of word implications aimed to envision that the retaliation has both legal 
and economic impact to the private economic actors.  This chapter is thus describing, firstly, 
the economic and legal implications of retaliation measure to some private economic actors, 
and secondly is analyzing to what extent state liability principle could be implied by these 
governments in a way to compensate trade damage suffered by private economic actors. 
 
2. From Banana Case (the U.S. v. the EU) to FIAMM Case 
 This sub section discusses the factual background on the implication of the WTO 
retaliation for private economic actors.  It begins with the controversy of banana case between 
the U.S. and the EU. Banana case furtherance is triggering several questions regarding non 
contractual liability in the EU, since some private economic actors in the EU become 
‘collateral victims’ of the banana wars between the U.S. and the EU.509 
2.1. The General Overview of Banana Dispute 
 Banana dispute began in 1993, when Costa Rica, Colombia, Nicaragua, Guatemala, 
and Venezuela invoked GATT dispute settlement procedures to allege that European banana 
import and licensing schemes violated GATT rules. In 1994, The GATT Council finding that 
the European quota regimes for banana export violated Article I and XI.1 of GATT.  
According to Panel, the EU’s preferential trading arrangement for bananas violated the Most 
Favored Nation (MFN) clause of GATT, because it treated bananas from Africa, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) countries510, particularly from twelve traditional ACP supplying countries, 
more favorably than bananas from other countries of origin.511Furtherance, The EU therefore 
adopted a new regulation. However, the new regulation – regulation 404/93- still maintained 
the distinctions between ACP and non ACP exporters in a way that favored the ACP 
                                                          
509Opinion of Advocate GeneralPoiaresMaduro (hereinafter A.G. Maduro) in Joined Cases C--120/06 P and 
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144 
 
exporters.512 According to complain from Latin America countries, regulation 404/93 was 
found to violate GATT Article I, which embodies the MFN, Article II concerning tariff 
bindings, and Article III concerning national treatment obligation. The EUtherefore requested 
a waiver from obligation based on Article I (1) and it was granted on December 1994 by a 
decision of the GATT Contracting Parties.  It allowed the EU to deviate from MFN clause due 
to the necessary of extent to provide preferential treatment for products originating in ACP 
states as required by the Fourth Lomé Convention, without being required to extend the same 
preferential treatment to like products of any other contracting party.513 
 In 1994, Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela and Nicaragua accepted the so-called 
Framework Agreement on Bananas (hereinafter BFA)514, which still consists the EU to 
increase the tariff quota for non-ACP bananas on a country-by-country basis, and to revise the 
management of export licenses.515  However, this framework was not accepted by all parties.  
In example, Guatemala refused it, Latin America countries still wanted to arrange this 
framework based on GATT, Ecuador and Panama could not be subject to this framework 
because they were not member of GATT at that time, Germany and the U.S. protested this 
                                                          
512 The allocation of the tariff quotas, as well as a system of import licenses foreseen in Regulation 404/93 
benefited ACP countries, to the detriment of non-ACP exporters, imposing new restrictions on the import of 
bananas into EU Members States, including Germany. See GATT Panel Report, EEC-Import Regime for 
Bananas, DS38/R (Feb. 11, 1994). 
 
513The Fourth Lomé Convention was signed on 15 December 1989 by the EC (EU) and the ACP countries, many 
of which are now WTO members. See African, Caribbean and Pacific States-European Economic 
Community: Final Act, Minutes and Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lome, 15 Dec. 1989, 29 I.L.M. 783 
(1990). The EC(EU) and ACP countries were granted ‘Lomé Waiver’, a waiver of their GATT obligations 
pursuant to GATT Article XXV: 5 and WTO Article IX:3. Under those provisions, the GATT General 
Council and the WTO Ministerial Conference may waive GATT member’s obligations under the GATT and 
related multilateral trade agreements in exceptional circumstances. See Marinberg, Daniel, (2001), 
‘GATT/WTO Waivers: “Exceptional Circumstances” as Applied to the Lomé Waiver’, Boston University 
International Journal, No. 19, pp.153. 
 
514The BFA took effect on January 1995, and it is set to expire on 31 December 2002.SeeEU: Regulation (EU) 
No 3224/94, European Union Legislation: Commission Regulation (EU) No. 3224/94 of December 1994 
laying down transitional measures for the implementation of the Framework Agreement on Bananas 
concluded as part of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, official Journal L 337, 
24/12/1994, p.72. 
 
515Ibid, Under the BFA, the EU allocated it its GATT Article II Schedule to each of the four exporting countries 
specific shares of the bound basic tariff quota.  This privilege gave guarantee a slice of the tariff-rate quota 
for dollar bananas.  Costa Rica, for instance, received a 23.4 percent share, Colombia a 21 percent share, 
Nicaragua a 3 percent share, and Venezuela a 2 percent share. To be sure, according to BFA, these countries 
did not get better than average treatment for free, although they agreed not to sue the EC in the WTO before 
2002. 
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framework.516  In result, Latin America countries filed suit against the EU again, in this time, 
the U.S. took part as complainant against the EU to the WTO adjudication bodies.517 
  The main reason for the U.S. took part as main complainant in the banana dispute III, 
because Chiquita Brand International, Inc. and the Hawaii Banana Industry Association filed 
petition according to Section 301 to the USTR.518Certainty the U.S. involved in the Banana 
dispute raised the most significant question from the EU as to why the U.S. had any ‘interest’ 
in the banana import regime, since the U.S. is considered as producing few bananas and 
exporting none to EU.  This became a non-legal question that submitted by EU.  Josling 
argued that the trading interest of U.S.-based on multinationals company request did not 
constitute an excuse for the U.S. Government to get involved in banana dispute. The GATT 
and WTO dealt only with goods, therefore the intention of the DSU was not to examine 
‘abstract legal questions’, but to deal with actual trade impediments.  The U.S. claimed if 
Chiquita and Dole suffered in the EU market, the U.S interests were involved.  Moreover, 
those companies are producers in Hawaii and Puerto Rico (within the customs area of the 
U.S.) that impacted indirectly by the effect on world banana markets.519 The USTR basically 
investigated the EU banana import regime on October 1994, because the Framework 
Agreement seem had not yet been implemented by the involved “dollar zone” 
                                                          
516  See Bhala, Raj, (2000), ‘The Banana War’, Mc George Law Review, No. 31, Summer 2000, pp. 844. 
 
517EC – Bananas III, WT/DS/27, 25 September 1997.  
 
518 Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the President to take all appropriate action, including 
retaliation, to obtain the removal of any act, policy, or practice of a foreign government that violates an 
international trade agreement or is unjustified, unreasonable, or discriminatory and those burdens or restricts 
U.S. commerce.  Section 301 cases can be self-initiated by the USTR or as the result of a petition filed by a 
firm or industry group.  If USTR initiates a section 301 investigation, it must seek to negotiate a settlement 
with the foreign country in the form of compensation or elimination of the trade barrier.  For cases involving 
trade agreement, the USTR is required to request formal dispute proceedings as provided by the trade 
agreements. See the U.S. Trade of 1974, Pub.L. 93-618, 19 U.S.C. § 2411.  In this petition, the main 
complaint of Chiquita against the EC is that the second category of import licenses for “dollar zone” bananas, 
only available to those importers that traditionally sell bananas from traditional ACP banana supplying 
countries, limits its ability to obtain import licenses for “dollar zone” bananas because the company does not 
sell ACP bananas. See Stovall, J.G., and Hathaway, D.E., (2003), ‘US Interest in the Banana Trade 
Controversy’, in Banana Wars: The Anatomy of a Trade Dispute, eds. Josling, E.T., and Taylor, T.G. Taylor , 
CABI Publishing-Oxon/UK, pp. 154-155, see also Rosegrant, S. (1999), Banana Wars: Challenges to the 
European Union’s Banana Regime, Kennedy School of Government Case Study, Harvard University Press-
Cambridge MA/USA, pp.9-11. 
 
519Josling, Tim, (2003), ‘Bananas and the WTO: Testing the New Dispute Settlement Process’, in Banana Wars: 
The Anatomy of A Trade Dispute, eds. Josling, T.E. , and Taylor, T.G. Taylor , CABI Publishing – Oxon/UK, 
pp. 177. 
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countries.520The USTR then investigated to determine whether Colombia’s and Costa Rica’s 
policies and practice under the Framework Agreement are unreasonable, discriminatory, and 
burden or restrict the U.S. commerce.521  Furtherance, the USTR found that the Regulation 
404/93 and related rules implementing an EU banana policy, including a restrictive and 
discriminatory licensing scheme designed to transfer market share to firms traditionally 
trading bananas from ACP countries and from EU overseas territories and dependencies are 
considered unreasonable. Thus, the Framework Agreement between the EU and Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Venezuela are also discriminatory and unreasonable as applied to 
U.S. banana marketing companies importing bananas from Latin America. In regard with this 
complaint, the U.S basically supported the EU’s zero-tariff preferences for ACP bananas; it 
charged that other features of the banana preference scheme violated three basic of GATT 
rules.   
2.1.1. Panel Findings 
The first issue was tariff. The complaint against the EU in this issue as described 
above was the differential tariff rates that applied between third country bananas and non-
traditional ACP imports.  The EU also did not provide unconditionally low tariffs on bananas 
from non-traditional ACP countries to bananas from third countries.  However, the Panel 
agreed with the EU’s defense that these obligations were excused by the Lomé Convention 
waiver. Although in the complainant’s point of view, tariff allocation was certainly violating 
the most favored nation principle.  
The second was quota issue.  In terms of quota, the complaining parties charged that 
the EU had allocated the banana import quotas in a way that was inconsistent with Article 
XIII of the GATT.  The ACP countries and countries that signed the BFA were granted 
specific quota, while other countries had no such quotas but had to compete for other quota of 
imports.  The allocation method gave the BFA countries exclusive right to fill any shortfall in 
supplies under the BFA quotas.522Both tariff and quota were significant complaint about by 
                                                          
520“Dollar bananas” or dollar zones are principally banana that produced in Latin America and marketed by 
Chiquita, Del Monte, and Dole which are U.S.-based multinational corporations. Latin American bananas are 
much cheaper than those of the ACP countries. See Grant, W., (1997), ‘The Common Agricultural Policy’, 
The European Union Series, St. Martin’s Press - New York/USA, pp. 135. 
 
521Ibid, On December, 1994, Colombia and Costa Rica implemented the Framework Agreement. 
 
522The EU subjected them to a per ton duty adjusted each year. In 1995, it was ECU 722, fully ECU 100 fewer 
than the ECU 822, the EU charged to out-of-quota shipments of bananas from third countries. In 1996-1997, 
the EU charged a tariff of ECU 693 per ton on over-quota amounts of bananas from non-traditional ACP 
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complainant parties in Banana dispute, in addition, the licensing system gave expression to be 
the most severe condemnation by the panel.  The licensing system is complex and it tends to 
lack of transparency which was tendentiously create discrimination.  In the complaint to 
Panel, the complainant parties includes the U.S. claimed that the import licensing system 
violated Article X of GATT, which required that countries administer trade measure, 
including licenses, in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner.  Moreover, the EU’s 
licensing system contravened the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.   
Other charge was the licensing system arrangement violated the TRIMS agreement, 
which contains a list of trade-related investment measures such as purchasing requirements.  
The requirement was violating National Treatment principle, since it requires that in order to 
apply ‘B’ license in import licensing all the importers or firms have to purchase bananas from 
the ACP.  Furtherance in relations with GATS, the Panel found that the EU regime also 
violated the non-discrimination and national treatment provisions of the GATS.523 
2.1.2. Appellate Body Findings 
In 1997, the EU then appealed the Panel decision and rulings, both are about findings 
and legal interpretation of panel. Appellate Body pointed out that if a member could choose a 
different legal basis for imposing import restrictions, it should avoid the application of non-
discrimination rules to ‘like’ products, then the object and purpose of those rules would be 
defeated.  In this case, Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s holding that the chapeau to Article 
XIII:2 requires a Member restricting imports to aim at a distribution of trade that would exist 
in the absence of the restriction itself.  It conceded that Article XIII:2 (d) sets forth specific 
rules for the allocation of shares in a tariff-rate quota among Members with ‘a substantial’ 
interest in supplying the product concerned, but is not explicit about allocation to Members 
not having a  substantial interest.524 However, similar to Panel, the Appellate Body stepped to 
the issue that the allocation of quota to members was lacking a substantial interest also must 
be subject to the basic principle of non-discrimination. Consequently, it is impermissible to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
suppliers. This tariff was clearly more preferential than the ECU 793 per ton rate applicable to out-of-quota 
shipments from third countries that took effect on 1 July 1996. The margin of preference, of course, reflected 
the distinction between ACP and non-ACP countries. Here, then, we see one more part of the pattern: 
discrimination in favor of ACP countries vis-a-vis non-ACP countries. See EC- Bananas III, WT/DS/27, 
25 September 1997. 
 
523Report of the Panel, EEC-Members States' Import Regimes for Bananas (DS32/R), 3 June 1993. 
 
524Report of Appellate Body, European Communities – Regimes for Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, 9 September 1997. 
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allocate tariff-rate quota shares to some Members who is not having a substantial interest, but 
not to other Members who also have lack this interest.  Hence, violating the non-
discrimination rule of Article XIII:1 to the importation cannot be restricted from one Member 
unless they are similarly restricted from all Members.525 
In respond to Panel and Appellate Body’s report, the EU modified its policy. The new 
banana was incorporated in Regulations 1637/ of 98 and 2362/98.526 Then in December 1998, 
the EU responded to the Panel’s ruling by making changes in the import regime for banana. 
The EU therefore requested a Panel, under Article 21 (5) of the DSU, with the mandate to find 
that the new banana regime of the EU ‘must be presumed to conform to WTO rules unless 
their conformity has been duly challenged under the appropriate DSU procedures’. However, 
the U.S. had declared that the changes were not sufficient; it was considered as a unilateral 
declaration with no WTO significance.527 
Furtherance, on 14 January 1999, the U.S. announced its intention to suspend 
concessions to the extent of its loss of banana trade.  The U.S. requested of the DSB approval 
of suspension to the extent of US$ 520 million. The EU protested at the amount of suspension 
concession, EU argued that the U.S. was not a banana exporter and therefore its rights were 
not nullified or impaired.  Then the EU requested for Arbitration to use the provisions of 
Article 22 (6) of DSU. 
2.1.3. Arbitration Findings 
The DSB reconvened the original Panel for arbitration on the issue of the value of 
concession that the U.S. could withdraw to compensate the loss of trade.  Originally the U.S. 
claimed to suspend concession up to US$ 520 million.  However, the Arbitrator should 
emphasize that the suspension should be appropriate and have regard to the equivalence528of 
                                                          
525Ibid. 
 
526Regulation 1637/98 continues the tariff quota of 2.2 million t bound in the EU’s schedule and an additional 
‘autonomous’ tariff quota of 353,000 t.  The total MFN quota was thus 2.553 million. See Josling, Supra 
Note 519. 
 
527The U.S. argued that the new formulation of the quotas in Regulation 1637/98 did not convince the U.S., who 
argued that the split in the tariff quota between then non-country-specific ACP quota and the allocated MFN 
quota still contravened Article XIII.22.  The reference quantities according to new license procedure were 
established under the old regulation.  Hence, the new regulation still considers discriminatory action 
inconsistent with WTO rules. See Report of Appellate Body, European Communities – Regimes for 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, 9 September 1997. 
 
528Panelist explained  according to The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historic Principles (1993), 
page 843, the ordinary meaning of the word “equivalence” is “equal in value, significance or meaning”, 
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the impairment suffered. The Arbitrator made calculation regarding the level of nullification 
and impairment by establishing the WTO-consistent counterfactual and to compare actual 
trade with this hypothetical situation. After some interchange with the parties to the conflict, 
the panel finally chose as a counterfactual a situation where the EU established a global quota 
of 2, 553 million.  
However, the Arbitrator decided the level of nullification or impairment that occurred in 
this term529.Thus, to estimate the level of nullification or impairment, the Arbitrator has used 
the same basis needs to be used by the original panel for measuring the level of suspension or 
concessions.530Basically in its initial submission, the U.S. proposed the level of suspension of 
concession based on counterfactual assumption that the EU would maintain a quota of 
857,700 tons for traditional ACP imports and would expand the tariff quota for third country 
and non-traditional ACP imports to 3.7 million tons, which the U.S. argues would be required 
in order to make the 857,700 tons quota WTO-consistent.  The U.S. also submitted four 
counterfactuals, including one based on no increase in the overall tariff quota.  However, the 
EU calculated differently regarding some of the specific assumptions used in the U.S. base 
counterfactual.  The EU argued that there were many possibilities of WTO-consistent 
counterfactuals under which there would be varying effects on the U.S. suppliers.   
The Arbitrator calculated the effect on relevant imports of the revised EU banana 
regime, compared with the reasonable counterfactual that a global tariff quota equal to 2.553 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
“having the same effect”, “having the same relative position or function”, “correspondingto”, “something 
equal in value or worth”, also “something tantamount or virtually identical”.  Obviously, this meaning 
connotes a correspondence, identity or balance between two related levels, i.e. between the level of the 
concessions to be suspended, on the other hand, and the level of the nullification or impairment to the other. 
See Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB, 
9 April 1999. 
 
529The Arbitration agreed to give authorization to suspend concessions or other obligation as a temporary 
measure pending full implementation by the U.S.  The Arbitration also agreed with the U.S. that this 
temporary nature indicates that it is the purpose of countermeasures to induce compliance.  But the purpose 
does not mean that the DSB should grant authorization to suspend concession beyond what is equivalent to 
the level of nullification or impairment, since there is nothing in Article 22 (1) of the DSU, let alone in 
paragraphs 4 and 7 of the article, that could be read as a justification for counter-measures of punitive nature. 
See WT/DS27/ARB, 9 April 1999, Supra Note 528. 
530The Arbitrator made estimation the level of nullification or impairment at the same basis needs to be used for 
measuring the level of suspension of concessions.  The level is the gross value of U.S. imports from the EU. 
The comparable basis for estimating nullification and impairment according to Arbitrator is the impact on the 
value of relevant EU imports from the U.S. (rather than U.S. firm’s costs and profits as used in the U.S. 
submission).  More specifically, the Arbitrator compares the value of relevant EU imports from the US under 
the present banana imports regime as actual situation with their value under a WTO-consistent regime as a 
counterfactual situation.SeeWT/DS27/ARB, 9 April 1999, Supra Note 528. 
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million tons (subject to a 75 Euro per ton tariff) and unlimited access for ACP bananas at a 
zero tariff (with the ACP tariff preference being covered as now by a waiver).  Because the 
current quota on tariff-free imports of traditional ACP bananas is in practice non-restraining, 
this counterfactual regime, thus, would have a similar impact on prices and quantities as the 
current EU regime. By using the particular methodology and counterfactual calculation, the 
task is to work on the differences between two scenarios in (a) the U.S. share of wholesale 
trade services in bananas sold in the EU and (b) the U.S. share of allocated banana import 
licences from which quota rents accrued.  Then by using the various data provided on the U.S. 
market shares, and the estimation of quota allocation that it would be under the WTO-
consistent counterfactual chosen by Arbitrator, it determined that the level of nullification and 
impairments is US$ 191.4 million per year.531 
 
2.2. The Suspension of Tariff  Concession up to US$ 191,4 Million to EU Members 
On 19 April 1999, the USTR had determined the suspension of tariff concession up to 
100% tariff ad valorem, based on the decision of Arbitration on 9 April 1999. Prior to it, the 
USTR has already announced the preparations for exercising its right to request authorization 
to suspend tariff concessions on European product since October 1998, if the EU failed to 
implement the DSB’s recommendations and rulings concerning the banana regime. The 
USTR then announced the list of product items subject to 100% tariff and it also sought 
public comment on a preliminary list.  On December 1998, the USTR announced a revised list 
of European products for which the U.S. intended to request authorization from the DSB to 
suspend tariff concession.  Furtherance, on 19 April 1999, USTR announced several product 
items from Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden or the United Kingdom are subject to 
100% tariff ad valorem.  The suspension on tariff concession was implemented in order to 
rebalance the nullification and impairment cost due to EU Banana regime up to US$ 191, 4 
million per year. 
Below the product item subject to 100% tariff ad valorem532 
 
Bath preparations, other than bath salt 
Handbags, whether or not with shoulder strap, including those without handle, with 
                                                          
531Ibid 
 
532Federal Register, Vol. 64, No. 74, Monday, April 19, 1999, Notices. 
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outer surface of sheeting of plastic 
Pecorino cheese, sweet biscuits, waffles and wafers 
Articles of a kind normally carried in the pocket or in the handbag, with outer surface 
of sheeting of plastic, of reinforced or laminated plastics 
Uncoated felt paper and paperboard in rolls or sheets 
Folding cartons, boxes and cases, of non-corrugated paper or paperboard 
Lithographs on paper or paperboard, not over 0.51 mm in thickness, printed not over 
20 years at time of importation 
 Bed linen, other than knit or crocheted, printed, of cotton, other than containing any 
embroidery, lace, braid, edging, trimming, piping or applique work, not napped 
Lead-acid storage batteries, other than of a kind used for starting piston engines or as 
the primary source of electrical power for electrical powered vehicles  
Electrothermic coffee or tea makers, of a kind used for domestic purposes 
 
2.3. The Impact of 100% Tariff Ad Valorem to Two EU Private Economic Actors. 
 The product items listed in the table above was mostly snapping some of non-banana 
related companies, because the tariff was imposed on their products.  The U.S. government 
has drawn up a list of predominantly French and British produced items, since French and the 
U.K. are the main EU banana producers. However, other companies from countries such as 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and 
Sweden were also subject to the retaliation, except Netherland and Denmark were exempted 
from retaliation because those countries did not support EU Banana rulings. The total value of 
the exports affected over all is estimated at around £500 million, or 700 million euros. 
Although the impact of punitive tariff affected to both the U.S. exporters and the EU 
importers and producers, but the most immediate impact occurred in Europe, where long 
established but small industries were facing devastation.533 
 The following sub section describes examples of the impact of 100% tariff imposed by 
the U.S. government to some private economic actors in the EU territory, such as cashmere 
wool producer and importer in the U.K., pecorino cheese producer, and batteries producers.  
Amongst these private economic actors, FIAMM Company (producer of batteries) brought 
the trade impact of the U.S. retaliation before General Court and appealed before the 
European Court of Justice.  From the court judgment, it is necessary to analysis the legal 
implication of WTO retaliation to FIAMM Company. 
 
 
                                                          
533 James, Steve, Banana War Threatens Jobs and Heralds Wider Trade Conflicts, 20 January 1999, available at 
: (http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/jan1999/ban-j20.shtml) 
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2.3.1.  Cashmere Wool 
Right after the USTR announced to impose a 100% tariff ad valorem rate of duty on the 
cashmere wool produced in the UK, the Scottish cashmere producer estimated to lose 
approximately £ 1.25 million from export to the U.S.  The cashmere wool industry which is 
50% centered in the Scotland borders area was also facing to lose almost £20 million in sales 
for twenty Scottish companies, as part of an estimated £ 82 million in lost trade from the U.K. 
itself.  The impact of high tariff to cashmere wool industry was more tangible and unnerving 
at small companies in the border region between Scotland and England.  Before retaliatory 
action was implemented, the cashmere producers usually pay normal tariff of 6, 5%, but with 
a 100% tariff, the companies will have to pay the difference themselves.534 
2.3.2.  Pecorino Cheese 
One of the items in the list is pecorino cheese, a cheese produced in Italy. Imports of 
Pecorino cheese from Italy account about 20-40% of total the U.S. imports in the U.S. market.  
When the U.S. imposed 100% ad valorem tariff, the Pecorino cheese company estimated 
losses at 1.72 times than of U.S. consumer. The calculation of loss for Pecorino cheese was 
US$ 4.96 million in consumer surplus loss per year as a result of the U.S. retaliatory policy.  
The U.S. collected US$1.86 million in tariff revenue and US$3.10 million was the dead 
weight loss. Thus, Pecorino producers lost US$8.55 million in revenue from the decline in 
exports to the U.S.535 
Nevertheless the trade impact of the U.S. retaliation to some EU companies considers as 
small trade impact. The U.S. reduces import from EU by US$ 116.8 million according to 
retaliation lists of products. The estimation on economic effect of the U.S. retaliation is 
divided in to four categories. First, the retaliation reduces export percentage for EU only -
0.105096%.  Second, it reduces GDP nominal up to -0.003803%. Third, for the GDP real, it 
reduces up to -0.000143%.  Fourth, total welfare in regard with the U.S. suspension of tariff 
concession is up to only -0.000671.536  To this end, the EU has seen that the level of trade 
restrictions and amount of trade impairment to those economic actors are small.  The EU 
                                                          
534 Andres, Edmund L., Bewildered Europeans Deplore 100% U.S. Tariff, the New York Times, March 5, 1999. 
 
535Heboyan,Vahe,Ames, Glenn C.W., and Epperson, James E., (2002), ‘U.S.-EU Banana War: Implications of 
Retaliatory Tariff on Pecorino Cheese’, Journal of Euromarketing, Volume 11, Issue 3, pp.53-69. 
 
536Breuss, Fritz, (2004), ‘WTO Dispute Settlement: An Economic Analysis of Four EU-US Mini Trade Wars’, 
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade No. 4, pp. 296. 
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therefore keeps maintaining the banana regime, despite the trade impact from the U.S. 
retaliation for several EU companies until 2001.537 
In 2000, some companies who are affected by the U.S. retaliatory tariff, submitted 
political communication to the EU Commission in order to request EU to comply with the 
DSB Decision, and request Commission to negotiate with the U.S. government to lift 
sanctions against the EU. After numerous contacts with these companies, including banana 
producers and operators, the Commission therefore submitted a proposal to the Council to 
resolve the long lasting banana dispute.  In 2001, the Council initiated to modify EU Banana 
regime by issuing Council Regulation (EC) No. 216/01 of 29/1/2001.  The regulation to 
modify EU banana regime is divided into two phases.  Phase I: A modified banana regime 
based on historical allocation of licenses entered into force on 1 July 2001 with the adoption 
of the Commission Regulation no 896/01. Phase II: from 1 January 2002, 100.000 tons are 
transferred from C quota to the B quota (to all suppliers), and the remaining 750.000 tons of 
the C quota are reserved for the ACP bananas.  
In April 2001, the U.S. Government and the European Commission reached an 
agreement to resolve their banana dispute, since the EU promulgates the new banana regime 
which will provide a transition to a tariff-only system by 2006. During the transition, bananas 
will be imported into the EU through import licenses distributed on the basis of past trade.  
Accordingly in July 2001, the U.S. government suspended the retaliatory tariff imposed 
against EU imports since 1999. 
 Although the U.S. has lifted the retaliatory tariff in 2001, but retaliatory tariff imposed 
from 19 April 1999 until 30 June 2001 is borne negative impact to several companies in the 
EU.538 For this impact, some companies such as FIAMM Company and Fedon Company seek 
recourse to the European Courts for their rights of compensation.  
 
 
                                                          
537Ibid, pp. 296-97.  Breuss argued the reason for the EU to give in all to the retaliation without considering trade 
impact of retaliation, because first, the EU wanted to be fair partner with especial interest.  Second, the EU 
eager to sustain the credibility of the binding nature of the dispute settlement system, if it is not, other WTO 
members could have argued that the EU itself disregarded the WTO adjudication body decisions. 
 
538See Case T-320/00 Cartondruck v. Council and Commission (2005) ECR II-00027, Case T-383/00 Beamglow 
Ltd v European Parliament and Others (Spain, intervening) (2005) ECR II-05459, Case T-135/01 Fedon&Figli 
and Others v Council and Commission (2005) ECR II-00029, Case T-151/00, Laboratoire du Bain v Council 
and Commission  (2005) ECR, II-23, and Case T-301/00, GroupeFremaux SA v Council and 
Commission (2005) ECR, II-25. 
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2.4. The Implication of WTO Retaliation to Private Economic Actors in the EU 
Besides FIAMM and Fedon Company, there were five cases regarding the implication of 
WTO retaliation to private economic actors in EU. These cases were dismissed by the GC 
because the requirement of non-contractual liability base on Article 340 TFEU did not meet in 
these cases.539 For example, the GC dismissed the complaint claimed by Beamglow Company 
because the damage is not considered as unusual damage. 
 
2.4.1. Beamglow Ltd Case 
The increased customs duties was affecting Beamglow Ltd., a company established in 
the UK, who produces folding boxes which fell within the category of “folding cartons, boxes 
and cases of non-corrugated paper or paperboard” in the list issued by USTR. The company 
claimed that the EU Institutions have to pay compensation in the sum of GBP 1,299,632, 
because the damage suffered by the company is due to failures at every stage in the process 
for changing the EU regime governing the import of bananas and, consequently, to the part 
played by all the EU Institutions involved, including the EU Parliament.540 The reason for 
Beamglow to file suit against EU Parliament before the GC is because this institution was 
consulted before the adoption of Regulations 404/93 and 1637/98 which were declared 
incompatible with the WTO Agreements.  The EU Parliament possessed, but failed to 
exercise, the right to submit any appropriate proposal on matters which it considered to 
require an EU Act.  Various opinions, resolutions and interventions of the EU Parliament 
eventually stressed the need to prevent the disastrous effects of the WTO rules for the 
producer regions of the EU. Accordingly, the EU Parliament is liable to pay compensation 
subject to non-contractual liability regime pursuant to Article 288 TEC (340 TFEU).541 
However, the EU Parliament contested the claim because the company does not in any 
way establish how the Parliament could have rendered the EU Institutions liability. In any 
event, the Parliament cannot be considered responsible for the alleged damage given its lack 
of competence to decide the terms of the EU Agricultural legislation at issue or to adopt 
measures capable of causing, preventing or mitigating the alleged damage.  The resolutions 
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adopted by the Parliament were merely a reflection of the exercise of its general power of 
debate.542 
In this case, the GC held that the company seeking compensation is justified in 
bringing their action against the EU, as represented by the Commission and the Council, 
according to Article 37 TEC (Article 43 TFEU). The EU Agricultural Legislation whose 
unlawfulness is claimed to be at the origin of the damage alleged. But the above provision 
does not confer any decision-making power on the Parliament and allows it to act only as a 
consultative organ in the course of the procedure for the adoption by the Council alone of the 
regulations, directive and decisions relating to the common agricultural policy. The opinion 
which the Parliament gave on that basis concerning the proposal submitted to it that led to 
Regulation 1637/98 was not therefore in any way binding. 
The company then claimed on the basis of the infringement of the protection of the 
legitimate expectations, legal certainty and proportionality, and on the infringement of its 
right to property and its right freely to pursue its economic activity, all rest on the premise that 
the conduct of which the EU Institutions are accused is contrary to WTO rules.543 However, 
the GC dismissed this complaint because the EU Courts only review the legality of the 
conduct of EU Institutions. It follows that the conduct of EU Institutions cannot be regarded 
as unlawful and there is no need to consider the company arguments relating to the legal 
nature of the provisions and principles claimed to be infringed and to the alleged gravity of 
their infringement. Moreover, the Company has established neither the nature nor the basis of 
the measures which it accuses the EU Institutions of not having adopted for its protection. 
And the omission by the EU Institutions can give rise to liability on the part of the EU only 
where the institutions have infringed a legal obligation to act under a provision of the EU 
Law. 
Finally in relation to the requirement of non-contractual liability base on Article 340 
TFEU, the GC then held that when damage is caused by the conduct of EU Institutions not 
shown to be unlawful, the EU can incur non-contractual  liability if  the conditions as to 
sustaining actual damage is fulfilled. In this case, the company has not established that it was 
impossible to mitigate its losses by putting up its prices or redirecting its export policy and 
that it has provided no explanation concerning the measures that it could have taken to limit 
the damage. The EU Institutions implicitly conceded that the company must, at the very least, 
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have necessarily suffered commercial damage by reason of the incontestable rise in the price 
of its product caused, on the US marker, by the sudden increase of the US ad valorem import 
duty to 100 per cent. It thus, the requirement of existence a sustain actual and certain damage 
is satisfied. Moreover, the GC also examined whether there is causal link between the damage 
suffered and the conduct of the EU Institutions. For this requirement, the GC held that it is 
true that the conduct of the EU Institutions necessarily led to the adoption of the retaliatory 
measure by the U.S. Authorities in compliance with the procedures established by the DSU 
and accepted by the EU, so that their conduct must be regarded as the immediate cause of the 
damage suffered by the company following imposition of the U.S. increased customs duty. It 
must therefore be accepted that the requisite direct causal link exists between the conduct on 
the EU Institutions and the damage suffered by the Beamglow Company.  However, the GC 
held that the requirement for the unusual and special nature of the damage is not fulfilled, 
since the suspension of concession of tariff provided by the WTO Agreements is among the 
vicissitudes inherent in the current system of international trade.  Accordingly the risk of this 
vicissitude has to be borne by every operator who decides to sell their products on the market 
of one of the WTO Members. It thus the risks to which the marketing by the company of its 
folding paperboard boxes on the U.S. market could be exposed are not to be regarded as 
beyond the normal hazards of the international trade as currently organized.  It concludes that 
the damage suffered by the company cannot be classified as unusual.544 
The Beamglow case is one of the examples that GC abandon the claim regarding 
infringement of individual right that occurred as well in FIAMM case. The FIAMM case will 
be discussed in the next sub section below. 
 
2.4.2. FIAMM’s Claim before the General Court 
 FIAMM case is a notorious case regarding the legal consequences of WTO retaliation 
to FIAMM Company due to suspension tariff resorted by the U.S. government. This company 
should pay statutory rate from the time of actual payment to the U.S. customs authorities of 
the 96.5% duty increase in exporting lead-acid storage batteries545.  Due to the increase of 
duty payment, FIAMM lost its benefits up to EUR12 .139. 521.546They believed that the EU 
is liable for the damage suffered by them as a result of their products being among those 
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subject to the increase of customs duty imposed by the U.S. authorities between 19 April 1999 
and 30 June 2001.  FIAMM Company sued the Council and the Commission before the GC in 
actions for compensation, based on Article 235 EC Treaty (Article 268 TFEU) in conjunction 
with the second paragraph of Article 288 EC Treaty (Art. 340 TFEU).547 
The main claims are:548 
1) Court should order the defendants (The Council and The Commission) to pay damages 
amounting to EUR10, 760,798.35 or such other sum as the Court considers reasonable, 
subject to updating in the course of the proceedings, together with interest at the Italian 
statutory rate, until final settlement, and default interest at the rate of 8% in the event of 
delay, after delivery of judgment. 
2) The total loss of FIAMM Company solely by reason of payment of the increased customs 
duty is EUR 12, 139, 521. 
 
In order to prove that the EU Institutions are liable for the damage suffered by the 
company, FIAMM (the applicant) complain that the damage caused to them is because the EU 
Institutions failure to adopt, within the period laid down by the DSB, provisions appropriately 
amending Regulations 404/93, in breach of the obligations entered into by the EU under the 
WTO Agreements. The applicants state that it is a matter purely terminology whether the EU 
infringed WTO rules deliberately, through the adoption of the EU provisions, or by omission, 
because of the failure to bring those provisions into conformity with the WTO Agreements.549 
Accordingly, the applicant’s claims for compensation based on non-contractual liability of EU 
for the unlawful conduct of EU Institutions. The applicant also seek the application by 
analogy of the rules governing non-contractual liability that are applicable to the Member 
States where the ECJ finds under Article 226 TEC (Article 258 TFEU) that they have 
infringed their EU obligations.  The applicant also relies on the rules governing the non-
contractual liability that the EU may incur even in the absence of unlawful conduct of its 
institutions.550To this end, the applicant concerns on three basis claims pursuant to principle 
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of non-contractual liability. First, liability of the EU for unlawful conduct of its institutions, 
second, the legal nature of the rules of law allegedly infringed by the EU Institutions and 
third, the seriousness of the alleged breaches. 
 
1) Liability of the EU for unlawful conduct of its institutions 
 In this context, the applicant complains that the increased duty imposed by the U.S. 
Government, which is causing them serious damage, is the direct consequence of the 
unwilling of the EU Institution to bring the EU regime governing the import bananas into 
conformity with the WTO Agreements.551  In addition, the EU also considered violating the 
certain fundamental principle of EU law, including the principle pactasuntservanda, because 
the EU has failed to fulfill its obligations as a WTO member, in regard being had to the 
binding nature of the WTO agreements and the DSU.  
 The defendants have also infringed the principles of the protection of legitimate 
expectations and legal certainty which must be inherently enjoyed by every citizen.  The 
applicant claims that they had a legitimate expectation that the tariff concessions negotiated 
with the U.S. in the form of the original import duty at the rate of 3.5 per cent would continue 
to apply, but that those concessions would not be altered because of the EU Institutions 
conducted unlawful measures.  However, the EU did not bring its legislation into line with 
WTO rules even though it had assured its trading partners of its intention to comply with the 
ruling and recommendation of DSB, and it had obtained an exceptional extension of the 
period granted for the purpose. It is thus deemed as the infringement of the principle of proper 
administration. The EU Institutions also infringed the right to property and right to pursuit of 
an economic activity, which is protected by the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), because the applicants were compelled 
to pay prohibitive customs duty on their imports of batteries in to the U.S. and to relocate their 
product facilities.552 
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2) the legal nature of the rules of law allegedly infringed by the EU Institutions 
 The principle legitimate expectation, legal certainty and proper administrations 
infringed by the defendants are superior in rank and they are designed to protect individuals. 
The Council and The Commission therefore allegedly infringed the legal nature of the rules of 
law.  Regarding this principle, the applicants considered that they have right to maintain 
export to the US at the reduce import duty of 3, 5%.553 
 
3) the seriousness of the alleged breaches 
 The applicant contends that the breaches committed by the defendants are sufficiently 
serious to be able to give rise to non-contractual EU liability.  The degree of clarity and 
precision of the infringed rules of law should be noted, as should the lack of discretion 
allowed to the EU Institutions for bringing the incompatible EU legislation into conformity 
with the WTO Agreements, especially DSB Decision and Rulings. Besides, the EU 
Institutions has persisted in its breach of the WTO Law and, therefore, EU Law, even after 
expiry of the 15-month period which it was granted by the WTO Arbitrator to comply with 
the WTO Rules.554 
 
On the contrary, the defendants counter claims are:555 
1) The WTO Agreements create rights only in favor of the contracting parties, to the 
exclusion of individuals.  The same true of DSB decisions, which merely interpret WTO 
rules.  It designed to regulate and manage international trade relation between subjects of 
international law only.  Tariff concessions agreed to by WTO members allow access to a 
national market without guaranty such access or a specified price level on that market, or 
directly conferring on businesses the right to a given tariff treatment or a right enforceable 
against EU institutions. 
2) The EU somehow is tolerating the suspensions of the U.S. concessions temporarily, during 
the period needed for finding a solution to the banana dispute.556 
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3) The WTO Agreements cannot be relied upon by the applicants, nor can it be pleaded that 
the principle pactasuntservanda has been infringed or that a legitimate expectation that 
those agreements would be complied with has been thwarted. 
4) The defendants contend that they did not exceed the limits of their discretion in particular 
because the situations to be resolved were complex and application and interpretation of 
the provision at issues were difficult. The Regulations No 1637/98 and No 2362/98 is 
procedures that initiated by the U.S. government, it cannot be complained since it 
established an EU import regime different from the original regime.557 
5) The defendants also argued that the suspension of concession according to Article 22 of the 
DSU constitutes the best solution after full implementation of the DSB’s 
recommendations.  And based on Article 3 (7) of the DSU, the selection of a mutually 
agreed solution has the effect of conferring a wide discretion on the competent authorities 
of WTO members enabling them to break free, even if only temporarily, from their 
obligations arising from the WTO Agreements.558 
6) In the context of causal link related to damage, the defendants deny that there is any causal 
link between the damage alleged and their conduct.  The increased customs duty is not 
consequence of their action but a unilateral act of the U.S. Government, which resulted in 
the delimitation of the circle of EU business that affected.  The U.S. authorities could have 
chosen products other than batteries and they also exempted from their increased customs 
duty products originating in certain Member States of the EU.  The level of tariff increase 
was likewise set by the U.S. Government acting with entire freedom.559 
  
2.4.3. The General Court Findings 
After reviewing the claim and counterclaims submitted by the parties, the GC came to 
the conclusion on their findings. 
1) The preliminary question as to whether the WTO rules may be relied upon 
 The Court decides that the principle pactasuntservanda cannot be asserted against the 
defendants in this case.  The WTO Agreements are not in principle, given their nature and 
structure, among the rules in the light of which the EU Courts review the legality by the EU 
Institutions. It is because first, the WTO Agreements is founded on reciprocal and mutually 
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advantageous arrangements which distinguish it from those agreements concluded between 
the EU and non-Member States that introduce a certain asymmetry of obligations. Other 
WTO counterparts also do not include the WTO Agreements among the rules by reference to 
which their courts review the legality of their rules of domestic law. Hence, if the Court 
reviews the legality of actions of the EU Institutions in the light of WTO Agreements, it could 
lead to an unequal application of the WTO rules which are depriving the legislative and 
executive organs of the EU. And second, the Article 22 of the DSU urges the disputant party 
to enter into negotiated arrangements in order to arrive at mutually acceptable compensation. 
The Court thus refrain from applying rules of internal law which are incompatible with the 
WTO Agreements that would have the consequence of depriving the function of legislative or 
executive organ to conduct negotiation in terms of WTO dispute.560 
2) Liability of the EU for unlawful conduct of its institutions 
 The complaints based on breach of the principles of the protection of legitimate 
expectations and of legal certainty, on infringement of the right to property and to pursuit of 
an economic activity and, on failure to observe the principle of proper administration all rest 
on the premise that the conduct of which the defendants institutions are accused is contrary to 
WTO rules. Those rules are not among the rules by reference to which the EU Courts review 
the legality of the EU Institutions conduct; these complaints therefore are rejected.  Since it 
has not been proved that the conduct of which the defendant institutions are accused was 
unlawful, one of the three cumulative conditions of non-contractual liability of the EU for 
unlawful conduct is not met. 
3) Liability of the EU in the absence of unlawful conduct of its institutions 
 The Court then led to the examination of non-contractual liability of the EU in the 
absence of unlawfulness.  It requires the actual damage that has been suffered, a causal link 
exists between the damage and the conduct of EU Institutions, and the damage is unusual and 
special in nature. 
3.1.) the existence of actual and certain damage 
 The applicants submit that the damage to them is comprised by, first, the 96.5 per cent 
increase in the import duty levied by the U.S. Authorities on the imports of batteries into the 
U.S. market, and second, the costs incurred in respect of the setting up and the relocation of 
production units those products which they were compelled undertake in response to that 
trade retaliation measure.  To this must be added losses of turnover resulting from 
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reconversion of the production units in question.  The applicants also stated that by expediting 
the establishment of a battery production unit in the U.S. and by converting a site in another 
non-Member State into a factory for the manufactures of batteries, they had been able to 
reduce to a minimum the adverse impact of the increased customs duty and to save their share 
of the U.S. market.  The applicants therefore did not lose sale volumes, but suffered only 
pecuniary loss.561 
 On the other hand, the defendants counter by stating that the sales contracts between 
the applicants and their U.S. customers provide for variation of the price of their products.  
The applicant also was responsible for the financial advantages allegedly resulting from the 
increased customs duty, which it actually added in the distribution agreement, under which 
the prices agreed with the purchaser based on the free on board clause.  It places the risk of 
variation of the customs duty on imports exclusively with purchaser.  The Applicants is able 
to export their batteries to other countries, in order to avoid loss of profit.562 
 The court in this matter decided that, first is that the applicants have suffered 
economic loss that is not the result of their own decisions which do not deny by the 
defendants.  Second is that in particular, the defendants accept that the distribution contract 
concluded by the applicants has effect of placing the risk of variation of the customs duty on 
imports exclusively with the purchaser. It means they cannot deny that the applicants must 
have necessarily suffered commercial damage by reason of the incontestable rise in the price 
of their products caused on the U.S. market, by the sudden increase of the U.S. ad valorem 
import duty of 100 per cent. To that extent, the Courts find that the condition requiring the 
applicants to have sustained actual and certain damage is satisfied.563 
3.2) the causal link between the damage suffered and the conduct of the institutions 
 The applicant emphasized that the damage suffered because the EU Institution was 
unwilling to bring the incompatible EU legislation into conformity with the WTO 
Agreements, meanwhile the U.S. Authorities will not concern about which EU business might 
be affected, since they have right to designate the sectors in question or to react with the other 
options provided for or allowed by the WTO Rules.564 
 On the contrary, the defendants deny that there is any causal link between the damage 
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alleged and their conduct, because the increased duty is not consequence from their action, 
but the unilateral act of the U.S. which resulted the delimitation of the circle of EU business 
affected. The EU Institutions cannot therefore be responsible for the imposition of a 
disproportionate burden on the business concerned. The relationships between the regulations 
on banana regime with the applicant’s decision to pat the increased customs duty do not exist. 
There is not obligation derive from the EU measure to export to the U.S. or to continue to 
export in the new circumstances.565 
 The Court finds that if there were not for the existence of the EU regime governing the 
import of bananas which according to the finding of the DSB is incompatible with the WTO 
Rules, the U.S. would not have been able to seek or obtain the DSB authorization to suspend 
its tariff concession on products originating in the EU. The unilateral decision by the U.S to 
impose customs duty on imports of batteries is not therefore such as to break the causal link 
that exists between the damage which the imposition of that increased duty caused to the 
applicants, and the defendant’s retention of the banana import regime at issue. The conduct of 
the defendant institutions led to the adoption of the retaliatory measure by the U.S. 
Authorities is regarded as the immediate cause of the damage suffered by the applicants. It 
must therefore be accepted that the direct causal link exist between the conduct of the 
defendants and the damage.566 
3.3) the unusual and special nature of the damage suffered 
 Similar to Beamglow case, the court is contrary to the argument with of the applicant.  
According to the court, the applicant is wrong in contending the possibility of retaliatory 
measures being implemented by a non-Member States is considered to be an unusual risk, 
since the tariff concession that is suspended as provided for by the WTO Agreements is 
among the vicissitudes inherent in the current system of the international trade. It follows that 
the risks to which the marketing by the applicants of their batteries on the U.S. market could 
not be considered as beyond the normal hazards of the international trade as currently 
organized, because the damage did not exceed the limits of the economic risks inherent in 
operating in the sector concerned and, it does not affect a particular circle of economic 
operators in a disproportionate manner by comparison with other operators.567 
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2.4.4. FIAMM’s Claim before the European Court of Justice. 
Notwithstanding the FIAMM claim is dismissed by the GC, this company appealed 
before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) along with Fedon (company produces spectacle 
case).568 In principle there are two pleas submitted by FIAMM and Fedon (the applicants), 
firstly, they submit that the GC judgments lack reasoning and are unfounded so far as 
concerns one of the main arguments regarding direct effect of DSB Decision which is 
underlying their respective applications for damages by reason of unlawful conduct of EU 
Institutions.  Secondly, the applicants submit that the damage incurred by them was unusual 
in nature, however, the GC reject their claim for compensation founded on a liability regime 
applicable in the absence of unlawful conduct of EU Institutions.  The GC gave reasons that 
were insufficiently explained, illogical and at variance with the relevant settled case law.569 
 
2.4.5. The European Court of Justice Findings 
After hearing argumentations from the parties, the ECJ made some points in their 
judgments. 
1)  The direct effect of DSB Decision 
 The ECJ held that the applicants did not assert relating to the possible direct effect of 
DSB decision in the section of those applications intended to establish that an infringement of 
the WTO Agreements by the EU Institutions can be relied upon.  The applicants instead 
seeking to demonstrate that the higher-ranking rules of law which are thus alleged to have 
been infringed, and which includes, in particular, the principle of pactasuntservanda. The 
applicants also argued that WTO agreements are intended to protect individuals, so that there 
would be compliance in regard with one of the condition on liability of the EU for unlawful 
conduct. The applicants simply submitted that, if direct effect and the resulting status of a rule 
protecting individuals were not to be accepted in the case of WTO Agreements, they should 
be as regards decision of the DSB.  The applicants did not state with the clarity and precision 
in their applications to GC that the direct effect may attach to decisions of the DSB in order to 
justify the establishment of failure to comply to them. The exception to the principle is that 
the WTO agreements cannot be relied upon for the purposes of reviewing the legality of 
secondary EU legislation.570  The ECJ also upheld the decision of GC that the expiry of the 
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period time allowed for the EU to bring banana import regime into conformity with DSB’s 
Decision on 25 September 1997 had not resulted in exhaustion of the methods for settling the 
dispute provided in DSU. In this connection, the review of the EU legality measures could 
have the effect of weakening the position of EU negotiators in the search of mutually 
acceptable solution to the banana dispute in WTO.571 
 The ECJ held that referring to the GC analyses, the applicants were wrong in inferring 
from Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU that the WTO Member is obliged to comply within a 
specific period, with the recommendations of DSB.  The ECJ thus held that the applications’ 
assertion about direct effect should be accorded to DSB recommendations and ruling one the 
period of time allowed for their implementation has expired, must be declared unfounded.572 
2)  Non contractual liability of EU Institutions 
The ECJ declared that the interpretation of second paragraph of Article 288 EC Treaty 
(Article 340 TFEU) means the non-contractual liability of the EU and the exercise of the right 
to compensation for damage suffered depend on the satisfaction of a number of conditions, 
relating to the unlawfulness of the conduct of which the institutions are accused.573In the 
context of non-contractual liability, the Court opined that in order to be successful on a claim 
begins as non-contractual liability actions are subject to the requirements set out in the 
Francovich Case574, and further codified in Brasserie du Pêcheurand also Bergaderm.575The 
requirements have been declared by the GC judgment that it should be an unlawful conduct of 
EU institutions, causal link between the damage and the unlawful conduct, and serious breach 
of law relating to the rights of individuals.  According to ECJ, if there is no act or omission by 
an institution of an unlawful in nature, so that the first condition for non-contractual of EU 
liability under the second paragraph of Article 288 EC (Article 340 TFEU) is not satisfied, 
they may dismiss the application in its entirety without being necessary for them to examine 
the other precondition of EU liability, such as the fact of damage and the existence of a causal 
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link between the conduct of the institutions and the damage complained of. The ECJ then 
stated that the strict approach taken towards the liability of the EU in the exercise of its 
legislative activities is attributable to two considerations.  First, the legality of measure is 
subject to judicial review when it may adversely affect individual interest.  Second, in a 
legislative context characterized by the exercise of a wide discretion, which is essential for 
implementing a EU policy, the EU cannot incur liability unless the institutions concerned has 
manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on the exercise of its power.576 
The ECJ then refer to the examination of GC regarding the liability of EU Institution 
based on absence of unlawfulness act. Although the ECJ admitted that in Dorsch Case, there 
were specific conditions under which liability could be incurred even with the absence of 
unlawfulness of conduct of EU Institutions, and the court is allowed to infer that it had 
established the basis and principles of such a regime.577  But EU law does not support liability 
of EU for conduct which fails to comply with the WTO Agreements. It must be concluded 
that, as EU law currently stands, no liability regime exists under which the EU can incur 
liability for conduct falling within the sphere of its legislative competence in a situation where 
any failure of such conduct to comply with the WTO Agreements cannot be relied upon 
before the EU Courts.  
3) The existence of infringement of general principle of law and fundamental right  
In respect to the existence of breach the rule of law relating to protection of the right of 
individual, the Court opined that the right to property and the freedom pursue a trade of 
profession do not constitute absolute rights. The Court has long recognized that they are 
general principles of EU law, while pointing out however that they do not constitute absolute 
prerogative, but must be viewed in relation to their social function.  In the context of a 
common organization of the market, condition that correspond to objectives of general 
interest pursued by the EU do not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, a 
disproportionate and intolerable interference infringed upon the very substance of the rights 
guaranteed. It follows that a EU legislative measure whose application leads to restrictions of 
the right to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or profession that impair the very 
substance of those rights in a disproportionate and intolerable manner, perhaps precisely 
because no provision has been made for compensation calculated to avoid or remedy that 
impairment could give rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the EU.  The Court then 
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adjusted that an economic operator cannot claim a right to property in a market share which 
he held at a given time, since such a market share constitutes only a momentary economic 
position, exposed to the risks of changing circumstances.  The Court also stated that the 
guarantees accorded by the right to property or by general principle safeguarding the freedom 
to pursue a trade or profession cannot be extended to protect mere commercial interest or 
opportunities to the uncertainties of which are part of the very essence of economic activity. 
The Court also gave reason that an economic operator whose business consists particularly  in 
exporting goods to the markets of non- EU member States must therefore be aware that the 
commercial position which he has at a given time may be affected and altered by various 
circumstances include the possibility, which is moreover expressly envisage and governed by 
Article 22 of the DSU, that one of the non- EU member states will adopt measures suspending 
concessions in reaction to the stance taken by its trading partners within the framework of the 
WTO and for this purpose will select in its discretion, as follow from Article 22 (3) (a) and (f) 
of the DSU, the goods to be subject to those measures.578 
The Court has held that EU law as it currently stands does not provide for a regime 
enabling the liability of the EU for its legislative conduct to found an action in a situation 
where any failure of such conduct to comply with the WTO agreements cannot be relied upon 
before the EU courts.  The claim for compensation by the applicants sought in particular to 
put in issue the liability of the EU for such conduct.  The ECJ also declared that is no need to 
examine the plea concerning the unusual nature of damage allegedly suffered by the 
applicants.  In addition, the plea is dismissed because it is lack of certainty of damage and 
lack of a causal link between that damage and the conduct of EU institutions.579 
 
 
3. Legal Analysis of the FIAMM  Case  
3.1. The Lack of Direct Effect of WTO Obligations 
In order to analyze the implications of WTO retaliation to FIAMM and Fedon 
Companies from legal perspective, it is necessary to put hierarchy point in this case. The 
major point is the absence of direct effect of WTO Obligations including DSB Decision, why 
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should put it on the major point? Since this research is relating to the implication of WTO 
retaliations to private economic actors, it should be bold asserted by these private economic 
actors that direct effect of WTO Law is necessary. In both GC and ECJ proceedings, FIAMM 
and Fedon attempted to settle the case law by advocating the direct effect of the DSB decision 
finding that the EU on imports of bananas had breached international trade law.  They 
persuaded the GC that the Nakajima exception was applicable.580  According to those 
applicants the unlawful conduct alsoexistssinceEU Institutions was failure to comply with a 
DSB decision within the reasonable period of time allowed by the DSB. However the concept 
direct effect is not an easy task to comply both from the applicant and the court itself, it 
involves political challenge.  It is because first, the other WTO Member such the U.S. do not 
recognize concept of direct effect. Second, the Court understands that the DSU negotiations 
continue to occupy a prominent position. Third, the DSU itself allows WTO members to 
implement DSB Decisions in several methods. Forth, it is political freedom of EU Institutions 
that they have limitless scope to imply the DSB Decision.581 
The analysis continue to the inconsistency of  applying direct effect in case per se. 
FIAMM and Fedon Company are supposed to be able to rely on Nakajima and Fediol 
Doctrine582 in order to obtain direct effect reassurance, since the ECJ in a particular case 
recognize direct effect of WTO Law. For example, in Dior Case, the ECJ has opened the door 
for individuals to rely directly on any provision of WTO law that falls within the competence 
                                                          
580 For further comparison, See Case C-69/89, Nakajima All Precision Co. v. Council of the European 
Communities, 1991 E.C.R. I-2069.  The ECJ in the Nakajima case refers expressly to precise provision of the 
WTO Agreements, when the ECJ rules that the Anti-Dumping regulation that questioned by Nakajima 
Company was adopted in order to comply with the Anti-Dumping Code of the GATT.  Thus, the ECJ 
interpreted the provision of the Anti-Dumping Code to find out whether the EC regulation was in conformity 
with the GATT.  See also Zonnekeyn, Geert A., (2003), ‘The ECJ’s Petrotub Judgment: Towards a Revival 
of the ‘Nakajima Doctrine’, Legal Issues of Economic Integration Journal, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 256. 
 
581Dani, Marco, (2010), ‘Remedying European Legal Pluralism: The FIAMM and Fedon Litigation and the 
Judicial Protection of International Trade Bystanders’, European Journal of International Law, Issue Vol. 21, 
No. 2, May – 2010, pp. 309.  Marco Dani emphasized that in the matter of limitless scope to imply the DSB 
recommendations by EC Institutions, innocent bystanders such as FIAMM and Fedon will ultimately pay the 
price of their political freedom. See also Ziegler, Katja S., (2011), ‘International Law and EU Law: Between 
Asymmetric Constitutionalism and Fragmentation’, in Research Handbook on the Theory and History of 
International Law, ed. Orakhelashvili, Alexander, Edward Elgar Publishing-Glos/UK, pp. 300.  There are 
some doubts in applying direct effect of substantive obligations under the WTO agreement.  In the frame of 
ECJ judgment in FIAMM case, transferability of the reasons such as reciprocity, flexibility and political 
negotiation, are the main reason of the lack of direct effect.  In this sense, the EU negotiation power could not 
be impaired. 
 
582See Case 70/87, Fédération de l´industrie de l´huilerie de la CEE (Fediol) v Commission of the European 
Communities, 1989 E.C.R. 1781, (1991) 2 CMLR 489. 
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of a Member state when a domestic system allows such direct effect.583 A notable opinion of 
Advocate General Saggio in the Portugal v. Council case also mentioned that there was no 
obstacle for the ECJ to review secondary EU law in the light of WTO law.584Thus, the reason 
why direct effect method should be placed as prominent reason to deal with individual’s right 
to compensation, because the ECJ requires this method as a main link on the implementation 
of WTO law.   
In the FIAMM case, the GC emphasized that first, private plaintiffs must be able to 
point out an alleged violation of law to the GC by invoking WTO law to begin with.  The 
Court often referred as “relying on” the law.  And the second is that WTO law, appropriately 
invoked before GC, must validly serve as a basis for invalidating EU law or actions.585 
However, before to assess the second requirement, the method of “direct effect”586 must be 
fulfilled before invalidity of the act of the institution can be relied upon a national court. That 
means the provision of WTO law must be capable of conferring rights on citizens of the EU 
which they can invoke before the Courts.587 Nevertheless, the ECJ has been focused on 
discerning the spirit and general scheme of the international law obligation by the WTO, so 
the ECJ has paid little attention to the issue that the provisions are sufficiently clear and 
unconditional.  The ECJ therefore could find that the WTO provision do not have direct effect 
because lack of being sufficiently clear and unconditional.588The ECJ definitely close the door 
for the implementation of concept direct effect in the FIAMM case, since the WTO, like its 
                                                          
583See Joined Cases C-300/98, Parfums Christian Dior SA v. Tuk Consultancy BV and C-392/98, AsscoGerüste 
GmbH, Rob van Dijk v. Wilhelm Layher GmbH & Co KG, Layher BV, (2000) ECR I-11307.  The ECJ held 
that “in a field in respect of which the Community has not yet legislated, the protection of intellectual 
property do not fall within the EC Competence, but within the competence of the Member States.  Thus the 
Community law neither requires nor forbids that the legal order of a member states should accord to 
individuals right to rely directly on the rule laid down by Article 50(6) TRIPS before the Courts.” 
584See Portugal Case, Supra Note 469, para 47. 
 
585Errico, John, (2011), ‘The WTO in the EU: Unwinding The Knot’, Cornell International Law Journal, 
     Vol. 44, Issue 1, pp. 179-191. 
 
586See Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transp. v. Netherland Inland Revenue Administrative, 1963 E.C.R. 1. The idea 
of direct effect first crystallized in the Van Gend en Loos case.  In this case, the plaintiff hoped that an 
individual could rely on a provision of the EU Treaty as international law in the court of a national member 
state to invalidate the actions of another member state.  
 
587Joined Cases C-21/72 & C-24/74, International Fruit Company NV v. ProduktschapvoorGroenten en Fruit 
1972 E.C.R. I-1219 [hereinafter International Fruit], before EU acts can be determined to be illegal on the 
basis international WTO law, its provision must also be capable of conferring rights on citizen of the 
Community.   
 
588Errico, Supra Note 585, pp. 186.   
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predecessors the GATT, is still to be based on the principles of reciprocity and concessions. 
The ECJ also noted that the WTO Agreements are not of such a nature that they can be relied 
on directly before national or EU Courts.589 Furtherance, giving direct effect for the WTO 
Agreements and DSB recommendations would have the consequences of depriving the 
legislative or executive organs of the contracting parties of the possibility afforded by Article 
22 of the DSU for reaching a negotiated settlement even on a temporary basis.590 
AG Maduro in his opinion regarding of this case mentioned that In term of the ability 
of ECJ to rely on international agreements, he refers to Article 300 (7) TEC (Article 218 
TFEU) that “international agreement duly concluded by the EU with third countries or 
international organizations are binding on the institutions of the EU and on Member 
States”.591  This wording is both a reminder of an agreement’s compulsory nature under 
international law and a statement of the binding force of these agreements includes WTO 
Agreements, under the EU law.592  It therefore concludes that external agreements which are 
concluded in accordance with EU law and which therefore have binding effect on the EU 
constitute a source of EU legality.593 The Court has expressly deduced from this that they 
have primacy over secondary EU legislation and in principle has jurisdiction to determine 
questions as to the validity of a EU act in light on an external agreement by which EU are 
bound.594 The fact that WTO law cannot be relied upon before a court does not mean that it 
does not form part of EU legal system. Hence, this case-law must be understood not as 
                                                          
589Joined Cases FIAMM and Fedon, Supra Note 9. 
 
590Bronckers, Marco, (2008), ‘From ‘Direct Effect’ to ‘Muted Dialogue’, Recent Developments in the European 
Courts' Case Law on the WTO and Beyond’, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 11, No. 4, 
December, 2008, pp. 885-898. 
 
591Opinion AG Maduro, Supra Note 509, para. 23. 
 
592See Case 181/73 Haegeman [1974] ECR 449, paragraph 5; Case 12/86 Demirel [1987] ECR 3719, paragraph 
7; Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, paragraph 37; and Case C-162/96 Racke [1998] ECR I-3655, paragraph 
41. With regard to the WTO agreements, see in particular Case C-344/04 International Air Transport 
Association and Others [2006] ECR I-403, paragraph 36; Case C-459/03Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR 
I-4635, paragraph 82; and Case C-431/05 Merck Genéricos – ProdutosFarmacêuticos [2007] ECR I-7001, 
paragraph 31. 
 
593See Case 30/88 Greece v Commission [1989] ECR 3711, paragraph 13; Case C-192/89 Sevince [1990] ECR 
I-3461, paragraph 9; and Case C-188/91 Deutsche Shell [1993] ECR I-363 paragraph 17 
 
594See Joined Cases 21/72 to 24/72 International Fruit Company and Others [1972] ECR 1219, paragraphs 6 and 
7. 
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denying that the WTO rules are a source of EU law but as affecting their significance before a 
court.595 
AG Maduro perceives that the possibility of relying on the WTO agreements as a 
whole has been categorically refused in principle, however, there still can be a room for 
application of the WTO rules by the courts only in so far as that would not affect the scope for 
negotiations for the WTO disputant parties, even in the event of the dispute itself. It is 
because political freedom to negotiate continues to exist if the reasonable period of time for 
implementation of the DSB Decision had not yet expired. But, FIAMM and Fedon have fair 
point in seeking compensation due to incompliance with the DSB Decision, since the 
reasonable period that the EU had been allowed to comply with the DSB Decision had expire 
on 1 January 1999.  In a decision of 19 April 1999, the DSB had found that on 1 January the 
EU legislation continued to be incompatible with the rules of the WTO. Hence, since no 
satisfactory compensation had been agreed during the 20 days following the date of expiry of 
the reasonable period of time pursuant to Article 22 (2) of the DSU, the EU could no longer 
seek negotiated solutions. They had no choice but to comply with the DSB Decision. In 
conclusion, the acceptance of the possibility of reliance on the DSB Decision to obtain 
compensation for the damage caused by the retaliatory measures adopted as a result of the 
failure to implement the DSB Decision would no longer have any effect on the political 
freedom of the EU Institutions. Since the Fedon’s claim for compensation was lodged after 
the WTO dispute had been settled, and FIAMM’s was at least examined after it had been 
resolved.596 
 Although AG Maduro has explicitly gave reason to allow applicants to rely on DSB 
Decision in order to obtain compensation, the Courts insisted to deny direct effect of WTO 
obligations, because of ECJ may review the legality of EU measures in the light of the WTO 
law, if the EU has intended to implement a particular WTO obligations and where the EU 
measure refers expressly to the precise provisions of the WTO agreements.  The ECJ also 
emphasized that recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights 
and obligations provided in the agreement concerned.  Those provision (GATT) are not such 
as to create rights upon which individuals may rely directly before the courts by virtue of EU 
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law.597 But if there is a potential change regarding the impact of infringement of WTO Law 
by the EU could lead to the review of the legality of EU acts, it might be triggered because of 
the expiry of the implementation period of time granted by the DSB. It thus related to the 
seriousness of the infringement and the character of the infringed rule which however still 
denied by the courts in this case.598 
Nevertheless, the analysis of this case will continue to stage where the applicants claim 
that there is absence of unlawful act conducted by the EU Institution in order to obtain 
compensation pursuant to EU liability principle. 
 
 
3.2. The Absence of Unlawfulness Act Conducted by EU Institution 
 The Court’s case law is enshrining in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 
288 TEC (Article 340 TFEU) refers to the basis of the non-contractual liability of the EU for 
damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties. It has 
held that the principle of the non-contractual liability expressly laid down in that article is 
simply an expression of the general principle familiar to the legal systems of the member 
states that an unlawful act or omission gives rise to an obligation to make good the damage 
caused.  Referring to the Brasserie case, the requirement for non-contractual liability is that 
there must be a violation of EU law.599  To this end, GC insisted in their judgments that there 
was not unlawful action conducted by the EU institution because the absence of direct effect 
pertinent to WTO obligations.600  In addition, the continuation of Banana regime does not 
                                                          
597 Joined Case FIAMM &Fedon, Supra Note 9, para. 105-134. 
 
598Thies, Supra Note  444, (kindle) location  3475 
 
599Holdgaard,Rass, (2008), External Relations Law of the European Community: Legal Reasoning and Legal 
Discourse, Kluwer Law International-The Hague/Netherland, pp.333.  Holdgaard posited the Court opinion 
that the absence of violation of EU law correlated to the risks of international trading where the trader are 
involving to.  The inherent risk is giving the effect that the very existence of possibility of retaliatory 
measures in the international trading system is excluding the right of individual to be compensated when 
Community acts have produced such retaliatory measures. 
 
600In example, see case C-351/04 IKEA v Commissioners of Customs & Excise (2007) ECR I-7723, para. 55-56 
(the judgment concerned average to average zeroing). The ECJ invalidated duty on bed linen, summarily 
finding that the EU institutions had committed a manifest error of assessment of EU law by having practiced 
‘zeroing’ in calculating the dumping margin.  For this case, the ECJ did not rely on the decision of WTO 
Appellate body.  In conclusion, the ECJ explicitly declined to review the EU antidumping duty against the 
WTO Antidumping Agreement. See also Eckes, Christina, (2012), ‘International Law as Law of the EU: The 
Role of European Court of Justice’, in International Law as Law of the European Union, eds. Cannizzaro, 
Enzo, Palchetti, Paolo, and Wessel, Ramses A., MartinusNijhoff Publisher – Leiden/ Netherland,  pp.366.  
Eckes argued that the appeals decision regarding the FIAMM case is interesting since the ECJ has different 
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constitute unlawful action conducted by the EU Institutions. These companies therefore 
referred to Dorsch case when the Court expounded that the liability for the absence of 
unlawfulness act should be under a precondition of the existence of ‘unusual and special 
damage’ and it would be necessary to ‘prove that the alleged damage is real and a causal link 
exists.’601 They refer to the GC’s previous judgment that “When damage is caused by the 
conduct of the Community institution (EU) not shown to be unlawful, the Community (EU) 
can incur non contractual liability if the conditions as to sustaining actual damage, to the 
causal link between that damage and the conduct of the Community institution (EU) and to 
the unusual and special nature of the damage in question are all met.”602Unfortunately the GC 
held that on the facts of the case, the conditions for the absence of unlawfulness act is not 
fulfilled; EU Institutions therefore were not liable to bear the compensation. 
 In the appeal proceedings, the ECJ  reject the Dorsch approach since according to 
them after the development of Schöppenstedttest formula, liability can only be incurred for 
unlawful acts and, in case of discretionary acts of the EU legislatures. The ECJ in this case did 
not recognize that the conduct of EU institutions could be categorized as the absence of 
unlawful act that is triggering the right to compensation for FIAMM and Fedon Companies.603 
 However, in term to seek the comprehensive analysis whether in this case, the EU 
liability can be accomplished, it is necessary to evaluate detail reasoning provided by the GC 
and AG Maduro regarding the EU liability in the absence of unlawfulness act.  The AG 
Maduro even emphasized that this case considers as ‘no-fault liability’. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
point of views.  The main point is the applicants did not have strong basis in regard with the lack of direct 
effect. 
 
601Dorsch Consult Case Supra Note 441. See alsoBetlem, Gerrit, (2011), ‘Francovich Liability for Breach of 
European Union’, in Theory of Practice of Harmonization, eds. Andenas, Mads, and Andersen, Camilla 
Baasch, Edwar Elgar Publishing-Glos/UK., pp. 134. The Court declared that the liability for lawful conduct 
cannot deduce from previous case law, since unlike liability for unlawful acts, there is no firmly established 
regime for liability in the absence of unlawfulness at Community level. 
 
602FIAMM Case Supra Note 478, para. 160. 
 
603See Turk, Alexander H., (2009), Judicial Review in EU Law, Edwar Elgar Publishing-Glos/UK., pp.280-290.  
Turk argued that the ECJ Judgment did not consider the existence of liability regime incur within the sphere 
of EU Legislative competence, it leaves the possibility open that the EU liable under Article 340 TFEU for 
lawful administrative conduct. 
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1) the existence of actual and certain damage 
In this case the applicants have shown the existence of actual damage where the damage 
is sufficiently certain and quantifiable.604The damage consisted as 96.5 per cent increase in 
the import duty levied by the U.S. The punitive tariff caused by the cost incurred in respect of 
setting up and the relocation of production units. It therefore because the loss of turnover 
resulting by the reconversion of the production units.605 
2) the unusual and special nature of the damage suffered 
 The GC emphasized that damage suffered by FIAMM and Fedon Companies did not 
consider as ‘a disproportionate and intolerable burden’, because the damage stemmed from 
the realization of a risk that inherent in the economic activity affected to private economic 
actors.606 The exclusion of liability in this context refer to the situation that those private 
economic actors should be aware of the risk of future regulations.607 There are two conditions 
for the term of damage itself, first, the actual damage should be ‘unusual’ and ‘special’ that 
means a damage needs a comparison to other affected company and thereby incorporates 
elements of the German Sonderopfertheorieorprinciple d’egalitédevant les charges 
publiques.608 Second, the judgment indicates that damage can be justified even if the measure 
pursues ‘a general economic interest’.   
 In the appeal proceedings, the AG Maduro opined that the GC’s decision should be 
annulled because of an error of law, since the GC had not properly assessed whether the 
damage was ‘unusual’ or ‘special’ in nature, taking into account the right to property of the 
applicants.609 According to AG Maduro, the GC should have assessed the unusual nature of 
damage by looking closer at the economic risks inherent in the sector which the applicants 
operating.  Damage could only be considered as normal if the realized risk has been inherent 
in the same market sector in which the applicants operated, and for which insurance could 
                                                          
604Toth, A.G., (1997), ‘The Concepts of Damage and Causality as Elements of Non Contractual Liability’ in  The 
Action for Damages in Community Law, Eds. Heukels and McDonnel, Kluwer Law International – The 
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605FIAMM Case, Supra Note 478   
 
606 See Holdgaard, (2008), Supra Note 599, pp.333.  
 
607Perkams, Markus,(2010), ‘The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative  Public Law – Searching for 
Light in the Dark’, in International Investment Law and Comparative Public law, ed. Schill, Stephan W., 
Oxford University Press- Oxford/UK, pp.145 
 
608See the case 59/83 Biovilac v. EEC [1984] ECR 4057 
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have obtained.  If there is no link between the EU conduct causing the damage and the 
economic sector in which the applicants operated, it thus the damage could not be considered 
the normal risk.610Thies argued that in order to identify risk of international trading, it is 
necessary to take account of the particularities of the legal situation of traders operating in a 
legal framework that is not only defined by the EU domestic legislation but also shaped by the 
WTO law.611 The Court cannot deem that the company should be aware to the risk of future 
regulation, because the risk of future regulation is a foreseeable risk.  Meanwhile, the WTO 
retaliation system pursuant to Article 22 DSU determines the discretion of other WTO 
Member to choose whether the imposition of suspension concession with respect to the same 
sector or other sector different with the sector to the dispute. Hence the private economic 
actors affected by the retaliatory measure cannot foresee the suspension concession. It also 
seems problematic to exclude in principle any right to compensation on the basis of 
‘foreseeability’ if the EU conduct that triggers the imposition of retaliation is entirety 
unrelated to the sector in which these retaliation victims operate. 
 AG Maduro also consider that the damage needs to be special in nature in order to  
justify a right to compensation in a system of liability that is based on equal treatment with 
regard to the discharge of public cost or expenses.612  According to EU Courts, damage is to 
be considered special ‘when it affects a particular circle of economic operators in a 
disproportionate manner by comparison with other operators’.613 However, the Court did not 
seek to compare with other operators who is also suffering from the retaliation, such as 
Pecorino Cheese and Cashmere Wool Companies, or other private economic actors who filed 
suit against EU Institutions, such as Beamglow, Carton druck, Le Laboratire du bain and 
others.614 The Court can be easily defined by looking at the lists of product drawn by the 
USTR.615 The product on the list can identify the private economic actors who are affected by 
the retaliation, and they are clearly distinct from all other economic actors in EU. 
 
                                                          
610 Ibid. Para. 82 
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615Federal Register, Vol. 64, No. 74, Monday, April 19, 1999, Notices. 
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3) the damage is not justified by a general economic interest 
The EU Institutions demand the ECJ to consider the lack of a general economic interest 
as an additional condition for non-fault liability.616 They concluded that compensation would 
be excluded if the EU act or conduct caused the damage was not adopted in order to favor 
particular interest but in the interest of society as a whole. Hence, according to ECJ, the 
exercise of legislative function must not be hindered by the prospect of actions for damages 
whenever the general interest of the EU requires legislative measures to be adopted which 
may affect individual interest. Liability could only arise if the institution concern had 
manifestly and gravely disregard the limits on the exercise of its power. 617 
However, AG Maduro opined that the case only constitute as ‘minority strand of case 
law’, which would not justify the recognition of such an additional condition.618 The 
recognition does not seem appropriate because ‘equality in bearing public burdens and the 
protection to be accorded to the right to property demand that economic operators who 
suffered unusual and special damage be compensated, even if the measure that caused the 
damage was justify by the general economic interest’.619 Furtherance, the analysis continues 
to the existence of infringement of general principle of law and fundamental right. 
 
3.3. The existence of infringement of general principle of law and fundamental right  
 FIAMM and Fedon Companies invoked the right to property and the right to pursuit of 
an economic activity (freedom to trade and the right to choose and practice freely a trade or 
profession) which belong to the category of economic and property rights, the principle of 
sound administration and the principle of protection on legitimate expectation.  
1) Property right and right to pursuit of an economic activity 
 FIAMM and Fedon claimed that the EU Institutions infringed their rights to property 
and to pursuit economic interest because they compelled to pay punitive tariff on their imports 
into the U.S. market.  However, the ECJ concerned that in order to view that fundamental 
rights under EU law are not absolute, but it must be viewed in the relation to their social 
                                                          
616Joined Case 9/71 and 11/71, Compagnied’Approvisionnement v. Commission, (1972), ECR 00131, para. 45 
 
617Joined Case FIAMM and Fedon, Supra Note 9, para. 174. 
 
618Opinion AG Maduro, Supra Note 509, para 91-92 
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function.620.  It refers to Germany v. Council Case, that such restriction in fact correspond to 
objectives of the general interest pursued by the EU and do not constitute in relation to the 
aim pursued a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the vary substance of 
the right guaranteed.621 Hence, according to the ECJ, the punitive tariff needs to be tolerated. 
FIAMM and Fedon would need to tolerate the impact of retaliatory measures imposed by the 
U.S. if the EU’s upholding of a breach of WTO law 
 AG Maduro in this case underlined that the right to property and the right to pursuit of 
an economy activity justify the EU liability principle, according to which the EU legislation 
would not be able to interfere in individual property to an extent that comes close to an 
expropriation without compensation.622 In order to justify the existence of infringement of 
property right, it is necessary to show that the damage caused by WTO retaliation is ‘severe’ 
in order to be considered as ‘unusual’ to fulfill the EU liability conditions, otherwise, the 
damage would not come close to an expropriation necessitating compensation on the basis of 
the right to property.623 AG Maduro emphasized it is not necessary to show the damage is 
equivalent to a total and definitive privation of property, but it must have a sufficiently serious 
impact on the rights related to property. However, it is irrelevant whether the measure is 
lawful or unlawful since the liability in the absence of unlawfulness is not based on fault. 624 
If thus the court should take into account the parameters such as the proportion of an 
economic actor’s business affected by the retaliation. 
 In the framework of interpretation of Article 340 (2) TFEU, the court needs to 
consider ‘the general principles common to the laws of the Member States’, while in some EU 
Member States, such a liability principle has been based on the protection of the fundamental 
right of property.  AG Maduro emphasized this by referring to German Law under 
Sonderopfertheorie (special sacrifice).  This theory requires the state to grant compensation in 
the absence of unlawful state conduct, if the damage comes close to an expropriation.625 This 
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622 Opinion AG Maduro,Supra Note509  Para 63 
 
623 Ibid, Para  76 
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theory basically is used by the GC in the Dorsch Consult case when the court explains in 
more detail what is meant by ‘unusual damage’. This criterion requires a comparison to other 
affected party, and thereby incorporated elements of the German Sonderoptheorie if the 
damage closes to act of expropriation.626  
2) Principle of sound and proper administration 
According to FIAMM in GC proceedings, the EU did not bring its legislation into line 
with WTO rules even though it had assured its trading partners of its intention to comply with 
the ruling and recommendation of DSB, and it had obtained an exceptional extension of the 
period granted for the purpose. It is thus deemed as the infringement of the principle of proper 
administration.  However, for this claim, the GC did not enter into detailed analyses 
concerning whether this principle is breached, since the absence of direct effect of WTO 
obligation will not trigger the infringement of sound and proper administration principle. 
3) The principle of legitimate expectation 
  Legitimate expectation is the principle that its root lays in the concept of good faith, 
and the administration should not fail to keep promise that is caused to individual suffers loss. 
It emphasizes that when administrative decision is cancelled or revoked, the EU Institutions 
must concern regarding they act which influence individual rights or benefits in economic 
activity. They also must be able to respond to change underlying economic situation, when 
the economic actors do not have a vested right on the maintenance forever of the existing 
common organization of the market.627 
 Based on the principle legitimate expectation, FIAMM claimed that there had been the 
expectation that the EU would comply with its WTO law obligation and would not create a 
retaliation situation.628 However, EU Courts denied this principle because the EU’s assurance 
to comply with the WTO law given to its other WTO Member in the context of banana 
dispute would de facto make those political declarations enforceable within the EU legal order 
in the absence of a parallel requirement concerning such implication even though the EU 
Courts had denied the direct enforceability of underlying WTO primary law.629 
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 Nevertheless, the general nature of protection on legitimate expectation principle is 
when EU Institutions have discretionary power to exercise the power in a particular way. This 
principle could give rise to an enforceable right on the part of the individual who held such an 
expectation that EU Institution will be required to give effect to it.630 FIAMM and Fedon were 
in the presumption that based on PactaSuntServanda principle, EU Institution as a WTO 
Member, would comply with the DSB Decision and pursuant to Article 218 TFEU, and the 
EU Institution would comply with the international trade regulation. However, Thies argued 
that “It can hardly be expected that the EU Courts will recognize that the EU general 
commitments to the WTO Agreement or its specific assurances given in the context of 
international disputes to its international partners represent obligations that the EU 
acknowledge towards its own individual or traders. It thus seems unlikely that the Courts will 
acknowledge a right to compensation for retaliation victims merely based on expectations 
created by the EU’s membership of WTO.” 631 
 FIAMM company also rely on the legitimate expectation of sustainable practice of 
3,5% tariff upon battery products that has been negotiated between the EU and other WTO 
counterpart. The 3,5% tariff is minimum tariff for all battery product imported from EU that is 
justified by WTO harmonization tariff schedule. FIAMM is expecting that the EU Institution 
should sustain the level of tariff base on harmonization tariff schedule on battery product. 
Base on legitimate expectation principle, EU Institution is responsible to sustain the practice 
conferring to protect individual’s right to trade. In this case, EU Institutions violate the 
legitimate expectation principle by not restraining the change of tariff that is diminishing the 
benefit of trade under the WTO Agreements. However, EU Courts did not make any 
consideration over this issue, since the EU Courts were reluctant to undertake legality review 
of EU measures against the benchmark of EU general principles and fundamental rights in 
FIAMM &Fedon Case, as it seems to have considered the direct effect of WTO law to be a 
precondition for the courts’ overall review of EU conduct in the context of the WTO dispute 
on bananas.632 
 
                                                          
630 Auburn, Jonathan, Moffet, Jonathan and Sharland, Andrew,Supra Note 413, pp. 20-24. 
 
631Thies, Supra Note 444, (Kindle), Location  4730 
 
632 FIAMM Case, Supra Note  478, Para. 146 
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4. The Foreign Sales Corporation and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion (hereinafter 
FSC/ETI) Case (the EU v. the U.S.) 
Another section of this chapter discusses the implications of WTO retaliation for private 
economic actors in the U.S.  The reason is not to compare but to seek to what extent the 
implications of WTO retaliation for private economic actors in the U.S. territory and how the 
U.S. government deals with this conundrum. The analysis begins with the famous FSC/ETI 
case between the EU and the U.S. 
4.1. The General Overview of the FSC/ETI Case 
 In 1999, the EU challenged the FSC as a violation of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). The FSC is the kind of tax 
exemption and special administrative pricing imposed by the U.S. Government to the U.S. 
Companies outside the custom territory of the U.S.  The FSC regulated several features. First, 
the tax exemption is imposed to limited income from exports. Second, the exemption method 
did not replace the U.S. system of worldwide taxation of its corporations with an allowable 
foreign tax credit.  Third, the FSC required company to carry out its economic activities 
abroad such exports. Fourth, the FSC required an agency agreements with its U.S. parent 
companies or related subsidiaries pursuant to which the American corporations produced all 
the exported products in the U.S. Fifth, as a rule of origin in trade terms, there was no more 
50% of the fair market value of the exported property could be attributable to articles 
imported into the U.S. in order to qualify the exemption.  Sixth, special transfer pricing rules 
applied to transactions between an American parents company and its FSC to maximize 
export sales profits in the FSC.633 The tax exemption imposed to foreign trading gross receipts 
which means the gross receipt of any FSC are generated by qualifying transactions.  It 
generally involves the sale or lease of export property.  It includes: property held for sale or 
lease, manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted in the U.S., by a person other than a FSC, 
sold leased, or rented for use, consumption, or disposition outside the U.S. with no more than 
50% of its fair market value attributable to imports.  According to the U.S. Internal Revenue 
Code634, a portion of the “foreign trade income” is deemed to be “foreign source income not 
                                                          
633TITLE 26—INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, p.2015 – 2029, available at: 
(http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title26/pdf/USCODE-2010-title26-subtitleA-chap1-
subchapN-partV.pdf. )Last visited 15 August 2012. See also McDaniel, Paul R., (2004), ‘The David R. 
Tillinghast Lecture Trade Agreements and Income Taxation: Interactions, Conflicts, and Resolutions’,Trade 
Law Review, Vol. 57, Winter 2004, pp. 279-280. 
 
634 Ibid, historically, in 1971, Congress passed Section 991 through 997 of the Internal Revenue Code that 
granted special tax benefits to Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISCs).  The Internal Revenue 
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effectively connected with a trade or business in the U.S.” and it is therefore deemed as 
untaxed.  This untaxed portion is referred as the “exempt foreign trade income”. The 
remaining portion is taxable to the FSC. Dividends paid by the FSC out of exempt and non-
exempt income to the shareholders or “related supplier”.635Khachaturian gave an example for 
this foreign tax system, “if an American company sells a computer made in California to a 
buyer in France, the American firm must sell that computer to its FSC located offshore.  This 
Company, in turn, sells the item to the ultimate buyer.  The FSC then gain a tax exemption on 
15/23 of its profit from that sale. In the calculation, if an American company produces a 
computer for US$ 1,500 in the U.S. and sells it to France for US$ 2,000, if the American 
company sells it directly, it is taxed at the full corporate tax rate of 35%.  Alternatively, if the 
company producer ships the transaction through a FSC subsidiary, then it significantly 
reduces its taxes.  The FSC can purchase the computer for US$1,885 and sells it to France for 
US$2,000.  The FSC’s profit of US$115 is shielded from corporate income tax.  The 
American exporter is then required to pay taxes on only US$385 of its export profits”.636 
 The FSC also implied special rule for agricultural cooperatives.  All of the foreign 
trade income that a FSC owned by a related qualified cooperative earns from the sale of 
agricultural or horticultural products will be treated as exempt foreign trade income.  In 
addition, the FSC also implied special administrative pricing sum up 23% of the total 
combined taxable income which derives from the sale of export property.  Another 
administrative pricing rule was the FSC allowed to take 1.83% of the total foreign trading 
gross receipts from the sale of export property as foreign trade income which was not exceed 
twice the amount allocable to the FSC under the combined taxable income method. 
 At last, a FSC must either itself perform or pay for specific economic processes related 
to the relevant export transaction.  By statute, in order to qualify for the partial tax exemption, 
a FSC that uses administrative pricing rules must perform, contract, or pay for all of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Services taxed DISCs on earnings distributed only to shareholders.  The IRS allowed DISCs to defer taxes on 
roughly 50% of the shareholders income, by not taxing them on worldwide income. See 
alsoKhachaturian,Alex,(2008), ‘Reforming the United States Export Tax Policy: An Alternative to the 
American Trade War with The European Union’, U.C. Davis Journal of International Law and Policy, spring 
2008, pp. 191. Khachaturian mentioned “three years later, the U.S. established the concept of Foreign Sales 
Corporations (FSC).  It is an offshore, wholly-owned subsidiary of a U.S. Corporations.  A portion of FSC is 
exempt from taxation.  This is done by routing the sale of an item from its American source to an offshore 
production site and, ultimately to its final destination: the foreign consumer”. 
 
635The United States-Tax Treatment For “Foreign Sales Corporations”, Report of The Panel, WT/DS108/R, 8 
October 1999, para. 2.1-2.5. (hereinafter FSC/ETI Case) 
 
636Khachaturian, Supra Note 634, pp.191. See also Desai, Mihir A, Hines, James R., (2000), ‘The Uneasy 
Marriage of Export Incentives and the Income Tax’, Michigan School of Business Office of Tax Policy 
Research, (Working Paper No.12). 
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distribution activities attributable to the export transaction, which performed outside the U.S. 
territory, such as solicitation, negotiation, or making contract of the relevant FSC export 
transaction. The FSC must take responsibility for all the distributive activities, such as 
advertising and sales promotion, processing of costumer orders and arranging for delivery, 
transportation of goods involved in the transaction to the customer, determination and 
transmittal of final invoice of statement of account, and receipt of payment, and assumption of 
credit risk. 
 
4.2.  Panel and Appellate Bodies Findings 
On 9 November 1998, the DSB established the Panel to assess the claim of the EU 
regarding of the action of the U.S. that violated Article XIII: 1 of GATT 1994 and Article 4 of 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) with respect to 
the Section 921-927 of the Internal Revenue Code (FSC treatment).  The EU claimed that the 
U.S. has maintained the tax exemptions and special administrative pricing rules was violating 
Article 3.1 (a) of the SCM Agreement by granting subsidies contingent in law upon export 
performance.  Article 3.1 (b) of the same Agreement by granting subsidies contingent in law 
upon the use of domestic over imported goods, and Article 3 and 8 read in conjunction with 
Articles 9.1(d), 10.1 and 10.3 of Agreement on Agriculture by granting export subsidies to 
agricultural goods in excess of its reduction commitments under that Agreement.  The EU 
considered that it was nullification and impairment benefits in respect to violation of those 
agreements. The EU claimed that the FSC scheme involves two subsidies, first the certain 
exemptions from income taxes for FSCs and their parent companies provided by the FSC 
scheme identified as subsidy. It violated of Article 1 and 3 para.1(a) of the SCM 
Agreement.Second, the administrative pricing rules which it considers derogate from normal 
transfer pricing rules and to increase the amount of income shielded from taxation by the FSC 
exemption. It violated Article 1.1 (a) (1) (ii) SCM Agreement. Finally the EU considers that 
the subsidies by the FSC scheme fall within the scope of item (e) footnote 59 of the 
Illustrative List of Export Subsidies prohibited by Article 3.1. (a) SCM Agreement.637 
                                                          
637FSC/ETI Case, Supra Note 635, para. 7.35. Annex I: Illustrative List of Export Subsidies SCM Agreement 
point (e): “the full or partial exemption, remission or deferral specifically related to exports, of direct taxes or 
social welfare charges paid or payable by industrial or commercial enterprises.” Footnote 59: “the Members 
recognize that deferral need not amount to an export subsidy where, for example, appropriate interest charges 
are collected.  The Members reaffirm the principle that prices charged for goods in transactions between 
exporting enterprises and foreign buyers under their or under the same control should for tax purposes be 
prices which would be charged between independent enterprises acting at arm’s length.  Paragraph (e) is not 
intended to limit a Member from taking measures to avoid the double taxation of foreign source income 
earned by it enterprises or the enterprises of another Member.” 
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 On the other hand, the U.S. contended that the FSC scheme does not confer any export 
subsidy. According to the U.S, the footnote 59 indicates that income generated from foreign 
economic process need not be taxed.  The exemption of some or all of such income, by 
whatever means, is not a prohibited export subsidy.  Referring to a 1981 decision and 
understanding of the GATT 1947 Council established that the exemption from tax of income 
attributable to foreign economic process does not constitute the foregoing of revenue that is 
otherwise due within the meaning of Article 1.1 (a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement.  The 
exempting income from foreign economic process is not considered to be contingent upon 
export performance.  The U.S. viewed that footnote 59 allows Members to use administrative 
or other practices to distinguish income derived from economic processes outside their 
territory, as long as the overall allocation of income approximates arm’s length results and 
does not result in a “significant saving” of direct taxes in export transactions.  Consequently, 
the FSC scheme does not confer any export subsidy within the meaning of Article 3.1(a) of 
the SCM Agreement.638 
 To this claim and contra claim both by the EU and the U.S., the Panel come to the 
conclusion in three points of view. The first, in regard with claims under Article 3.1(b) of the 
SCM Agreement, Panel found that exemptions under the FSC scheme are prohibited export 
subsidies, because, first, the revenue is foregone according to Article 1 of the SCM 
Agreement and, second, the exports are taxed more favorably than production abroad.  The 
Panel also decided that footnote 59 of the SCM Agreement does not permit a territorial 
exemption applied solely to export earnings.639The second, in regard with Article 3.3 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture (consequently with its obligations under Article 8 of the 
Agreement), Panel found that the U.S. has acted inconsistently with its obligations under this 
agreement, by providing export subsidies listed in Article 9.1(d) of the Agreement on 
Agriculture in excess of the quantity commitment levels specified in the U.S. Schedule in 
respect of wheat.  The U.S. also violated Article 9.1(d) of the Agreement on Agriculture in 
respect of all unscheduled products by providing export subsidies. In terms of 1980 decision 
and understanding of GATT, the Panel declared that the 1980 Council Decision is not “a legal 
instrument” of the GATT-1947.  Although the Council Decision was reached affirmative 
negotiation than any other Council Decision in GATT history, it did not consider as a legal 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
638Ibid, para. 7.36. 
 
639Ibid, para.7.113-7.117 
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instrument that the U.S. could rely on to this case. In addition, the Panel concluded that the 
1980 Decision had not been adopted in the GATT 1994.640 
 On October-December 1999, the U.S. and the EU appealed certain issues of law 
covered in the Panel Report and certain legal interpretations developed by the Panel in the 
previous proceedings.  In their appeals, both parties argued about some issues regarding the 
FSC treatment. For this appeal, Appellate Body come to the conclusion that first, the FSC 
measure constitutes a prohibited export subsidy under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement. 
Second, the U.S. proved act inconsistently with its obligations under Article 10.1 and 8 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture by applying export subsidies, through the FSC measures.  The 
measure leads to circumvention of its export subsidy commitments with respect to both 
scheduled and unscheduled agricultural products. Third, the Appellate Body also decline to 
examine Panel interpretation as requested by both party in respect to Article 3.3 Agreement of 
Agriculture.  The Appellate Body as well declined to examine Panel’s denial that the EU 
claim the FSC administrative pricing rules pending recourse by the EU to the facilities of an 
appropriate tax forum.641 Finally, the Appellate Body ruled that the U.S. should apply the tax 
system in a way that is consistent with its WTO obligations. According to Appellate Body, 
“whatever kind of tax system a Member chooses, that Member will not be in compliance with 
its WTO obligations if it provides, through its tax system, subsidies contingent upon export 
performance that are not permitted under the covered agreements.”642 
 
4.3. Arbitration Findings 
  In order to comply with the Panel and Appellate Body decisions and DSB 
recommendations, the U.S. promulgated the Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Acts 
(hereinafter ETI) on 15 November 2000.643ETI was considered as the newest American 
taxation scheme.  It replaced all FSC legislation, and it is also defined as “the gross income of 
                                                          
640Ibid 
 
641 The United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”, WT/DS108/AB/R, 24 February 2000, 
para. 177-178. (FSC/ETI Case Arbitration) 
 
642Ibid, para. 179-180 
 
643Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, (2002), ‘The Foreign Sales Corporation Drama: Reaching the Last Act?’International 
Economic Policy Briefs, No. PB02-10, November 2002, pp. 6. The ETI Act is excluding from the U.S. 
definition of gross income certain foreign source income or “a portion of export earnings, and a portion of 
earning from production abroad.  In other word, the U.S. adopted a partial territorial system, providing some 
relief from double taxation both for exports and foreign production.  However, corporate tax payers could 
only use the territorial method by renouncing their tax credit with respect to the same earnings.  The benefits 
of the ETI Act were conditioned on the use of less than 50% foreign inputs of goods and services. 
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taxpayer attributable to foreign trading gross receipts”.644ETI also adopted the principle 
feature that it is an exclusionary of taxation method, and not a deferral taxation method like 
FSC.645By making ETI, a taxation exclusion method to make sure that it was not export 
contingent.  Congress created ETI in order to be fully compliant with the WTO decision on 
FSC’s.  It has been stated by one of the U.S. official, “our proposal directly addresses the 
WTO Panel decision and it is both in fact and in law of WTO compatible.”646 
 However, the EU considered that the ETI Act still did not comply with the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB and it was not consistent with the U.S. obligations 
under the SCM Agreement, the Agreement on Agriculture and the GATT 1994. The EU 
therefore requested to refer the matter to the original Panelist accordance with Article 21.5 of 
the DSU (compliance Panel). However, similar to Panel decision in the first report for FSC 
case, the Panel decided that the ETI Act also involved subsidies related to export 
performance, thus it is inconsistent with Article 3.1 (a) of the SCM Agreement. It also fails to 
fall within the scope of footnote 59 of the same agreement because it is not a measure to avoid 
the double taxation of foreign-source income within the meaning of the footnote.  The U.S. 
also has acted inconsistently with its obligation under Article 3.2. of the SCM Agreement not 
to maintain subsidies referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the SCM Agreement.  The ETI 
Act involves export subsidies as defined in Article 1(e) of the Agreement on Agriculture, 
accordingly, the U.S. is in this regard applying the export subsidies with respect to both 
scheduled and unscheduled agricultural product, in the way threatens to circumvent its export 
subsidies under Article 3.3. of the Agreement on Agriculture, and violating Article 10 (1) and 
8 of the same agreement. In terms of GATT 1994, the ETI Acts is considered inconsistent 
with Article 4 by reason of the foreign articles/labor limitation as it accords less favorable 
treatment within the meaning of that provision to imported products than to like products of 
U.S. origin.  The last, the U.S. basically has not fully withdrawn the FSC subsidies found to 
be prohibited export subsidies inconsistent with Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement and it 
                                                          
644Ibid. 
 
645Lopez-Mata,Rosendo, (2001), ‘Income Taxation, International Competitiveness and the World Trade 
Organization’s Rules on Subsidies: Lessons to the U.S. and the World from the FSC Dispute’, Tax Law 
Review No. 54, pp. 604. ETI adopted two characteristic of income to be excluded, first, qualifying foreign 
trade income means the amount of gross income which, if excluded, will result in a reduction of the taxable 
income of the taxpayer from such transaction equal to 30% of foreign sale and leasing income or 50% of 
foreign trade income.  Second is non- qualifying foreign trade income is not excludable from gross income. 
 
646 See Murphy, Sean D., (2000), ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International 
Economic Law, US position of Foreign Sales Corporation’, America Journal of International Law No. 94, pp. 
533. 
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has therefore failed to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB made pursuant 
to Article 4.7 SCM Agreement.  
 Furtherance the Panel decision has been strengthens by the Appellate Body decision.  
The Appellate Body upheld all Panel decisions, included the interpretations of Article 10.3 of 
the DSU regarding the third party.  The EU requested Appellate Body to reverse the Panel’s 
finding that third parties are not entitled to receive all of the parties’ written submissions to 
the meeting of the Panel, only for the first written submissions.  On the contrary, the 
Appellate Body finds that the Panel erred in its interpretation of Article 10.3 of the DSU to 
rule that all written submission of the parties filed prior to the only meeting of the Panel must 
be provided to the third parties. Finally, the Appellate Body recommends the DSB to request 
the U.S. to bring the ETI measure that found in the Panel Report, to be consistent with its 
obligations under SCM Agreement, Agreement on Agriculture and GATT 1994.  The DSB 
afterward requested the U.S. to implement fully of the recommendations and rulings of the 
DSB in the FSC Case.647 
 Unfortunately, the EU concerned that the U.S. did not comply with the DSB 
recommendations regarding ETI Act, thus on 17 November 2000, the EU requested DSB to 
establish Arbitration under Article 21.5 of DSU, considering that the U.S. fails to withdraw 
the subsidies as required by Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement.648The DSB then established 
Arbitration to assess the argument of both parties, and to calculate the amount of nullification 
and impairment caused by subsidies that the U.S. has conducted.  According to Arbitration, 
the amount of countermeasures that proposed by the EU is appropriate.  The amount of 
US$4,043 million, which falls within the range of reasonable values calculated on the basis of 
the parties methodologies can be considered to be a reasonable approximation of the actual 
value of the subsidy for the year 2000.649 
 On August 2002, the Arbitrator determined that the EU could impose tariffs on US$ 
4,043 million to the U.S. exports. The EU officials indicated that they would not apply the 
                                                          
647The United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by 
the European Communities, WT/DS108/AB/RW, 14 January 2002, para. 4 and 256. 
 
648 The EU noted that the time period within which the U.S. was to have withdrawn the prohibited FSC subsidy  
in this dispute originally terminated on 1 October 2000.  After the U.S. asked the DSB to modify the time 
period, the termination would be 1 November 2000, however on 15 November 2000, the U.S. was still 
enacted the ETI Act. See WT/DS108/AB/RW, Ibid 
 
649The United States – Tax Treatment For “Foreign Sales Corporations” , Recourse to Arbitration by the United 
States under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article  4.11 of the SCM Agreement, Decision of the Arbitrator, 
WT/DS108/ARB, 30 August 2002, para. A 34. 
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tariff s as long as the U.S. was making progress towards WTO compliance. However, on May 
2003, the EU officials stated that they would begin imposing tariffs by January 2004.  In 
November 2003, again the EU officials delayed the imposition of the retaliatory tariffs until 
March 2004. It provided time for the Congress of the U.S. passed legislation to bring the U.S. 
into compliance with its WTO obligations. 650 
 On September 2002, the EU Officials published a list of product that could be subject 
to retaliation.  These products were selected from the very general custom chapters which 
have been notified to the WTO at the time of the original condemnation of the FSC by the 
WTO Adjudication Body. The EU decided to impose the escalating tariff beginning at 5% and 
culminating at 17% a year later to indicate restraint.651 
Below is the FSC/ETI Retaliation List of Products:652 
Sector 
Harmonized System, 
2 digit level 
 
Percent of Total US 
Exports to EU 
2002 
Estimated Value 
Targeted (Euros in 
millions) 
Percent of Total 
Targeted 
Precious Stones and 
Jewelry 
2.1 1,431 36.0 
Machinery and 
Mechanical 
Appliances 
22.5 627 15.6 
Wood and Paper 
Articles 
2.1 300 7.5 
Leather Articles 
Thereof 
0.1 289 7.2 
Toys, Games, Sports 
Equipment 
0.6 181 4.5 
Copper and 
Aluminum Articles 
0.4 181 4.5 
Electrical Machines 11.8 146 3.6 
Cotton, Textiles and 
Footwear 
0.4 139 3.4 
Vegetables, Fruits, 
Grains and Oils 
2.2 138 3.4 
                                                          
650 Ahearn, Raymond J., European Trade Retaliation: The FSC-ETI Case, in CRS Report for Congress, 
RS21742, 11 February 2005, pp.3 
 
651Ibid, the EU applied countermeasures on the selected products consist of an additional customs duty of 5% to 
be enforced as from 1 March 2004, followed by automatic monthly increases by 1% up to a ceiling of 17% to 
be reached on March 2005, if compliance has not happened in between.  The EU has estimated the amount of 
the countermeasures at $315 million in additional customs duties in the period 1 March to 31 December 2004 
and at US$666 million in additional customs duties for the period 1 January 2005 – 31 December 2005.  
These amounts have been estimated by applying the above mentioned extra customs duties on the average 
imports during the period of 1999-2001. 
 
652Ibid. 
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Iron and Steel 0.8 131 3.2 
Certain Prepared 
Foods and Food 
Residues 
1.3 123 3.0 
Ceramic Glass 
Products 
0.5 113 2.8 
Meat and Dairy 0.2 72 1.8 
Prepared Foods and 
Sugar 
0.1 71 1.7 
Tools, Implements  0.6 88 2.2 
 
The U.S. considered that the retaliation affected a numbers of the U.S. Companies and 
workers, furtherance they have complained bitterly to their representatives. 
 
5. The Implication of the FSC/ETI Retaliation to the U.S Trade policy 
Unlike the Banana Case, when several EU Companies recourse to seek compensation 
caused by WTO retaliation to the EU adjudication bodies, the U.S. Companies would not seek 
compensation through the adjudication body, instead they persuaded their political 
representatives to comply with the DSB ruling and recommendation. This is because the U.S. 
explicitly does not recognize direct effect of WTO Agreements in to domestic law. 653 
Section 201 of the UURA regulates explicitly non direct effect of WTO obligation, 
accordingly, when the EU planned to impose retaliatory tariff, the companies in this regard 
realize that there will be no recourse before the court to seek compensation654; instead they 
relied on consultations with relevant the U.S. Congressional committees and Senate.  In early 
2003, eighty business and trade associations around the U.S. filed petition to their 
representative both to the Congress and Senate, due to the proposal of retaliatory tariff 
                                                          
653See Chapter III 
 
654See Garten, Jeffrey E., (1995), ‘American Trade Law in Changing World Economy’, International Lawyer 
Journal No. 29, pp.30.Garten mentioned that “The UURA refers to the notion of the U.S. in regard with the 
implementation of GATT that the U.S. will not permit the GATT to provide a remedy to private parties and 
become a substitute for domestic courts. The implementation of legislation will therefore provide that, if the 
U.S. government accepts the panel decision, they will implement it in a prospective manner, as has been our 
consistent practice, through changes to U.S. law if necessary. “On the other hand private party can sue 
against federal agency in regard with violation of WTO obligation. See case Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 1984.Pursuant to Section 102 (c) of URAA that is prohibiting 
private parties from challenging governmental action on the basis that it violates a WTO Agreement, it does 
not preclude the U.S. Court’s consideration of an Appellate Body’s decision. In this case, the court explained 
that a foreign manufacturer bringing an Appellate Body decision to the Court’s attention is not bringing an 
action under any WTO Agreement.  Rather, the court stated, the manufacturer is arguing that the federal 
agency’s application and interpretation of U.S. law violates its international obligations pursuant to a WTO 
Agreement. 
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imposed by the EU. In this petition, those companies refer to the future loss of benefit they 
would have if the U.S. Government remained silent to this retaliation.  For example, the letter 
of petition from the Manufacturing Jewelry, Jewelers and Suppliers of American Association 
mentioned because the EU’s retaliatory tariffs cover several U.S. industries includes jewelry 
industry. This industry was targeted with 30% of the tariffs. Although the tariff began at level 
of 5% from March 2004, the EU increased 1% every month until a ceiling of 17% reached on 
March 2005. The jewelry industry could pay up to US$ 1.43 billion of the US$ 4 billion 
retaliation.655 Another targeted high tariff was paper industry. The Paper industry likely had 
the same problem with the jewelry industry, although the estimated value targeted reached 
US$ 300 million in a year.  This punitive tariff will be imposed on 165 paper and pulp items 
around the U.S. territory, which gave much burden for those affected companies.656Those 
business associations submitted two issues: the first, Congress must repeal the ETI provisions 
in order to comply with WTO decisions and rulings, and the second, on the other hand, due to 
the possibility of lost job in some companies that is also facing the gradual high tariff imposed 
by the EU, the Congress must find a way to bring American jobs back into the U.S., in 
calculation, the Congress must find ways to bring back US$ 300 billion in American jobs.657 
 It was not only big multinational company who complained through their 
representatives regarding the future impact of retaliatory tariff, but also most of American 
small business owners who would be more devastating.658  Thus, in 2003, various proposals 
were introduced in the House and Senate Committee to repeal the ETI Act. Congress believed 
the repeal could return approximately US$50 billion to the U.S. treasury over the next ten 
                                                          
655Heebner, Jennifer, (2005), ‘Change Afoot for U.S. Jewelry Manufacturers’, JCK Magazine, 5 January, 
available at:  
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656Ince, Peter J., Akim, Eduard, Lombard, Bernard, andParik,Tomas, (2004), Chapter 8: Consumption Climbs in 
Central and Eastern Countries, Stagnates in the West: Markets for Paper, Paperboard and Woodpulp 2003-
2004, UNECE/FAO Forest Products Annual Market Review, 2003-2004, pp. 59-60. 
 
657Byrd, Kristin, (2005), ‘Can We Provide A Level Playing Field for U.S. Corporations and Increase U.S. Jobs 
While Repealing the Extraterritorial Income Act?’,Houston Business and Tax Law Journal, Vol. V, pp. 339-
365. Congress need to create an indirect value added tax, similar to the European System, increase incentives 
for research and development, reduce the effective corporate tax rate of 32%, provide provisions for the 
repatriation of income for companies that continue to keep money overseas and make available certain tax 
incentives for companies that maintain/jobs within the continental U.S. and phase out the incentives as the 
companies move facilities across international borders. 
 
658Resource from  Hearing of Committee on Small Business House of Representative,  108 Congress, The 
WTO’s Challenge to FSC/ETI Rules and Effect on America’s Small Business Owners, Serial No. 108 – 114. 
Washington DC, May 14, 2003, p.2-3. 
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years, it also could increase the competitive position of the U.S. companies in conducting 
international trade and to retain jobs within the U.S. and in the end, it could be possibly to 
restrain the severe impact of the EU retaliatory tariff. There are three proposals created by 
House of Representative and Senate, namely, The Job Protection Act of 2003, (H.R. 1769), 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2003 (H.R. 2896), and Jumpstart Our Business Strength 
(JOBS) Act 2003 (S. 1637).  These three bills are accommodating both the interestsof 
American private economic actors in achieving international trade benefit and restrain the EU 
tariff retaliation. 
1) The Job Protection Act of 2003, (H.R. 1769)659 
 On April 2003, the Committee on Small Business House of Representative created a 
bill of Job Protection Act of 2003.  The bill is purposed to amend the Internal Revenue Code 
to repeal the FSC/ETI exclusion, with an exemption for certain binding contracts in effect 
before the date of enactment of this Act. The Act permits a foreign corporation that elected to 
be treated as a domestic corporation to revoke such election and be treated as a domestic 
corporation transferring its property to a foreign corporation with no gain recognized on such 
transfer.  It also provides: 1) a transitional 2004 through 2008 sliding-scale deduction for an 
FSC/ETI beneficiary based on the corporation’s 2001 FSC/ETI benefit; and 2) special rules 
for 2003 and for fiscal year taxpayers.  The Act is allowing a deduction for income 
attributable to the U.S. production activities equal to 10% of qualified production activities.  It 
provides a 2006 through 2009 phased-in period.  The act defines “qualities production 
activities” as: 1) the portion of the modified taxable income attributable to domestic activities, 
and 2) the domestic/foreign fraction. At last, the Act set forth related provisions with respect 
to: 1) determination of income attributable to domestic production activities; 2) domestic 
production gross receipts; 3) qualifying production property; 4) domestic/foreign fraction and 
5) special rules.660 
                                                          
659Bill Summary and Status 108 the Congress (2003-2004), H.R. 1769, Job Protection Act, The Library of 
Congress, available at (http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:H.R.1769).  the Act is jointly 
sponsored by Congressmen Phil Crane (R-Illinois), Vice Chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Committee, Charles Rangel (D-New York), Ranking Member of the House Ways and Means Committee, and 
Don Manzullo (R-Illinois), Chairman of the House Committee on Small Business. 
 
660Ibid, summary. 
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2) American Jobs Creation Act of 2003 (H.R. 2896)661 
On October 28, 2003, the House Ways and Means Committee passed the Thomas bill 
24-15. The purpose of the bill is to provide US$140 billion of tax relief over ten years.  
However, the net cost of the proposed mark is US$60 billion over ten years.  Over two-thirds 
of the tax relief goes to domestic manufacturers.  Less than one-third of the tax relief goes 
towards international tax relief for multinational companies even though they currently 
received over 90% of FSC-ETI benefits and employ over 50% of the U.S. manufacturing 
workforce. In summary, the bill provides a provision that is allocating US$ 40 billion of the 
US$50 billion from the repeal of the ETI Act, toward a 3% income tax rate cut to 
manufactures.  The tax rate cut applies to property that is manufactured, produced, grown or 
extracted, including tangible personal property, agriculture, softwood timber, processed food, 
construction, architectural, and engineering services for construction projects built in the U.S., 
extracted items are software, movies, music and, oil and gas. The bill also provides new 
reduced 32% top corporate tax rate for all corporations with less than US$20 million of tax 
income. For small and medium enterprise, the section of 179 provision increase the amount of 
capital purchases from US$25,000 to US$100,000 and increase the size of companies eligible 
for the provision by doubling the capital expenditure cap from US$200,000 to US$400,000.662 
In order to restrain the EU retaliatory tariff, the bill also provides a provision that is 
enable the U.S. companies to compete under rules similar to their foreign competitors.  The 
bill modifies the current taxation of foreign sales and services income so that U.S. companies 
are not at a disadvantage in the marketplaces when competing against foreign companies in 
the EU.  The provision allows U.S. companies to remove duplicative and uncompetitive 
structures and operate under rules similar to those enjoyed by EU companies.  It specifically 
helps U.S. companies expand their manufacturing by lowering the costs of U.S. exports to 
Europe.  The main reason for this provision is treating the EU as one country.663 Although the 
EU lifted sanctions against the U.S few weeks after the Act is enacted, the EU still hesitates 
                                                          
661Resource from Committee on Ways and Means, The American Jobs Creation Act of 2003, Summary of H.R. 
2896 passed by the Committee, 28 October 2003. P. 1-5. Also Available at (http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d108:H.R.4520).The American Jobs Creation Act of 2003 (H.R. 2896), sponsored by 
Congressman Bill Thomas (R-California) and Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee. 
 
662Ibid 
 
663Ibid,  Besides the tax rate cut, the bill also provides Alternative Minimum Tax relief, Net Operating Loss 
relief, S-Corporation Reforms, and Repatriation Provisions 
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about the purpose of this bill in repealing the FSC/ETI Act. Furtherance, in 2005 the EU 
requested that the WTO convened a Panel in order to address the Act’s phase-out of the ETI, 
and to examine whether it actually complied with the WTO. In 2006 the Panel findings 
upheld to appeal.664 
3) Jumpstart Our Business Strength (JOBS) Act 2003 (S. 1637)665 
The JOBS Act is a leading bill that was introduced by Senator Charles Grassley and 
Max Baucus in the Senate Finance Committee. The proposed bill remained revenue neutral 
and provided increased revenue to corporations, approximately US$ 56 billion, through a 
reduction of the corporate tax rate from 35% to 32%.   The main purpose of the bill is the 
benefit from ETI Act will gradually decrease as for 2004-2005 it reduces to 80% and for 2006 
only 60%. The proposal continued to provide over US$100 billion in business tax breaks over 
the next decade.  The main of this bill is the U.S. might consider moving toward a territorial 
tax system as the Joint Committee on Taxation recommended.  It would provide U.S. 
companies with the same benefits of European nations now receive.   
As result of JOBS Act, the EU suspended retaliation effective January 1, 2005, but 
moved to challenge the legality of certain provision such as transitional arrangement for its 
abolition and the “grandfathering” benefits for U.S. corporations that had already signed 
contracts. In early 2006, the Appellate Body agreed with decision of the Panel that the U.S. 
repeal legislation fails to comply with its WTO obligations because of the grandfathering and 
two year transition period under which the FSC/ETI benefits should be phased out.  On 
January 31, 2006, the EU adopted a new regulation providing for new retaliatory duties by 
May 2006, however, the countermeasures were never imposed due to the fact that Congress 
repealed the grandfathering FSC/ETI benefits providing in Tax Increase Prevention and 
                                                          
664Request for the Establishment of a Panel, United States — Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporation,” 
WT/DS108/RW2 (Jan. 14, 2005).see also United States – Tax Treatment For “Foreign Sales Corporations”, 
Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, WT/DS108/AB/RW2, 13 
February 2006.  In  In September 2005, the WTO Panel concluded, in paragraphs 7.65 and 8.1 of the panel 
report, mentions that “ to the extent that the United States, by enacting Section 101 of the American Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004, maintains prohibited FSC and ETI subsidies through the transitional and 
grandfathering measures, it continue to fail to implement fully the operative DSB recommendations and 
rulings to withdraw the prohibited subsidies and to bring its measures into conformity with its obligations 
under relevant covered agreement. 
 
665Bill Summary and Status 108th Congress (2003-2004), the Jumpstart Our Business Strengths Act (S. 1637), 
The Library of Congress, available at (http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:S1637), the Act is co-
sponsored by Senator Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and Senator and 
Max Baucus (D-Montana), Ranking Member of the Senate Finance Committee. 
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Reconciliation Act.666 
The EU might not impose the retaliation; however, the implication of it was leading 
the U.S. Government to change their trade policy in to conformity with the WTO decision.  
The FSC/ETI Case is one of the cases that has involved challenges to trade policies or 
decisions of the U.S. Government.  It has been shown that Congress made different 
approaches to comply with WTO regulations and in its final form, the Act has changed the 
Code, not only to avoid the sanction but also to safe the U.S. business from decreasing benefit 
in international trade relations.667The U.S. Legislative bodies (Congress and Senate) have 
made some efforts to restrain the damage of the EU retaliatory tariff by promulgating new 
Act.  The reaction of both Congress and Senate is to repeal the Act that violates the WTO 
Agreement.  
As mentioned in chapter III, the implementation of Uruguay Round in the U.S. 
demands highly political process instead of adjudicating process.668 Private economic actors 
therefore can interfere in the process of implementing the WTO Law by influencing Congress 
as political and economic constituents. In this term, Congress increases involvement in 
foreign trade by its function derives from pressure of private economic actors. These private 
economic actors may exert their influence within the executive through the Congressional 
instrument of delegation. As a result of the division of powers between Congress and the 
executive in foreign trade, the Congress views individuals can control the executive in trade 
policy matters through the instrument of delegation, so the Congress establishes rights for 
individuals in the trade process in order to influence the final trade policy outcome.669 
 In the array of the U.S. legal system, the place of private economic actors can be 
deemed as individual who is holding right and obligation, their political right is more 
prominent by submitting petition to their representative body.  As already noted in Chapter II, 
R. Ostrihansky posited “it is not government, but enterprises and individual who make most 
                                                          
666See Commission of the EU, Proposal for a Council Regulation, Amending and Suspending the Application of 
Regulation (EC)  No 2193/2003 establishing additional customs duties on imports of certain products 
originating in the United States of America, Brussels, 22.12.2004, COM(2004) 822 final 2004/0282 (ACC). 
Available at:  
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0822:FIN:EN:PDF) 
 
667Organek, Robin, (2008),  ‘Congressional Response To WTO Sanction: Turning Lemons into Lemonade in 
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004’, University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review 
Vol.16, pp.150 
 
668 Ibid, pp. 156 
 
669Molyneux, Candido T.G., (2001), Domestic Structure and International Trade: the Unfair Trade Instruments 
of the United States and the European Union, Hart Publishing – Oxford/UK, pp. 65. 
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economic decisions.”670 From this argument, it is comprehensible if private economic actors 
are holding an important role in economic environment; moreover, these legal entities for 
some reasons are affecting government economic policy both at the level of national and 
international.671 
 The UURA basically does not totally close to possible leeway for private economic 
actors to complain before the court in the context of WTO obligation.  The court in some 
cases recognizes that, at least under certain conditions, a WTO dispute settlement decision 
may be taken into account by a court in ruling on the correctness of federal agency’s 
determination.672In the case of Pam S.p.A v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, the court declared that 
the reasoning of decisions by WTO Panels and Appellate Body may help to inform the court’s 
decision.673In other case such Timken Co. v. U.S. the court posited that an ambiguous statute 
should be interpreted to avoid conflict with international obligation.674The WTO Agreement 
would seem to be applicable as law, but only a single plaintiff, the U.S. Federal Government 
has standing to invoke them in the domestic court. But, in term of implication of WTO 
retaliation to private economic actors in the U.S., the rights of private economic actors due to 
the loss of trade benefit is not seeking compensation but more to political pressure to the 
Congress to comply with the WTO obligation, because the UURA recognize the preclusion of 
private remedy.  This is based on that the force of the WTO rules within any member’s 
domestic law depends on direct effect and supremacy, and the WTO supremacy is excluded 
an as option in the U.S.675When it comes to implication of WTO retaliation, the private 
economic actors need to refer to the system that is adopted by the U.S. legal system. 
 
6. To What Extent State Liability is Accomplished?  
The implication of WTO Retaliation (Banana and FSC/ETI case) is trade damage 
borne by private economic actors. However, when these private economic actors are seeking 
                                                          
670Ostrihansky, Supra Note168  ,p. 174-175. 
 
671 See MacDonald and Woolcock, Supra Note 166. 
 
672 See case SNR Roulements v. U.S., Supra Note 494. 
 
673 See Case Pam S.p.A. v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1362, in 25 International Trade Review 
(BNA) 1577, 2003. 
 
674 See ‘Timken Co. v. U.S. Case’, 788 F. Supp. 1221, the U.S. Court of International Trade, 12 March 1992 in 
International Trade ReviewVol. 26, pp. 1072. 
 
675see Jackson, John H., (2000), The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO: Insight on Treaty Law and Economic 
Relations, Cambridge University Press-Cambridge/UK, pp. 328- 366  
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compensation caused by the retaliation, both EU and the U.S. restrains this possibility by 
invoking concept non-direct effect. John H Jackson mentioned that the lack of direct effect of 
WTO Agreements in domestic law is considered a possible protection against sovereignty 
diminution. He emphasized that “ this is because without direct effect, a nation normally can 
decide how to respond to a complaint that its actions have breached international law, and one 
response possible is to ignore the complaint and live with the breach.”676 Sovereignty 
diminution in this context is that the WTO Member gives a part of their sovereignty in order 
to comply with WTO obligations.  
 From the EU experience, although Article 340 TFEU opens possibility for private 
economic actors to seek compensation due to the damage caused by EU Institutions in the 
performances of their duty, but when the damage occurs due to the infringement of WTO 
obligations, the EU Courts unequivocally declare in all settled case law, that  “No liability 
regime exist under which the Community (EU) can incur liability for conduct falling within 
the sphere of its legislative competence in a situation where any failure of such conduct to 
comply with the WTO Agreements cannot be relied upon before the Community (EU) 
Courts.”677  It is because the EU Institutions have sole authority to deal with external 
relationship, includes trade relationship under WTO Law. The Court thus refrain from 
applying rules of internal law which are incompatible with the WTO Agreements that would 
have the consequence of depriving the function of legislative or executive organ to conduct 
their function in terms of WTO dispute. The Court’s reasoning to deny the overall to invoke 
WTO Law and its breaches has been based primarily on the EU political interest to prevent 
consequences, which could place the EU Institutions in a disadvantages situation compared 
with other WTO Members.678 Hence, this situation creates a dogma that political power over 
judicial repercussion refrain the function of state liability as a principle to protect individual 
rights.  
 It has been discussed in chapter III that the perception of state liability principle is 
protecting individual (economic) right from injustice and unlawful conduct of government 
                                                          
676ibid, pp. 172.See also Jackson, John H., (1992), ‘Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A policy 
Analysis’, America Journal of International Law No. 86, pp. 310. 
 
677Joined Case FIAMM and Fedon, Supra Note 9, para. 176 
 
678See Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v Council of the European Union, (1999), ECR I-08395, para. 
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which is causing the damage, and the main function of state liability principle is to rectify or 
to compensate the damage borne by the individual.  However, from EU experience in 
FIAMM Case, the ECJ held that it was not in a position to grant compensation on the basis of 
a WTO Law infringement, as legislative institutions should neither be hindered by the 
prospect of actions for damages nor put under an obligation to comply with WTO Law as a 
consequence of successful compensation actions.679 Consequently, although conditions for 
EU liability is fulfilled in FIAMM case, the main function of state liability to rectify the 
damage is not accomplished due to the lack of direct effect of WTO Law in  EU legal system. 
 From the U.S. experience, UURA definitely refuse the concept of direct effect of 
WTO Law in the U.S. legal system, as Barcello argued that, “the UURA doesn’t have direct 
effect, since the meaning of direct effect as a single concept is that the WTO rules have direct 
effect to a private person so they must have standing in a domestic court to base a legal claim 
on a WTO provision as a rule of decision.”680 From the U.S. perspective, the non-direct effect 
itself derives from the concept of sovereign immunity adopted by the federal law of the U.S.   
 As one of federal laws, UURA is shielded by sovereign immunity doctrine.  Although 
the basic point of sovereign immunity has never been a complete immunity from litigation for 
the government, since in recent development of federal sovereign immunity doctrine, it can be 
waived by several reasons; because a sovereign creates the law does not mean that he should 
be immune to that law.681 But the URAA is invoking sovereign immunity doctrine to bar 
court entirely from hearing some individual’s claim directly of legal wrong that conducted by 
government. Thus, theoretically if the law itself perpetuates the immunity from claim, one 
should notice that state liability cannot derive from the implementation of this law. 
 The role of U.S. congress in relation to WTO obligations, pursuant to URAA sections 
123 and 129, is that the U.S. Congress can determine whether the DSB Decision will be 
implied in the domestic law.682   If at any situation, the U.S Law is infringing the WTO Law, 
the implementation of Bill promulgated by the Congress will make clear that the U.S. law will 
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take precedents.683  The U.S. law emphasizes the responsibility of the Federal Government, 
and not private citizen, to ensure that Federal or States law are consistent with the U.S. 
obligations under WTO Agreements.684 Hence, in relation with the FSC/ETI Case, the 
Congress made effort by introducing legislative package in order to prevent retaliation from 
the E.U. which will be causing trade damage to their private economic actors.  In conclusion, 
the U.S. tends to promote political accountability instead of state liability in this case. Political 
accountability refers to the responsibility or obligation of government officials to act in the 
best interest of society of face consequences.685Both EU and the U.S. basically rely on the 
political accountability by changing several regulation related to the dispute (EU-banana 
regime and U.S FSC/ETI Act).686 Political accountability is a part of democracy principle 
when the political leaders are obliged to answer their constituent in regard with particular 
issue. Political accountability is a form of constitutional commitment from legislative and 
executive body to reform any legislative or executive bodies’ product in order to prevent the 
violation of constitution. It is significantly exist in a good governance system together with 
implementation of state liability principle. the distinguish between political accountability and 
state liability principle is that political accountability is performed by the legislative or 
executive bodies, meanwhile the authority to perform state liability principle is in the 
discretion of judicial body. These two principle are not be able to supplant to each other, since 
state liability principle will be implied by judicial body in relation with compensation of the 
damage due to the violation of rights. This chapter nevertheless is proving that state liability 
principle is not accomplished due to the lack of direct effect of WTO Law; it therefore entails 
non-compensation action for the private economic actors.  
 The absence of direct effect of WTO law in both the EU and the U.S. legal system 
becomes a barrier for private economic actors to obtain compensation caused by the 
infringement of WTO Law conducted by their governments.  This barrier restrains the 
accomplishment of state liability, where principally the main function of state liability is 
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684Ibid, in Uruguay Round Agreements Act Statement of Administrative Action (H.R. REP. NO. 103-826, pt.1, 
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rectifying and compensating the damage caused by the conduct of government. However, 
since the private economic actors are barred from getting compensation, it is causing the 
downfall of their trade benefits under the WTO Agreement. Meanwhile, the objective of 
WTO Agreement is enhancing trade benefits of economic actors of WTO Members.687 
 State liability principle is also a measure for any government to protect (economic) 
right of citizen, and the term of protection of rights is to render to court for any violation of 
right,688 it thus requires judicial act to account the violation of right conducted by government, 
as a part of judicial protection for individual. However, without direct effect, this measure will 
not be accomplished.  Coherently, the following Chapter discusses the friction between WTO 
law and the state liabilityin order to seek the answer to what extent is the absence of direct 
effect of WTO Law will affect the individual rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
687 See Chapter II.  Van den Bossche, Peter, Supra Note 56, pp. 39.Van den Boosche argued that “WTO is 
merely concerned of state to secure its private economic actors in involving international trade without vexation 
of other state restriction or protection on trade.  In addition, the WTO as international trade rules is necessary to 
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CHAPTER V 
THE FRICTION BETWEEN THE WTO LAW AND STATE LIABILITY 
 
1. Background 
 Chapter IV discussed about two important points in term of the implications of WTO 
retaliation to private economic actors. First, the lack of direct-effect of the DSB decision in 
the EU legal system689 is one of the reasons for the ECJ not to imply non-contractual liability 
in order to give compensation to FIAMM and Fedon Companies. And second, since the U.S. 
law (UURA) explicitly denies direct-effect of WTO law, private economic actors therefore 
are barred off to stand before the court but more to rely on legislative body to change 
legislation in order to comply with DSB decision.690 From this situation, the direct-effect of 
DSB decision is debatable in terms of implications of the WTO retaliation, since most of 
WTO Member, such as the U.S. and Canada, prevent private party from invoking DSB 
decision and rulings before domestic courts,691 private economic actors therefore are barred 
from getting compensation to recoverthe damages suffered from retaliation, to that end, 
without direct effect, state liability principle is challenging to be implied. Although EU Treaty 
recognize non-contractual liability, but it was difficult to imply it in the context of 
compensation caused by the WTO retaliation. 
 There are some arguments in regard with the direct-effect of WTO Law and DSB 
Decision in order to imply state liability in terms of the WTO retaliation to private economic 
                                                          
689 Von Bogdandy, Armin, (January 2005), ‘Legal Effect of World Trade Organization Decision within 
European Union Law: A Contribution to the Theory of the Legal Acts of International Organizations and the 
Action for Damages under Article 288 (2) EC’, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 45-66. 
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actors.692Although the ECJ do not make any distinction between direct effect of WTO 
Agreement and the DSB Decision and Rulings, this sub section discuss two different 
arguments between pros and cons of implying direct-effect both WTO Law and direct effect 
DSB Decision and Rulings to the domestic law. 
  
2. Direct- Effect to WTO Law  and DSB Decision and Rulings 
The WTO Agreements do not create direct effect to the Members, thus, it depends on 
WTO Members to decide whether WTO Agreements may produce direct effect within their 
jurisdictions,693 because in principle, international law does not interfere with the internal 
legal system of nations.  The reception of international legal rules is left to the domestic law 
of each nation. It thus depends on whether a country adopts monism or dualism theories.  In 
monist countries, international obligations are considered a part of domestic legal system with 
no act of transformation required, because both international law and national law have a 
common underlying legal basis that derives its origin from the law of nature which binds 
equally the state and individuals.694Kelsen posited that the monistic view is the result of 
analysis of the norms in positive international referring to the national legal orders. It comes 
from the standpoint that international law has connection with national law.695 For the monist 
countries, international law has what is termed direct effect to their national law.  Another 
theory is dualism theory, in dualist country, international legal obligation do not enter the 
domestic legal system unless an act of transformation occurs. Accordingly the difference 
                                                          
692See Joined Case FIAMM and Fedon,Supra Note 9, pp. 30.  See also Erico, John, Supra Note 585,pp. 197.  “In 
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contrary, Bronckers and Goelencriticized that the ECJ could not reject to imply community liability principle 
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693See Cottier, Thomas, and Schefer, K.N., (1998), ‘the Relationship between World Trade Organization Law, 
National Law and Regional Law’, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 1, Issue 1, pp. 83-122. 
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between international law and national law is fundamental. International law is binding base 
on the common will of states meanwhile national law is binding the individual within its 
jurisdiction. Since international law establishes a relation between its norms and the norms of 
the different national legal order, thus, direct effect of international law is not possible.696 
Some countries are a mixture of monism and dualism.  In these countries, certain international 
obligations will enter domestic legal system directly but some others will require an act of 
transformation.697 
Article XVI: 4 of the WTO Agreement require Members to ensure the conformity of their 
laws, regulations and administrative procedures with the WTO obligations, thus, WTO 
Members have they own discretion to comply with the WTO obligations.  The WTO 
Agreements do not regulate the manner in which a state may choose to put itself domestically 
in the position to meet its obligation. Each member can determine in accordance with its own 
constitutional practice whether to give direct domestic law effect to the WTO Agreements or 
whether to transform, adopt or incorporate those rules into domestic law by statutes or by 
some other means.698 
In term of compliance with the DSB decisions, Jackson has mentioned that states would 
be reluctant to change their domestic legislation in order to comply with DSB decision to 
avoid sovereignty diminution.699 However, if a member decides to choose not to comply with 
DSB decision, the impact is getting retaliation by the winner party to the dispute is 
unavoidable.  In the end, the retaliation is merely causing trade impact to domestic trade 
player in both Members.700 This research is focusing on state liability principle in order to 
give compensation, although to imply state liability, state should deal with several issues in 
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Akehurts’s: Modern Introduction to International Law (Seventh Edition), Roudledge – London/UK, pp.63. 
Nevertheless, in reality the opposing school between monism and dualism did not reflect actual state practice, 
it refer to argument of Fitzmaurice that, “the entire monist and dualist controversy is unreal, artificial and 
strictly based on point, because it assumes something that has to exist for there to be any controversy at all – 
which it fact does not exist – namely a common field in which the two legal orders under discussion both 
simultaneously have their sphere of activities.” See Fitzmaurice, Gerald, (1957),‘the General Principle of 
International Law Considered from Standpoint of the Rule of Law’, Recuil des Cours,Vol. 092, No. 1, pp. 71.  
 
697 See Schaefer, Supra Note 691, pp. 609-652. 
 
698See Jackson, Supra Note 93, pp. 79 -99. 
 
699See Jackson, Supra Note 487, pp. 157-188. 
 
700See Chapter III.  See also Pauwelyn,Joost, (2003),Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO 
Law Relates to Other Rules of International law, Cambridge University Press – UK, pp. 227. The suspension 
of obligation in response to breach, absolutely have a direct impact on individual operators.  
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question, such as direct effect of WTO Law and/or direct effect DSB decision in domestic 
legal system. 
The direct-effect of DSB decision so far becomes major polemic in regard with the 
relation between the WTO and individual.  Nothing in the WTO rules mentioned directly 
about this relation.  However, the Panel declared in Panel Report of the U.S. – Sections 301-
310 of the Trade Act of 1974 that “under the doctrine of direct effect which has been found to 
exist most notably in the legal order of the EC (EU) but also in certain free trade agreements, 
obligations addressed to States are construed as creating legally enforceable rights and 
obligations for individuals.  Neither the GATT nor the WTO has been so far interpreted by 
GATT/WTO institutions as a legal order producing direct effect. Following this approach, the 
GATT/WTO did not create a new legal order the subjects of which comprise both contracting 
parties or Members and their Nationals.”701 Accordingly, the WTO law does not oblige the 
Members to impose direct-effect in their domestic law, but more to discretion of the Member 
to establish concrete parameters of the relationship between the WTO law and domestic 
law.702 To this end, there are two different points of views with respect to direct-effect of 
WTO Law and DSB decision, first those who see direct-effect as political decision of a state 
or opponent to direct effect doctrine, and second those who concern that direct-effect WTO 
Law and DSB Decision is important. 
 
2.1.Argumentation about Direct-Effect of WTO Law as A Political Decision 
 In building the nature of direct-effect of the WTO law, some authors prefer to lead 
their arguments that direct-effect is a political decision.703 It refers to Chayes opinion, “it is 
natural for different laws in different circumstances bind states in different ways, thus, 
                                                          
701United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, Report of the Panel, WT/DS152/R,22 December 
1999, para. 7.72 
 
702See Tsymbrivska, Oksana, (2010), ‘WTO DSB Decisions in the EC Legal Order: Approach of the Community 
Courts’, Legal Issues of Economic IntegrationVol. 37, no. 3, pp. 185-202.  See also Cottier, Thomas, (2002), 
‘A Theory of Direct Effect in Global Law’, in European Integration and International Co-ordinationStudies 
in Transnational Economic Law in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, eds. Von Bogdany, Armin, 
Mavroidis, Petros C., and Meny, Yves, Kluwer Law International – the Hague Netherland, pp. 102,  
 
703See Trachtman, Joel P. (1999), ‘Bananas, Direct Effect and Compliance’, European Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 10 No.4, pp. 664.Trachtman emphasized that “the grant of direct-effect to a legal rule is a political 
decision, as the EC and the U.S. have recognized in different ways.” See also Cottier, Supra Note 702, pp. 
99. Cottier argued that “the whole problem of direct effect is, essentially, a matter of balance of power among 
the EC bodies”. See also Leebron, Supra Note 490, pp. 175-242. 
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critique and good positive scholarship would pursue a kind of end analysis, pointing out 
where the level of binding force is actually less or more.”704 
 From the EU perspective, the EU Treaties, along with the Council Decision is 
concluding the WTO Agreement as represent the authentic political statement by the EU 
Member States on the issue of the WTO law.705Antonidas opined about direct effect of WTO 
Law that “If the combined interpretation of the case law, the legislative activity and the 
institutional practice means that the Community (EU) legal order is a dualist that one for the 
purposes is the application of the WTO law, then so be it.  Following from this, unless the 
Community (EU) transforms the WTO law into the Community (EU) legal system by means 
of transposition into its own legal instruments, the WTO law cannot have direct-effect. This 
means that the Community (EU) chooses WTO law as a second best set of rules. In its 
internal policy making,it uses WTO law as a benchmark and accepts its primacy in its 
commercial policy instruments. It therefore tries to interpret legislation consistently with the 
WTO Agreements.”706In fact, the ECJ needs to support the supremacy of EU Law,707 thus the 
recognition of direct effect of the WTO law would deprive the ECJ from the authority to 
uphold the supremacy of the EU Law.708Bogdandy also revealed that if the WTO law has 
direct-effect, it will have a constitutional function for the EU legislator, because direct-effect 
of WTO law is the most relevant legal feature to have alleged constitutional function to 
stipulate the supremacy of international treaties over EU legislation. The ECJ does not 
exclude any effect of WTO law, but it denies direct-effect when it comes to force the 
                                                          
704Chayes, A, and Chayes, A.H., (1998), the New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements, Harvard University Press – Cambridge MA/USA, pp. 17-22. 
 
705See Kuijper, Pieter J., (1995), ‘the Conclusion and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results by the 
European Community’, European Journal of International Law, Vol.6, No.1,pp. 222-244. 
 
706Antoniadis,Antonis, (2007), ‘the European Union and WTO Law: A Nexus of Reactive, Coactive and 
Proactive Approaches’, World Trade Review, Vol. 6 No.1, pp. 45- 87, at 86.  See also Eeckhout, Piet, (1997), 
‘The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems’, Common Market Law 
Review, Vol.34, Issue No. 1, pp.11-29 
 
707Timmermans, Christian, (1999), ‘the EU and Public International Law’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 
Vol.4, No.2,pp. 181. 
 
708Antoniadis, Supra Note 706, pp. 86-87.  The scales in the balancing act could be represent by the concepts of 
monism and dualism which is monism being inherently prone to accord supremacy to international law and 
dualism to domestic law.  The catalysts for the balancing act in this sense are compatibility and direct effect. 
In fact, the Court, in Opinion 1/91, was quick to acknowledge the supremacy of the EU Treaties over 
provisions of the proposed EE Agreement. It held that the jurisdiction of the proposed EEA Court affected 
theallocation of responsibilities as defined by the EC (EU) Treaty and therefore, underminedthe autonomy of 
the Community (EU) legal order. 
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legislative institutions of the Union to comply with the WTO law.709The denial of direct-
effect of the WTO law therefore is rather the political exception for the EU approach to 
international law.710Trachtman emphasized the direct-effect of WTO Law as political bargain 
between EU and others WTO Members.  The ECJ has generally declined direct-effect of 
GATT obligations because other states do not accord direct-effect thereto.  It would create a 
bargaining disparity which would have to be accorded if the U.S. denied direct-effect to these 
obligations while the EU accorded direct-effect. Thus according to this interpretation, the ECJ 
simply is upholding political bargain, as in Portugal vs. Council Case the ECJ suggested that 
the absence of reciprocity as to direct effect would lead to an imbalance of the WTO 
obligations between EU and its trading counterpart in WTO.711 
Hence, the direct-effect of WTO Law also deprives the freedom of political institutions. 
There are two aspects of the freedom of political institutions, first, the external aspect, where 
the grant of direct effect is destined to weaken the negotiating strength of the institutions 
within the WTO in relation to the most important trading partners.  Second is the internal 
aspect, the shift of the institutional balance in external trade matters from the Council and the 
Commission to the Court. The direct-effect of the DSB Decision would also have the 
consequence that any EU legislative measure could be challenged before the court as the 
WTO incompatible.712 
 
                                                          
709Von Bogdandy, Armin, (2008), ‘Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say: On the Relationship between 
International and Domestic Constitutional Law’, International Journal of Constitutional Law (I.CON), Vol. 
6, No. 3&4, pp. 397-413. 
 
710Weiler, J.H.H., (1999), the Constitution of Europe, Cambridge University Press – UK, pp. 295-298. See also 
Klabbers, Jan, (2001-2002), ‘International Law in Community Law: The Law and Politics of Direct Effect’, 
in 21 Year Book European Law, eds. Eeckhout, Piet, Tridimas, T, and De Burca, G, Oxford University Press-
Oxford/UK, pp. 274-275. 
 
711Trachtman, Supra Note 703, pp. 655-678. See also Stoll, Peter Tobias, and Schorkopf, Frank, (2006), ‘WTO- 
World Economic Order, World Trade Law’, in Max Planck Commentaries on the World Trade Law, Max 
Planck Institute for Comparative Law and International Law, MartinusNihoff – Leiden/Netherland, pp.42.  
The provision of WTO Law does not deem to be suitable for direct application, as it considers the WTO rules 
to be subject to reciprocity and negotiation between the Members of WTO. In contrary, Petersmann argues 
that denial of direct-effect on the ground of lack of reciprocity is unjustified since almost international 
agreements are based on some kind of reciprocity. See also Petersmann, Ernst-Urlich, (1983), ‘Application of 
GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 20, Issue 
3, pp. 426.  
 
712See Jackson, Supra Note 487, pp. 315-319. Jackson mentioned that “direct effect would considerably 
strengthen the role the judiciary to the detriment of other power and thereby adversely affect the institutional 
balance as established in the national constitution. Beyond that, a directly effective international treaty 
superior to ordinary domestic legislation may be subversive to the idea of democratic representation.” See 
also Antoniadis, Supra Note 706, pp. 86-87. 
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2.2.Opponent Argument regarding Direct-effect of DSB decision 
2.2.1. Direct-effect of DSB Decision from the EU standpoint 
 Direct-effect doctrine has appeared in international law under several terms ranging 
from direct applicability and self-executing provision to direct effect.713EU Member States 
refer to classic definition of direct-effect that the objective of direct-effect is a legal provision 
granting rights to individual which must be upheld to national court.714  The European Courts 
have authority to establish whether a DSB Decision has direct- effect or not in their cases, 
such in Biret Case, Chiquita Case,the Case of Van Parys and FIAMM Case, but none from 
the judgment of those cases entail justification of direct-effect of DSB Decision, except in 
Biret case, when the ECJ considered that DSB Decision in Hormone Case was inescapably 
and directly linked to the plea alleging of the infringement of SPS Agreement, the ECJ 
therefore criticized the GC for not having explicitly addressed whether the DSB decisions 
could have direct effect and provide grounds for a review of EU Institutions acts.715 
 Nevertheless, before the establishment of the WTO, the ECJ had experience to deny 
the direct effect of GATT 1947.  The ECJ argued that the GATT had to be conceived as a 
trade/diplomatic tool, rather than a judicial one, and the flexible and imprecise agreement is 
incapable of conferring rights that citizens can invoke in domestic courts to challenge the 
lawfulness of a EU act, also preclude the Court from taking provisions of GATT into 
consideration to assess the lawfulness of a regulation in an action brought by a Member 
State.716The ECJ still implies this concept after the 1994 of WTO establishment, although in 
Biret Case, the court introduced an innovative conceptual distinction between the direct effect 
of WTO rules and reliance on the DSB Decision, thus, private economic actors potentially 
could be permitted to invoke a DSB Decision condemning the EU as a basis for claiming 
damage before the ECJ pursuant to Article 288 EC Treaty (340 TFEU).717 But the ECJ 
                                                          
713Klabbers, Supra Note 710, pp 272. 
 
714Denza, Eilleen, (2002), The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European Union, Oxford University Press – 
Oxford/UK,pp. 14, see also Cottier, Supra Note 702, pp. 105. Cottier mentioned that “direct effect may be 
prescribed or prohibited by the agreement or domestic legislation.  Usually, the matter is left for decision to 
the judge on a case by case basis.  Courts have asked as to whether a provision is sufficiently precise for 
having direct-effect.” 
 
715See Case C-93/02 P, Biret International SA para. 56; Case C-94/02 P, ÉtablissementsBiretetCie SA para. 59.  
 
716Case C-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the European Union, [1994] ECR I-4973, para. 
5073.  See also Case C-21/72, International Fruit Co. v. ProduktschapvoorGroenten en Fruit, (1972) ECR 
1219. 
 
717Thies, Supra Note 444, (Kindle) Location 317.  See also Bronckers, Marco, Supra Note 590, pp. 885-898. 
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rejected to give compensation because Biret did not suffer any damages after the expiration of 
the reasonable period of time to comply with the ruling. The reason was that Biret went out of 
business in 1995, while the fifteen-month implementation period ended in May 1999. The 
ECJ therefore considered that there was no causal link between the damage and the act of EU 
Institutions.718 And the most prominent argument from ECJ is that the court mostly relied on 
concern over the lack of reciprocity principle as a powerful reason to reject the direct effect of 
the WTO law.719The ECJ added in their judgment that evaluating the invocability of a DSB 
ruling is a conceptually separate problem from the implementation of direct effect of DSB 
decision. The ECJ also argued that giving possibility for private party to claim compensation 
for damage does not amount to the recognition of direct effect.720Thus, the ECJ recognized 
the argument relating to the legal effects of DSB decision is autonomous from that pertaining 
to the direct effect of WTO Law. Although, it confirms that the previous judgment did not 
tackle the issue of direct effect of the DSB.721 
 In Chiquita case, the Court is also giving argument in regard with non-direct effect of 
DSB decision, mentioned that “since the WTO Law has no direct effect, an action for non-
contractual liability directly based on an infringement of WTO Law would be bound to 
fail”722. However, similar to Biret case, in Chiquita case, the Court considered “the DSU does 
not establish a mechanism for judicial resolution of international dispute by means of decision 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
718Case T-174/00, Biret International SA v. Council para.57 (Jan. 11, 2002), available at(http://europa.eu.int) 
Case T-210/00,ÉtablissementsBiret et Cie SA v. Council para. 64 (Jan. 11, 2002), available at 
(http://europa.eu.int) last visited December 2012.  The ECJ rejected the appeal of Biret Company because 
according to the court a right to recover damages suffered before the end of the deadline would render 
ineffective the grant of a reasonable time period for compliance with the DSB ruling. 
 
719See Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v. Council, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395, and see also FIAMM vs. Council, 
Supra Note 16. The ECJ argument in regard with the reciprocity is merely realpolitik argument rather than 
legal argument.  See also Cottier, Supra Note 526, pp. 105. See also Snyder, Richard Carlton,(1948), The 
Most Favored Nation Clause, King’s Crown Press- NY/USA, pp.366-367.  The EU has to maintain the 
balance between its various institution and members, and minimizing possible negative implications on its 
legal order from evolving system like GATT (or WTO today). 
 
720Nsour, Mohamad F. A., (2010), Rethinking the World Trade Order towards A Better Legal Understanding of 
the Role of Regionalism in the Multilateral Trade Regime, Sideston Press – Leiden/the Netherland, pp. 194. 
Nsour opined that” Biret case can be considered a modest but promising start for creating a better legal nexus 
between a key RTA like the EU and the Multilateral system.” 
 
721See Di Gianni, Fabrizio, and Antonini, Renato, (2006), ‘DSB Decisions and Direct Effect of WTO Law: 
Should the EC Courts be more Flexible when the Flexibility of the WTO System has Come to an 
End?’,Journal of World Trade,Vol. 40 No. 4, pp. 777-793. 
 
722Ibid, pp.784.  See Case T-19/01, Chiquita v. Commission, Judgment of 3 February 2005, 
 
207 
 
with binding effect comparable with those of a court decision in the internal legal system of 
the Member States.”723 
 In Van Parys case, the ECJ observed that “obliging courts to set aside rules of 
domestic law when they are found to be incompatible with WTO rules would hinder the 
possibility of reaching a negotiated solution.  Moreover, requiring the Community (EU) 
courts to review the legality of Community (EU) measures in the light of the WTO rules, on 
the sole ground that the time-limit for implementation of the DSB decision has expired, could 
undermine the Community’s (EU) position in trying to reach a mutually acceptable and WTO 
conforming solution to the dispute.”724 In the Case of Van Parys, the ECJ concluded that Van 
Parys did not have the possibility to invoke before a national court, the incompatibility of EU 
measures with certain WTO rules, even though the DSB had declared the EU legislation to be 
incompatible with those rules. 
 In FIAMM and Fedon case, the ECJ made another statement regarding direct effect of 
DSB Decision, since those companies requested the Court to make distinction between the 
direct effect of provision of WTO Agreements which impose substantive obligations, and the 
direct effect of a ruling of the DSB. Nevertheless, according to the Court, its case law shows 
that such distinction cannot be made. “DSB decision, which has no object other than to rule 
on whether a WTO member’s conduct is consistent with the obligations entered into by it 
within the context of the WTO, cannot in principle be fundamentally distinguished from the 
substantive rules which convey such obligations and by reference to which such a review is 
carried out, at least when it is a question of determining whether or not an infringement of 
those rules or that decision can be relied upon before the Community (EU) courts for the 
purpose of reviewing the legality of the conduct of the community (EU) institutions.”725 
Hence, in this case the Court put aside again the direct effect of DSB decision. 
                                                          
723Case Chiquita v Commission,ibid. See also Cygan, Adam, (2011), ‘The European Court of Justice and 
External Relations: Internationalist Objectives or Integrationist Policy’, in The European Union and Global 
Governance: A Handbook, eds. Wunderlich, Jen Uwe, and Bailey, David J., Routledge International 
Handbook- UK, pp.112. The Court’s case law recognizes the importance of the Community International 
Trade obligations, but the policy of the judgment is that direct effect will only be permitted when WTO 
decision are themselves binding on all members. 
 
724Case C-377/02 Van Parys v BelgischeInterventie- en Restitutiebureau, Judgment of 1 March 2005.See Egli, 
Patricia, (2006), ‘Le´on Van Parys NV v. BelgischInterventie- en Restitutiebureau: ECJ judgment on effect 
of WTO agreements and dispute settlement decisions in EC law’, in ‘International Decisions’, ed. Daniel 
Bodansky, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100 No. 2, pp. 449- 454 
 
725 Joined Case FIAMM &Fedon, Supra Note 9, see also Eeckhout, Piet, (2011), EU External Relations Law 
(Second Edition), Oxford University Press – Oxford/UK, pp.372. There was no basis for distinction between 
direct effect of WTO rules imposing substantive obligations and direct effect of a DSB decision.  A DSB 
Decision could not in principle be fundamentally distinguished from the WTO Agreement as substantive 
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2.2.2. Direct Effect of DSB Decision from the U.S. standpoint 
 From the U.S. perspective, WTO supremacy is excluded as an option for the U.S. legal 
system. A subsequent federal statute always overrides a prior self-executing or having direct-
effect international agreement. Although, the decision of DSB in principle entails an 
obligation, it cannot be self-executing or directly applicable in the strict meaning of the 
words, thus, it cannot give rights for individuals.   
 However, there are some arguments leading to the concept indirect effectof DSB 
Decision in the U.S. legal system.726 Although the U.S. has declared that reports issued by 
Panel or the Appellate Body under the DSU have no binding effect under the law of the 
United States and do not represent an expression of the U.S foreign or trade policy727, but the 
U.S. courts can engage in indirect application of DSB Decision.  For example, in order to 
apply a DSB decision that found a particular U.S. measure WTO- inconsistent in a domestic 
case which is involving a similar but not identical with the U.S. measure, the court would be 
applying the DSB Decision indirectly. Furthermore, it has to be pointed out that the 
inconsistency of a U.S. measure or provision with the WTO law can concern federal statutes 
or regulations or practice of executive agencies. It will emerge indirect-effect by drawing the 
consequences from the inconsistency of a U.S. interpretation of a WTO law provision in a 
federal status, the regulation or practice with an adopted DSB Decision against the U.S. 
relating to it where the WTO inconsistency refers to the ambiguous legislative measure.  The 
U.S. courts therefore could infer authority from DSB rulings.728The indirect-effect doctrine 
has surfaced most prominent in the U.S. in connection with trade remedy law, such as 
antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguards (or escape clause) law. For example in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
rules which convey such obligations. To support this finding the court again referred to the general reason for 
the lack of direct effect of WTO law where the nature of WTO agreements is reciprocity and flexibility, room 
for discretion and scope for negotiation and also referred to Article 3 (2) DSU. 
 
726Barceló III,Supra Note 680, pp. 147-167. In the U.S. international agreements are given indirect effect based 
on the Charming Betsy canon of interpretation of federal statutes that first articulated in the early Supreme 
Court Case of Murray v. the Charming Betsy. See also Jackson, John J, Davey, William J.,and Sykes, Alan 
O. (2002), Legal Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases, Materials, and Text on the National 
and International Regulation of Transnational Economic Relations, West Publishing Company – NY/USA, 
pp. 244.  
 
727Neither federal agencies nor state governments are bounds by any finding or recommendations included such 
reports, See the interpretation of section 102 (c) of the SAA InH.R. DOC. NO.103-316, at 676 (1994). 
 
728Gattinara, Giacomo,(2009), ‘The Relevance of WTO Dispute Settlement Decision in the U.S. Legal Order’, 
Legal Issues of economic Integration, Vol. 36 no. 4, pp. 285-312. 
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Allegheny Case729, a case regarding countervailing duties, the court referred to Charming 
Betsy doctrine730when considering the effects of a DSB decision.  In this case, the court had to 
judge on a methodology followed by Department of Commerce to calculate a countervailing 
duty to be applied against a subsidized company.  In order to comply with the 
recommendations of DSB, Department of Commerce changed the methodology to calculate 
the countervailing duty according, and adopted new decision, although it would have applied 
only to future investigations.  Accordingly, the judgment of the Court did not take new 
decision, since it remained consistent with the interpretation of DSB Decision.731 
 Principally, the U.S. courts do not give direct effect, and if there is indirect effect to 
WTO law within the U.S. legal system, it is severely circumscribed and subordinated to 
political process, because it will derive from political pressure from import competing 
interest.  The Executive Branch, in favors of WTO compliance, is certainly capable to this 
political pressure. However, legitimizing political pressure can achieve a kind of optimality 
by maximizing political support for open trade by supporting open market initiatives 
whenever the costs to import competing interests are not excessive. Thus, political leaders 
who anticipate pressure to aid injured industries may be more willing to make trade 
concessions across the board if they know that they can respond the interest party by changing 
the policy.732The use of Charming Betsy doctrine is more a political responsive in a way to 
achieve indirect effect rule for the WTO, but it is not a choice with a forgone conclusion for 
an open trading system. It is likely if direct effect is granted, it would pose a big threat to trade 
remedy law in the U.S. legal system.  Since domestic application of trade remedy rules 
through agency action and deferential court review still holds open avenues for the exertion of 
political pressures, especially through the agencies.  Panel and Appellate Body decisions at 
the WTO level would be insulated from such influence. Hence, using direct effect principle 
                                                          
729Allegheny Ludlum Corp vs. U.S., 367 F. 3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 
730See caseMurray vs. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, US 64, 2L.Ed. 208 (1804). See also C.A. 
Bradley, C.A., (1998), ‘The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking of the 
Interpretative Role of International Law’,Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 86, No.7, pp. 491. Charming Betsy 
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prevail over a conflicting international obligation. 
 
731The basis claim of Allegheny Ludlum Corp. is the DSB Decision on United States – Countervailing Measures 
Concerning  Certain Products from the European Communities, WT/DS212/AB/R (9 Dec. 2002). 
 
732See Sykes, Alan O., (2004), ‘the Persistent Puzzle of Safeguards: Lessons from the Steel Dispute’, Journal of 
International Economic Law, Vol. 7, Issue 1,pp. 523-564. 
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for DSB Decision will curtail protectionism that clearly some import competing industries 
would not want those decisions to have direct effect.733 
 The status of DSB decision in the U.S. legal system has received significantly less 
consideration734, becausethere is not necessary to give direct effect in order to solve the 
problem of non-compliance of DSB decision, since domestic litigation might serve as a 
substitute for, rather than a complement to. And in general, if the reason to give direct-effect 
of DSB decision in domestic courts will enhance the certainty and predictability of the WTO 
law, it would likely produces inconsistent judicial interpretations in over 157 WTO Members 
States, because the frequent disagreements are inevitable when hundreds of domestic courts 
are all independently empowered to identify the best readings of ambiguous treaty text and 
dispute resolution reports.735 
 
2.3.  The Importance of Giving Direct-Effect to WTO Law and DSB Decision 
  Unlike those who opponents to direct effect of WTO Law, there are some arguments 
in regard with the importance of giving direct-effect to the WTO law.736  It mostly relates to 
the rights of individual to invoke treaty provision before the domestic court.  Tumlir is a 
pioneer in supporting direct effect of economic treaty in general from individual standpoint. 
He argued that “one can imagine the international economy policy commitments of 
government to be undertaken in the form of self-executing or directly effective treaty 
provisions, creating immediate private rights enforceable against one’s own government.  
These rights would be enforceable in national courts only with no sacrifice of legal 
sovereignty.”737Tumlir emphasized the notion of direct-effect is ‘granting right to individual 
                                                          
733Tarullo, Daniel, (2002) ‘The Hidden Costs of Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping 
Decisions’, Law and Policy in International Business, Vol. 34, No.1,pp.109-180 
 
734See Davies, Arwel, (2007), ‘Connecting or Compartmentalizing the WTO and United States Legal Systems? 
The Role of the Charming Betsy Canon’, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.10, Issue 1, pp.117-
149. 
 
735Dunoff, Jeffrey L., (2008-2009), ‘Less than Zero: the Effect of Giving Domestic Effect to WTO Law’, Loyola 
University Chicago International Law Review, Vol. 6 Issue 1, p. 279 -310. 
 
736Cottier, Thomas Cottier, (2007), the Challenge of WTO Law: Collected Essay, Cameron May – London/UK, 
pp. 272. 
  
737Tumlir, Jan, (1983), ‘International Economic Order and Democratic Constitutionalism’, ORDO –Jahrbuch 
Fur die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesselschaft Vol.34, pp. 71-83. See also Bourgois, J.H.J. (1996), ‘the 
Uruguay Round of GATT: Some General Comments from an EC standpoint’, in the European Union and 
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for judicial protection derives from the International Treaty’. Moreover, using the judicial 
protection would also be a safeguard for individuals who suffered damage from protectionist 
national policy.  For example, the reason for the claim of Biret and FIAMM was because the 
EU deliberately maintenance WTO inconsistent measures on behalf to protect its national 
policy. Hence if the WTO Law was granted direct effect, individual could invoke its 
provisions before domestic courts and it would be a form of judicial protection available to 
those citizen harmed by protectionist national policy.   
  The idea of giving direct effect in order to grant the rights of individual is also posited 
by Moser. He argued that “the domestic foreign trade laws of most states circumscribed the 
discretionary trade policy powers of governments only in vague terms, and protection of 
individual rights and judicial review are often less developed in the trade policy than in other 
fields of domestic economic regulation.  Trade restrictions can also be used as a mean of 
escaping the legal disciplines of domestic economic law.  It causes harmful ‘external effect’ 
not only to domestic consumers and export industries, but also to foreign trading nations.” 
Moser emphasized that an open international economic order is not dependent on 
international enforcement, but it will emerge if national governments protect certain basic 
rights (individual) and only if international contracts are enforced in the national courts.738 
In terms of giving direct effect to WTO Law, Van den Bossche also underlined the 
main argument in favor of the idea of granting direct effect is the argument of judicial 
protection for individual.  If individuals could rely on the provisions of the WTO Agreement, 
their rights to trade freely with foreigners would be judicially protected and enforced.739 
Similar to arguments above, Kuilwijk argued that “in the EC (EU) perspective, the EC (EU) 
and those Member States have committed themselves at the international level to opt only for 
the first best policy instrument. These policy instruments provide for the quickest and least 
harmful route to economic welfare.  Policy instruments which are not compatible with GATT 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Schefer, K.N., (1998), ‘The Relationship between World Trade Organization Law, National and Regional 
Law’, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 83-122. 
 
738Moser, Peter, (1990), The Political Economy of the GATT ,VerlagRuegger – Switzerland, pp. 141-150. 
 
739Van den Bossche, Supra Note 56, pp. 65-67. Contrary to this argument, Evans argued that “there is no clear 
answer to the question whether the provisions of WTO have direct effect, or whether they give rights to 
individuals and whether the individual can invoke these rights in the national courts.”  See Evans, Gail 
Elizabeth, (2000), ‘Law Making Under the Trade Constitution : A study in Legislating by the World Trade 
Organization’, in Studies in Transnational Economic Law, Vol. 14, Kluwer Law International – The Hague/ 
Netherland, pp. 214 
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law must be considered, per definition, manifestly erroneous. The Court would thereby also 
better to protect the individual rights of Community (EU) traders.”740 
Another argument is the effectiveness of WTO Agreements.  By giving direct effect, 
domestic court is able to review the implementation of WTO Agreement by legislative body. 
It should give value to the effectiveness of WTO Agreements.  Brand argued that   principally 
international law would be effectively enhanced through the observance and application in 
domestic law. But if international law has no real effect on people’s lives, then its value is 
substantially diminished.  And if international law has real effect on people’s lives, but those 
people have no access to its application, this also diminishes its value. The concept of direct 
effect of international economic law therefore carries great significance in the development of 
the relationship between the individual and international law.  Governmental institutions 
cannot ignore the importance of this concept to the developing global legal framework.741 
 
 In the European Court, some opinions are also relating to the protection of individual 
rights under the WTO Law, for example AG Alber in Biret case who emphasized that the 
WTO norms have as their object to protect individual, thus it should be directly applicable. 
Alber also proposed ECJ to declare that WTO law has direct-effect in the framework of 
damages action, because the fact that the WTO infringed are embodied in DSB Decision 
would entitle private parties to invoke them once the reasonable period of compliance has 
expired.742 Moreover, AG Alber considered that granting binding effect to DSB decisions will 
not weaken the trading position of the EU, as Members of the WTO cannot decide to maintain 
rules contrary to WTO Law.  Alemano commented that, “allowing individuals to rely on DSB 
Decision and Rulings to seek compensation for damages deriving from non-compliance may 
strike a better balance between the interests of member states and their private business 
operators, and the invocability of DSB rulings could improve the relationship between private 
operators and the multilateral trading system without modifying its flexible nature.”743 He 
                                                          
740Kuilwijk,Kees Jan, (1996), The European Court of Justice and the GATT Dilemma:  Public Interest  versus 
Individual Right, Nexes Edition Academic Publisher – The Netherland, pp.257 
 
741Brand, Ronal A.,(1997), ‘Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the United States and the European 
Union’,Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Vol. 17, Issue 1 Winter, pp. 557 – 608. 
 
742Opinion of Advocate General SiegbertAlber in Cases C-93/02 P and C-94/02 P, Biret International SA and 
EtablissementsBiret et Cie. SA v. Council of the European Union, in  EU Press Release, CJE/03/39, 15 May 
2003, pp. 120. 
 
743Alemanno, Alberto, (2004), ‘Judicial Enforcement of the WTO Hormones Ruling Within the European 
Community: Toward EC Liability for the Non-Implementation of WTO Dispute Settlement 
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referred to the argument of Advocate General Alber in Biret Case who argued  that, “the 
recognition of the direct effect of Panel or/and Appellate Body rulings would not reduce the 
margin of discretion that WTO members enjoy in the implementation process, because once 
the DSB has issued a ruling, there is no more room for negotiation, the DSB 
recommendations must be implemented.”744His opinion is strengthening the opinion of AG 
Maduro in FIAMM case who underlined that “there can be still a room for application of the 
WTO rules by the courts only in so far as that would not affect the scope for negotiations for 
the WTO disputant parties, even in the event of the dispute itself. It is because political 
freedom to negotiate continues to exist if the reasonable period of time for implementation of 
the DSB Decision had not yet expired. But, FIAMM and Fedon have fair point in seeking 
compensation due to incompliance with the DSB Decision, since the reasonable period that 
the EU had been allowed to comply with the DSB Decision had expire on 1 January 
1999.”745However, the European Courts declined to consider rights of individual to invoke a 
WTO decision in order to set aside domestic legislation.746 
 Cottier argued that the court should be able to protect citizen or private economic 
actors from denial of justice due to violation of WTO Agreements.  Because Members of 
WTO are bound by dispute settlement decision as a matter of international law, the domestic 
court and domestic authority therefore should take into account the legalization of the DSB 
Decision and its guarantees of due process and fairness as a matter of domestic law.  In 
principle, DSB Decision should be implemented and the court should refrain from applying 
domestic rules found to be inconsistent with DSB Decision.747Cottier refers to the idea of 
Tumlir regarding the importance of granting right for individual to invoke treaty provision 
before domestic court.,Tumlir emphasized that direct effect of trade treaties as a weapon 
against inherently protectionist tendencies in domestic law systems. He suggest to grant 
individuals the right to invoke treaty provision before their domestic courts in order to protect 
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them from protectionism of national policy that put in to effect by other national interest 
group.748 
Another argument is about indirect effect of WTO Law when Bronckers analyzed the 
responsibility for the conviction government toward international economic law in EU. He 
argued that “the WTO’s domestic law effect must give a place to the conviction that 
international economic law is to be meaningful to private parties, as well to the responsibility 
the EU and its institutions, they have to manage this international system sensibly in a way 
that takes the effects on European interests overall duly into account.” Bronckers  emphasized 
that direct effect can be more flexible instrument where international economic agreements 
are concerned.  One important principle developed by the court is that treaty consistent 
interpretation, whenever an EU measure permits several interpretations, the court feel obliged 
to choose the interpretation that is consistent with relevant agreement, the EU Court therefore 
develop technic to pay respect to international rules and rulings even without granting them 
direct effect. In this position, Bronckers is more perceptive to indirect effect doctrine.749 
  The major point from arguments above is that direct effect of WTO Law and DSB 
decision is important in order to give certain judicial protection for individual in terms of 
implication of WTO retaliation.  Direct effect of WTO law is also a measure for the 
effectiveness of international trade law where the effectiveness depends on whether 
international trade rules are complied with by governments and whether compliance with the 
norms actually has a constraining influence on protectionist measures and thereby furthers the 
goals of the WTO rules.750 However, giving direct effect of the WTO Law is not simple; 
many contradictory arguments appear which is entailing the friction between WTO law and 
state liability principle. In recent research some scholars such as Pettersmann, Cottier and 
Trachtman even tried to penetrate the idea of constitutionalization of the WTO Agreements, 
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in order to build direct effect doctrine in a way to give deepen reason for what the WTO 
Agreement is purposed to be.  
 
2.4. Building Direct-effect of WTO Law from Constitutional Approach of WTO 
 Some arguments are leading to the constitutional approach to build direct effect of 
WTO Law where central implication on constitutional approach to the WTO Agreement is 
constitutional norms.  Constitutional norms are rights (individual rights) and therefore the 
WTO system should evolve to a point where individuals rather than states can rely on directly 
enforceable of WTO law or it is called “direct-effect”.751 This constitutional norm of the 
WTO law is articulated by Petersmann who sets up the idea about right-based 
constitutionalization.  He argued that the WTO Agreements should be read as constitutional 
instrument. Based on this understanding, the WTO Agreement does not only employ formal 
techniques as constitutional method, but also includes various substantive principles as 
constitutional principles. These constitutional methods and constitutional principle are 
characteristic of constitutionalism. WTO law can thus be conceived a part of multilevel 
constitutional framework in multilevel trade governance. Moreover, the WTO constitution 
complements with national constitutions of national governments.752 The WTO Agreements 
may also consists not only rights and obligations among states, but also governmental 
obligations to protect private rights, such as right to trade753 and private right to judicial 
remedies.754  From this point of view, Petersmann posited that a concept of right-based 
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752Petersmann, Ernst-Urlich, (2006), ‘Multilevel Trade Governance in the WTO Requires Multilevel 
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concept of constitutionalization of WTO, Howse argued that the term of constitutionalization is the fallacy of 
constitutionalism; see Howse and Nicolaidis, Supra Note 225, pp. 307-348. 
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ECR 531, at 548 
 
754See Cass, Deborah Z.,(2003), ‘China and the ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law’, inChina and 
the World Trading System : Entering the New Millennium, eds. Cass, Deborah, Williams, Brett G., and 
Barkers, George, Cambridge University Press – Cambridge/UK,  pp. 50. Right of private to judicial remedy 
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constitutions is a democratic governance powers restrained by comprehensive guarantees of 
fundamental rights.755  Furthermore, WTO constitution can also help to set up multilevel 
restraint and to prevent human rights of citizen from being abused by government power. The 
right-based constitutionalization in the WTO is aimed to balance the state centered concept 
built in the establishment of the WTO, because like other international agreement, the WTO is 
perceived as intergovernmental rights and obligations among states to protect freedom and 
non-discrimination in international economic relations without corresponding to individual 
rights.756 The international trade relations thus need a value balance between state centered 
concept and right-based concept where the prominent value of international trade is correctly 
delivered in terms of individual benefits from global trading.  The value balance is to mitigate 
the arbitrary power of government, as Petersmann noticed that government powers risk being 
abused for distorting market competition and for redistributing income for the benefit of 
powerful group interests.757  The constitutionalization of WTO requires the subjection of 
WTO members to the rules and obligation of WTO which can be realized along the route of 
direct-effect or direct applicability of WTO rules by national court.758 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
755See Petersmann, Ernst-Urlich, (1998), ‘How to constitutionalize International Law and Foreign Policy for the 
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 Cottier is one of the WTO constitutionalists who purposed a classic constitutionalism 
where direct effect of suitable provisions of WTO law would enable the domestic judiciary to 
check the Member’s executives and legislative body who have unlimited discretion in 
applying WTO rules.  It means that constitutionalism of WTO is to control political power in 
order to safeguard the autonomy of the individual.  The constitutional approach to the 
judiciary also permits us to appraise the WTO dispute settlement institutions and the national 
courts as forming one multilevel judiciary.759It is coherence with the concept of legal 
constitutionalization of WTO law where the one of features of legal constitutionalization of 
WTO is direct effect.  Although direct effect is not necessarily relevant feature in domestic 
constitutionalization, but it may have significance in an international setting.  Because direct 
effect actually involves the integration level such in multilevel judiciary, the utilization by 
international legal rules of the more binding dispute settlement is available in domestic law. 
For example, by finding that EU law had direct effect in the courts of member states, the ECJ 
both gave EU law greater binding effect and gave individuals greater control over the 
development of the EU law.760 
 Constitutional approach of WTO principally is not merely about building direct effect 
to the WTO law, but also concern to the effectiveness of WTO. If domestic court is giving 
direct-effect to WTO law, thus, the WTO is effective in term of its relation with individual.  
Furthermore, the domestic court can give a value balance between the right of individual 
derives from WTO law and the legislative power.  This value balance will give normative 
influence when the court needs to imply state liability in order to give compensation caused 
by the WTO retaliation to private economic actors (individual). 
 However, until today, the concept of direct effect to the WTO law is still only a set of 
ideas, although direct effect is an essential requirement to imply state liability principle in 
term of WTO retaliation to private economic actors, but the majority of WTO Members 
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decline to imply direct-effect doctrine to WTO Law based on political argumentation. The pro 
and contra arguments in respect to direct effect eventually brings lots more friction to imply 
state liability principle in order to give compensation to private economic actors.   
 
3. The Friction between WTO Law and State Liability 
 WTO Law is not only about rights and obligations to conduct international trade 
among Members, but also commitments from government to their private economic actors. 
These commitments areconceivable to support their private economic actors to achieve better 
income and benefit, to promote positive result of enhancing welfare, full employment and 
large volume of real income for individual under the WTO Law.761 Hence, the WTO 
Agreementsindirectly provides wide opportunity for private economic actors to achieve trade 
benefits through their government commitments, where these commitments constitute as 
rights of private economic actors (individual in general) to trade freely across frontier, to 
enhance their benefits from international trade under the WTO agreements, and at the end to 
obtain their economic rights. 
Although the WTO Agreements do not mention directly about rights of private 
economic actors, but in WTO Panel Report of the case Section 301 – 310 of US Trade Act of 
1974 enshrined the relation between individuals and WTO law through the commitment of 
their governments.  Panel explained that “It would be entirely wrong to consider that the 
position of individuals is of no relevance to the GATT/WTO legal matrix.  Many of the 
benefits to Members which are meant to flow as a result of the acceptance of various 
disciplines under the GATT/WTO depend on the activity of the individual economic 
operators in the national and global market places.  The purpose of many of these disciplines 
indeed one of the primary objects of the GATT/WTO as a whole. It is to produce certain 
market conditions which would allow this individual activity to flourish.  Providing security 
and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of 
the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the WTO 
preamble.  The security and predictability in questions are of the multilateral trading system is 
per force composed not only of states but also, indeed mostly of individual economic 
operators.  The lack of security and predictability affects mostly these individual operators.  
                                                          
761 See Shell, G. Richard, (1995), ‘Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World 
Trade Organization’, DUKE Law Journal No. 44, pp. 830 – 925, at 877-78. See Chapter VI. 
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Trade is conducted most often and increasingly by private operators.  It is through improved 
conditions for these private operators that Members benefit from WTO discipline.”762 
 It can be drawn from the Panel report above that the relations between individual and 
WTO Law is merely depending on whether the government is willing to provide and protect 
the rights of individual to achieve better benefits from international trading under the WTO 
Agreements.  Thus, when their rights are violated, it also depends on the government to 
rehabilitate the rights by giving compensation from it. On the other hand, state liability 
principle engages with the prospective of balancing and rehabilitating individuals rights 
because of the violation conducted by the governments.   
 The concept of state liability from government to individual is not recognized by the 
WTO law. Because the nature of remedy in WTO Agreements as public international trade 
law is subject to international state responsibility principle when a Member violates the WTO 
law, it will entail an obligation to give appropriate remedy for violation of the rights of other 
Member.763It is widely recognized that private trade remedy is subject to national law. It thus 
depends on the domestic legal system of the member to imply state liability principle in terms 
of violation of WTO. Unfortunately, the absence of direct effect creates a friction between 
WTO Law and state liability.  State liability in general requires a willingness of the court to 
review the legislative product that violates individual rights, but without direct effect of WTO 
Law, the court is unable to review the national policy relating to WTO law.764The absence of 
direct effect of WTO law therefore will not create the judicial protection for individuals in a 
way to give an opportunity for them to rebalance their rights that is impaired by the violation 
of WTO Law. The absence of domestic judicial protection will also diminish the substantive 
value of WTO Law where the value of WTO Law will be effectively implied if the national 
court can relate the individual right and WTO Law by giving direct effect.765 
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763 See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001, Supra Note83 . See Article 23 (1) DSU 
“When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits 
under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered 
agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.” 
 
764 See Chapter IV 
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 Nonetheless, the friction between WTO Law and state liability can be suppressed by 
looking closer to the analytic argument of reason for establishment of the WTO Agreements 
and the provenance of state liability principle where principally there is a nexus between 
WTO Law and state liability principle. The following chapter therefore analyzes the nexus 
between WTO Law and State Liability principle.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
points out that “domestic courts would offer the best guarantee of protection of interests and rights of 
individual operators, thus making the entire GATT system more effective.” 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
THE NEXUS BETWEEN STATE LIABILITY PRINCIPLE AND THE WTO LAW 
 
1. Background 
It has been concluded in Chapter IV that in terms of the implication of WTO 
retaliation to private economic actors, state liability so far is not accomplished. The reason is 
because there is a friction between state liability principle and the WTO Law.  The friction 
occurs due to the absence of direct effect of WTO law and DSB Decision766, thus, private 
economic actors are barred to rely on WTO Law and DSB Decision to challenge the illegality 
of national trade policy which is violating the WTO Law.767 In result, private economic actors 
cannot obtain compensation from damage caused by the violation. 
 As mention in Chapter III, the characteristic of state liability principle is protecting 
individual rights, including economic rights, from the harmful act conducted by government. 
And the function of state liability principle is rectifying or compensating the damage caused 
by the infringement of individual right.768 Economic right known as right granted in national 
constitution769, on the other side it is obligation of government.770 It is inherently 
accommodating individual to pursue economic interest across frontier. In order to 
accommodate this right, government is obliged to provide rules and mechanism for every 
individual to pursue their economic interest across frontier by participating in the WTO. Since 
the WTO itself contains substantive and procedural rights as inherent obligation of 
government,771 accordingly, when a government deviate these rules and mechanisms, it thus 
will directly infringe individual economic right. And when the damage occurs, it will then 
entail the obligation to rectify and to compensate the damage according to state liability 
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principle. This argument consider as a nexus between state liability principle and WTO law.  
In order to elaborate the nexus, the following sub section discuss three points of arguments: 
1) The WTO law consists obligation of government to provide a rule and mechanism for 
individual to pursue economic interest across frontiers 
2) This obligation based on individual economic right pursuant to national Constitution. 
3) When government deviate these rules and mechanisms, it thus will directly infringe 
individual’s economic right, it will then entail the obligation to rectify and to compensate 
according to state liability principle. 
 
2. The WTO Law Consists of the Obligation of Government to Provide A Rule and 
Mechanism for Individual to Pursue Economic Interest Across Frontiers. 
 Referring to historical background of establishment the WTO Agreements, the 
founding members of GATT 1947 has been concerned in regard with the necessary of fair 
trade among nations.  In 1994 over one hundred governments took part in the Uruguay 
Round, defending the interest of countries of all sizes, stage of development and economic 
structure. All WTO Members brought their national economic interests and national trade 
policies into the negotiation in Marrakesh.   Politically WTO remains about multilateral and 
bilateral trade negotiation, therefore in every WTO negotiation rounds, Members were 
focusing on bargaining of trade obligations among them.   
 From the legal perspective, refer to Panel argument in Section 301 – 310 of US Trade 
Act of 1974 case, WTO does not only contains obligations of a Member to other Members, 
but also obligations of governments to their citizens. Panel declared that “what are the objects 
and purpose of the DSU, and the WTO more generally, that are relevant to a construction of 
Article 23? The most relevant in our view are those which relate to the creation of market 
conditions conducive to individual economy activity in national and global markets and to the 
provisions of a secure and predictability multilateral trading system (emphasize added).”772 
There are two layers of obligations in terms of WTO law. First is obligations among the 
Member States (or obligations to private economic actors in other WTO Members), and the 
second is obligations from a government to private economic actors (individual) within its 
jurisdiction. The obligation from government to its private economic actors is that the 
government is obliged to provide rule and mechanism conducive for private economic actors 
to conduct economic activity across frontier in order to pursue their economic interest.  
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 Panel also declared that “It would be entirely wrong to consider that the position of 
individuals is of no relevance to the GATT/WTO legal matrix.  Many of the benefits to 
Members which are meant to flow as a result of the acceptance of various disciplines under 
the GATT/WTO depend on the activity of individual economic operators in the national and 
global market places. The purpose on many of these disciplines, indeed one of the primary 
objects of the GATT/WTO as a whole, it is to produce certain market conditions which would 
allow this individual activity to flourish.”773 Chapter II in this research however already 
analyzed the obligation of government to provide rule and mechanism for individual to 
conduct economic activity across frontier in order to gain benefit under the WTO Agreement. 
The rules and mechanism is provided in the array of GATT/WTO Agreements including 
Annex. In this term, government also needs to consider individual rights, both substantive and 
procedural, derive from WTO Agreements.774 
 The obligation of government to provide rule and mechanism basically derives from 
economic rights granted in national constitutions775 as a legal support and protection for those 
individual to conduct economic activity across frontier. Without legal support and protection 
from their governments, including national and international legal support, these legal entities 
find a paucity of economic benefits. It thus will be relevant if the analyses continue to discuss 
that the obligation of government to provide rule and mechanism for individual to pursue 
economic interest across frontier is basically based on economic right pursuant to national 
constitution. 
 
                                                          
773Ibid, Para. 7.73. 
 
774See Chapter II 
 
775For definition of national constitution see Conant, Michael, (2009), The Constitution and Economic 
Regulation: Objective Theory and Critical Commentary, Transaction Publisher – NJ/USA, pp. 1. Basically 
the concept of constitution is the same in every country where constitution consist obligation of government 
to protect rights of individual. EU basically has created the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe or 
European Constitution.  It was ungratified international treaty intended to create a consolidated constitution 
for the European Union.  It would have replaced the existing EU Treaties with a single text, given legal force 
to the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  In 13 December 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon was created to replace the 
Constitutional Treaty.  It contains many of the changes that were originally placed in the Constitutional 
Treaty but was formulated as amendments to the existing treaties.  The Treaty Lisbon entered into force on 1 
December 2009.  See Treaty Lisbon 2009, available at: (http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text/). 
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3. The Obligation of Government to Provide Rules and Mechanisms for Individual to 
Pursue Economic Interest Across Frontiers based on Economic Rights pursuant to 
National Constitution 
 Economic rights in this context are relating to freedom to engage in economic 
activities.  It is similar to freedom to produce and freedom to trade what they produce.  In the 
means of production, trade and distribution, this freedom is not restricted by the states 
preventing from buying, selling and operating means of production.  And the relation of 
employment is that if the people are allowed to own means of production, then potential 
employees are allowed vastly greater array of potential employment.776 Accordingly, it is 
comprehensible if the argument begins with the main core of obligations of government to 
provide and to protect individual economic right derives from constitution.  
 Economic rights exist in almost all national constitution in different phrases, such as 
economic freedom777, right to work778, right to property779, right to trade or to conduct 
business780, intellectual property rights781, and other right associate with economic 
activities782. All these rights are foundation for all individual to engage in any economic 
activities, such as activity to produce goods, to provide services, to sell and purchase goods, to 
distribute goods and services, and to own the property derives from any economic activities. 
Hence, governments are obliged to provide and to protect individual economic rights in order 
to guarantee all individual to pursue economic interest where all economic rights are granted 
in their national constitutions. 
                                                          
776Petersmann, Supra Note 225, pp. 475-476.  See also McCrudden, Christopher, (2004), ‘Property Rights and 
Labor Rights Revisited: International Investment Agreements and the “Social Clause” Debate’, in The Auto 
Pact: Investment, Labor, and the WTO, ed. Irish, Maureen, Kluwer Law International – the 
Hague/Netherlands, pp. 305. 
 
777For example: Romanian Constitution Article 45, Bulgarian Constitution Article 19, Switzerland Constitution 
Article 27 
 
778For example: Constitution of Norway Article 110, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Article 15, 
Constitution of Peru, Article 24, and Japan Constitution Article 27. 
 
779For example: Japan Constitution Article 29, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Article 14, and Argentine 
Constitution Section 17. 
 
780For example: Commerce Clause and Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution, EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights Article 16, Argentine Constitution Section 14, and Article 19 para. (g) in The Constitution Of India 
1949. 
 
781 For example: Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 the U.S. Constitution,  
 
782For example: Article 33 of Indonesian Constitution. 
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 States are aware to legitimate economic interest of their citizens in the constitution.  
For example, the EU Charter contains few rights which can be clearly classified as modern 
and advanced economic rights.  The right to property is another rights recognized as the right 
of possession.783 Possessions are given a wide interpretation to include various assets acquired 
through economic activities.784 All vested rights having an economic value are included. The 
right is also including the means to earn an income from business.785 Through the protection 
of right to property, the EU Charter has certainly incorporated a wide range of economic 
activities within sphere of legal protection. The EU Charter should not be judged in isolation 
but be read with the European Union legal system. Within the European Union, the ECJ has 
held that individuals obtain rights from the treaties creating the EU which are endowed with 
economic rights. This right, however, relate to the establishment of a common market area.786 
 Similar to the EU, The U.S. Constitution also recognizes guarantee of individual to 
pursue economic interest based on economic rights.787 Economic rights are protected by the 
U.S. Constitution in the power of Congress listed in Article I, Section 8 which is recognized 
as commerce clause.  The Commerce clause is one of the most important clauses in the entire 
Constitution both in term of providing individual a mechanism to pursue economic interest 
and giving power to Congress to regulate the individual commercial activities.  Article 1, 
Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress “to regulate commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among several States, and with Indian Tribes.”788  The term of commerce 
                                                          
783Article 17 European Charter of Fundamental Rights, “Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and 
bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except 
in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair 
compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so far as 
is necessary for the general interest.” available at 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf,) last visitedat 12 December 2011. 
 
784 The European Court concluded that right to property does not only protect tangible property, but also 
intangible property such as shareholders rights were also considered property rights.  See case Lithgow and 
others vs. the United Kingdom, 8-July 1986, series A-102. See also Van Banning, Theo R.G., (2001), the 
Human Right to Property, Intersentia – Antwerp/Belgium, pp. 85-86. 
 
785See Case V.D. Mussele v. Belgium, 23/11/1983 Series A-70, Van Marlea.o. v. Netherlands, 26/06/1986 series 
A-101, and,H. v.s. Belgium, 30/11/1987 series A-117-B. These cases are pertinent to the rights to an income 
arising from the exercise of occupation or business. 
 
786Booysen, Hercules, (2007), Principles of International Trade Law as a Monistic System, Interlegal Publisher – 
South Africa, pp. 46-48. 
 
787See Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. VIII, Supra Note 328, pp. 278.     
 
788Fischel, William A., (1995), Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics, the President and Fellows of 
Harvard Publisher – Cambridge MA/USA, pp. 113. The Commerce Clause became the constitutional vehicle 
by which congress could regulate almost any private activity and any level of government. 
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as used in the Constitution means business or commercial exchanges in any and all of its 
forms between citizens of different states.  Interstate commerce or commerce among several 
states is the freedom of individual to exchange of commodities between citizens in different 
states across state lines.  And commerce with foreign nations occurs between citizens of the 
U.S. and citizens subject to foreign governments.  For domestic commerce or commerce 
within jurisdiction of one State is subject to the exclusive control of the State.789 
 The U.S. Constitution also recognizes the contract clause promulgated in Article 1, 
Section 10, Clause 1, where this provision protects the enforcement of contracts.  Contracts 
must be enforceable so that property can be exchanged.  Without freedom of contract and 
enforcement of contract by the courts, there would be little stability in financial arrangements, 
thus, uncertainty would discourage people from getting involved in economic life.790Another 
important economic right is the copyright clause, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution which states that Congress shall secure for limited times to authors and inventors 
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. These economic rights 
constitute fundamental right that is protected by the Fifth Amendment.791 The U.S. 
Constitutions emphasizes the important of property right pertinent to the liberalization of 
commerce and trade.  It is protected in so far as the states are prohibited from passing laws 
interfering with the obligation of contracts.792 
 The economic rights lay down in the constitution is a foundation for government to 
provide a legitimate rule and mechanism for individual to pursue economic interest across 
frontier.  For example the regulation of market access in order to simplify access for citizen to 
conduct their economic activity across border. The higher level of governance provides the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
789See Schultz, David Andrew, (2009),Encyclopedia of the United States Constitution, Infobase Publisher – 
NY/USA, pp. 148-149. 
 
790 See Schug, Mark C., Caldwell, Jean, Ferrarini, Tawnilun, (2006), Focus: Understanding Economics in the 
United States History, National Council on Economic Education Publisher – USA, pp. 107-114.  Other than  
commerce clause, the U.S Constitution promulgate the taxation clause, Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution states that Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes. This power enables the federal 
government to use tax revenue to pay for public goods, for example providing for national defense and 
building roads, bridges and canals. 
 
791 Fifth Amendment states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law.  It also state that the government may not take private property for public uses without paying ‘just 
compensation’ to property owners.  In other words, government may not arbitrarily take the property of 
individuals.  For example it may not nationalize business or farms. 
 
792Dietze, Gottfried, (1985), America’s Political Dilemma: From Limited to Unlimited Democracy, University 
Press of America – Maryland/USA,  pp. 66-67. 
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necessary discipline and guarantee in market access, for example the economic liberty which 
is guaranteed as fundamental rights in Swiss Federal Constitutions793, then in the regional 
level, the Four Fundamental Freedom are guaranteed by the EU Law794, and in the global 
level like the WTO enshrines market access right795 for all individual from all WTO 
Members. 
 The government commitment is to preserve economic rights in the international scope 
by participating in international economic relation such a WTO.  It has been discussed in 
Chapter II that the core of intensive international economic relations begins with individual 
economic interest.  According to Voitovich, “the global economic relation derives from 
common economic interest of states which is influenced by individual economic interest 
within the country, hence, to meet this common economic interest, state construct 
extraterritorial economic agreements which is creating international legal rules.”796Van 
Themaat also argued that “interdependency of states in economic activity is obvious to realize 
the objective of national economic interest, since historically at national level in the west, that 
is no longer possible to achieve a number of objectives of national economic policy through 
national means only. It is thus necessary to have international intervention in addition to 
international rules for liberalization and non-discriminations simply for realization of the 
objective of national economic interest.”797Henceforth, the government involves setting up 
international economic law with other governments.  International economic law therefore 
should meet the requirements of the infrastructure of national economic policies and national 
economic law,798where the national economic policy is genuinely representing the individual 
                                                          
793Article 27, Economic Freedom of Switzerland Constitution, para. (1) economic freedom is guaranteed, (2) In 
particular, it entails the free choice of profession as well as free access to and fee exercise of private 
economic activity. Available at:(http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/sz00000_.html)last visited on 6 September 
2011. 
 
794Market Access right for goods is promulgated in Free Movement of Goods, Articles 28 - 37 of Treaty 
Functioning of European Union. Available at  
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:en:PDF) 
 
795WTO recognizes market access for goods that means the conditions, tariff and non-tariff measures agreed by 
members for the entry of specific goods into their markets.  Tariff commitments for goods are set out in each 
member’s schedule of concessions on goods.  The tariff concessions in GATT 1994 are supposed to lead to 
better market access under the WTO.  Market Access right also recognized in GATS article XVI.   
 
796Voitovich, Supra Note 165, pp.4. According to Voitovich, international economic relations as a whole cannot 
be regulated in isolation by either international economic law or municipal laws.  In this sphere close 
interrelationship between international and national laws is inevitable. 
 
797Van Theemat, Supra Note 195, pp. 15-16. 
 
798Ibid, pp. 16. 
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economic interest that could be the primary reason to commit international economic law in 
the sphere of development of cross border economic activity.  Significantly, the motivation 
behind any international economic law is the intention of state to enhance its private 
economic actors to gain a broader benefit.799As Kohona argued that, “in the contemporary 
world, this would be a result in the development of closer relationship between international 
norms and domestic norms, since international economic relations tend to affect citizens.  As 
the world becomes more economically interdependent, the citizens thus will more find greater 
possibility to conduct their business and to provide better income that is affecting their quality 
of life.  The result of this, citizens of the country could be expected to assert them in more 
aggressive and require their government to respond their needs to a greater extent in 
development of international economic relations.”800 To that end, the intention of government 
to join the WTO is to enhance its private economic actors to gain broader benefits based on 
their economic rights.   
 
3.1. The Commitment of Government’s Accession to the WTO is to Guarantee 
Individual Economic Rights 
 
It has been discussed in Chapter II that the key objective of WTO Law is the 
progressive removal of barriers that prevent or make more difficult beneficial exchange 
between producers and consumers located in different countries.  The removal of barriers 
intend to enhance broad empirical support for the proposition that the WTO promotes growth, 
economic stability, in turn supports investment in the creation and protection economic rights 
for individual.801  In fact, all Members of the WTO is voluntarily accessing and adopting 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
799The motivation for all government to involve in the international economic law is to develop their national 
economic interest which is underlined inGA Res. 3281(xxix), UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 (1974) 
50,Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, Article 5, “All states have the right to associate in 
organizations of primary commodity producers in order to develop their national economies, to achieve 
stable financing for their development and, in pursuance of their aims, to assist in the promotion of sustained 
growth of the world economy. In particular is accelerating the development of developing countries.  
Correspondingly, all states have the duty to respect that right by refraining from applying economic and 
political measures that would limit it.” Available at: (http://www.un-documents.net/a29r3281.htm.) 
 
800Kohona, Supra Note 200, pp. 5. See Love and Lattimore, Supra Note 143. See also Carbaugh, Robert J., 
(2009), International Economics 12th edition, South-Western Cengage Learning-Ohio/USA, pp.27 – 29.  See 
Chapter II. 
 
801Anderson and Wager, Supra Note 226, pp.5.Relation between economic rights and interest of private 
economic actors is, private economic actors are the institution representing the group of individuals in 
achieving their economic rights.  According to international human rights law, individual has right to attain 
its economic rights, such as right to work, in article 23 (1) Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948; 
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WTO rules base on their constitutional commitment to guarantee economic interest of their 
individual, so indirectly the corresponding to individual right hence exist in the coherence 
context between the intention of the Members to join the WTO and the obligation to 
guarantee individual economic interest where the guarantee is pertinent to their obligation to 
protect and to preserve economic rights derive from their constitutions.802 Although in the 
context of WTO, the obligation is extending to other individual from other WTO Members, 
for example, based on principle non-discriminatory, Most Favored National Treatment and 
Market access, WTO Members are obliged to give the same protection to other nationals from 
other member, as it constitutes mutual concession treatment among the WTO Members.803 
It must be pointed out that although WTO and GATT do not contain individual 
guarantee of the freedom of trade, but WTO Law contains precise rules of non-discrimination 
in the sense of most favored nation treatment and national treatment which is very significant 
to guarantee functions with regard to the safeguarding of unimpeded trade. Unlike the EU 
law, the WTO also does not contain economic rights and liberties which can be invoked by 
the individual in preference to national law, which may importantly promote and secure trade 
liberalization.804However, the economic rights and liberty derives from national law of each 
WTO Members become a main purpose for all individual to involve in the international trade, 
since the accession to WTO Agreement contains several possibilities for individuals to gain 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
“everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of work and 
to protection against unemployment”. And right to own property in Article 17 (1) “Everyone has the right to 
own property alone as well as in association with others”. 
 
802This argument is about placing the national constitutional commitment above political approach which is 
contradictory with Howse who mentioned that “constitutional is viewed as the means of placing law, or the 
rule of law, above politics. In short, a constitutionalism attempts to place economic freedom above politics”, 
see Howse and NicolaidisSupra Note 751.  However, according to Hirschl, “most constitutional catalogues of 
rights place boundaries on government action and protect the private sphere (human and economic) from 
unjustified state intervention.” See Hirschl, Ran, (2004),TowardJuristocracy: The Origins and Consequences 
of the New Constitutionalism, the President and Fellows of Harvard College Press – Harvard/USA,   pp. 47 -
49. 
 
803  See Panitchpakdi,Suphachai, (2001), ‘Balancing competing interest: The Future role of the WTO’, in The 
Role of the World Trade Organization in Global Governance, ed. Samson, Gary P., United Nations 
University Press – Tokyo/Japan, pp.29-36.  The main reason for this mutual treatment is for balancing 
competing interest among the WTO members. 
 
804See Stoll and Schorkopf, Supra Note 711,pp. 36 – 38. Stoll and Schorkopf argued that “without the driving 
force of directly applicable individual trade rights which take priority over national law, the liberalization of 
trade rests entirely with the Members, which by the way, very well take on interests and complaints of 
individuals, and thus indirectly bring the rights and interest of individuals into play.” 
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their economic interest.805 In the light of it, when WTO creators negotiate the multilateral 
trading system, they create objective of WTO Law in accordance with economic right of 
individual. The government therefore relies on this objective in regard to provide rule and 
mechanism for individual to trade across border. 
In order to support the argument above, the following sub section discusses the 
analytical approach of objective of the WTO and its relation to economic rights. 
 
3.2. Correlation between the Objective of the WTO and Economic Rights. 
 The objective of WTO defines as “to raising standard of living, ensuring full 
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, 
and expanding the production of good and services”,806 elaborates the relation between the 
existent of right of individual to raise standard of living and full employment derives from 
WTO and the economic activity as an engine for such economic growth that is basically 
fuelled by individual activity. The success of the WTO, increasing the world’s economic 
welfare depends to a considerable extent on individual initiatives.807 Thus, the objective of the 
WTO of increasing human welfare with an open trading system that fosters employment and 
development at the same time requires and promotes individual freedom and economic rights. 
Economic rights serve trade interest because they enhance economic potential and protect 
economic freedoms.808Economic freedom in this context refers to the achievement of 
                                                          
805Comparing to the argument of Petersmann regarding the WTO constitutionalization concept when the WTO 
Members have no responded to the U.S. proposal for human rights approach to international trade and 
emphasize that the WTO rules and policies remain members driven or producer driven for benefit of 
powerful ‘rent seeking interest group’ and it would be detriment of general consumer welfare and citizen 
rights.  However, basically, the intention of all Members to access the WTO is for the benefit of all individual 
within its jurisdiction and extends to other Members’ individual.  See Petersmann, Supra Note 752, pp. 475-
476.   
 
806The interpretation of objective of WTO Agreement refers to WTO Panel Report, Section 301 – 310 of US 
Trade Act of 1974, Supra Note 762, Section ( c ), para. 7.74,  "… the ordinary meaning … in the light of [the 
treaty's] object and purpose",  which is similar language in the second preambles to GATT 1947 and GATS. 
The TRIPS Agreement addresses even more explicitly the interests of individual operators, obligating WTO 
Members to protect the intellectual property rights of nationals of all other WTO Members. Creating market 
conditions so that the activity of economic operators can flourish is also reflected in the object of many WTO 
agreements. 
 
807 Refer to WTO Panel Report, Section 301 – 310 of US Trade Act of 1974, Ibid, para. 7.77. See also Van den 
Broek, Naboth, (2009), “Enforcing WTO Compliance through Public Opinion and Direct Effect: Two New 
Proposals to enhance the Compliance Perspective for Least Developed WTO Members”, in Frontiers of 
Economics and Globalization, Trade Disputes and the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO: An 
Interdisciplinary Assessment, ed. Hartigan, James C. Hartigan, Emerald Group Publishing: Bingley/UK, pp. 
453. See also Davies, Supra Note 105, pp. 31-67. 
 
808See Choudhury,Barnali,Gehne, Katja, Heri, Simone, Humbert, Franziska, Kaufmann, Christine, and Schefer, 
Krista Nadakavukaren, (2011), ‘A Call for a WTO ministerial decision on trade and human rights’, in The 
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economic rights, such as right to property, right to conduct business or right to work, and 
intellectual property right.809 
  
1) “The  achievement of trade and economic endeavor should be conducted with a view 
to raising standards of living” 
As mention before that the WTO Law is a rule and mechanism for private economic 
actors (individuals in general) to conduct trade across frontier that is negotiated by their 
governments. This trade rule and mechanism based on the intention of all WTO Members to 
conduct trade and economic with a view standard of living for all individual by expanding 
trade in goods and services and reducing barriers to trade.810Tariff concession and Non Trade 
Barriers consider as a rule that is provided for private economic actors to simplify their 
economic activities across border.  With this rule, they are supposed to pursue economic 
interest while the government is supporting it by its constitutional commitment to protect right 
to obtain profit from economic activity as a broader concept from protection of right to 
property.811 
 From the national perspective, individual right to property, as a part of economic right, 
becomes a major intention for each nation to involve in the WTO.  The establishment of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Prospect of International Trade Regulation: From Fragmentation to Coherence, eds. Cottier, Thomas,  and 
Delimatsis, Panagiotis, Cambridge University Press – Cambridge/UK,  pp. 323 -333. 
 
809For definition of economic freedom see Gwartney and and Lawson, Supra Note 153, pp. 5. The key 
ingredients of economic freedom are personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to compete, and 
protection of person and property. Institutions and Policy provide an infrastructure for voluntarily exchange 
and protect individual and their property from any aggressions. Government promotes economic freedom by 
providing a legal structure and a law enforcement system to protect the property rights and enforce contract. 
 
810See the interpretation of preamble of GATT in Appellate Body Report, EC — Bananas III (Article 21.5 — 
Ecuador II)WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, 26 November 2008, EC — Bananas III (Article 
21.5/US), WT/DS27/RW/USA,19 May 2008 para. 433,  
 
811See argument regarding the protection of right to obtain profit from economic activity, See case Case 4/73 
Nold v. Commission (1974) ECR 491when the court declared that Commission deprived the fundamental 
rights of Nold of free development of its business activity in result it jeopardized the profit from conducting 
business. Case V.D. Mussele v. Belgium, 23/11/1983 Series A-70, Van Marlea.o.v. Netherlands, 26/06/1986 
series A-101, and H. v. Belgium, 30/11/1987 series A-117-B.  See also opinion of Sir Gordon Slynn in Case 
SA Biovilac NV v. European Econonomic Community, case 59/83, judgment of the Court 6 December 1984.  
A.D. Slynn opined that “in regard with Community acts affecting a person’s business activities and causing 
economic loss, such an action, if existing at all, must be within a narrow compass.”  Similar to it in the U.S., 
see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), when the Court upheld Congress's power under the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act to impose a quota on wheat grown by a single farmer primarily for personal consumption. 
The Court found that while personal growth and consumption of wheat might not, by itself, directly affect 
commerce, the cumulative impact of individual conduct, aggregated among many farmers, could affect the 
price and availability of wheat and, thus, interstate commerce. The quota also considers depriving the right of 
individual to property. 
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secure and stable right to property has been a key element in the rise of modern economic 
growth.  It stands to reason that a private economic actor or individual would not have the 
incentive to accumulate and innovate unless they have adequate control over the return to the 
assets that are thereby produced or improved, and at the end individuals have right to enjoy 
the benefit from it.812 In relation with the objective of the WTO, the protection of this right 
will elevate the full raising of standard of living when individual has right to obtain and enjoy 
benefit from their economic activity, without any restriction or deprivation from the national 
policy.813The objective of the WTO accommodates the promotion of rights lie exclusively in 
the international economic sphere, such as the rights of exporters and importers to enjoy of 
property and freedom of contract, non-discrimination in relation to other like industries, and 
freedom of movement of goods and services across border.814 
 These rights are protected by the national constitution, for example, freedom of 
commerce derives from the U.S. Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Bill of Rights, EU Charter 
recognize Article 16 (Freedom to conduct a business) and Article 17 (Right to property), 
Right to property in Japan Constitution Article 29, and protection on right to property in 
Argentine Constitution Section 17. 
 
2) “Full employment” 
 Historically in 1944, the statesmen of Bretton Woods attempted to design a world 
economic order toward full employment and high rates of growth.  This was a goal of the 
Bretton Woods negotiation to allow for domestic planning and full employment within each 
nation and to avoid the instability created by a global system driven purely by market forces, 
because the escalating instability of laissez-faire capitalism during the 1920 and the 
                                                          
812Rodrik, Dani,, (2002), ‘Trade Policy Reform as Institutional Reform’, in Development, Trade, and the WTO: 
A Handbook Issue 1, eds. Hoekman, Bernard M., Matto, Aaditya, and English, Philip, the World Bank – 
Washington DC/USA, pp. 4-5. 
 
813Relevant to argument above, refer to opinion of General Advocate Alber regarding violation of fundamental 
right conducted by the EU Institutions when they refused to comply with DSB Decision in Hormone Case. 
See opinion of Advocate General Siegbert Alber Supra Note 742. 
 
814See Hart, Michael, (2008), From Pride to Influence: Towards a New Canadian Foreign Policy, UCB Press – 
Vancouver/Canada, pp. 42. Hart pointed out that “the international rules governing allocative efficiency are 
predicated on the view that private markets and individual initiative are critical to growth and prosperity.  
Governments’ development of trade and investment rules also accepts that the ability of the state to dispense 
distributive justice may be severely compromised if it undermines the ability of the private economy to 
achieve allocative efficiency. Thus the objective of WTO relate to a steady increase in the confidence of 
traders and investors, leading to expanding international exchange and growing individual, national and 
global prosperity.” 
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destructive retreat autarky and currency blocs during the 1930s, which in turn led to extreme 
nationalism and to a second world war.815 Henceforth, learning from the historical experience 
of protectionism and nationalism, states are more aware in progressive removal protectionism 
to be more liberalized in order to achieve full employment condition for individuals. Because 
when a nation becomes more industrialized it becomes more necessary to secure the services 
of suitable trained people in the factories and workshops.  Such people are now able to 
command higher salaries and wages than was formerly possible. They pursue their 
governments to be more functioning to perform in the economy, as stabilizer, as a planner of 
public investment, as guarantor of high employment, as arena of social bargaining and as 
custodian of benign welfare state. To some extent, in such circumstances a country will 
automatically secure the development of those branches of manufactured which are best 
suited to its own particular situation.816This was a reason for governments to establish an 
international trade organization which has purpose in providing a wide opportunity for their 
individuals to expand their economic activities in order to obtain full employment result.   
 The WTO creator therefore created a rule and mechanism that is relating to 
employment. For example, the GATT has several provisions relating to employment, such as 
GATT Article XII: (3) para. (a) mentions that “contracting parties undertake, in carrying out 
their domestic policies, to pay due regard to the need for maintaining or restoring equilibrium 
in their balance of payments on a sound and lasting basis and to the desirability an 
uneconomic employment of productive resources.” It is relating to domestic policies directed 
toward the achievement and maintenance of “full and productive employment”.817 
 Employment dimension also plays a role in other WTO Agreements, for example in 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), Article 15(4) 
                                                          
815See Bordo, Michael D., (1993), ‘The Bretton Woods International Monetary System: A Historical Overview’, 
inA Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary System, eds. Bordo, 
Michael D., and Eichengreen, Barry, University Chicago Press – Chicago/USA,  pp. 1-5. The architect of 
Bretton Woods’s system wanted a set of monetary arrangements that would combine the advantage of the 
classical gold standard with the advantage of floating rates i.e. independence to pursue national full 
employment. 
 
816Kuttner, Robert, (1999), the End of Laissez-faire: National Purpose and the Global Economy after the Cold 
War, University of Pennsylvania Press – Penn/USA, pp. 3-25.  According to the Keneysian theory which is 
qualified free traders, they considered the systemic commitment to high growth, planning and full 
employment necessary to make porous domestic market politically endurable.  In the absence of such a 
global regime, nations might have to limit free movement of capital and goods in order to practice keneysian 
in on country. 
 
817GATT Article XII: (3) para. (d), “The contracting parties recognize that, as a result of domestic policies 
directed towards the achievement and maintenance of full and productive employment or towards the 
development of economic resources …” 
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underlined “the examination of the impact of the subsidized imports on the domestic industry 
shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on 
the state of the industry, including employment”.818Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, 
Article 6 (3), also regulate a standard examination of the effect of import to be able to relate in 
to employment.819 The most profound agreement regarding employment is GATS where in 
Article V bis: Labor Markets Integration Agreements states that WTO Agreement shall not 
prevent any of its Members from being a party to an agreement establishing full integration of 
the labor markets between or among the parties.820 Another rule regarding employment in 
GATS is Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services.  This annex applies to 
measures affecting natural persons who are service suppliers of a Member, and natural 
persons of a Member who are employed by a service supplier of a member.821 
 WTO Members thus should concern to the meaning of full employment. From 
domestic sphere the context of full employment is pertinent to economic rights which 
constitutes as foundation for all individual to earn personal income derive from their 
economic activity. National trade policy should not deprive this right since it is essential 
foundation for all individual in order to gain the benefit from trade across frontier subject to 
WTO Law. 
 
 
                                                          
818Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), Article 15 (4), underlined that “The 
examination of the impact of the subsidized imports on the domestic industry shall include an evaluation of 
all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including actual and 
potential decline in output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, return on investments, or utilization of 
capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, 
employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments and, in the case of agriculture, whether 
there has been an increased burden on government support programs.” See also Appellate Body Report in 
Case United States-Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors 
(DRAMS) from Korea, WT/DS296/AB/R, 27 June 2005. 
 
819Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Article 6 (3) states “In making a determination of serious damage, or 
actual threat thereof, as referred to in paragraph 2, the Member shall examine the effect of those imports on 
the state of the particular industry, as reflected in changes in such relevant economic variables as output, 
productivity, utilization of capacity, inventories, market share, exports, wages, employment, domestic prices, 
profits and investment; none of which, either alone or combined with other factors, can necessarily give 
decisive guidance.” 
 
820 GATS Article V bis: Labor Markets Integration Agreements. it is relating to GATS Article VI (6) regulate “In 
sectors where specific commitments regarding professional services are undertaken, each Member shall 
provide for adequate procedures to verify the competence of professionals of any other Member.” 
 
821GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services, para (1). However this rule is exempted 
from natural persons seeking access to the employment market of a Member, nor shall it apply to measures 
regarding citizenship, residence or employment on a permanent basis as underlined in para. (2). 
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3) “Trade security and predictability” 
 According to Panel Report in Section 301 – 310 of US Trade Act of 1974 Case, the 
multilateral trading system is, per force, composed not only of States but also, indeed mostly, 
of individual economic operators. The lack of security and predictability affects mostly their 
individual operators. Hence, providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading 
system is another central object and purpose of the trade system which could be instrumental 
to achieve the broad objective of the WTO Agreements.822 To this end, the government 
should take necessary measure to provide stability and predictability trade mechanism in 
order to protect individual economic right related to trade or business. For example, refer to 
statement of Argentina in the case of Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, 
Textiles, Apparel and Other Items that the government of Argentina concern to provide 
stability and predictability of trade mechanism which is promulgated under the Law No. 
22.415 whereby importers have procedural right to challenge any duties assessed beyond the 
bound rate which purportedly a part of Argentine Law.823This procedural right derives from 
right to trade and to conduct business underlined in the Argentina Constitution.824 
 In this proceeding, Argentina also stated that the stability and predictability of 
concessions in its Schedule were supported by Section 75 paragraph 22 of the Argentine 
Constitution of 1994.825 These commitments were at the top of the legal hierarchy and, 
therefore, took precedence over domestic legislation. Any judge in Argentina had the power 
to declare, at the request of an interested party, the unconstitutionality of any measure adopted 
in breach of rules contained in an international treaty, such as the WTO 
Agreement.826Accordingly, Argentina is a WTO Member who adopts direct effect of WTO 
law underlined in the constitution. 
                                                          
822WTO Panel Report, Section 301 – 310 of US Trade Act of 1974, Supra Note 762, para. 7.75 – 7.76. See also 
Appellate Body report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R,WT/DS10/AB/R , 
WT/DS11/AB/R, 4 October 1996, see also Appellate Body Report in  India-Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted in 19 December 1997, see 
also Panel Report of the case of Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and 
Other Items, WT/DS56/R, 25 November 1997, para. 6.29. 
 
823See Panel Report of the case of Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and 
Other Items, WT/DS56/R, 25 November 1997, para. 3.215 – 3.217. 
 
824Constitution of the Argentine People, Section 14 states “All the inhabitants of the Nation are entitled to the 
following rights, in accordance with the laws that regulate their exercise, namely: to work and perform any 
lawful industry; to navigate and trade …” available at: (http://www.senado.gov.ar/) last visit 12 July 2013. 
 
825Ibid, CHAPTER lV, Powers of Congress, Section 75, para. 22. 
 
826See Panel Report of the case of Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and 
Other Items, Supra Note  823, para 3.214. 
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4. The Obligation of Government to Imply State Liability as a Result of Violation of 
WTO Law, based on infringement of Economic right 
 There are two different consequences if a national trade policy infringes trade rule and 
mechanism provided in the array of WTO Agreements. First, the national trade policy 
infringes the WTO Law which violates individual right to trade and to gain benefits under the 
WTO rules. Second, the national trade policy infringes the WTO law, causing the retaliation 
from other WTO Member where the retaliation itself at the end violates individual right to 
gain benefits under the WTO Law.   
4.1. Infringement of Fundamental Rights in Biret Case 
  EU had several experiences regarding the consequence of violating WTO Agreement 
where this violation is deemed as infringement individual economic right. One of the 
examples is Biret Case. In this settled case, Biret Company claimed to have suffered damage 
as a consequence of EU Legislation prohibiting the importation of hormone treated 
meat.827Biret referred to the DSB Decision in Hormone Case828 that EU ban on imports of 
meat and meat products from cattle treated with any of six specific hormones for growth 
promotion purposes was inconsistent with the provisions of the SPS Agreement, and required 
EU to lift the hormone ban in the absence of any scientific risk assessment of harm.829Biret 
sought damage for the EU’s failure to comply with the WTO law because the EU refused to 
implement the DSB Decision in the Hormone Case. However, the GC rejected the claim for 
damage because the GC did not identify the unlawful conduct of EU. The court also denied 
the possibility for individuals to rely on provision of the WTO Agreements in order to 
establish unlawful conduct of the EU Institutions.830 According to the court, since the EU 
Directive were adopted before SPS Agreement came into force, the court could not logically 
‘expressly refer to’ or ‘implement’ particular obligation of the SPS Agreement. Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
827 Council Directive 96/22/EC of 29 April 1996, OJ 1996 L 125/3; Council Directive 88/146/EEC of 7 March 
1988, OJ 1988 L. 70/16 Council Directive 81/602/EEC of 31 July 1981, OJ 1981 L 222/32 
 
828EC-Hormones case, WT/DS26/13 and WT/DS46/13, 19 February 1997. 
 
829Panel Report: EC-Hormones case (complaint by the U.S.),WT/DS26/R/USA and EC-Hormones (complaint by 
Canada), WT/DS48/R/CAN, 18 August 1997. Appellate Body Report: WT/DS/26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R, 
16 January 1998. 
 
830Biret Case, Supra Note 479,   the GC refused to review EU Legislative on hormone based on the ‘nature and 
structure of the WTO Agreements’, the reciprocal character of WTO obligations and the need to maintain the 
discretion enjoyed by the EU Institutions, similar to that enjoyed by bodies of the EU trading partners. 
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neither the existence of a DSB rulings identifying the unlawfulness of the EU measure nor the 
lack of its implementation in the present case were considered as possibly modifying the 
scope of the EU courts legality review regarding the compatibility of EU measures with the 
EU’s WTO law obligations.831 
 In this case, Biret Company also claimed that the ban was contrary to the principle of 
the protection of legitimate expectations.  Since they could legitimately expect that, first, the 
prohibition on the hormones would only be temporary, pending an appropriate scientific 
assessment as to whether or not they posed a risk for human health and, secondly, that the 
scope of the derogation provided for in Article 7 of Directive 88/146 would gradually be 
extended to include the categories of animals in the U.S which it had planned to import into 
the EU.832 However, the GC held that the ban did not frustrate the legitimate expectation of 
Biret Company affected by the prohibition of the use of the hormones in question, because 
traders were not entitled to expect that a prohibition on administering the substances in 
question to animals could be based on scientific data alone. Furthermore, Biret Company did 
not set up its business until after the adoption and entry into force of Directive regarding 
hormone ban.833 
 G.A. Alber in Biret Case opined that the GC’s reasoning to refuse to comply with the 
DSB Decision is infringing fundamental right or economic right of Biret Company. 
Fundamental right is affected in its core when Biret Company cannot continue their normal 
commercial activities because the EU has decided not to comply with a WTO law which is 
affecting their business.834 Thus, it is unfair to deny a citizen a damages claim where the EU 
legislature (regarding the Hormone Ban), through its action, had continued to maintain a state 
of affairs contrary to WTO law for a period of four years after the expiry of the period 
allowed for implementation of the DSB recommendation, and thereby further unlawfully 
reduced the fundamental rights of the citizen.835AG Alber argued that EU Courts must not 
                                                          
831Ibid 
 
832Ibid 
 
833Ibid 
 
834 See BronckersandGoelen, Supra Note 692,pp. 399–418. 
 
835 See Opinion of AG Alber, Supra Note  742,  para 91-92 
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disregard the freedom of trade and freedom to pursue economic activity that has been 
expressed in more recent judgment.836  
 According to AG Alber, trade in States organizes on market economy principle is 
conducted primarily by private individuals. In particular, provisions on SPS Measures such as 
those contained in the SPS Agreement are of considerable importance to citizens engaged in 
trade. It is apparent from the first recital in the preamble to the SPS Agreement, Article 2 (3) 
that the agreement is intended to prevent a disguised restriction on international trade. 
Restriction on trade through the adoption of SPS measures are in discrimination between 
domestic and imported goods and those engaged in the trade such goods. Restriction on trade 
therefore affects the citizen’s freedom to pursue an economic activity. Meanwhile the ban of 
hormone constitutes a restriction to trade for Biret Company.837 
 AG Alber referred to the Kampffmeyer case when the Court held that the Regulation 
of the Council on the progressive establishment of common organization of the markets in 
grain was directed to ensuring appropriate support for the agricultural markets of the Member 
States during the transitional period and on the one hand to allow the progressive 
establishment of a single market by making possible the development of the free movement of 
goods within the EU on the other.  The interest of the regulation that was intended to protect, 
is of a general nature not to prevent the interest of individuals which are engaged in EU 
trade.838 It is similar to the rules on liberalization contains in the WTO Agreements and the 
provisions of the SPS Agreement that is, in fact, intended to protect individual interest. 
  The opinion of AG Alber is relevant to Panel report in Section 301 – 310 of US Trade 
Act of 1974 where “trade is conducted most often and increasingly by the private operators. It 
is through improved conditions for these private operators that Members benefit from WTO 
disciplines. The denial of benefits to a Member which flows from a breach is often indirect 
and results from the impact of the breach on the market place and the activities of individuals 
within it (emphasized added).”839 
  
                                                          
836Ibid, See Case 240/83, Procureur de la République v. Association de défense des 
brûleursd'huilesusagées (ADBHU), (1985), ECR 00531.  
 
837Opinion AG Alber, Supra Note 742,   para. 117. See also Chapter II. 
838
See  Joined Case 5, 7 and 13 to 24-66, Firma E. Kampffmeyer and others v Commission of the EEC, 
(1967), ECR 00245, pp 933 & 262 
839See WTO Panel Report, Section 301 – 310 of US Trade Act of 1974, Supra Note 762, Para. 7.77 
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 In conclusion, the hormone ban that restricts Biret Company to conduct their 
economic activities under the WTO Agreement is infringing the right to pursue economic 
activity which is granted in the EU Charter Article 16 (Freedom to conduct a business) and 
Article 17 (Right to property). It is also contrary to the main objective of WTO Agreement 
that WTO Member should support their private economic actors to pursue economic interest 
across frontiers with a view standard of living for all individual by expanding trade in goods 
and reducing barriers to trade. In this context, the ban is deemed as barrier to trade, while 
basically Biret Company has inviolable right to trade protection by EU Charter. Hence, since 
this case concerning the infringement of fundamental right, Biret Company is entitled to 
obtain compensation in order to rectify the damage caused by the hormone ban. Pursuant to 
EU Liability principle, the EU can be held liable if there is a serious breach of rule conferring 
rights on individual, they have acknowledged that breaches of rule conferring individual 
rights can constitute the basis for compensation.840 
 
4.2. Infringement of Fundamental Right in FIAMM Case 
 In the FIAMM and Fedon case,841 the applicants acknowledge that enforcement of 
punitive tariff infringed the right to property included the freedom to conduct a business 
embodies in Article 16 of the EU Charter, which represents a particular form of freedom of 
profession. The A.G. Maduro was strengthening applicants’ argument by mentioned that “the 
damage on which they rely is unusual which it constitutes sufficiently serious harm to the 
attributes of the right to property, and to rule on whether that damage is special.”842 
Accordingly, the damage caused by WTO retaliation constitutes infringement of economic 
right based on EU Charter Article 16. This infringement is supposed to lead to non-
contractual liability and responsibility of EU legislative institutions.843 
 To analyses this case, it necessary refers to the substance of FIAMM claim of 
infringement right to property and right to pursue economic activity.  According to FIAMM, 
the EU Institutions infringed they rights because they have to pay prohibitive customs duty on 
                                                          
840 See Schneider Case, Supra Note 389. The GC acknowledges that the right to heard is infringed by the EU 
Institution as legal basis to compensation. 
 
841See Chapter IV 
 
842
See Opinion of AG Maduro, Supra Note 509. 
 
843See case 4/73 Nold v. Commission (1974) ECR 491, Supra Note 392,   see also Case  V.D. Mussele v. Belgium 
23/11/1983 Series A-70, Van Marlea.o.v.Netherlands, 26/06/1986 series A-101, and H. v. Belgium, 
30/11/1987 series A-117-B. 
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their imports of batteries into the U.S. and to relocate their production facilities.844 They 
challenged the provision of Banana market regulation interfered with the export operation in a 
manner that impaired the very substance rights, because the duty tariff hit the core of their 
trade activities.845The opinion of AG Maduro in FIAMM and Fedon Case regarding the 
infringement of individual rights can be divided into two coherent factors. First, the factor that 
the damage is unusual and special which is causing the infringement of individual rights 
become the main reason for FIAMM and Fedon companies to obtain compensation and the 
second, the retaliation of WTO caused by non-compliance of DSB decision become a 
supporting factor where the damage is coming from. 
 It thus necessary refers to the opinion of Advocate General Sig A. Trabucchi in Nold 
Case in 1974, in order to see legal reason that the prominent foundation to compensate the 
damage is infringement of individual rights. AG Trabucchi argued that the established right to 
the status of Nold as a direct coal wholesaler virtually on the basis that anyone has the right to 
carry out such an economic activity according to the principle of freedom of trade. It is not 
only concurrent to the spirit and to the very aims of the ECSC Treaty but much more 
generally, to the requirement to the modern organization of society. When Nold is unable to 
satisfy the conditions on the right of direct access to coal supplies, the EU Executive has any 
power to intervene in the economy which is consequently deprived of the possibility of 
carrying on direct trade. Hence, The ECJ needs to ensure the application of the Treaties of law 
which means that the Court should be particularly sensitive when dealing with problems that 
concern those fundamental rights forming the basis of every civil society. The respect for 
liberty, for property ownership, the declaration of principles of equality, of non-
discrimination, of proportionality are form a part of the framework for the whole EU system 
that may never been deviated.846 
 The court need to consider principle quarom cause omneiusconstitutum (every law has 
been created for the sake of the men) which also proclaimed in modern constitutions, such an 
Article 14 of German Constitution.847 The Court must ensure respect for these fundamental 
                                                          
844Joined Case FIAMM &Fedon, Supra Note  9,   para.94 
 
845Thies, Supra Note 444, (kindle) Location 4913. See also Case Cartondruck, Supra Note 538, Para. 89 
 
846Opinion General Advocate Trabucchi in Case 4/73,J. NoldKohlen- und Baustoffgrosshandlung v Commission 
of the European Communities, (1974), in Common Market Law Review No. 2,pp.348 – 350. 
 
847German Constitution Article 14 [Property, inheritance, expropriation] recognise: (1) Property and the right 
of inheritance shall be guaranteed. Their content and limits shall be defined by the laws.(2) Property entails 
obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good.(3) Expropriation shall only be permissible for the public 
good. It may only be ordered by or pursuant to a law that determines the nature and extent of compensation. 
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right which the EU must adopt by recognizing that there are limits to the activity of organs 
and individuals and by, if necessary, recognizing liability. Both forms of recognition conform 
to the realities and to the requirements of the various forms of protection. The very important 
of the essential forms of recognition of fundamental rights requires that they should be 
invoked as a general ground by which to deny a more specific obligation or to impede the 
demands of social conduct which requires that everyone should accept limitations and 
sacrifices in exercising his rights.  Indeed, the right of the individual is always also the result 
of limiting an aspect of liberty. Like every freedom, an individual right is not without its 
limits: every right must therefore be exercised in accordance with the rules which govern it. 
The EU order certainly cannot disregard the right of every citizen to engage in trade. The 
protection of the public interest, both by national legal orders and by the EU legal order, does 
however limit in several respects the exercise of trading activity.848 
 Base on opinion AG Maduro, Bronckers argued that “the reasons that the Court of 
Justice to reject such liability are not convincing. Governmental liability for special and 
unusual damage does not block policy choices of the EU legislator, it merely encourages the 
legislator to make policy choices more cautiously, and there is nothing wrong with that. One 
will recall that the EU attaches great importance to the rules-based trading system embodied 
in the WTO. When the EU occasionally deviates from these rules it is simply unjust to pass 
on the damage to some randomly selected European entrepreneurs.  This also affects their 
fundamental right of freedom to conduct a business as guaranteed in the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.”849Thies, in this context also argued that “in the FIAMM and Fedon 
Case, the ECJ has not analyzed in the context whether the specific, allegedly infringed WTO 
law provision conferred rights or were meant to protect the interest of individual.”850 In fact, 
several provisions of the WTO agreements are at least in the interest of individual, since they 
are meant to regulate and protect individual trade activities.851 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Such compensation shall be determined by establishing an equitable balance between the public interest and the 
interests of those affected. In case of dispute respecting the amount of compensation, recourse may be had to the 
ordinary courts. Available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm#14 , visited on 14/03/14. 
848Opinion General Advocate TrabucchiSupra Note 846. 
 
849See Bronkers and Goelen, Supra Note 692. 
850Thies, Supra Note444  (kindle); Location  5030. 
 
851See Chapter II 
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 From the opinion of AG Trabucchi in Nold Case and the Opinion of AG Maduro in 
FIAMM and Fedon case, and argument Bronkers and Thies.  There are some points can be 
concluded 
1. In order to make a decision in regard with EU Liability, the court need to consider the 
fundamental right as a general ground by which to deny a more specific obligation or to 
impede the demands of social conduct which require that everyone should accept 
limitations and sacrifices in exercising his rights. The EU Legislative concerning banana 
regime hence lack of consideration that this legislative product will eliminate the right of 
trade of several economic actors.852 
2. The EU courts need to consider that the decision of EU Institutions not to comply with the 
DSB Decision within the period of time was causing trade retaliation where the retaliation 
is absolutely depriving the right to gain trade benefits under the WTO Agreements caused 
to FIAMM and others companies who their products are on the list of trade retaliation 
invoked by the U.S. 
3. The WTO retaliation with punitive tariff is of course impairing trade activity that FIAMM 
and other company need to deal with. The impairment of their trade activity substantively 
is infringing their right to conduct business. As a general principle, the essence of right to 
conduct business is right to obtain benefits from business activity. 
4. From the WTO Agreement standpoint, the infringement of right to conduct business is 
substantively irrelevant with its objective that “The  achievement of trade and economic 
endeavor should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living” for all individual 
of Members of the WTO. The protection of right to conduct of business will elevate the 
full raising of standard of living when individual can obtain and enjoy benefit from their 
economic activity, without any restriction or deprivation from the national policy. 
 
 
                                                          
852
See Case T-30/99, Bocchi Food Trade International GmbH v Commission of the European 
Communities, (2001) ECR – 947. See Joined cases C-364/95 and C-365/95, T. Port GmbH & Co. v 
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas (1998) ECR I-01023. See Case T-521/93,  Atlanta AG, Atlanta 
Handelsgesellschaft Harder & Co. GmbH, AfrikanischeFrucht-Compagnie GmbH, 
CobanaBananeneinkaufsgesellschaftmbH& Co. KG, EdekaFruchtkontor GmbH, International 
FruchtimportGesellschaftWeichert& Co. and Pacific Fruchtkontor GmbH v Council of the European 
Union and Commission of the European Communities, (1996), ECR II-01707 
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4.3. The absence of unconstitutional act of U.S. government in terms of the implication 
of WTO Retaliation in FSC/ETI Case 
 The implication of WTO retaliation base on FSC/ETI case has been discussed in 
chapter IV. There was no possibility for private economic actors to recourse to adjudication 
bodies in the U.S. for the damage caused by the E.U retaliation.  It has been explained that the 
Congress pursuant to Article Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution and UURA Section 
123 and 129, has authority to comply with the DSB Decision by introducing new legislative 
package in respect with the FSC/ETI policy. In this situation the USTR has conducted its 
function to negotiate the retaliation with EU in advance even before EU has intention to 
impose the punitive tariff. EU at the end delayed to impose the retaliation in order to provide 
ample time for the U.S. Congress to comply with the DSB Decision. 
 Assuming that the retaliation of FSC/ETI case will infringe the economic right of 
private economic actors in the U.S., one should notice that the infringement of economic right 
(in example property right) base on U.S. state liability principle only occurs when there is 
‘direct appropriation’ by the government.  The U.S. Supreme Court in Knox v. Lee and Parker 
v. Davis in respect to Legal Tender Acts declared that the lawful conduct of U.S. Congress 
will not consider infringement of the Fifth Amendment unless ‘direct appropriation’ occurs.853 
 The U.S. Supreme Court even posited that the taking clause has always never been 
supposed to have any bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to 
individuals.  A new tariff, an embargo, a draft, or a war may inevitably bring upon individuals 
great losses; may, indeed, render valuable property almost valueless.  They may destroy the 
worth of contracts.  However, it will not constitute as infringement of individual right 
pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.854 It thus will give the interpretation that the WTO 
retaliation will not create violation of individual right which entails obligation to 
compensation based on state liability principle because the punitive tariff do not consider 
infringement of individual right pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. 
 However, although the EU has waived the retaliatory tariff and the Congress has 
submissively changed trade policy in to conformity with the DSB decision to avoid sanction, 
there is still a gap between the rights of private economic actors to enhance their benefits 
under the WTO Agreement and the obligation of the U.S. Government to fulfill this right in 
order to maximize the trade benefit of their private economic actors. The major gap is that in 
                                                          
853See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis, (1870), U.S Supreme Court   
 
854Ibid 
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order to avoid retaliation, the Congress made effort by introducing legislative package which 
is inevitably consuming long length of time, it is thus resulting unpredictable trade situation 
among the U.S private economic actors who their products are on the list of imposition 
punitive tariff planned by the EU.855This situation is irrelevant to the objective of WTO as the 
Panel in several cases emphasized that WTO Members are necessary to provide security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system, since the lack of security and predictability 
affects mostly their individual operators.856 
 
4.4. Applying Indirect Effect of WTO Law in order to Accomplish State Liability 
Principle 
 The main friction between the WTO Law and state liability principle is the absence of 
direct-effect, however the Panel in Section 301 – 310 of US Trade Act of 1974 case recognizes 
indirect-effect of WTO. Panel stated that “it may be convenient in the GATT/WTO legal 
order to speak not of the principle of direct effect but of the principle of indirect effect.”857 
Hence, by using the concept of indirect effect, the national court can effectively grant right to 
individual for judicial protection which is instigating a safeguard for individuals who suffered 
damage from WTO retaliation.  It can be concluded that although the WTO does not create 
direct-effect to domestic law, but in order to protect individual’s substantive rights, domestic 
court should have discretion to interpret the substantive right derive from WTO Agreement. 
For example the interpretation of TRIPS Article 50,858 when the EU Court held in Hermes 
Case that the Court has jurisdiction to interpret Article 50 of TRIPs in order to meet the needs 
of the courts of the EU Member States, they are called upon to apply national rules with a 
                                                          
855 Van Hof, Carrie Anne, (2002), ‘Avoiding A Nuclear Trade War: Strategies for Retaining Taw Incentives for 
U.S. Corporation in a Post-FSC World’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 1383. 
A key problem with any legislative package is time lag.  Some lawmakers believe that replacement law could 
take more than six months. Thus, the time lag could make unpredictable trade situation for some companies 
which their product is subject to the retaliation’s list. 
 
856See case Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, 
WT/DS56/R, 25 November 1997, para. 6.29. Panel refer to the Panel Report on EEC - Import Regime for 
Bananas, DS/38/R, 11 February 1994, regarding to the ‘unpredictable trade situation’. 
 
857WTO Panel Report, Section 301 – 310 of US Trade Act of 1974, Supra Note 762, para. 7.78. 
 
858Article 50 of the TRIPs Agreement provides: 1) The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order 
prompt and effective provisional measures: (a) to prevent an infringement of any intellectual property right 
from occurring, and in particular to prevent the entry into the channels of commerce in their jurisdiction of 
goods, including imported goods immediately after customs clearance; (b) to preserve relevant evidence in 
regard to the alleged infringement. 2) The judicial authorities shall have the authority to adopt provisional 
measures in auditaaltera parte where appropriate, in particular where any delay is likely to cause irreparable 
harm to the right holder, or where there is a demonstrable risk of evidence being destroyed. 
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view to ordering provisional measures for the protection of rights arising under EU 
Legislation falling within the scope of TRIPs.859 
 The question about direct application of TRIPS Agreement also exists in Dior 
case.860Although, the ECJ decided in this case, that TRIPS is not directly effective as a matter 
of EU law, but the question of direct effect must be resolved as a matter of EU Member 
State’s law as to those areas in which the member state retains exclusive competence, because 
the matter is complex, so it does not enjoy exclusive competence vis-à-vis the member states 
in the field of IPRs. The ECJ then held in Dior Case that the Netherland Court would have 
discretion to decide whether Article 50 (6) of TRIPS Agreement, regarding provisional 
measures, would be directly in Dutch Law.861  The ECJ has in effect acknowledged that the 
question whether TRIPS is directly effective is to be determined by each WTO Member. The 
Court in Dior Case also decided regarding the interpretation of intellectual property rights as 
substantive rights of individual, since TRIPS does not provide an express definition about 
‘intellectual property rights, instead it refers to Article 1 (2) to all categories of IPRs that are 
subject of Part II Section 1 through 7.862  The ECJ has observed that TRIPS leaves the WTO 
Members the freedom to give such an interpretation.  The Court held that “ the interest which 
will be protected under TRIPS as intellectual property rights and the method of protection, 
provided always, first, that the protection is effective, particularly in preventing trade 
counterfeit goods and, second, that it does not lead to distortions of or impediments to 
International trade.”863 
                                                          
859See the Judgment of Hermèsv. FHTCase C-53/96,[1998] ECR I -3603, para. 28 -29.See also Case C-431/05 
Merck Genericos-ProdutosFarmaceuticos v. Merck  Co. Inc. and Merck Sharp DohmeLda(2007) ECR 1-
7001, in Merck Case the Court enlightens direct application by declaring that “the reference from the 
Portuguese Supreme Court was about the effect of Article 33 of the TRIPS concerning the period of 
protection of patents.  The Court held that the field is one in which the Community has not yet legislated and 
which consequently falls within the competence of the Member States, the protection of IP rights and 
measures taken for that purpose by the judicial authorities do not fall within the scope of Community law, so 
that the latter neither requires nor forbids the legal order of a Member State to accord to individual the right 
to rely directly on a rule laid down in the TRIPS or to oblige the courts to apply that rule of their own 
motion.” See also Eeckhout, Piet, (2011), EU External Relations Law (Second Edition), Oxford University 
Press – Oxford/UK, pp. 279. 
 
860See Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98 Parfums Christian Dior SA and Tuk Consultancy BV, (2000) ECR I-
11307. 
 
861Ibid, para. 49  
 
862 See TRIPS Agreement, Part II – Standard concerning the availability, scope and use of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Section 1: Copyright and Related Rights. Available at : 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm3_e.htm) 
 
863 See Joined Cases Parfums Christian Dior, Supra Note 859,para. 60. 
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 Hence, it will not be considered imprecise if then the argument refers to argument of 
Bronckers regarding the indirect effect of WTO law in order to implement state liability in the 
EU. Bronckers analyzed the responsibility for the conviction government toward international 
economic law in EU. He argued that “the WTO’s domestic law effect must give a place to the 
conviction that international economic law is to be meaningful to private parties, as well to 
the responsibility the EU and its institutions, they have to manage this international system 
sensibly in a way that takes the effects on European interests overall duly into account.” 
Bronckers emphasized that direct effect can be more flexible instrument where international 
economic agreements are concerned.  One important principle developed by the Court is that 
treaty consistent interpretation, whenever an EU measure permits several interpretations, the 
court feel obliged to choose the interpretation that is consistent with relevant agreement, the 
EU Court therefore develop technic to pay respect to international rules and rulings even 
without granting them direct-effect.864 
 The concept of indirect-effect of WTO Law or DSB decision is also recognized in the 
U.S. case law. In the case of Allegheny Ludlum Corp vs. the U.S865, a case regarding 
countervailing duties, the court referred to Charming Betsy doctrine866 when considering the 
effects of a DSB decision.  In this case, the court had to judge on a methodology followed by 
Department of Commerce to calculate a countervailing duty to be applied against a subsidized 
company. In its judgment, the Court thus refer the Charming Betsy doctrine that further 
supports the statutory principle which threats sales of stock and sales of assets identically for 
the assessment of countervailing duties.  In this case, disparate treatment under the same-
person methodology would contravene the international obligations of the U.S., the court 
therefore refers to Appellate Body Report in the U.S. – Countervailing Measures Concerning 
Certain Products from the EU.867 Consequently, where neither the statute nor the legislative 
history supports the same-person methodology under domestic countervailing duty law, the 
court finds additional support for construing the Act 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(F) as consistent 
                                                          
864Bronckers,Supra Note 749,pp. 244 - 255.   
 
865Allegheny Ludlum Corp v. U.S.,367 F. 3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004), the United States Court of Appeals, Federal 
Circuit, 13 May 2004. 
 
866See caseMurray vs. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, US 64, 2L.Ed. 208 (1804). See also Bradley, 
Supra Note 730, pp. 491. Charming Betsy Doctrine remain the doctrine that is used by the national court, in 
case a possible conflict between a domestic provision and an international obligation, the national court shall 
look first of all at the content of the national rule and see if there is scope for interpretative. In fact, in such a 
case, an unambiguous statute will definitely prevail over a conflicting international obligation. 
 
867See United States — Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the European 
Communities,WT/DS212/AB/R, 9 December 2002. 
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with the determination of the WTO Appellate report. Although, the Court emphasize that the 
WTO Decision is only a guidelines, it does not bind this court in construing domestic 
countervailing duty law, but the court considered gave an indirect-effect to WTO decision in 
its judgment. 
 The conclusion of Chapter VI is the WTO law principally recognizes the obligation of 
government to protect the economic rights of private economic actors (or individual in 
general) in order to pursue economic interest across frontier.  When government imposes 
trade policy which is violating WTO law, then it is consequently infringing rights of 
individual to obtain benefit under the WTO Rules, it thus constitutes a violation of economic 
rights of individual. It then will entail the obligation to rectify and to compensate according to 
state liability principle, where the function of state liability principle is that the government is 
obliged to compensate and rectify the right which is infringed caused by unconstitutional act 
imposed by both legislative and administrative institutions. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
A. Conclusion 
 The main purpose of Article 22 (2) DSU is to promote compliance by the non-
compliance party to the WTO dispute.  The purpose is not to punish nor coerce the country at 
fault, but rather to enable the injured party to recover by re-levelling its trade.  However, 
under the DSU rules, a WTO member is using a suspension of concession or other obligation 
(retaliation) lacks any duty to mitigate the economic or social consequences to private 
economic actors.  Many of these actors will be innocent of any responsibility for the WTO 
violation that underlies the case. Nothing in the parlance of DSU refers to the consequence of 
implementation of Article 22 (2) to private economic actors or individual in general. It is 
because there is no interrelationship between private economic actors and WTO. The WTO 
relies on the responsibility of WTO Member to deal with the impact of trade retaliation to 
private economic actors.  One should notice that the implementation of Article 22 (2) of DSU 
is temporary measure to induce the compliance of scofflaw party to the dispute.  Once the 
injury party implies trade retaliation, the victims of retaliation are expected to persuade their 
government to comply with the DSB decision.  However, it is somehow obliged the 
willingness of government from both disputant parties to negotiate the compliance with DSB 
decision, since the WTO trade retaliation is an intractable issue that needs to be tackled 
politically.  In fact the negotiation consumes length of period of time which is causing injury 
party to impose high tariff as a form of retaliation.  The imposition of high tariff is 
unavoidable causing the damage to domestic private economic actors. 
 Banana and FSC/ETI cases were example of WTO cases from where private economic 
actors bore the cost of trade damage caused to them due to the retaliation.  It is clear that 
WTO retaliation likely to influence private economic actors. They are powerless to bear trade 
damage caused by the WTO retaliation in consequence of non-compliance of their 
governments to WTO rules. The damage is not only causing the downfall of benefit of trade 
they are expecting to gain under the WTO rules but also emerging the reluctance of private 
economic actors to rely on WTO Agreements. 
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 Case study over Banana dispute is an illustration on how the EU Courts deal with the 
impact of non-compliance of the EU Institutions with DSB Decision.  The EU Courts so far 
was dealing with two kinds of cases in regard with Banana dispute.  First is the case 
concerning the direct impact of violation of WTO Agreement over Banana import. Banana 
suppliers and producers filed sue against EU Institutions due to the damage caused by the 
violation of WTO Agreements. Second is the case about the impact of WTO retaliation.  Due 
to the non-compliance of EU to the DSB Decision in Banana case, DSB authorized the U.S. to 
impose retaliatory tariff to over 100 items products imported from EU.  Seven companies 
went to GC and ECJ to file suit against EU Institutions in order to seek compensation based 
on Article 340 TFEU for the damage caused by the retaliation.  However, the lack of direct 
effect of WTO Law becomes a major point for the EU Courts to dismiss the claim of 
compensation.  FIAMM and Fedon case is one of the examples by which EU Courts referred 
to non-direct-effect of WTO Law in order to dismiss the claim.  Because of the absence of 
direct-effect, the applicants could not rely on the violation of WTO Law as an unlawful 
conduct which is done by the EU Institutions.  Hence, the AG Maduro was more focusing on 
the damage caused by the retaliation.  Trade damage that is borne by the private economic 
actors substantially infringes their rights to gain trade benefits under the WTO which is 
directly infringing their rights to trade, rights to pursue economic interest or in general 
economic rights. On the other hand, economic rights is granted and protected by national 
constitutions where the government is obliged to preserve and to protect this right even from 
the mischievous of national policy. Hence, national judicial bodies need to construct a feasible 
system to rebalance violated right by enforcing state liability principle. As already discuss in 
the previous chapter that the characteristic of state liability is to protect individual rights that 
is infringed by the government while the judicial body has discretion power to perform the 
function of state liability to rectify and to compensate the damage accruing to the victim.  In 
FIAMM and Fedon case, the state liability is not accomplished, although the main issue is the 
damage which is violating the right of FIAMM and Fedon companies under Article 16 and 17 
of EU Charter. The Court did not evaluate the impact of trade damage accruing to them and 
disregard the potential of violation of their rights.  It thus becomes unfortunate condition for 
those private economic actors. The EU Court is supposed to imply the principle of indirect-
effect that has been mandated by Panel Decision in Section 301 – 310 of US Trade Act of 
1974 case.  By implying indirect-effect of DSB Decision, the EU Court could be more 
concern on the damage accruing to the victims.  Moreover, AG Maduro has explicitly referred 
to the claim for compensation in the context of the absence of unlawful conduct where the 
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assessment of the claim merely based on the damage and the impact of the damage that is 
considered as violation of inviolable rights underline in the EU Charter. Once again, in the 
ECJ proceeding, this claim is dismissed due to the absence of direct-effect of the WTO Law 
in EU legal system. 
 The U.S. also does not recognize direct-effect of WTO Law and DSB Decision as it 
underlines in Article 102 URAA. Private economic actors or individual are barred from stand 
before the U.S. Court to file suit against the U.S. Government to comply with the DSB 
Decision.  However, when the U.S. is violating the WTO Agreements, the URAA is explicitly 
regulates the obligation of the U.S. legislative bodies to comply with the WTO Law and DSB 
Decision. In case of trade retaliation, the private economic actors are barred from file suit 
against the U.S. Federal Government to obtain compensation caused by the retaliation. The 
U.S Court can not imply state liability principle in order to award compensation to the 
victims, because of non-direct effect of DSB Decision.  However, the mandate of Article 123 
and 129 is clearly explicating that the U.S. legislative bodies is obliged to reform the law that 
is inconsistent with the WTO Law.  Hence, when the EU initiated to impose retaliatory tariff 
due to the non-compliance of the U.S. with DSB Decision in FSC/ETI Case, several 
American private economic actors filed petition to the U.S. Congress and Senate in order to 
persuade them to comply with the DSB Decision.  The U.S. Legislative bodies perform their 
function according to political accountability principle. This principle is a part of democracy 
principle when political leaders are obliged to answer their constituents over a particular 
issue.  All individual has right to file petition in the scheme of political accountability 
principle. However, this principle is not an alternative for state liability principle, due to the 
different function of these two principles.  Significantly, political accountability and state 
liability are implied in two different issues.  First is the issue of compliance with the WTO 
Law or DSB Decision.  According to political accountability principle, private economic 
actors have rights to persuade their government to comply with WTO Law and DSB Decision 
by filing a petition to legislative bodies. Second is the issue of compensation. State liability 
principle is eligible to apply only when damage occurs. Private economic actors have rights to 
file suit against their government before the domestic courts in order to rehabilitate the 
damage.  Nevertheless, in FSC/ETI case, the U.S private economic actors could not enjoy the 
rights to obtain compensation due to non-direct effect of WTO Law and DSB Decision 
according to Article 102 of URAA 
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 In conclusion, private economic actors both in EU and the U.S are barred from 
obtaining compensation for trade damage caused by WTO retaliation. The EU Courts failed to 
perform the function of state liability principle due to the lack of direct effect of WTO Law 
and DSB Decision in the EU Legal System. Meanwhile, the U.S. Court is barred to perform 
the function of state liability principle due to non-direct-effect of WTO Law and DSB 
Decision in the U.S. Legal system.  
 Direct-effect of WTO Law and DSB Decision is a very crucial point in this research. 
The willingness of WTO Members to grant direct-effect of WTO Law and DSB Decision in 
their legal system depends on the political point of view. The EU Courts avoid granting direct 
effect because according to them direct-effect will deprive the authority of EU Institutions to 
perform their function to negotiate international trade with other WTO counterparts. The 
absence of reciprocity principle among WTO Members becomes predominant reason for the 
EU Courts not to give direct-effect. Not all WTO Members are granting direct-effect of WTO 
Law and DSB Decision, it then leads to imbalance of trade amongst the WTO Members. 
Meanwhile, the U.S. explicitly regulates non-direct-effect of WTO Law and DSB Decision 
since the U.S recognizes state sovereign immunity doctrine. If direct-effect of WTO Law is 
granted then it will be considered as sovereignty diminution. The power of the U.S. legislative 
bodies will be diminished by granting individual direct-effect of WTO Law and DSB 
Decision.  To this end, the research provides a solution for this conundrum by referring to 
indirect-effect principle.  Indirect-effect principle is a solution where the national judicial 
body can perform the function of state liability by merely focusing on trade damage caused by 
WTO retaliation. Indirect-effect doctrine will also emanate the effectiveness of WTO Law. 
Domestic court should indirectly refer the real effect of WTO Law and DSB Decision on 
individual’s life. The impact of implementation Article 22 (2) of DSU needs to be evaluated 
by the domestic court in order to hinder the violation of individual’s right.   
 The WTO Agreements basically regulate trade rule and mechanism for private 
economic actor to conduct economic activity across frontiers. Moreover, the WTO 
Agreements also provide substantial and procedural rights for those economic actors in order 
to gain benefits under the WTO agreements.  These rights on the other hand are obligation of 
government. The government is obliged to provide market condition conducive to private 
economic actors in order to obtain trade benefits under the WTO Agreements. 
 The trade rules and mechanism is politically negotiated by the government in every 
WTO negotiation rounds which is pertinent to the function of government in the WTO as 
policy maker. The intention of WTO Members to join the WTO is inherently derive from the 
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interest of national economic influenced by individual economic interest. When individual 
pursuit their economic interest to conduct economic activity, their activity is protected by 
constitution where every individual constitutionally enjoys economic rights such right to 
property, right to work, right to conduct business or right to trade. When the damage occurs 
due to the violation of WTO Agreements, state is obliged to rehabilitate the damage in order 
to provide a market conducive for all individual under the WTO rules. 
 Bearing in mind that the FIAMM case is an example such a failure to perform the 
function of state liability principle due to the absence of direct effect of DSB decision will 
create the condition which the private economic actors are hesitance to rely on the WTO 
Agreement to gain trade benefits across frontiers, since the absence of direct effect is an 
impediment of judicial protection for individuals in a way to give an opportunity to rebalance 
their rights that is diminished by the incompliance of DSB Decision. To avoid the failure to 
perform the function of state liability, judicial bodies need to consider merely on the 
infringement of individual rights. 
 
B. Recommendations 
 To conclude this research I recommend four points of arguments 
1. The WTO Adjudication bodies need to consider the social and economic impact on the 
implementation of Article 22 (2) DSU to the private economic actors as main player of 
WTO. DSB needs to recall the raison d’etre of establishment of WTO as international 
trade organization which is involving the economic interest not only country as a whole but 
also individual who is conducting their economic activities across frontiers.  
 Prior to authorize the injured party of WTO dispute to impose trade retaliation, the 
DSB needs to consult the impact of trade retaliation to the economic actors within the 
jurisdiction in both disputant party.  DSB is necessary to consider the balance between the 
purpose of Article 22 (2) DSU and the value of international trade underlines in the 
objective of WTO Agreements. It has been analyzed in chapter VI that the objective of 
WTO Agreements is giving wide possibility for every individual to raise standard of living 
from trade activity across frontiers and full employment, because when a private economic 
actor bears a burden from the WTO retaliation, it is impeding to achieve substantive value 
of objective of WTO Agreements.  
2. DSB also recommended urging the disputant party to imply Article 22 (1) DSU 
(compensation) instead of Article 22 (2) of DSU (suspension of concession) by giving 
more ample time for the disputant parties to negotiate the level of compensation.  
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3. The judicial bodies in the domestic level are necessary to be more concern on the impact of 
WTO retaliation from the perspective of infringement of individual economic rights. It has 
been explained in the previous chapter that the judicial body has discretion to perform the 
function of state liability principle in order to rebalance the rights that is infringed by the 
national policy. In addition, by using the concept of indirect effect, the national court can 
effectively grant right to individual for judicial protection which is instigating a safeguard 
for individuals who suffered damage from WTO retaliation. 
4. Although the government has wide authority to perform its function as policy maker in 
international trade, it will be more reliable if the government also considers the value 
balance between the political interest in trade national policy and the obligation to provide 
market condition conducive for all private economic actors to obtain benefit under the 
WTO Agreement. The government needs  to reconsider the main purpose of accessing the 
WTO Agreement is to support every individual to pursue their economic interest across 
frontiers. 
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